Supplementary memorandum from the Department
for Transport (DfT) (TS 27)
QUESTIONS ARISING FROM THE TRANSPORT COMMITTEE'S
HEARING ON TRANSPORT SECURITY—2 NOVEMBER 2005
NEW SECURITY
EQUIPMENT AT
PADDINGTON
1. The Committee would be interested in being
briefed on, and viewing, the equipment to be tested at Paddington
and London Underground network when it is operational. Could this
be arranged?
Yes. We suggest a private briefing and demonstration
in the early stages of the trial.
RESPONSIBILITY
2. Who has formal responsibility at Cabinet
level for transport security in the UK?
The Secretary of State for Transport. The Home
Secretary has overall responsibility for national security.
CURRENT THREAT
3. What is the current intelligence assessment
of the present level of threat from terror attacks to UK transport
systems, and on what is that threat based? How much credence does
the Government place in such assessments?
It is not appropriate to comment specifically
on intelligence matters in an open document. Furthermore, the
intelligence services are continuing to look at the security and
intelligence aspects of the July events. What can be said is that
UK transport systems have been assessed as being at a high level
of threat for some time. Events both here and overseas have confirmed
the accuracy of the assessments. The Madrid commuter attacks of
March 2004 and the London attacks in July 2005 demonstrated the
intent of terrorists to attack the rail networks and their inherent
vulnerability.
RESPONSE TO
CURRENT THREAT
4. Is it not a mistake to base protective
security measures for UK transport systems on intelligence when
we find that the intelligence has not been there, or was not sufficiently
precise, or was wrong?
Threat assessments are provided by JTAC, a multi-agency
group of counter terrorist experts based within the Security Service.
It takes account of what is known from intelligence and past activity
about terrorists' capability and intentions. These assessments
usually reflect the general picture. In deciding how best to manage
the risks in response to these assessments, we will also take
account of the industry's vulnerability to attack and the probable
impact of the measures. Where specific intelligence about a threat
is received we will consider specific additional security measures
in response.
5. Does the Government agree that in the
absence of intelligence that is good enough to stop attacks like
"9/11", the Madrid train bombings in 2004, and the London
bombings, a much greater protective security effort needs to be
mounted on our transport systems?
Security is kept under continuous review so
that appropriate new measures can be developed and incorporated,
and indeed security has been steadily increased since the various
attacks. All the measures currently in place are sustainable for
the foreseeable future with the aim of creating a security regime
that is practicable and allows the transport networks to continue
to function effectively.
6. Are London's transport networks going
to continue to be the main terrorist target in the UK?
It is not appropriate to comment on specific
knowledge of terrorist targeting but clearly the transport network
remains a major target and this forms a key assumption in our
contingency planning.
RESPONSE TO
THE EVENTS
OF 7 AND
21 JULY
7. What concrete steps has TRANSEC taken
to improve its performance in the light of the current terrorist
threat?
TRANSEC has increased the quantity of staff
in order to take on the additional work required, and through
careful recruitment processes has ensured that quality remains
high. New staff attend customised induction training courses.
Staff responsible for devising our security
programmes are briefed regularly on the threat and on terrorist
modus operandi. New programmes of work have benefited from the
considerable level of professional expertise within the Directorate
and from consultation with other security experts.
8. What is the Government's assessment of
the way the transport authorities and the emergency services responded
on 7 and 21 July? Could the response have been better? In what
ways will it be better in future?
As stated publicly by both the Secretary of
State for Transport and the Home Secretary, the response on 7
and 21 July was very effective, due to the amount of pre-planning
and exercises that had taken place. Key lessons learned include
the need for greater clarity over command and control of closing
and re-opening the transport networks, and for more streamlined
communications with the transport operators during a crisis.
PUBLIC CONFIDENCE
IN TRANSPORT
SECURITY
9. One of TRANSEC's key stated aims is "to
retain public confidence in transport security". How does
TRANSEC measure the extent to which it is succeeding in retaining
public confidence in transport security and meeting this aim?
Formally, we have used Departmental questions
in national attitudinal surveys to give us feedback. Less formally
we use feedback from industry contacts, amount and content of
correspondence from the public as a very rough guide to the level
of public confidence. Letters from the public often compare security
overseas unfavourably to that experienced at home eg standards
in aviation security at overseas airports.
More recently, questions on security were included
in a BMRB Access Omnibus Survey, looking at how Londoners and
users of the London Underground have responded to the London bombings
and their attitudes to the potential introduction of higher security
measures on the transport network.
