Memorandum from the British Ports Association
(BPA) (TS 23)
DEVELOPMENT OF
MARITIME SECURITY
REGIME
1. The British Ports Association represents
ports located throughout the UK. In particular, it represents
the overwhelming majority of UK passenger traffic.
2. The UK maritime sector has been required
to operate security controls since the 1990 Aviation and Maritime
Security Act. This Act introduced powers to create restricted
zones and to conduct searches. The focus was on preventing attacks
to ships through embarkation controls. The measures were largely
confined to passenger ports dealing with international traffic.
During the 10 year period up until the September 11 attacks, the
industry developed a workmanlike relationship with TRANSEC officials,
although there was concern that the risk to shipping had been
overestimated and the measures taken out of proportion.
3. Following the September 11 attacks, the
IMO produced the International Ship and Port Security Code (ISPS),
subsequently implemented through EU Regulations which came into
effect on 1 July in 2004. Since then, another EU Directive has
been adopted which extends security requirements to the port area;
the ISPS Code is confined to the ship/port interface only. The
risk assessments carried out to underpin the 2004 Regulations
took into account the whole port area and its security requirements;
TRANSEC are currently carrying out pilot studies to investigate
the implications of this but TRANSEC's view is that the EU Directive
should not significantly change current UK requirements. A further
EU Directive will tackle security throughout the entire transport
chain. We expect this to be launched in early 2006. The maritime
security regime is therefore extensive, regularly monitored by
TRANSEC and entails strong management, operational and financial
commitment from the industry.
ASSESSING THE
THREAT AND
COMMUNICATION
4. The BPA are members of the National Maritime
Security Committee (NMSC), chaired by the Director of TRANSEC
and which meets twice a year to review strategic issues. This
national committee is informed by two separate committees, one
dealing with ports and one with shipping. These look at more operational,
day to day issues and problems. The relationship with TRANSEC
officials is generally good, although there have been some problems
in achieving consistency between different TRANSEC teams and between
different ports. The introduction of Regulations in mid-2004 with
a new system of notification and nominated ship and port security
personnel and a new system of security levels provided examples
of sound co-operation between the industry and the authorities.
Costs have been borne entirely by the industry.
5. The security record of ports and ships
in UK waters is good, to the extent that BPA members have questioned
the value of the various security measures that they operate.
We have tried to raise this with TRANSEC in various ways, for
example, asking how TRANSEC measure the success (or otherwise)
of the measures they have introduced; we have also asked for examples
of indicators that TRANSEC might use to measure their effectiveness.
We have not received a clear answer to any of these requests and
we note that in recent evidence to the Transport Committee provided
by the Secretary of State and TRANSEC representatives, a similar
question (Q24) was put based on remarks made by British Airways
on the use of a Regulatory Impact Assessment for new measures
and whether additional requirements were either "proportionate
or reasonable". The answer from TRANSEC alluded to government/industry
discussion about best methods, but did not address the issue of
the effectiveness of security measures and how they might be measured.
We have discussed with TRANSEC figures on numbers of seized weapons
as an indicator and we believe it is worthwhile developing other
indicators.
6. The costly security activity required
by ports is an addition to the general cost of providing facilities
for various government agencies, particularly Special Branch and
HM Customs and Revenue. All in all, the border agencies represent
a significant cost and operational burden to the UK port sector
and currently there is little sharing of intelligence and only
limited co-operation between different agencies. We have provided
details of security costs to DfT in the past though we have had
little feedback.
7. All in all TRANSEC could be more forthcoming
on these topics. Their annual report is an example of a public
document which, from the industry's point of view, skirts round
the effectiveness issue and only provides a matter of fact summary
of the regime. These are important points: we believe that one
of the main defences against terrorism is a high awareness by
staff working in the port area; more information on the nature
of the threat would help to support this.
8. On a similar theme, we have explored
from time to time the possibility of industry representatives
being provided with more specific briefings on the threat to cover
more sensitive information. This could then be relayed in more
general terms to the industry. Again, we see this as a means by
which TRANSEC could develop more support for its measures. These
briefings could be related to different types of threats and updates
on incidents.
COMPETITION
9. It has been a long standing issue for
UK ports that they have been required since 1990 to maintain embarkation
security controls whereas passenger ports at the other end of
Continental routes were not required to do so. This has been corrected
with the new EU Regulations which, at least in theory, introduce
equivalent regimes. Mismatches between protective security can
affect other types of shipping, for example, cruise ship calls
and container feeder traffic. However, Continental ports have
had a standing start in reaching the level of expertise present
in UK ports. TRANSEC must ensure through its EU contacts that
ports facing equivalent risks are required to implement equivalent
measures in response. Clearly the efforts of one port can be considerably
undermined if a corresponding port operates a laxer regime. We
have no hard evidence of the extent to which this has been achieved
and understand that inspections are only about to start on the
way in which each member state has implemented the Regulations.
We expect this to be high on the government's agenda.
CONCLUSIONS
— The UK has had, for a longer period
of time than any other EU member state, an extensive and well
monitored maritime security regime.
— Justification for the measures implemented
by ports and their performance measurement are lacking.
— UK must ensure equivalent regimes
in other EU member states for equivalent levels of threat.
December 2005
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