Memorandum from Merseytravel (TS 18)
It was with great interest that I followed the
initial evidence session held as part of the "Travelling
Without Fear" inquiry. This is a timely inquiry and we welcome
the opportunity of submitting a memoranda.
SUMMARY
We would concur with the Secretary of State
for Transport in observing that for modes of transport which require
more "open access" networks, for example bus as opposed
to rail, the familiar "airport security" approach to
anti-terrorism becomes unworkable. It is our suggestion that by
focusing upon securing networks against all crime types there
is a "diffusion of benefit" that includes making public
transport less attractive as a target for terrorists. Demonstrating
an effective response to common crime will improve passenger confidence
and facilitate their travelling without fear. Specific attention
should be given to the introduction of a national Incident Reporting
System for public transport related crime which, outside of the
rail network, is entirely lacking. In addition TRANSEC should
consider adopting the bus network into its remit although we acknowledge
that without massive resource implications the role would be to
advise on and set national standards for the industry.
MERSEYTRAVEL
As you know, Merseytravel is comprised of the
Merseyside Passenger Transport Authority (MPTA) and Executive
(MPTE) acting together with the overall aim to provide a single
integrated transport network for Merseyside which is accessible
to all.
In planning and procuring major elements of
the public transport system, Merseytravel operates socially necessary
bus services, rail services, maintains bus operations, owns and
operates Mersey Ferries, operates the Mersey tunnels, provides
a range of prepaid and concessionary tickets, produces and distributes
timetables and implements the local transport plan for Merseyside
with our district council partners. An underlying theme across
all of the services we provide is the safety and security of the
travelling public. Merseytravel has worked hard to make sure we
have the best security and emergency procedures in place so that
we can minimise the risk of a terrorist threat, and its implications
were it to occur.
TRANSEC
We have always ensured our full co-operation
with Government and its agencies on security issues. However,
we believe that it is a strategic error that buses are not included
as part of TRANSEC's remit. The industries currently regulated
are aviation, maritime, railways, the Channel Tunnel, London Underground
and now all industries in respect of the security of dangerous
goods in transport.
More than 200 million journeys are carried out
in Merseyside across all modes every year. 34 million of these
are by rail but 164 million are by bus.
Without TRANSEC's involvement security issues
are, therefore, left to a combination of Passenger Transport Executive,
Local Authorities, local Police forces and private bus companies.
These private companies also have their own commercial considerations.
We believe that a more strategic, centrally-based, approach should
be adopted for buses as well as other parts of the transport system.
In this way a national "minimum" standard could be devised
and required of all operators.
One of our activities is the research and trialling
of new initiatives and technologies and we have recently written
to TRANSEC to explore the opportunities for working more closely
with them and for trialling transport security measures in and
around Merseyside. We believe that new measures of transport security
should be explored throughout the UK and not solely in London.
This is something that the Government has recognised but we believe
that a more active engagement is required and have sought to initiate
this.
SECURITY AT
ALL LEVELS
We appreciate that the Government has to demonstrate
clearly its commitment to protecting the travelling public and
often does this through large, set-piece initiatives and announcements.
These, of course, have a role to play in security but, we believe,
there is a need to recognise that a more holistic approach is
required. In our memoranda for the first evidence session, we
detailed the TravelSafe initiative that Merseytravel is undertaking.
We wish to take this opportunity of placing this in the wider
context of the protection from terrorist violence. It is our contention
that a relationship exists between common types of crime and the
exceptional incidents of terrorism.
The goal of TravelSafe is:
"To work as partners to create a public
transport system that offers the opportunity for all members of
the community to travel safely and without fear".
The initiative involves Merseytravel working
in partnership with, amongst others:
— Rail Passengers Council.
— British Transport Police.
— Crown Prosecution Service.
— Government Office for the North West.
— Safer Merseyside Partnership.
— Crime and Reduction Partnerships
from across Merseyside.
TravelSafe is a cross-industry initiative to
work towards a safer public transport system for all. Its aims
are to:
— Build strong links with public transport
users.
— Deliver meaningful crime prevention
messages in an interactive and friendly environment.
— Establish lasting relationships with
schools.
— Reduce crime and disorder across
the public transport system.
— Encourage people to use public transport.
— Help provide reassurance to public
transport users.
As the Secretary of State has acknowledged taking
action to make the bus network more secure against terrorist attack
will require a different approach to that taken for other modes.
