Memorandum from Transport for London (TS
24)
SUMMARY
— Transport for London (TfL) through
planning and training with emergency services and other key partners,
together with investment in security measures such as CCTV, was
already at a high state of preparedness prior to the attacks on
7 and 21 July. This preparation helped deliver a rapid response
to the attacks.
— We are continuing the training and
exercises that were in place prior to 7 July. Multi-agency planning
and exercising to reinforce operational resilience and recovery
in the event of major disruption takes place on a regular basis.
Within TfL, the provision of robust Emergency Contingency and
Business Recovery regimes has been and remains a priority.
— TfL is a member of the London Regional
Resilience Forum and has had managers seconded to the London Resilience
Team since it was established in October 2001.
— There is ongoing, close liaison between
the Commissioner of Transport and Commissioner of Police. The
British Transport Police (BTP) and London Underground (LU) also
worked particularly closely during and after the attacks. There
is good cooperation and joint working at all levels across the
Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), BTP, City of London Police
and TfL.
— We are continuing to liaise and share
knowledge with other organisations outside of the UK, as we were
prior to 7 July.
— Lessons learnt from terrorist attacks
in other countries, such as the 9/11 attacks in New York and those
of March 2004 in Madrid all aided the response that was instigated
on 7 July.
1. BACKGROUND
1.1 Transport for London's (TfL's) resilience
capability received its severest test in the terrorist attacks
on London's transport infrastructure on the 7 and 21 July. The
response to these attacks, based on prior planning, training and
testing within TfL and with partner organisations, has been widely
commended. Nonetheless, we, along with partners, continue to seek
to improve our capability to prevent and detect threats to public
transport and manage and effect business recovery.
1.2 TfL and its predecessors have established
plans to manage the effects of disruption to daily services irrespective
of cause. The threat to public transport operations from terrorist
activity is not new; in the past thirty years, examples of terrorist
action have resulted in both infrastructure damage and fatalities
in the public transport environment.
1.3 What has changed is the nature of the
threat. The events of 7 and 21 July 2005 had actual and failed
attacks in London by suicide bombers whose overriding aim appeared
to be the creation of maximum damage and casualties in a transport
environment. Since the attacks in New York in September 2001,
the UK authorities—and in particular agencies in London—have
worked together (largely under the aegis of the London Regional
Resilience Forum (LRRF)) to develop plans and conduct exercises
aimed at reducing the risk of attack and at achieving recovery
from a successful attack so as to permit a return to normality
as soon as practicable.
1.4 It is not TfL's intention to become
a security specialist but rather to engage with those agencies,
including Government, that are charged with assessing the threats
affecting transport infrastructure and to introduce appropriate
improvements arising from outputs and recommendations.
1.5 TfL also recognises the benefits of
the additional links with the MPS and the London Fire Service
that the Greater London Authority (GLA) Group has brought.
2. WHAT STRUCTURES
ARE IN
PLACE TO
ENSURE THAT
THE TRANSPORT
INDUSTRY AND
THE GOVERNMENT
CO -OPERATE
FULLY IN
COUNTERING THE
THREAT OF
FUTURE TERRORIST
STRIKES?
2.1 Rail
DfT Transec, the Transport Security and Contingencies
Directorate, regulates London Underground (LU) and the Docklands
Light Railway (DLR) on preventative security measures.
These measures for LU/DLR are laid out in the
LU/DLR Security Programmes respectively. These documents are developed
from the security instructions issued by the Secretary of State
for Transport under the Railways Act 1993.
LU, Network Rail and the BTP have a long history
of working together to provide counter-terrorist measures for
rail transport and responding to Transec advice of any changes
to threat levels received via the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre.
The DLR has recently been included in this process.
2.2 Bus
TfL oversees the largest and most comprehensive
bus network in Europe, accounting for 44% all UK bus journeys.
As such, TfL has invested heavily in the safety and security of
the bus service. All 8,000 vehicles are equipped with two way
radios linked to a 24/7 operations centre. Furthermore, all buses
are equipped with recording CCTV which has proved to be invaluable
in deterring crime and disorder on vehicles as well as enabling
rapid identification of suspects for a range of offences both
on and off vehicle. CCTV was, of course, critical in the identification
of suspects in the criminal investigations arising from the terrorist
attacks of 7 and 21 July.
2.3 Policing
TfL has also invested heavily in additional
policing on all parts of its transport operations. The relationship
between the BTP and LU and the DLR is long established. TfL now
funds over 670 BTP officers on its networks. Similarly, TfL and
the MPS established the specialised Transport Operational Command
Unit (TOCU) in 2002 which deploys in support of bus services and
the major road network in London. TfL fully funds this unit which
now numbers over 400 police officers and around 800 Traffic Police
Community Support Officers and Traffic Wardens.
Close working relationships with police and
security services form an important part of the process of maintaining
effective security regimes. As mentioned above, recent investment
in developing those relationships has included investment in the
dedicated policing for LU and DLR networks by the BTP, whereby
security is a major aspect of the service provided. The BTP remains
a key source of intelligence to the organisations responsible
for the safe operation of those networks as well as providing
high visibility policing and rapid response to disruptive incidents.
The BTP has a control centre co-located with LU's Network Operation
Centre to facilitate working both on a day-to-day basis and during
emergencies.
