House of Commons - Transport - Written Evidence

Select Committee on Transport Written Evidence

Memorandum from the British Transport Police (BTP) (TS 13)

TRAVEL SECTOR: UK MAINLINE AND LONDON UNDERGROUND RAILWAYS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The national UK railways and London Underground fall under the authority of the Department for Transport (DfT) for security regulation via TRANSEC. As the Regulator, TRANSEC provides no immediate response capability and is not visible to the travelling public. Policing services are provided by British Transport Police (BTP). These include a wide-range of "specialist" policing functions unique to the requirements of the railway in addition to more generalist policing activities consistent with those provided by Home Department forces. Terrorism-related threats (and a range of broader safety implications associated with the fear of terrorism) are managed by BTP via a risk management based approach. In addition to intelligence-led activities, railway-specific procedures are in place to address the inherent vulnerability associated with open, mass-transit, rail transport.

Particularly during periods of heightened perceived risk (following well-publicised acts of terror, for example) the potential for network-wide disruption is high. In this busy and open environment lost property, for example, is—despite the best efforts of railway staff—an inevitable and regular occurrence. In the early 1990s, BTP developed a railway-specific process for dealing with this contingency—the HOT protocol. It was adopted by the railway industry and endorsed subsequently by DfT. HOT, and the measures put in place jointly by the rail industry, the BTP and, latterly, TRANSEC, has proved significant in the effective management of unattended items and thus the reassurance afforded to the travelling public and railway staff alike. (It is for example, difficult to support a stance of "business as usual" if every item of lost property attracts a bomb-disposal response and prolonged cessation of services).

Since the early 1990s, (the start of the more recent mainland activities from Irish related terrorism), BTP has monitored, evaluated and improved the way terrorism-related risks are managed. Some measures, the unique and highly successful process for assessing and managing anonymous threats, for example, have evolved within a well-defined risk environment. Others, such as BTP's capacity and capability to respond to unconventional risks, such as those posed by chemical, biological or radiological hazards, rely more heavily on value judgements and lessons learned by others.

Underpinning this highly-focused and proven response is the specialist training given to BTP officers. BTP is unique in providing role specific, consistent counter-terrorism training to officers whether they are based in England, Scotland or Wales. BTP is not complacent and seeks actively to further relationships with both the railway industry and its Regulator (TRANSEC) and improve its own response to the threat from terrorism.

Support in the development of this risk-management-led approach has come from the DfT, from the Secretary of State personally and from the new and independent British Transport Police Authority.

REFERENCES:

A. BTP submission to the Transport Committee dated 9 December 2005.

B. Appleton, B.(1992) Appleton Inquiry Report, London: HMSO.

C. BTP (1994) Unattended Items aide memoire (revised 2005).

1. INTRODUCTION

This report supersedes the memorandum submitted to the Transport Committee on 9 December 2005 (Reference A).

2. BACKGROUND

The railway in Britain is a national network. The DfT (via TRANSEC) regulates its security on a national basis and it is policed nationally, by British Transport Police (BTP). In terms of managing risk associated with terrorism, this consistency across the regions has proved pivotal in developing a measured and effective response. The approach, which is founded on the principles of risk management, was proven during the Irish republican campaign of the 1990s and addresses both the fear generated by high-profile acts of terrorism (whether in the UK or abroad) and the reality of managing risk in an open, mass-transit environment. As the Appleton Inquiry Report (Reference B) identified, and common sense dictates, risk in this environment cannot be managed piecemeal. Direct comparison with the policing of road transport or aviation—both of which are highly compartmentalised and rely heavily on a local focus—is not appropriate.

3. RELATIONSHIP WITH TRANSEC

BTP has developed and maintains a close working relationship with TRANSEC. It has, for example, provided presenters for TRANSEC courses and draft scripts and images for TRANSEC counter-terrorism training films and train the trainers packages. It has also provided guidance suggesting how TRANSEC's aviation experience can best be applied in the railway environment. Every effort is also taken to ensure that the counter-terrorist functions of BTP's newly established Special Branch do not cut across TRANSEC's role in briefing the industry. Particularly in the wake of the 7 July attacks, BTP has been particularly keen to ensure its unique perspective on railway security is considered at the earliest stages of various TRANSEC initiatives (eg, passenger screening, vehicular access to stations, CBR monitoring, etc). However, it is considered vital that the close working relationships established between BTP, train and station operators and the wider railway community are not confused (or otherwise disrupted) by TRANSEC's role as Regulator.

