Memorandum from the Department for Transport
(DfT) (TS 26)
INTRODUCTION
1. The purpose of this memorandum is to
provide the Transport Committee with an account of the Department's
responsibilities for transport security (land, aviation and maritime),
its role in the aftermath to the London bomb attacks of July 2005
and its role as the coordinator for contingency planning within
the Department. The memorandum includes information on:
— the overall aims and objectives of
the Transport Security & Contingencies Directorate (TRANSEC)
of the Department for Transport (DfT), and key processes of transport
security;
— rail security and the attacks of
7 and 21 July;
— history, staffing, resources, oversight
and business planning;
— the role of TRANSEC within Government;
— programme development and relationship
with industry;
— breakdown of modal transport security
regimes—land, aviation and maritime, and the broad contingency
arrangements in place;
— transport security from an international
and EU perspective;
— financing transport security;
— the role of technology;
— the role of the media; and
— recruitment, vetting and training.
AIMS AND
OBJECTIVES
Aim
2. Transport security is regulated by TRANSEC
which is responsible for developing and enforcing the security
standards required of transport operators. Its aim is:
"to protect the travelling public, transport
facilities and those employed in the transport industries, primarily
from acts of terrorism, and to retain public confidence in transport
security, whilst not imposing requirements that impact disproportionately
on the travelling public or on the effectiveness and efficiency
of industry operations; and to co-ordinate the DfT's arrangements
for responding to serious disruption of national life, actual
or threatened, however caused."
Objective
3. A key objective of transport security
is to ensure that effective and proportionate security regimes
are maintained across all of the regulated transport security
modes, addressing threats to and vulnerabilities in domestic and
overseas operations, and taking account of new and emerging threats,
including to transport "soft targets".
4. Furthermore, the transport security regimes
are designed whenever possible to detect an act of terrorism before
it is committed and prevent it happening. Some measures may deter
the would-be perpetrator. Others have value in terms of public
reassurance.
KEY PROCESSES
OF TRANSPORT
SECURITY
5. A key component underpinning the security
regimes is to have, both at home and overseas, proportionate,
pragmatic and sustainable security that does not place an undue
burden on UK industry and does not discourage the travelling public
from travelling. A "layered approach" to security acknowledges
that no single security measure is either fool-proof, or capable
of mitigating every type of threat. The aim, therefore, is to
reduce the risk rather than seek to eliminate it entirely.
6. Each regime combines "front line"
security measures (eg screening, searching, physical barriers,
patrolling) designed to prevent, detect or deter a terrorist attack,
with secondary measures (eg background checks, security vetting,
training) focusing on the quality and integrity of staff.
7. Mature and well developed security regimes
have been in place since the early 1990s for the aviation, maritime
and Channel Tunnel sectors. Since 2000, the national rail, London
Underground and the Docklands Light Railway networks have been
regulated, as has the Glasgow Subway with effect from November
2005. The regulatory framework was also extended to the security
of dangerous goods in transport in July 2005.
8. The regulatory regimes are implemented
through the serving of legal directions on the industry by TRANSEC,
and supported by detailed written programmes which provide advice
on delivery. A comprehensive, risk-driven, inspection and enforcement
process—led principally by TRANSEC inspectors—underpins
the regimes.
9. Detailed descriptions of the work and
priorities of TRANSEC's land transport, aviation and maritime
security regimes and its contingencies activities are attached
at Annexes A, B, C and D respectively. The Land Transport
Annex provides a brief account of TRANSEC's role in the aftermath
to the London bombings of July 2005.
HISTORY, STAFFING,
RESOURCES, OVERSIGHT
AND BUSINESS
PLANNING
History
10. TRANSEC was established in 1991 as a
result of the Lockerbie disaster building on what had been the
Aviation Security Division in DfT. Its responsibilities were extended
to cover maritime security in the early 1990s and then further
extended to cover the Channel Tunnel, national railways, London
Underground and the security of dangerous goods in transport over
the following decade. The UK was the first country in the world
to establish a comprehensive cross-modal security authority in
government—a pattern now being adopted elsewhere, notably
in the USA and Australia.
Staffing
11. Between December 1988 (the time of the
Lockerbie disaster) and 1994, TRANSEC expanded from 15 to about
125 posts. A subsequent efficiency round led to a reduction in
posts to 81 by 2001.