We would suggest that a network that is robust in defence of its
passengers against crime will also offer reassurance and a measure
of defence and resilience to terrorist attack. The most obvious
example of this type of base level action is CCTV on buses. This
acts not just as a deterrent but also assists in the collection
of evidence, making buses a less attractive target. If acts of
crime and vandalism can be carried out on the transport system
then it is obvious that there is also a security issue to be addressed.
We have made a great deal of play in making anti-crime actions,
such as the installation of CCTV, highly visible to the travelling
public so that are given the reassurance they seek.
We have made capital grants available to the
operators to install suitable CCTV systems which are to evidential
standards.
For instance, by recruiting a specialist crime
analyst, we have been able to develop the specifications, design,
develop and implement an Incident Reporting System (IRiS) which
conforms to the Police National Intelligence Model The IRiS system
can then help us to identify where current weaknesses in the systems
are, make a judgment about the level of effectiveness of measures,
such as CCTV, and see where attention needs to be focused going
forward. This level of information informs our decision making
about the measures that are introduced. We would contend that
the IRiS system can be rolled out nationally. A copy of the most
recent "IRIS" report is appended for information and
reference.
We do not believe that the DfT, or other departments,
have accurate figures on the number of crimes on public transport
or the cost. We conservatively estimate it to be in excess of
£100 million per annum. Figures suggest that the usage of
public transport would rise by around 11.5% nationally if common
crime issues were to be addressed effectively. A clear demonstration
about the effectiveness and resilience of the transport system
would also help to make it look less of an "easy target"
for terrorists.
We have also established a protocol with Merseyside
Police which means that they now accept any intelligence that
we gather as we meet the format and standards they require. This
level of interplay is proving invaluable.
Transport for London is often able to take the
lead on many such issues but this is often because of the much
bigger budget that it enjoys. For instance in its "TfL and
Transport Policing Fact Sheet" they identify a commitment
of over £120 million a year to policing services. Our settlements
do not allow for such spending and the danger is that best practice,
from wherever it originates, cannot be pursued and that the travelling
public outside of London are less well protected.
Any cost benefit analysis of security measures
on open transport networks will identify that implementation must
be targeted at crime with the benefit extending to counter terrorism.
To illustrate the point if a bus based CCTV system can provide
high quality, easily retrieved images of a bag being stolen, then
the evidence will also be there of someone leaving a bag on a
vehicle.
One of the biggest impacts that we can have
on terrorism is by having a secure network for all issues of personal
security.
RECENT EXPERIENCE
As well as putting the base level requirements
in place, strategic relationships and protocols are required between
the emergency services and those responsible for delivering transport.
Merseytravel is a key and active participant in the emergency
planning process alongside Local Authorities and the Emergency
Services. We continue to take part in exercises to gauge Merseyside's
preparedness for major disruptive events.
We have in place tested and reviewed systems
and processes to respond positively to an emergency so the Merseytravel
can:
— take the lead for accurate and timely
provision of public transport on Merseyside during and following
any major disruptive event including information provision;
— take or direct persons under threat
from immediate danger in accordance with the directions of the
relevant Authority. If required by the Incident Commander, to
facilitate access to the emergency area;
— enable Merseyside to be in a position
to recover speedily, guided by Merseytravel experience and the
requirements of the relevant Authorities; and
— offer Merseytravel staff the support
they need if they have been exposed to traumatic events.
We recently had to put our emergency procedures
to the test. The incident was not terrorist related but a train
derailment in an underground tunnel—thought to be caused
by a problem with the track. Nevertheless, the incident gave us
the opportunity to evaluate our procedures and the feedback was
very positive; no one was hurt or seriously injured, everyone
was evacuated from the tunnel quickly and we were able to get
services running to a satisfactory level on most of the network
within 12 hours and minisise disruption across the whole network
while the incident was being investigated. We were able to learn
lessons from that experience to ensure continuous improvement
in our procedures.
Unlike many other bodies, Merseytravel has to
prepare for emergencies across a range of operations:
— Rail, including an underground section
with five very busy stations.
CONCLUSION
All parts of the UK's infrastructure need to
work together if the public, and in particular the travelling
public, are to be properly protected. In the medium-term the next
stage of security planning should be to bring all parts of the
UK's infrastructure together in terms of their prevention measures
and contingency methods. In this, I would endorse the recent words
of Dr Sandra Bell ("Thinking The Unthinkable", Whitehall
& Westminster World, 8 November 2005).
The Department has an opportunity to strengthen,
still further, security planning and build on its excellent work
to date. A recognition of the interdependence between all elements
of the UK's infrastructure the Department would open further opportunities
for this strengthening to continue.
We would like to wish the Committee every success
in its inquiry and would be happy to contribute further if this
would be useful.
December 2005
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