4. RAILWAY-SPECIFIC COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICING

Simply superimposing generalist policing procedures, with the attendant possibility of local Force variations, has significant and proven limitations in the railway environment. This consideration is perhaps best illustrated by examining the specialist measures devised and developed by the BTP to address (a) the management of unattended and suspicious items; (b) chemical biological and radiological (CBR) preparedness and reassurance measures; (c) the categorisation of anonymous threats; and (d) counter-terrorism training specific to the challenges of the railway environment. Each of these areas was tested to the full following the events of July 2005—including numerous hoaxes and false incidents. These challenges are described in greater detail in the following sections (and, within a broader context, at Appendix 1 to this paper).

5. THE MANAGEMENT OF UNATTENDED ITEMS AND ITEMS DISCOVERED SUSPICIOUS BY THE FINDER

With some five million individual journeys made on railways in Britain each day, lost property is inevitable. The number of items that cause alarm to the finder appears proportional to the finders' perception of risk (ie, lost property numbers are related to passenger numbers; reports of suspicious items fluctuate, seemingly in relation to perceptions of risk—possibly informed by media reporting). Analysis conducted by BTP, contrasting terrorist-attack scenarios and scenarios related to lost property, led to the development of a railway specific aide memoire for BTP officers (Reference C). In 1996, this was extended to the rail industry as a whole and became known as the "HOT" Protocol.

6. In 1996 the concept was adopted by the TRANSEC and promulgated through the embryonic National Railway Security Programme. (BTP is aware that the RMT union has questioned the application of HOT by London Underground, but is unaware of any concerns raised directly by the RMT.) To assist a more detailed understanding of the HOT protocol, an abstract of the 2005 "HOT review" is at Appendix 2 to this paper.

7. BTP is the only member of the police service to have been subject to independent evaluation of its ability to manage unattended/suspicious items. In the early 1990s, the Appleton Inquiry Report (Reference B) found that significant disruption to the rail network was caused in 20% of incidents involving items reported as suspicious by the finder. Today, the figure is less than 1%. While a small number of forces and agencies in the UK (and other parts of the world) have adopted this procedure, no such formal arrangement has been developed elsewhere. To better understand the very significant and positive impact of the application of the "HOT" procedure on railways, there were between 1991 and 2001 some 2.5 million items reported as unattended. Of these, all but 36,000 were successfully treated as "lost property" by staff applying "HOT". Of the remainder, some 24,000 were reported to police but discounted without any disruption to passengers or train services. The remainder (approximately 12,000 items) were dealt with by specially trained BTP officers—only 45 required the attendance bomb disposal units from the army or MPS).

8. This approach (ie codifying an initial assessment process and providing specific training) has proven particularly successful because it addresses the arousal/reassurance paradox in a way that poster campaigns and other generalist approaches do not. The interaction of one authoritative body (BTP) across the entire railway industry lends credibility to this advice and cannot be mirrored by local initiatives. Of particular relevance is the period after the July attacks. Despite an increase in the number of items declared suspicious by railway staff and members of the public, (up from an average of less than 50 each month to approximately 1,000 per month) BTP confirmation procedures led to only two station closures in the whole of Britain. Both of these incidents were outside London (Bradford and York). It is useful to contrast this level of performance with Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) deployment occasioned by the generalist response to unattended items utilised beyond the railways. (Details of the increase in EOD deployments during July 2005 are available from the Joint Service EOD Centre (JSEODOC) and could doubtless be made available to the Inquiry if a direct approach were to be made.)

9. The benefit of this system is not associated only with reduced levels of business interruption (estimated in monetary terms as around £10,000 per minute on London Underground), but also in terms of reducing the public's exposure to non-terrorism related hazards. Fewer evacuations, for example, reduce the likelihood of injury as people leave stations—especially when large numbers are displaced in an perceived emergency. A risk-managed approach also ensures evacuations, when necessary, are less likely to be treated with complacency (eg the it's just another security alert syndrome).

10. To provide increased reassurance (primarily in relation to the London rail network), a small number of specially trained BTP officers are equipped with sophisticated x-ray and other examination and detection equipment. These officers of the Special Response Unit (SRU) have been able to clear packages and other items in an average time of approximately 12 minutes. (It is a measure of their professionalism that on no occasions have any of the items cleared by the SRU required bomb disposal support). This ensures normality is disturbed as little as possible and that valuable and limited bomb disposal assets are not deployed unnecessarily.

11. CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM

Following the Aum Shinrikyo nerve gas attack in Tokyo, in 1995, the BTP pioneered the use of Detection, Identification and Monitoring (DIM) equipment. During the next ten years, this capability was further developed to meet the unique needs of the railway environment. In particular a significant expertise has been developed in discounting ambiguous scenarios including unattributable odours and unidentified loose materials (so called white powder incidents).

12. This railway specific capability is reflected throughout BTP Counter Terrorism (CT) training and in agreed railway procedures. In addition to a response capability tailored to the environment, vulnerable locations are subject to regular DIM profiling activity utilising sophisticated electronic monitoring equipment. The capability has reduced significantly the number of station closures and the consequent disruption to services and passengers that this causes. The rapid and proportionate nature of the BTP response to such reports has also served to reassure rail staff at times of great uncertainty. BTP has also worked closely with government departments other than TRANSEC and equipment manufacturers in the development of a networked detection system.

13. THE ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT IF ANONYMOUS THREATS

Since the 1950s the railways in Britain have been subject to spasmodic threats, delivered most frequently by telephone. Many of these threats were hoaxes, but a small proportion related to impending attacks. In the 1970s and particularly in the 1990s, this tactic was refined by the Provisional IRA (PIRA) and subsequently the Real IRA (RIRA). In response to massive disruption precipitated by anonymous threats (following the murder by bombing at Victoria Station, in February 1991) BTP pioneered a bespoke system of analysis and categorisation of all threats received by any agency where the railways or a railway location was the perceived or actual target.

14. The process involves not only the recording and analysis of threats (and the outcome of every one received and categorised), but the establishing of prior agreement of the railway industry to act in a certain way to advice provided by BTP. (This agreement is also tied-in to security levels and policing action at the locations threatened.) The success of this approach is unrivalled by any organisation elsewhere in the world. Since 1992, almost 8,000 threat messages have been categorised by BTP. Of these, only 53 series of threats have led to large-scale evacuation and disruption upon BTP advice at less than 100 locations. An explosion or the discovery of a viable explosive device is linked to approximately 50% of this small proportion threats assessed to be credible. In contrast, where BTP advice had been to continue services at the locations threatened, no explosions occurred and no viable devices were found. Notable successes of these BTP/railway specific procedures include:

Oxford Circus station in 1994.

South Quay Station in 1996.

Acton/Ealing 2001.

15. In assessing the success of this highly-focused approach, it is also useful to note the numerous incidents where anonymous threats have not led to evacuation and have not disrupted rail services. The procedures developed by BTP are now mirrored, in part, by the database administered by the Anti-Terrorist Branch, but implemented under local arrangements by local forces. (While anonymous threats were not a feature of 7/7 or 21/7, both series of incidents triggered increased levels of hoax calls.)

16. COUNTER-TERRORISM TRAINING SPECIFIC TO THE RAILWAY ENVIRONMENT

The railway is a unique policing environment. There are no compulsory baggage checks, identity checks and very often, no checking of travel documentation. The environment—particularly beyond the public areas—is complex. Within this environment ambiguous incidents can escalate rapidly and acts of terrorism can merge into the background. Railway-specific training is therefore essential if over reaction is to be avoided and real terrorism (whether in the attack or reconnaissance phases) is to be identified.

17. This specialist training has been significant in dealing rapidly and effectively with ambiguous scenarios as well as the response to live incidents. Particularly in terms of multi-agency deployments, BTP officers have been able to use these unique skills to inform the decision making process in scenarios where generalist counter-terrorist techniques would have proved counter-productive—and may actually have increased risk.

18. DFT SUPPORT

Following exercise Osiris II a significant counter-terrorism live multi-agency exercise carried out in London in 2003 the DfT accepted recommendations made in two key reports for the enhancement of the BTP physical and technological response capacity.

19. This resulted in a one off 12 month funding to triple the size of the Special Response Unit (from 8 to 24 officers), the provision of three specially fitted out response vehicles and the purchase of new and advanced state of the art detection, identification and monitoring equipment. Nearly £2.5m was invested in BTP for this purpose which has significantly added to the capacity and capability to protect the railways in London in particular and minimise unnecessary disruption due to false, but well-intended reports of unattended items. Provision was also made for protective gas tight suits and breathing apparatus which will permit officers to go into a contaminated area for a limited period to carry out more detailed analysis and assessment of any source of concern.