12. TRANSEC's role increased significantly
following the 11 September 2001 and the Madrid 2004 attacks and
increased international security activity over this period. The
DfT Board agreed the resulting growth in TRANSEC to meet the major
new obligations, challenges and expectations, and since 2002 TRANSEC's
headcount has increased to 200 posts with an overall annual budget
of £16.8 million.
13. Of the 200 staff, 122 people are engaged
in front-line work, 35 in direct support of this work, a further
24 in general administrative support and 19 members of senior
and middle management.
Oversight and Business Planning
14. TRANSEC's work is planned in line with
the DfT's business planning framework. TRANSEC contributes to
the Departmental Business Plan and has its own detailed annual
business plan which is security classified. In addition, its work
is an integral part of the Government's wider counter-terrorism
programme. Work is currently in hand on the DfT and TRANSEC Business
plans for the three year period commencing on 2006-07. As a result
of the new format for the DfT Plan we hope to be able to include
more information about TRANSEC's plan and targets in the Departmental
plan than has been possible in previous years.
15. Oversight of TRANSEC's work is undertaken
through its reporting to the Secretary of State and the DfT Board.
On a Directorate basis its business plan, including consideration
of risks to delivery is managed by the Director[5]
through her divisional managers and internal Programme Management
Group. Security does not feature in DfT's PSA targets as it is
a comparatively small (though important) part of DfT's functions
and, more importantly, because the subject area does not lend
itself well to the adoption and measurement of specific, measurable
outcome-based targets, delivery of which rests in the Department's
control.
16. The Secretary of State places TRANSEC's
annual report in the House of Commons' Library.
TRANSEC'S POSITION
WITHIN DFT
AND WITHIN
GOVERNMENT
Position within DfT
17. TRANSEC sits within the DfT, reporting
to the Secretary of State but it operates independently from the
transport policy Directorates. Thus positioned, it can be aware
of, but not inappropriately influenced by the Department's industry
"sponsorship" considerations.
Position within Government
18. The Government's long-term counter-terrorism
strategy—CONTEST—is overseen by the Cabinet Office.
Its aim is to reduce the risk from international terrorism so
that people can go about their business freely and with confidence.
In strategic terms, reducing the risk is undertaken across four
broad mission areas (also known as the four "P"s):
— Prevent—terrorism by
tackling its underlying causes;
— Pursue—terrorists and
those that sponsor them;
— Protect—the public and
UK interests through better protective security; and
— Prepare—for the consequences
and to improve our resilience to cope with attacks and other major
disruptive challenges.
19. Transport security and contingencies
have been and remain key components in the "Protect"
and "Prepare" pillars of that strategy.
20. Transport security has recently been
established as a separate workstream within the CONTEST "Protect"
structure which should provide a more robust and effective framework
for closer working with key Government stakeholders, notably the
Police (primarily the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and the
British Transport Police (BTP)) and the Security Service (who
advises the transport industries on physical security and electronic
attack).
PROGRAMME DEVELOPMENT
AND RELATIONSHIP
WITH INDUSTRIES
Relationships with Industry
21. Responsibility and accountability for
the design and delivery of security programmes are shared between
the transport operators who own and manage the transport systems,
and the Government. Government activity is divided between:
— the DfT, which directs and advises
the industry (including on the basis of threat assessments from
the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC));
— the security agencies—the National
Security Advice Centre (NSAC) and the National Infrastructure
Security Coordination Centre (NISCC), which offer the industry
expert advice on electronic security; and
— the Police, who have a wider responsibility
to prevent and detect crimes and to respond to major incidents
and emergencies.
22. In addition, TRANSEC and the Foreign
& Commonwealth Office (FCO) advise on the protection of UK
transport assets and citizens overseas.
23. The Police's counter-crime and counter-terrorist
programmes make an important contribution to transport security
in deterring acts of unlawful interference, in providing public
reassurance and an immediate response to any security incident.
The BTP and the MPS have produced detailed complementary strategies
designed to provide an over-arching approach for co-ordinating
the Police response towards countering a heightened threat from
terrorism on the "open" transport networks.
24. TRANSEC puts much time and effort into
the relationship with the transport industries, and examples will
be found throughout this memorandum. Of course, industries will
often seek to reduce through the consultation process their exposure
to security costs. TRANSEC has always sought to regulate by setting
goals rather than by imposing specific processes on industry,
and to achieve compliance through the commitment of industry to
the cause of security rather than through the use of legal powers.