10. People have been reported as being reluctant
to use the London Underground since the events in July. What are
the facts about current usage, and is any reduction of numbers
not a good measure of the extent to which the public has lost
confidence in those responsible for protecting them when travelling?
It is too soon to be sure what the overall effect
of July's events will be on passenger numbers. However, the figures
show that in September passenger numbers were only slightly below
those for 2004 and that confidence in the tube has recovered.
The main fall in passenger journeys were in July, when several
tube lines were closed. The northern section of the Piccadilly
line and the Circle line did not re-open until 4 August. In all
about 1½ % of scheduled train kilometres were lost as result
of the July bombings.
| London Underground (Passenger millions)
|
| Months | 2004
| 2005 |
| January | 77.1 | 79.1
|
| February | 81.6 | 83.9
|
| March | 88.4 | 78.3
|
| April | 87.0 | 88.8
|
| May | 78.7 | 84.7
|
| June | 78.8 | 82.7
|
| July | 80.8 | 76.7
|
| August | 78.1 | 73.4
|
| September | 81.7 | 81.0
|
| October | 85.1 |
|
| November | 87.2 |
|
| December | 76.6 |
|
MEDIA
11. Does TRANSEC consider the media an ally in the fight
against terror?
The media has its job to do and has a legitimate interest
in security and public safety. Coverage can be helpful.
12. Can TRANSEC explain why you think it is not helpful
for the media to highlight alleged weaknesses in security?
We always investigate any alleged breaches of security, whether
exposed by the media or by anyone else, so that we can address
any weaknesses. Our preference would be for genuine weaknesses
not to be put into the public domain, as it could help terrorists.
If, on investigation, the alleged weaknesses prove not to be genuine,
then public confidence is undermined for no good reason. But refuting
unsubstantiated media allegations normally entails putting more
into the public domain than is in the interests of national security.
OUTREACH TO
THE PUBLIC
13. What extra is TRANSEC doing to enlist the support
of the public in enlisting their active cooperation in the effort
to make our transport systems safer places to use?
Since the Madrid commuter attacks in March 2004, TRANSEC
has worked with the land transport industry in particular to increase
the level of public awareness by promulgating a variety of public
messages. This requirement on industry will be included in forthcoming
Instructions to the rail industry.
TRANSEC AND THE
TRANSPORT INDUSTRIES
14. Is TRANSEC confident that it has the wholehearted
support of the transport industry in driving up the standards
of protection afforded to the travelling public?
The transport industries have a responsible attitude towards
security as evidenced by the high standards of compliance and
by the approach taken by industry in our many dealings with them
at all levels. TRANSEC ensures that key industry senior managers
and security contacts are properly briefed on the threat, so that
the need to maintain good security is well understood.
15. Does TRANSEC not accept that when commercial considerations
have to be taken into account in determining security, then ideal
security must necessarily be compromised?
The starting point is always the security objective and working
with industry to identify different ways of delivering that objective.
Commercial considerations may point us towards one solution over
another, rather than there being a stark choice between good security
or not.
16. What sanctions does TRANSEC have against those transport
operators who fail to implement the protective security measures
you recommend? If TRANSEC has none at its own hand, how is enforcement
delivered?
Relevant primary legislation establishes offences in relation
to persons who, without reasonable excuse, fail to do anything
required by an instruction or direction issued under that legislation.
If found guilty of such an offence a person is liable, on summary
conviction, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum; or
on conviction on indictment, to a fine or to a term of imprisonment
not exceeding two years, or both.
TRANSEC adopts a stepped approach to enforcement that is
clearly understood by the regulated industries. The steps range
from informal discussions for very minor issues, formal written
requests for rectification in a stated timeframe, "on the
spot" notices requiring immediate rectification, to the issue
of a formal "Enforcement Notice" which prescribes rectification
measures and is, in effect, a formal warning of impending prosecution,
non-compliance with which is in itself an offence.
In practice we have never had to move beyond the stage of
Enforcement Notice issue to secure compliance.
In terms of less formal "sanctions" TRANSEC's inspectors
do have the power, for example, to detain an aircraft for the
purpose of carrying out an inspection. This power is not used
often, but if it is, the act of delaying an aircraft in itself
represents an effective and immediate sanction where there is
reason to suspect that security procedures have not been properly
complied with.
17. How frequently does industry resist TRANSEC recommendations?
Have there been prosecutions to ensure compliance? If so, how
many?