20. In 2004, a further £900k was forthcoming from the DfT to purchase over 200 new and improved more general lower level chemo-bio protective suits for trained BTP officers to man protected cordon areas following any report of a suspect dispersal of such elements on the railway (or elsewhere in London under combined force joint agreements).

21. Prior July 2005, both BTP and TRANSEC were working in concert with the Association of Chief Police Officer (Terrorism and Allied Matters) Business Area, and the Home Office Scientific and Development Branch, in trying to identify new and advanced screening technology which could be effectively utilised at selected stations.

22. POLICE AUTHORITY SUPPORT

The emergence of a truly independent Police Authority for BTP in 2004 saw the birth of a refreshing and new acceptance of responsibility for the provision of an effective and efficient police service. The Police Authority is submitting its own report to the Transport Committee (relating to increased numbers of Explosives Search Dogs, Police and Community Support Officers and constables) under separate cover.

23. FIREARMS

A measure not addressed in detail in this paper is the question of armed police support at railway stations. At times of high alert, local Home Office Forces are often stretched to capacity. BTP is the only non-Home Office Force in the UK not to maintain an armed capability (both Ministry of Defence Police and Civil Nuclear Constabulary are authorised to carry firearms). The question of whether armed officers positioned within target-rich environments such as railway termini actually a) reassures the public or b) effectively deters suicide bombers is open to differing opinions. However, the general issue is being considered actively by BTP.

24. RADIO COMMUNICATIONS

BTP maintains an analogue radio system that works throughout all deep tube stations (despite misleading media comment post 7 July). Although not compatible with Airwave (BTP's national system) it is an extremely resilient means of communication, which LUL has pledged to support until BTP is able to migrate to Airwave for underground communications. The Home Office-led project to secure an Airwave solution on the London Underground cannot complete its work before London Underground installs its own digital radio system. (This is because Airwave will be sharing much of London Underground's own infrastructure). Therefore, full implementation may not be realised until 2008. In the meantime, an interim Airwave solution will be available from March 2006. BTP is also closely involved in the work of the ESRLG (Emergency Services Radio Liaison Group). One area of its focus is the provision of a number of bronze inter-operability radios that would be held by individual organisations.

25. It has been reported recently that the inability of the MPS to use its radios on London Underground is a result of their being a separate police force for the railways. This is inaccurate. If the MPS were to police the Underground, the position regarding radios would be exactly the same. BTP carry two radios to have access to a separate channel and this option is open to the MPS. Radio communication between the two forces will be further enhanced when the MPS takes advantage of Airwave, although they have chosen to be last on line.

26. CONCLUSION

From Irish republican attacks in the early 1990s (and before) to the present day, BTP-led innovations have contributed towards improving the safety of the travelling public across Britain's railways. Developments in countering-terrorism have each been founded within a sound context of risk management. The approach has also been significant in terms of ensuring that business interruption (for example, following anonymous threats or the discovery of unattended items) is not caused unnecessarily. In addition to the obvious public safety considerations, managing risk in this way is vital both in terms of ensuring that (a) the railways remain viable and (b) public confidence is not continually tested because of premature evacuations.

27. The current position—proved in such challenging circumstances in July of 2005—has been achieved via a supportive governmental department and a professional outward looking Police Authority, via very dedicated and professional police officers and staff. Despite notable successes, there much is still to be done and no room for complacency from any quarter.

APPENDICES:

1. Policing the new normality.

APPENDIX 1

POLICING THE NEW NORMALITY

RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE RAILWAY POLICING ENVIRONMENT

The railways, as a function of their 19th century design criterion, provide a means of public transport used by millions of people each day, with no check on their identity, no screening of their belongings and very few physical barriers to restrict their movements into or about the network. The bombings in London on 7 July 2005 exploited fully this "openness". The attack was unprecedented in the history of railway-related terrorism in Britain; not just in terms of the numbers of people killed and injured, but because of the modus operandi adopted by the bombers. In other respects the individual incidents highlighted, once again, the vulnerability inherent within the architecture of the open mass transit environment.

Perception of this vulnerability prior to 7 July is often considered more in terms of mass disruption, than mass murder—as witnessed by Irish republican activity from the 1800s onwards. Analysis of previous incidents in Britain, and taking into account railway-related events from further afield (for example, Tokyo, Paris, Moscow and Madrid, to name but four cities attacked in recent years) only serve to reinforce the railway's regular status as a target of choice. The necessity to respond effectively to multiple, simultaneous attacks (including the numerous false and hoax incidents that invariably follow intense coverage by the media) has been integral to the counter-terrorist strategy of British Transport Police for many years.