We believe we have been largely successful in these aims, and
in taking the industries with us. Indeed without the willing co-operation
of industry the UK would not be in the pre-eminent position it
holds internationally in the field of transport security.
25. TRANSEC conducts its relationships with
industry both formally through the National Committees (see paragraph
35) and informally through managers and staff at all levels (see
paragraphs 35, 37 and 38). We also seek to act as a bridge between
industry and other parts of Government with a security role. The
National Committees have police, border agency, Home Office and
intelligence services representatives, and provide opportunities
for the industry to raise issues about policing and border control.
The new workstream described in paragraph 20 should also ensure
that the various Government agencies engaged in transport security
are co-ordinating their activities and prioritising work. Initiatives
such MATRA (see Annex 5, paragraph B) brings Government and industry
together at a local level.
26. The maritime and land transport divisions
of TRANSEC have completed Regulatory Impact Assessments (RIAs)
when implementing measures whose origins stemmed from traditional
legislative bases—ie implementation of UN and EU Regulations
(such as the recent UN / EU transport security of dangerous goods
measures and the Ship and Port Facility Security Regulation).
In terms of serving general directions on the industry, consultation
is undertaken in every case which includes consideration of cost.
TRANSEC has recently reviewed this process and has agreed to implement
a more formal approach to considering the potential impact of
new requirements, based on the formal RIA process.
The Threat
27. There is a history of transport not
only being attacked but being used as the means of attack. Protective
security regimes need to minimise both of these risks. They address
the threat from both conventional and unconventional terrorist
attacks, and recognise that there are many soft targets (particularly
on the "open" land transport networks) as well as the
traditional harder targets (eg the "closed" aviation
network), and therefore a wide range of possible attack scenarios.
28. The nature of air travel (international
focus, relatively limited number of entry and exit points to the
system, used for longer journeys and the need in many instances
for other passenger controls) has made it possible to maintain
a "closed" system and to exercise central security controls.
This has been helpful in addressing the risk to aviation posed
by terrorists and others. History demonstrates that aviation has
long been an attractive target and it has thus been subject to
security for a longer period than other modes of transport. The
consequences of a successful attack remain potentially very serious
and every effort continues to be made to address vulnerabilities.
29. In recent years, terrorist attacks around
the world have demonstrated a shift towards "soft" targets.
These include the "open" networks such as rail and underground
systems, which are designed to be readily accessed by large numbers
of people for relatively short journeys. It is not possible to
apply the same "aviation-style" security techniques
to an open system, but much effort has been devoted to devising
measures which enhance security in what are effectively public
places. The closed systems do not take priority over the open
ones. The approach to security and methods used are necessarily
different.
30. Relevant and timely threat information
must be a cornerstone of transport protective security regimes
if they are to remain proportionate and flexible. However, it
is also important to take vulnerability and consequences into
account when making decisions about levels of security.
31. To inform the more detailed analysis
of the effectiveness of the current regimes, JTAC produces up-to-date
threat assessments, which include an identification of the most
likely terrorist modus operandi that could be used against the
transport network. An important aspect of TRANSEC's work is to
inform the relevant UK industry of any changes in the threat levels
and the required response measures. This is done by a secure means
of communication, available on a 24/7 basis.
Baselines and Enhanced Measures—Risk Assessment
Process
32. The regulated programmes all have "baselines"
of measures that remain in place regardless of the threat. The
baselines are enhanced in response to increases in the threat
in order to maintain the risk at an acceptable level. Baselines
are set in accordance with prevailing threat levels, international
requirements, the history of attacks, the inherent vulnerability
of the mode of transport, whether it is an "open" or
"closed" system and the potential consequences of a
successful attack. Account also has to be taken of operational
realities: security measures that bring transport to a standstill
would deliver the terrorists' objective for them.
Stepped Approach to Enforcement
33. As well as being the security regulator,
TRANSEC seeks to build positive relationships with the transport
industries to encourage their compliance. It works closely with
transport operators to develop security measures and practices
that are effective, sustainable and responsive to the changing
nature of security threats. TRANSEC pursues security improvements
that are responsive to commercial realities, and works with industry
to ensure robust security while meeting the increasing demand
for travel.