Industry representatives play a full part in the consultation
process to develop the security programmes, and expect a clear
explanation of why the various elements are needed. Our aim is
to reach agreement with industry before the measures are included
in directions or instructions. Once this has happened, our experience
is that industry does its best to comply, and that any failures
are taken very seriously by industry management. Enforcement Notices
are quite rare and prosecution has not been necessary.
18. It appears intrinsic to TRANSEC's stated "Objective"
to ensure a balance between protecting the travelling public and
placing requirements on the transport industry that, in the words
of your Memorandum, do not "impact disproportionately ...
on the effectiveness and efficiency of industry operations".
How do you ensure this "balance", and how do you know
when the "balance" is right?
The process is as described in the answers to questions 15
and 17 above. By focusing on our security objective and by looking
at options for meeting the objective and engaging with the industry
on how the different options will impact on their business, we
can usually find the right balance. Although security is our first
concern, we would feel that we had failed if our measures impeded
the transport operation to the point that it was no longer commercially
viable or that the public were deterred from travelling.
19. Can TRANSEC offer the committee examples of where
the "balance" of security and industry burden has been
achieved, and others where it has not?
The post-Madrid review of rail security resulted in a package
of measures which enhanced rail security but which also took account
of the burden on industry. This was achieved through close working
with industry before recommendations were put to ministers. Further
information is attached at Appendices A and B.
20. Is TRANSEC actively working with aircraft manufacturers
to ensure that the specification for new generation aircraft incorporates
anti-terrorist protection devices?
Passenger aircraft operating in the UK are required to have
lockable, reinforced cockpit doors. Such doors can be specified
when a new aircraft is ordered.
On-board anti-terrorist protection devices which will counter
a surface to air missile attack against a civil aircraft are under
development. Should this technology prove viable, we shall work
with the US and other international partners in establishing a
common approach to the aircraft manufacturers.
RISK
21. "Having already implemented measures for the
largely `closed' transport systems which TRANSEC deems to be pragmatic,
proportionate and cost-effective, the challenge now lies in developing
options for addressing "open" systems and new modes
of attack". Define the rationale for "closed" and
"open" systems of transport, and explain the reasons
why TRANSEC has prioritised security for the former over the latter
Transport systems vary greatly for reasons unconnected with
security. We have had to accept and work with those differences
when devising appropriate approaches to security. The nature of
air travel (international focus, relatively limited number of
entry and exit points to the system, used for longer journeys
and the need in many instances for other passenger controls) has
made it possible to maintain a "closed" system and to
exercise central security controls. This has been helpful in addressing
the risk to aviation posed by terrorists and others. History demonstrates
that aviation has long been an attractive target and it has thus
been subject to security for a longer period than other modes
of transport. The consequences of a successful attack remain potentially
catastrophic and it is right that every effort continues to be
made to address vulnerabilities.
In recent years, terrorist attacks around the world have
demonstrated a shift towards "soft" targets ie those
that are harder to protect. These include the open networks such
as rail and underground systems, which are designed to be readily
accessed by large numbers of people for relatively short journeys.
It is not possible to apply the same "aviation-style"
security techniques to a closed system, but much effort has been
devoted to devising measures which enhance security in what are
effectively public places.
The closed systems do not take priority over the open ones.
The increase in TRANSEC's staff over the past four years has enabled
us to run programmes for all the modes of transport which are
fit for purpose.
22. Can TRANSEC provide information about the "baseline"
measures that remain in place regardless of threat?
All the National Security Programmes (the baseline measures)
are classified RESTRICTED. A summary of the approach adopted for
each regulated transport mode can be found in Appendix C.
BUSINESS PLANNING
AND REPORTING
23. Does TRANSEC's Business Plan contain specific Departmental
performance targets? If so, what are these?
Yes. TRANSEC's Business Plan conforms to the DfT format and
includes high level and detailed targets. It would not be appropriate
to detail these in this document as there are many dozens of targets,
and some of them will in themselves reveal details of existing
security vulnerabilities. However, we would be pleased to let
the Committee have sight of our Business Plan during their visit
to TRANSEC. The overall aims of the 2005-06 plan are:
(a) To maintain and improve transport security and resilience.
(b) To devise and enforce appropriate and effective security
regimes for delivery by transport providers in the UK.
(c) To promote effective security in overseas transport
networks.
24. Could consideration be given to reinstating some level
of detail on expenditure and human resource allocation, and performance
targets, in the TRANSEC Annual Report for the future?