It was, and still is, possible to deter opportunist terrorists, ie, those who intend to "live to fight another day"—and who are not too selective about their exact target. However, the reality of facing bombers whose ambition it is to die during an attack poses fundamentally different challenges to otherwise tried and tested counter-measures. Within the context of so-called suicide attacks, for example, risk management measures may be less effective than we would wish if bomb-carriers are not interdicted before they reach a crowded place (whether the crowded place within which they are challenged is their intended target or not). This assumption, underwritten by hard-won experience in other regions of the world, raises significant doubts about how best to identify and stop "suspicious" people in the absence of specific intelligence. This short paper sets out some of the considerations and challenges faced by British Transport Police in the wake of the July 2005 bombings. (The paper does not address the policing of London buses, which is managed under local, not national arrangements.)

The July attacks were aimed exclusively at the country's transport infrastructure, or more specifically, the users of that infrastructure. Terrorism against the railways, as indicated in the preceding text, is not a new phenomenon. Irish republican terrorists (IRT), for example, have been bombing the railways for over one hundred years. Over time, this particular threat was ameliorated through a combination of railway-specific counter measures, including high-profile police patrols, staff checking regimes, the use of CCTV and the hardening of the environment. A combination of measures leading to a notable displacement of their interest. The graph below (Chart 1) indicates the steady move away from station bombings—as well as representing a more general displacement from the highly prized, but better-protected targets of central London. Throughout the 1990s the railway remained a target of opportunity, but its stations and trains featured less often as the targets of choice.

Chart 1: Railway incidents 1991-2005 (June)

In contrast to these earlier experiences, the July attacks of 2005 were launched by a breed of bomber who:

— Deliberately selected target-rich environments (ie, crowded tube trains, in tunnels, between stations) with the intention of committing mass murder.

— Was not deterred by any of the target hardening measures deployed against opportunistic attack.

— Appeared unconcerned by the prospect of capture or compromise.

— Intended to die during the attack.

— Did not issue threats.

Map 1. Stations affected directly by explosions on three trains on 7 July. (King's Cross/Russell Square; Paddington Edgeware Road; Liverpool Street/Aldgate.)

Much has been written about events on the 7th and, in particular, the scenes of devastation encountered by the emergency responders, all of whom reacted promptly and with great courage. From the perspective of British Transport Police, the scale of the incident began to become apparent soon after 09:00. Officers based at Aldgate, for example, not only heard, but also felt the explosion through the floor of the police office—and early sitreps were received from officers at King's Cross and attending Edgeware Road. While any initial concerns about chemical attack were discounted quickly and pragmatically, the subsequent explosion on a number 30 bus (diverted towards Russell Square because of the King's Cross incident,) highlighted the possibility that further attacks were imminent.

In addition to rescue and recovery work undertaken at the bomb scenes and the high-visibility policing requirement at stations across Britain, the investigation (led by the Anti-Terrorist Branch at New Scotland Yard) placed further demands on resources. Not least of which was the urgent requirement to identify, collect and view CCTV images. On the London Underground network alone, over 17,000 tapes were recovered. BTP was also involved intimately in setting-up and managing the temporary mortuary (described by one Coroner as the gold standard for mortuary provision of this type). It is worth noting that during this period other commitments—aside from day-to-day policing—included support to the G8 summit in Scotland and the Live8 concert in London. In response to this exceptional event, BTP was able to re-deploy officers from across England, Scotland and Wales. (One of the many advantages of being a national force is the resilience afforded by having identically trained and experienced officers available to support exactly this contingency.)

Beyond these more general-policing concerns, it was clear in the days following the explosions that the public's perceptions of this highly-publicised risk followed traditional lines, but now incorporated a number of new anxieties—many of which were heightened further by events on 21 and 22 July. For example, although al-Qaeda and its affiliates are not known for issuing attack-specific threats, an increase in the number of anonymous bomb threats was recorded. In June, for example, BTP categorised less than 20 threats (this figure represents a relatively quiet month). In July, that figure rose to over 70 (see Chart 2). There is no evidence whatever that any of these threats were associated with previous attacks and the existing BTP categorisation protocol led to no station evacuations or closures.