34. The compliance model used by TRANSEC
is applied consistently to all transport modes. It follows a stepped
approach with the primary emphasis on co-operation, advice, dialogue
and self-rectification, followed up through enforcement and, in
the worst or persistent cases, prosecution. Experience to date
has shown that prosecution has not been necessary as industry
has been willing to implement remedial action when breaches, or
potential breaches, of security have been highlighted by the Department.
National Committee Structures and Communications
with Industry
35. TRANSEC operates on a number of levels:
— TRANSEC liaises with senior industry
officials and nominated security contacts on a wide range of security
issues including the dissemination of relevant threat assessments;
— protective security regimes are overseen
by national security committees for each transport mode. These
comprise all key industry stakeholders and the Police, and whose
bi-annual meetings are chaired at senior official and ministerial
level. Their remit is to maintain an overview of the standard
of security and to discuss any concerns arising; and
— below the national committees, various
sub-committees and working groups ensure that Government and industry
continue to work together effectively.
FINANCING SECURITY
36. It has been the policy of successive
Governments that the cost of transport security should be borne
by those that use the transport systems rather than by the general
taxpayer. Thus, the costs of providing security measures on the
ground fall to each transport industry, and are passed on to the
end user, the passenger, as appropriate.
37. TRANSEC consults with industry on protective
security matters at both formal and working levels. The starting
point in discussions is always the security objective and identifying
different ways of delivering that objective. Commercial considerations
may point TRANSEC towards one solution over another, but this
is not a choice between good security or not. TRANSEC are currently
reviewing this process to see if it can be enhanced.
38. Industry is not required to meet the
costs of security regulation or compliance monitoring. Furthermore,
Government departments and the Police pick up some of the costs
of the funding of research, development and evaluation of technologies
and other systems to support the industries' provision of security.
(Much of this development is funded by commercial companies who
then stand to profit from their investment). Government contributions
include the provision of advice, some contribution to training
courses, training aids, and the administration of counter-terrorist
checks for relevant staff in the industries. The Government also
funds TRANSEC's considerable international effort, designed to
enhance the security of the industries' overseas operations.
INTERNATIONAL AND
EU ACTIVITY
39. The international community has responded
to the changed security environment by expanding existing, and
developing, new international protective security regimes, a process
which TRANSEC has actively supported. This includes:
— the development of international
aviation security at the EU level and through the International
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and the European Civil Aviation
Conference (ECAC);
— the greater prominence given to maritime
security by the International Maritime Organisation's (IMO) new
regime;
— international concerns about the
secure transport of dangerous goods which have been reflected
in recently adopted United Nations and EU security requirements;
and
— TRANSEC's long-established working
relations with French counterparts on security in the Channel
Tunnel.
40. Work in the EU is the highest priority
from an international perspective. Over the years, the European
Commission has introduced regulations governing key aspects of
maritime and aviation security. It also introduced in 2005 regulations
governing the transport security of dangerous goods. On supply
chain (freight) security TRANSEC expects to see a Communication
from the Commission in 2006.
41. TRANSEC enjoys significant influence
and respect internationally as a result of its expertise, experience
and high standards of transport security in the UK. This is demonstrated
by the many international delegations it receives on a regular
basis and the many requests for TRANSEC's input into international
exchanges.
ROLE OF
TECHNOLOGY
42. Technology is at the heart of many key
security measures. Developments in technology can bring improvements
in security and/or reduce costs eg through more reliable detection
of terrorist weaponry, or by reducing the amount of direct human
intervention. Technology can also permit the implementation of
measures that cannot be carried out manually.
43. Following the attacks in July, there
were calls for a greater role for technology in preventing further
attacks. Equipment that can screen three million people a day
(approximate passenger numbers for the London Underground) without
unduly inconveniencing them does not exist at the present time.
However, over the next few months TRANSEC will be trialling various
types of security equipment on different parts of the rail network:
some of it new to the market and some of it used in the past in
aviation security. The tests, starting in the New Year, will run
alongside other security measures and will last about six months.