Yes, as the Committee clearly finds this information helpful
we will consider reinstating information on expenditure and human
resource allocation. We will also consider what we might reasonably
say about performance targets, though in this area we are likely
to be more constrained by security considerations.
25. The TRANSEC Annual Reports 2001 to 2003 contained
an annex on "incident statistics" which also appears
to have been dropped. Would the Department consider reinstating
this?
We are currently reviewing our processes for collating incident
information to ensure better consistency of reporting across the
modes. We will certainly consider including something on this
subject in future years' reports. Please note, however, that the
level of detail on incidents from around the world is unlikely
to be repeated as it was concluded that the cost of collecting
and collating such data was disproportionate, and the staff resource
has been reallocated to other tasks. Future data will therefore
be restricted to incidents with a direct UK interest.
26. Would TRANSEC undertake to establish a stable reporting
template in order to facilitate comparisons year on year? Would
the Department undertake to look at that with a view to implementing
it from the next annual reporting cycle?
We would prefer a consistent format for the Annual Report
as it would make both its production, and year on year comparisons,
far easier. Some of the changes in the most recent report reflected
the fact that we published it on our website for the first time,
and notwithstanding undertakings we have made above regarding
its future content we will aim for a more consistent format in
future. We need to recognise, however, that external factors and
differing priorities year on year may necessitate some changes
in format.
27. The Departmental Annual Report 2005 contains a section
on the work of TRANSEC. Rather than deposit a separate report
in the Library of the House of Commons, would it not avoid duplication
and aid transparency to include it as an annex to the Department's
main report?
This is an interesting proposal and one that we will consider.
Timing may be an issue as the Departmental report is usually ready
ahead of TRANSEC's Annual Report which contains more detail. We
will also need to check that the proposal would meet our legislative
obligations.
28. What proportion of the TRANSEC budget in 2004-05 was
spent on administration and what proportion on "front line"
duties?
Of 200 staff, 122 people are engaged in front-line work,
35 in direct support of this work and a further 24 in general
administrative support, and 19 senior and middle management of
TRANSEC. TRANSEC's budget (£16.8 million) is allocated accordingly.
THE COST
OF SECURITY
29. Does the Government know what the financial cost is
to the transport industries and the travelling public of implementing
TRANSEC's security measures? How can we be sure that the cost
of security in ticket prices represents good value for money?
It is not possible to put a figure on this. It is for the
industry to decide how to deliver security requirements. In some
cases security will be a dedicated function and in others security
will be combined with other duties. It is in the industry's interests
to provide security in the most cost-effective way, so long as
they comply with our requirements. Through industry working groups
and formal and informal contacts, we can advise on best practice.
Ultimately, security value for money is hard to measure by
normal business methods. Our working assumption is that without
security there would be more attacks, with consequential loss
of life and disruption to society.
30. Does the Government have a figure for the total annual
cost to the Government of security in the UK?
As set out in the 2004 Spending Review, the Government provided
additional resources so that by 2007-08 the UK's planned investment
in counter terrorism and resilience will be over £2billion—more
than double the pre-11 September 2001 level. This does not include
core military and police spending.
31. Is it right to leave the cost of transport security
primarily with the industries when terrorist outrages have a country-
wide impact? In those circumstances should the contribution from
general taxation to security not be increased, and will the Government
undertake to examine the current policy?
The Government's policy is that the user should pay. The
cost of transport security is borne by industry and passed on
to the passenger. The same principle applies to the security of
other sectors of the Critical National Infrastructure.
AGENCIES' CO
-OPERATION
32. Transport security has been "established"
"recently" as a "separate workstream" within
one part of the Government's long-term counter terrorism strategy,
and this has made for "more effective" working by "key
Government stakeholders". Why has this happened only recently,
and was previous cooperation between the "key Government
stakeholders" poor?
There have always been good informal links between those
responsible for contributing to transport security. In addition
to TRANSEC's programmes, the police have a role to play in protective
security. The industries receive further practical advice on a
range of protective security measures from two additional sources—National
Security Advisory Centre (NSAC), which is part of the Security
Service, and National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre
(NISCC), which specialises in advising on electronic security.
A review and rationalisation of the Government's whole counter-terrorist
programme (CONTEST) earlier this year resulted in a move to four
separate sub-programmes, of which protective security is one.
Within that, transport security was identified as a workstream
in its own right (although it is technically one of the 10 sectors
of the Critical National Infrastructure which is also a workstream).