Chart 2. Anonymous threats June and July 2005

Similarly, the number of unattended items reported as suspicious increased from less than 50 In June, to over 1,000 in July. In central London alone, over 300 incidents were dealt with by BTP's Special Response Unit (SRU) (see Chart 3). The SRU carries a wide-range of detection, identification and monitoring equipment and, after assessment, no "unattended" item required the attendance of bomb-disposal assets nor led to the prolonged closure of a station. (The ability to deploy to multiple-scenes simultaneously meant that the average partial closure time in London was less than 20 minutes.) This railway-specific response also meant that hard-pressed EOD assets were not diverted from more ambiguous tasks elsewhere.

Chart 3. Unattended items dealt with in central London, July 2005

Another issue to assume particular prominence in the wake of these attacks was the numerous sightings and reports of "suspicious" people. (This was particularly noticeable after the Metropolitan Police Service's (MPS's) operation at Stockwell, on 22 July.) The response to suspicious people is still being developed fully, but events in July led to a number of changes to the briefings given to patrolling officers and Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs). These front-line officers involved in BTP high-visibility deployments used Section 44 of the Terrorism Act (2000) extensively in the days and weeks after the bombings. The tactic has been accepted without complaint by the majority of those stopped and continues to provide an important component of reassurance policing. The "Section 44" searches are also perceived as invaluable in terms of efforts to disrupt hostile reconnaissance. Allied to this human-focused intervention, the systematic deployment of explosives' search dogs (ESDs) has proved particularly successful. The use of dogs in a reassurance role is a measure that, in comparison to some other developments (the overt use of firearms officers, for example) has been universally well received by the travelling public.

The searching of passengers and their belongings prior to entering stations or boarding trains is another issue to be given higher precedence after 7 July. The practicalities associated with this procedure have been reviewed periodically by BTP since the PIRA campaign of the 1990s and were subject to further review following the al-Qaeda-inspired attacks in Spain (March 2004). In an absolute sense, there is clearly a role for screening to protect any target-rich environment. However, in relation to open mass transit networks, it should be noted that any activities that cause a delay to passenger throughput run the risk of simply moving the intended target (ie, people) from one side of a line, to the other. In relation to the threat posed by "suicide bombers", this is clearly an undesirable outcome. If it is accepted that these terrorists need to inflict large numbers of casualties, rather than simply damage infrastructure, then target hardening, as a concept, acquires a new significance. It cannot, for example, be assumed safely that any assets deployed to reassure the public (ie, high-visibility duties performed in crowded locations) would also fulfil a deterrent function. Nor, that any established measures would necessarily deter someone willing to take his or her own life during an attack.

The July bombings, particularly the initial confusion caused by the failed attacks on 21 July, brought into sharp relief the ability of first responders to confirm or discount the possibility that attacks might incorporate a chemical, biological or radiological element. Since the Aum Shinrikyo (ASK) attacks against the Tokyo Metro (March 1995), BTP has maintained an immediate response capability designed to address this requirement. On the 21st, for example, specially trained and equipped officers were able to confirm not only the absence of potentially hazardous chemical materials, but also that readings obtained on the day were consistent with existing profiles. The reassurance provided by the Special Response Unit (SRU) that no chemical or radiological hazard was detectable, or otherwise apparent, was vital in informing the decision-making process concerning cordons and the decision to reopen the London Underground network.

In summary, the multiple-attacks in July 2005 reinforced the requirement to deploy to several incident scenes simultaneously, against a background of great uncertainty. The specialist knowledge of BTP officers on site and the close working relationship with colleagues from other agencies (especially the MPS) quickly discounted concerns about possible chemical attack and secondary devices. This greatly expedited the rescue process and the return to normality. BTP's detailed understanding of the rail environment also contributed to the effective management of unattended items. The importance of this combined skill set should not be underestimated. It is, for example, difficult to maintain an impression of business as usual if services are subject to long delays because every item of lost property is being treated as a viable explosive device. Many of the lessons learned from previous railway-related incidents were applicable to the scenes encountered on 7 July. However, the threat posed by "suicide-bombers" raises fundamental questions about the applicability of existing procedures used to reassure the travelling public, screen passengers, deter terrorists and detect potentially hazardous devices.

The nature of the attacks against London's mass transit system on 7 and 21 July raised a number of new concerns associated with managing terrorism-related risk. While existing procedures coped well—particularly on the 7th—there is a clear need to review how the risk associated with this type of attack will be managed in future. This process is still being developed but involves (a) building upon those aspects of the response proved to be effective and (b) not assuming that subsequent attacks will necessarily follow identical patterns. It is also important to acknowledge that within the context of a truly open mass transit system, while risk can be managed, vulnerability can never be eliminated completely.

December 2005



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