44. TRANSEC sponsors a programme of research,
development and technical evaluation (R&D&E). The programme
has four key objectives with the common aim of improving transport
security:
— fund research and development of
promising ideas to the point at which the idea is proven to have
sufficient potential that commercial developers will take it on;
— evaluate new equipment or technology-based
security processes to establish their effectiveness and suitability
for transport security applications;
— enhance the effectiveness of security
technologies by collaboration with manufacturers to refine their
designs and by research and development focused on improving the
way security personnel use technology; and
— inform the development of the modal
security programmes by conducting research to identify and characterise
security vulnerabilities, to assess the likely impact of attack
scenarios and to evaluate options to prevent or mitigate an attack.
45. Annex E provides a brief summary of
some of the key outcomes from the TRANSEC R&D&E Programme
during the financial year 2004-05.
ROLE OF
THE MEDIA
46. The media has a legitimate interest
in security and public safety. TRANSEC has to consider the balance
between the public's right to be informed of the risks (and their
mitigating measures) and to ensure terrorists are not fully aware
of the preventive measures in place. Public vigilance and support
remains essential.
47. Coverage can be helpful—TRANSEC
always investigates any alleged breaches of security, whether
exposed by the media or by anyone else, so that any weaknesses
can be addressed. TRANSEC's preference would be for genuine weaknesses
not to be put into the public domain, as it could help terrorists.
If, on investigation, the alleged weaknesses prove not to be genuine,
then public confidence is undermined for no good reason. But refuting
unsubstantiated media allegations normally entails putting more
into the public domain than is in the interests of national security.
RECRUITMENT, VETTING
AND TRAINING
Recruitment and Vetting
48. Varying degrees of recruitment and vetting
practices—regulatory and advisory—operate within the
transport industries, depending largely on the "closed"
or "open" nature of the transport system, the sensitivity
of the security posts and functions, the maturity of the security
framework and the needs of the industry.
49. The most established regime exists in
the aviation industry with vetting for airport staff with security
duties beginning in March 1997. Since 2003, certain security duties
in the maritime and Channel Tunnel industries have carried a requirement
to undergo vetting in the form of employer recruitment and counter-terrorist
checks. There are no mandatory requirements on vetting of general
rail staff with security duties, although guidance is offered.
Training
50. Other than the mandatory security training
in the aviation industry, training in the other transport modes
is on an advisory basis, though plans are in place to regulate
here too. The absence of a legal obligation does not mean that
appropriate training is not taking place. Where appropriate, TRANSEC
specifies the content of the courses, formally approves providers
and monitors the quality of the training. It also contributes
to courses by providing lecturers and administrative support.
The Security Service plays an important role in assisting with
this work.
CONCLUSION
51. Transport security has had well developed
and mature programmes of regulation and guidance in place since
the early 1990s, augmented by the strong working relationships
that have been forged between the Government and industry, and
between the various Government stakeholders. Having already implemented
measures for the largely "closed" transport systems
which TRANSEC deems to be pragmatic, proportionate and cost-effective,
the challenge now lies in developing the options for addressing
"open" systems and new modes of attack. The closed systems
do not take priority over the open ones.
52. The focus of TRANSEC's work programme
remains to ensure that its proportionate security regimes are
maintained across all of the regulated transport security modes,
addressing risks and vulnerabilities in domestic and overseas
operations, and taking account of new and emerging threats, including
to transport "soft targets".
December 2005
Annex A
LAND TRANSPORT
SECURITY AND
THE LONDON
JULY ATTACKS
1. Security regulation was introduced in
the Channel Tunnel network in 1994, the heavy rail network in
February 2000, London Underground and the light rail network in
October 2003, the Docklands Light Railway in September 2005 and
the Glasgow Subway from November 2005. From July 2005, the security
of dangerous goods in transport was also brought under formal
regulation.
2. Industry is responsible for the implementation
of the regulated security measures. DfT inspectors monitor and
enforce compliance against the security standards.
3. The hierarchy of measures are devised
in response to the mode-specific threat levels identified by the
intelligence services. An important aspect of TRANSEC's work is
to inform the relevant UK industry of any changes in the threat
levels and the required response measures. This is done by a secure
means of communication, available 24/7.
Pre-Madrid Security Regime
4. Rail security in Great Britain has strong
foundations in place which have been developed over time to deter
the Irish terrorist threat. Its focus has been on bombs left in
stations and, to some extent, on trains, and to make it as hard
as possible to leave unattended items. Many of the security measures
in place (left luggage screening, station searches, restrictions
on litter bins and BTP-developed rail staff procedures to evaluate
the risk associated with the discovery of an unattended item)
were specifically developed to deal with that threat.