The Director of TRANSEC was appointed Senior Responsible
Owner for the transport security workstream, with a remit to co-ordinate
all aspects of transport security and report to the official and
ministerial committees. This has provided a more formal framework
and is programme managed to ensure that the various stakeholders
have visibility of each others' work, that the boundaries between
the various programmes are managed efficiently and that progress
reports are given at scheduled intervals to the Committee that
oversees the work. This builds on and strengthens the informal
processes already in place.
33. Is there now sufficiently close cooperation and exchange
of information between TRANSEC and other security and intelligence
agencies to ensure that vital intelligence in the hands of the
counter-terrorism agencies reaches those who need to know in the
"front line", and what concrete examples do you have?
Co-operation and exchange of information is excellent. The
establishment of the Government's Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre
(JTAC) in 2003 brought together in one organisation counter-terrorist
specialists from across Government and the intelligence agencies
to provide a single point of contact for threat assessment. A
small number of TRANSEC staff are "visiting members"
of JTAC and have full access on a daily basis to all relevant
intelligence. Reports are also read by senior managers and others
within TRANSEC so that we can take account of them in our front-line
work. Key contacts in the industry are also briefed on a confidential
basis as appropriate. JTAC provide regular written and oral briefings
to industry meetings, eg the National Security Committees established
by TRANSEC and give specific assessments as required.
34. TRANSEC states that work in the EU is the "highest
priority from an international perspective", but suicide
bombers will presumably enter the aviation system at the weakest
security link -which might be in a country far from Europe. Can
TRANSEC explain the priority it gives to Europe?
TRANSEC seeks to raise the baseline of international standards
and improve standards of implementation as a key part of its efforts
to enhance aviation security worldwide. We focus this multilateral
activity primarily on the two bodies which set mandatory standards,
the EU and ICAO.
Of these, we give precedence to the EU work on both strategic
and practical grounds. In 2004, 73% of aircraft arriving in the
UK came from another European country. We have found from experience
that it is more likely that higher standards can be agreed and
adopted among the 25 EU MS than across the Contracting States
of ICAO, which have more diverse economic, cultural and geographical
circumstances. The EU encompasses developed countries with similar
concerns about the current threat, who in most cases had already
adopted most or all of the key security provisions of the voluntary
European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) aviation security programme,
from which the EU regime was largely derived. The EU standards
are also being actively adopted outside the EU by states seeking
to join the Union, and by a progressive programme to extend the
acquis through Neighbourhood Agreements and mutual recognition
arrangements.
The measures adopted by the EC for aviation security are
directly applicable in the UK, and therefore we need to be closely
involved in their development in order to ensure that measures
which could conflict with or dilute important elements of the
UK programme are not adopted.
We are also closely involved in the development of standards
in ICAO, which is the global regulator, and have pressed successfully
for reinforcement and clarification of ICAO standards and recommended
practices.
35. Can TRANSEC explain in detail where and how the worldwide
aviation network needs to strengthen its protection, and what
TRANSEC is doing to help?
Civil aviation continues to be an attractive target for terrorists.
Its network character provides the opportunity for targets to
be reached indirectly, through the exploitation of weaknesses
anywhere in the international system. The threat to civil aviation
from international terrorism is at an enhanced level in the UK,
and in many other parts of the world. We believe standards world-wide
are inconsistent compared to the UK. To meet the threat to UK
operations, the UK works both multilaterally and bilaterally,
in concert with the FCO and other parts of Government, to drive
up standards worldwide.
Aviation security worldwide is governed by international
law set out in Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention 1944. This Annex
is administered by the International Civil Aviation Organisation
(ICAO), whose Contracting States are required to implement the
security standards set out in Annex 17. The UK has pressed strongly
in the wake of 9/11 for action to enhance standards to an appropriate
level for the current threat. We have since led the development
of Amendment 11 to Annex 17, which when adopted in July 2006 will
further enhance the international civil aviation security baseline.
The UK is a major contributor to the ICAO aviation security
budget which funds the ICAO Universal Security Audit Programme.
Under this programme, ICAO audits the security standards in place
in the Contracting States against those in Annex 17 and provides
training and assistance to states where deficiencies are identified.
Audit results are not published for obvious reasons.
Within Europe, the UK has played a major role in the development
of a harmonised EU aviation security regime. The EU regulation
is binding upon all member states, and is currently being reviewed
and further refined, with UK input. We also contribute trained
staff to assist with the EU and ECAC security audit programmes.