The MPS provides close links with the bus and
road networks via the Transport Operational Command Unit (TOCU),
whose command and control team is co-located with the bus control
centre ("CentreComm"). Joint command and control arrangements
have proved invaluable in managing the effects of major incidents
affecting the network, whilst links between TOCU and specialist
policing units such as SO13 Counter-terrorism team ensure that
intelligence transfer between organisations takes place.
2.4 London Regional Resilience Forum
TfL is a member of the London Regional Resilience
Forum (LRRF) and has had managers seconded to the London Resilience
Team (LRT) on both a full-time and part-time basis since it was
established in October 2001. This has ensured that the operational
realities of mass transit systems can be properly considered in
resilence-related political and investment decisions and has enabled
TfL to play an integral part in the development of resilience
plans and exercises. TfL serves on a number of working groups
and sub-Committees, including those for "Transport",
"Consequence and Recovery", "Evacuation" and
"Command and Control". In addition, the Mayor of London
is Deputy Chair of the LRRF and acts as a focus for communications
with London during emergencies, which TfL is able to feed into.
The LRT has led the development of resilience
plans that include evacuation of parts of London, managing the
effects of chemical, biological and radiological attacks and "seamless"
partnership working between agencies in London. It has also taken
a lead role in the development and implementation of "command
post" table top and live emergency exercises. The largest
of these was a weekend exercise (Osiris), on 7 September 2003
at Bank Underground station, which simulated a chemical attack
at one of the largest and most complex stations on the network.
Osiris was a multi-agency exercise which was also attended by
political leaders. In April 2005, the LRT and partners took part
in the international "Atlantic Blue" exercise, which
although conducted as a table-top exercise in London provided
vital experience in managing the aftermath of multi-seated attacks
such as those experienced in London in July 2005. The outputs
from these and other multi-agency exercises play a vital role
in developing working practices and relationships that would survive
prolonged operation in the field.
3. THE STATE
OF INTERNATIONAL
CO -OPERATION
IN COMBATING ATTACKS
ON TRANSPORT SYSTEMS
3.1 Transport operators in London have longstanding
liaisons with overseas transport operators on security matters
and have, over many years, built up a series of contacts and working
relationships that aim to identify and share best practice in
combating terrorist attacks. TfL has an international reputation
for effectively handling the terrorist threat and receives many
visitors from around the world seeking advice on approaches to
security and contingency planning.
3.2 In the period since the attacks in New
York, a considerable increase in the number of visits both from
and to representatives of other countries has taken place. In
recent months, there has been much international interest from
transport organisations in the London terrorist attacks. Although
demanding in resource terms, these exchanges have been welcomed
by TfL and have aided knowledge-sharing between the parties.
3.3 TfL is a member of the UITP (International
Association of Public Transport) and an active member of the working
group on security. This collaboration enables TfL to keep abreast
of new initiatives and technology advances.
3.4 In March 2004 London Underground hosted
a security conference in London for key personnel from transport
operators across the world. There were representatives from the
USA, Russia, Israel, Spain and France amongst others—all
of whom had suffered from terrorist attacks.
3.5 In November 2005 TfL hosted a further
security conference in London sponsored by UITP. This was planned
before 7 July attacks, was attended by 250 international colleagues,
received positive media coverage and was a useful forum to share
ideas and security concepts in mass transit systems.
4. WHAT HAS
BEEN LEARNT
FROM THE
EXPERIENCE OF
OTHER COUNTRIES
WHICH HAVE
EXPERIENCED TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON
THEIR TRANSPORT
SYSTEMS
4.1 TfL has undertaken a number of reviews
of its response to the terrorist attacks of July and also what
options there might be to reduce the threat of further terror
attacks. This has included analysing experience from elsewhere
and considering what best practice we can adapt for use in London.
4.2 In addition to established processes
used by individual TfL modes, a series of London-wide measures
had been developed in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in New
York and those of March 2004 in Madrid to reinforce the mechanism
for dealing with a catastrophic incident.
4.3 One of the main lessons we have learnt
is from examining other international operators' use of technology
in these types of events and how it is often not appropriate in
a mass transit environment due to reliability problems or unsuitable
technology for the environment.
4.4 In October 2005, an international multi-agency
de-brief at the Guildhall was held, where the experience gained
during the July attacks was shared with transport, government
and security service representatives from a wide-range of organisations
and countries. TfL played a key part in the preparation and delivery
of the event.
4.5 TfL will continue to review and update
its response capabilities in line with threat levels, official
advice and available technology.
5. CONCLUSION
5.1 The threat to public transport operations
from terrorist activity is not new. TfL and its predecessors have
established plans to manage the effects of disruption to daily
services irrespective of cause.
5.2 Clear operational plans are in place
for all TfL's transport services to handle minor, major and catastrophic
events. There are robust decision making and management structures
within TfL to handle issues ranging from service disruption through
to service withdrawal and reinstatement.
5.3 There are well established and robust
links between TfL's operating businesses and police agencies.
These enable the exchange of intelligence and information; ensure
an effective and coordinated response and aim to maximise the
safety and security of the travelling public and to maintain transport
services wherever possible.
5.4 There are sound structures in place
to ensure that the transport industry and the Government co-operate
fully in countering the threat of future terrorist strikes. The
establishment of the LRRF and the ongoing liaison with other agencies,
the police and security services and international partners have
been crucial in the continuing efforts to detect and prevent terrorist
attacks and effectively manage and effect business recovery.
December 2005
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