Post-Madrid Review of Rail and Underground Security
5. Following the Madrid rail attacks in
March 2004, TRANSEC undertook a comprehensive review to examine
rail security measures already in place nationally and investigate
new ways of improving those measures. It was undertaken in conjunction
with the BTP, industry and other Government departments.
6. The outcomes of the review, endorsed
by Government in late 2004, identified a package of short, medium
and long-term measures to enhance rail counter-terrorist security
and for industry to deliver. These centred on: new regulatory
measures; new and improved guidance; better working arrangements
with the BTP and industry; and further studies into long-term
transport security issues.
7. A key feature of the review was to ensure
that the measures remained proportionate, pragmatic, sustainable
and did not place an undue burden on industry. The measures were
designed for the prevailing threat at the time and to be introduced
without requiring a significant shift in the "open"
nature of the rail system. Furthermore, the measures not only
continued to address the threat from bombs deposited on stations
but also extended the focus to trains.
8. Running in parallel with the Madrid review,
the BTP produced in December 2004 its National Strategic Framework
which was designed to provide an over-arching approach for co-ordinating
the Police response towards countering a heightened threat from
terrorism upon the rail network. It describes how it could provide
a national capability that takes into account alterations to the
threat level.
Rail Security Post-7 July
9. The 7 July attacks against the London
Underground were the first suicide attacks in the UK. On that
day, the mandatory security requirements were raised to their
highest level across the rail and underground networks resulting
in the tightening of the existing measures. Prompted in part by
TRANSEC, industry also introduced measures over and above their
regulatory requirements, previously agreed with TRANSEC.
10. A rail industry working group has been
convened to keep under review existing security policies and consider
any further areas for action following the London attacks. This
will ensure greater and more prompt focus is given to the full
range of rail security issues.
11. TRANSEC collaborates with other agencies,
principally the Home Office and NSAC to support their research
and development activities in a number of areas that are of relevance
to transport security. These include:
— evaluation and development of "Intelligent
Vision Systems"—systems designed to automatically or
semi-automatically detect unusual or unauthorised behaviour in
a CCTV image;
— investigation into blast effects
and blast mitigation strategies, with a particular emphasis on
blast on tube trains; and
— behavioural sciences—including
techniques for identifying suspicious behaviour.
Bus and Coach Security
12. TRANSEC issued protective security advice
and guidance to all bus and coach companies in the United Kingdom
in November 2005. This is based in part on the regimes TRANSEC
has in place for elements of the rail industry.
Annex B
AVIATION SECURITY
1. Security regulation was introduced into
the aviation sector through the Aviation Security Act 1982. TRANSEC
is responsible for regulating and monitoring compliance with aviation
security standards in the UK. It also works to protect UK airline
operations overseas, including by pressing for higher standards
and better implementation internationally.
2. Under the 1982 Act, TRANSEC issues Directions
to airlines, airports and others and requires these "Directed
Parties" to carry out the measures specified—such as
the screening of passengers and their bags. Directions are written
in broad terms, leaving industry managers to identify the optimum
means of implementing the requirements. They specify the minimum
standard required though industry can apply additional measures
should it choose to do so. The Directions, together with the recommended
practices which indicate how standards may be best applied, make
up the National Aviation Security Programme (NASP).
3. Measures are primarily ground-based.
The airport Restricted Zone (RZ) is a "cordon sanitaire"
in which all passengers, staff, baggage and cargo are subject
to screening. As in other modes, security is layered; it is a
combination of measures rather than a single line of defence.
4. Ensuring that measures are implemented
effectively is crucial. TRANSEC inspectors assess the delivery
of security on the ground to ensure that the required standards
are being met. TRANSEC maintains a constructive dialogue with
industry at all levels and encourages them to take ownership and
responsibility for ensuring standards are being met. TRANSEC seeks
rectification where appropriate and takes enforcement action where
necessary.
5. The delivery of effective aviation security
requires co-ordinated working between stakeholders, including
government, industry and the Police and other control authorities.
