Memorandum from the United Kingdom Major
Ports Group (UKMPG) (TS 22)
The United Kingdom Major Ports Group is the
Association which represents most of the major commercial ports
in the UK. Our members operate 40 ports which account for about
two-thirds of the freight traffic passing through UK ports. We
recognise that the Committee's inquiry will be primarily concerned
with the safety of passengers using the internal transport system,
following the recent terrorist incidents. However we note that
the Committee will be looking at security arrangements across
all modes, so we offer this brief paper which comments on some
of the measures which the Government has put in place to protect
ports and their users from the risk of terrorist attacks.
For some years TRANSEC (the security division
of DfT) have been responsible for putting in place arrangements
to protect the security of ports and airports. These arrangements,
which were set up under powers contained in the Aviation and Maritime
Security Act 1990 (AMSA) typically involve the searching of vehicles
and passengers, and can be varied depending on the Government's
current assessment of the level of threat. These measures were
almost entirely confined to passenger ports.
Following the 9/11 attacks in the United States
the International Maritime Organisation developed the International
Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code which introduced new arrangements
for enhancing security of ships and ports. The Code requires all
ports which handle international traffic to have security plans
in place, approved by governments, and to appoint trained security
officers. Under the ISPS Code the security arrangements relate
only to the area in the immediate vicinity of ships (known as
the "ship port interface") but the European Union have
subsequently adopted a Directive which extends the provisions
of the ISPS Code into the whole port area. The plans required
under the Code and the Directive typically require control of
access, usually involving the installation of fencing, use of
CCTV etc etc.
We accept that ports, and the ships which use
them, can potentially represent a terrorist target, and the industry
has accepted without question the need to enhance security arrangements
as a contribution towards national security as well as for the
protection of the ports themselves. But the implementation of
the security plans required under the ISPS Code has led to considerable
increased expenditure by ports some of which has inevitably had
to be passed on to customers. In the Port of Bristol for example,
which is a medium sized port, it is estimated that the capital
costs of compliance with the Code were £1.5 million with
additional running costs of £500,000 per annum.
TRANSEC are responsible for the oversight and
approval of port security plans, and our relations with them,
both at national and local level, are generally good. However
the present arrangements have given rise to certain problems to
which we would draw the Committee's attention.
1. Ports receive very detailed guidance from
TRANSEC on requirements for the security plans—height of
fences, use of CCTV etc. But the industry receives very little
information about the evidence (if any) on which these requirements
are based. It would be easier for the industry to accept the need
for the additional measures which TRANSEC from time to time requires
if we could be assured that the requirement is based on well researched
intelligence rather than the whim of a security inspector.
2. The Committee are particularly interested
in international arrangements. The ISPS Code and the associated
European Directive make provision for countries to enter into
bilateral agreements covering security of transport systems operating
between the two countries. The UK Government has made very little
use of this up to the present. We have frequently pointed out
to the Government that it makes little sense to increase security
arrangements at one end of a ferry route if there are not similar
arrangements in place at the other end, yet they seem unable to
make such agreements.
3. One continuing area of difficulty relates
to rights of way through ports. A number of ports have rights
of way passing through the port, often following the riverbank.
Some of these rights of way go across lock gates, which are obviously
a point of particular vulnerability in a port. We have pressed
TRANSEC to use the powers in the AMSA to close such rights of
way, but they have said that they are only prepared to consider
this if and when the terrorist threat increases from its present
level. We remain concerned that this is an obvious gap in some
ports' security arrangements, since if a lock gate is damaged
all the berths behind the lock become unusable.
4. We feel that coordination between the
various Government departments and Government agencies involved
in security leaves much to be desired. The Departments and Agencies
who are involved with security in ports include HMRC, the Home
Office, the Police, the security service and TRANSEC, and all
these have from time to time taken initiatives relating to security
in ports, but with little evidence of coordination between them.
An example is the Cyclamen project which is concerned to introduce
scanning of cargo for radioactive material, which appears to have
been introduced with scant consultation with TRANSEC. A similar
example is the effort by the Home Office to introduce Multi Agency
Threat Assessment (MATRA) into the ports. We feel that coordination
between initiatives by different Government Departments could
and should be improved.
We are at the Committee's disposal if they wish
us to elaborate on any of the above points.
December 2005
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