Sir John Wheeler's 2002 report on aviation security, commissioned
by Government, endorsed TRANSEC's role in this relationship. It
also concluded that multi-agency analytical work on the threat
of serious and organised crime to airport security was required
in order to develop a more holistic approach. This recommendation
led to the establishment of the Multi-Agency Threat and Risk Assessment
(MATRA) process at UK airports.
6. Under MATRA, those with a stake in the
security of the airport work together to agree a risk register
and identify further actions required to mitigate risks to an
acceptable level, which ultimately leads to an airport security
plan. This voluntary process is supported by a joint DfT/Home
Office secretariat, which promotes best practice and monitors
progress. MATRA has created greater mutual familiarity between
stakeholders for each other's responsibilities, ways of working,
issues and concerns.
7. Since 11 September 2001, the overall
pace and scope of international aviation security work has increased
dramatically and a large number of initiatives have been taken
forward. As a comprehensive regime already existed in the UK,
relatively little change to UK practice was required. Some of
our international partners faced a greater challenge in raising
their levels of protective security. There has been a greater
impetus in a number of international organisations to develop
new aviation security standards and initiatives. This has called
for even greater engagement by TRANSEC internationally, both multilaterally
in the EU, ICAO, ECAC and G8, and through an intensified programme
of overseas assessments and other bilateral work.
8. Work in the EU is the highest priority
from an international perspective as EC Regulations are directly
applicable in UK law, and bear on key neighbouring States with
major traffic flows to the UK. The UK engages closely in the work
of the EC Regulatory Committee which develops the regulatory standards
and implementing procedures for aviation security in the EU, and
is contributing actively to the present recasting of the baseline
EU regulation, in light of two years' experience of its application.
9. The UK also plays a very active role
in ICAO and a high priority is to try to raise the security baseline
and to press for ICAO standards which are more directly relevant
to the current threat scenario. TRANSEC also makes best use of
opportunities in international fora to raise awareness of the
seriousness and global nature of the threat to aviation.
10. TRANSEC carries out a major programme
of overseas assessments, in co-operation with Host State authorities.
This programme concentrates primarily on UK airline operations
to encourage standards which will enable UK airlines to operate
securely. In addition, an intensified programme of visits to the
UK by aviation security specialists from foreign governments allows
TRANSEC to promote and demonstrate UK aviation security philosophy
and best practice to those best placed to influence standards
overseas.
11. TRANSEC employs Regional Aviation Security
Liaison Officers (RASLOs) based overseas to work collaboratively
with international partners and UK airlines in key regions around
the world, providing technical and specialist support, training
and guidance. TRANSEC has been actively involved in training activities
internationally for many years. This has particular benefits at
locations where UK airlines operate but also serves to improve
the security environment for other airline operations to the UK.
Annex C
MARITIME SECURITY
1. Security regulation was first introduced
into the maritime sector through the Aviation & Maritime Security
Act 1990. TRANSEC is responsible for regulating maritime security
and monitoring compliance in the UK. It also works to protect
UK maritime operations overseas, including by pressing for higher
standards and better implementation internationally.
2. TRANSEC is given operational support
by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) in ensuring that UK
registered cargo vessels are compliant with the requirements of
the International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code. UK passenger
vessels, ferry services and all of the UK's port facilities serving
ships engaged on international voyages fall within the work of
TRANSEC directly. It also maintains general oversight of the maritime
security arrangements for the Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies.
3. An important aspect of TRANSEC's work
is to inform the UK shipping and port industries of changes in
the security levels in response to threat information that is
received by TRANSEC from the intelligence services. This is done
by a secure means of communication.
4. The implementation of the ISPS Code in
July 2004 represented a major change in the way maritime security
was regulated. Developed by the IMO and given effect by European
regulation, it has been embraced by the shipping and ports industries
where levels of compliance were already satisfactory.
5. TRANSEC worked with industry to introduce
security measures that were proportionate and sustainable. There
is now a programme of compliance to ensure that the security plans
agreed and approved by TRANSEC and the MCA are in place. TRANSEC
works with the EC and Member States to ensure that compliance
with the requirements is being achieved internationally. Where
necessary, it engages in capacity building initiatives in partnership
with the EC, G8 States and the IMO.
6. The maritime security programme includes
engaging with other Government Departments to provide assurance
that an effective response to maritime threats and incidents can
be mounted. Specifically, TRANSEC is contributing to security
planning for major events and participating in security drills
and exercises. Maritime contingency plans are under review by
industry to ensure that they are effective and can be activated
at all times.
7. The regulatory regime is being extended
in two areas. First, by 1 July 2007 sea-going domestic maritime
operations will come within the regulatory regime. Secondly and
within a similar timetable, by way of an EC Directive, security
regulations will also apply to all commercial maritime transport
operations at ports, extending their scope beyond the port facility
where the ship and the port interface.
8. Two considerations will help to lessen
the impact of these legislative developments. First, domestic
maritime operations will be subject to a risk assessment to determine
which need to be subject to the full regulatory regime and those
which may be exempted from some of the provisions. Secondly, the
provisions of the EC Directive were foreseen and TRANSEC has tailored
its existing instructions and guidance on security at port facilities
accordingly.
9. The maritime security programme of TRANSEC
also embraces operations which lie outside of the ISPS regime.
The first step towards establishing this policy will be to undertake
a risk assessment based on threat and vulnerability in order to
establish the priority of further work.
Annex D
CONTINGENCIES AND
RESPONSE
1. TRANSEC is mainly focused on seeking
to prevent terrorist attacks. Response to incidents, as we saw
on 7 July, is primarily a matter for the emergency services, working
in close co-operation with staff from the utilities and local
authorities (primary and secondary responders, as they are designated
in the Civil Contingencies Act). TRANSEC is not the funder of
any of these responders and is not empowered to direct their response
activities. Nor would it wish to direct because it cannot be as
expert in judging what is the best way to handle an incident underground,
for example, as either the people who run the system or the highly
trained emergency response personnel.
2. It does nonetheless have some important
contributions to deliver. The aim of this work is to ensure that:
— at the strategic level, DfT plays
its part in government-wide preparations for crisis and in exercises
on contingency planning;
— individual divisions are ready to
deliver what may be required of them in a crisis response (such
as authorisation of air exclusion zones or relaxation of restrictions
on drivers' hours); and
— there is dialogue with industry about
contingency planning, so that TRANSEC can share information about
risks and work together intelligently in a crisis.
3. TRANSEC also quality controls the emergency
plans held by key divisions within DfT, setting out how they will
deliver their part of a response to crisis, including one occurring
without notice and/or "out of hours".
4. Ministers have agreed that it is not
appropriate for the Department to audit transport operators' own
contingency plans. However, TRANSEC has been stepping up contacts
with industry on contingency planning to ensure that the transport
sector has adequate information on developments (eg on current
threats and hazards) to enable them to maintain, update and regularly
exercise their plans.
5. Many contingency plans are regularly
called into play to meet day to day problems such as breakdowns,
bomb alerts or unplanned closures of transport systems. Along
with partners such as the Regional Resilience Teams, TRANSEC seeks
to add value at the higher level, where there is a need to ensure
that plans consider wider events and indirect impacts. The value
of exercises has been repeatedly mentioned by responders in debriefs
following 7 July. These exercises not only model reality very
accurately, but contribute to the familiarity and excellent joint
working that was seen from all responders on 7 July.
Annex E
RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT
People Screening
A major trial at Heathrow Airport provided successful
results to the extent that TRANSEC approved the method as an alternative
way of screening people, bringing benefits in terms of security
and passenger facilitation.
X-ray screener competency
TRANSEC has made further advances in improving
the standards of x-ray screening. A new version of the national
test has been developed and introduced. This version has improved
robustness and also raised the standard required. Further developments
have taken place in the application of threat image projection
(TIP)—a system for improving screener alertness. The UK
requirements have been adopted by ECAC as the European standard.
Software which analyses the TIP data on individual
screeners has been distributed to users. The process allows TRANSEC
to monitor their performance and allow comparisons to be made
between other UK airports.
Staff management
The supervisors of security staff have an important
role to play in quality control. TRANSEC funded a comprehensive
study into best practice, one output being a comprehensive guidance
booklet. This new knowledge will be used to fashion a validation
trial.
Technology evaluation
TRANSEC has continued to evaluate commercial
security equipment in the areas of hold baggage screening, metal
detection and explosive trace detection. The work on baggage systems
has led to the setting of enhanced UK standards and, together
with the work on metal detectors, has made an important contribution
to the development of EU standards.
December 2005
5 Current TRANSEC Director is Niki Tompkinson. Back
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