As part of its G8 Presidency, the UK took forward work to
develop best practice guidance in key areas of aviation security,
which will support work in ICAO and the EU.
TRANSEC employs Regional Aviation Security Liaison Officers
based around the world, to work with local Governments to help
to raise aviation security standards. We also provide an advisor
to support and assist Governors in the UK Caribbean Overseas Territories
and Bermuda on aviation security matters.
Every UK Mission overseas has a Post Aviation Security Officer,
to engage with those responsible for aviation security in the
host country and to provide local support for UK airline operations
abroad. The PASO's act as TRANSEC's "eyes and ears".
Significant improvements have been made in recent times to the
training and support given to PASOs, who also facilitate TRANSEC's
continuing programme of assessments of the security standards
applied to UK carriers overseas.
The UK also provides assistance, through training courses,
technical advice and information exchanges, in partnership with
other countries and organisations, and also bilaterally. We regularly
host inward visits by the aviation security authorities of other
states, as an opportunity to promote the UK's aviation security
approach through briefings on key issues and visits to airports.
This approach is delivering enhancements in local security overseas
and strengthening our relationships with key individuals. The
FCO's Global Opportunities Fund promotes the UK's aviation security
objectives by providing funding to support projects intended to
raise and sustain the level of aviation security overseas.
36. Expand on what problems, if any, do the apparent differences
in the US and European approaches to the global terrorist threat
have in pursuing international cooperation and transport security?
We work closely with our US partners and benefit greatly
from the work which they do, for example in the field of technology
development. There are some differences in approach to physical
security and personnel security and our respective ways of assessing
risk.
TRAINING
37. Why is security training on transport modes other
than aviation on an "advisory basis" only? What exactly
does "advisory basis" mean?
"Advisory" in this sense means that there is no
legal obligation (through instruction or direction) for certain
staff to undergo specified training, and therefore no recourse
to prosecution in the event that staff are not appropriately trained.
The absence of a legal obligation does not mean that appropriate
training is not taking place.
The security regimes in respect of non-aviation transport
modes are generally less well developed and less extensive, and
include only mandatory responsibilities in a number of areas that
are subject to formal regulation in civil aviation. This reflects
also the differing levels of threat and risk and our overall aim
to deliver proportionate regimes. There are, however, some mandatory
requirements for training outside aviation: key maritime security
staff (eg Port Facility Security Officers) are required to undergo
training, as are staff involved in the security of dangerous goods
in transport.
In railways, a basic training programme exists, and training
records are kept (and monitored by TRANSEC inspectors) even though
they are not mandated. Our Business Plan includes objectives for
issuing instructions/directions on training but these are not
our top priorities.
38. TRANSEC has plans to regulate training in other modes.
What are these plans, and what stage have they reached?
TRANSEC is currently in the process of mandating a requirement
on the rail industry including London Underground and regulated
light rail operators to provide security training for staff with
specific security duties. Work is quite well advanced on draft
detailed training requirements, and we expect to consult the industry
and issue appropriate instructions during 2006.
39. What training does TRANSEC provide for railway staff?
TRANSEC currently provides a counter-terrorist security training
course for those in the rail industry with direct managerial responsibility
within their organisations for security policy or security staff.
The three day course aims to increase awareness of rail security
issues. It is held twice a year (subject to demand) and is provided
without charge. We are currently developing a training course
specifically for industry trainers to equip them to deliver security
training to a wider range of rail staff.
In addition to formal training, TRANSEC provides the rail
industry with a training toolokit and aides which includes a railway
security training video. This is widely used as part of induction
and refresher training programmes. The video is currently being
updated and it is hoped that it will be ready for distribution
in early in 2006. The toolkit is designed to provide guidance
and materials to enable operators to train staff in security matters
appropriate to their roles—ranging from general security
awareness through to screening and searching. Further elements
are under preparation.
VETTING
40. Explain the system of security vetting that currently
applies in the transport industry. What are the guiding principles?
Government security vetting is applied to:
— aviation security staff at UK passenger terminals;
— Port Facility Security Officers and their deputies;
— all staff at the Folkestone Channel Tunnel site;
— security staff at Waterloo and Ashford Eurostar
terminals; and
— national rail and underground security managers.
Other staff undertaking security duties may undergo checks
of their identity, employment history or criminal record. We aim
to undertake vetting of industry staff where:
(a) the duty of the post is one that is regulated by TRANSEC,
and
(b) there would be value from applying a vetting check
as an adjunct to primary security measures.
41. How many applications did TRANSEC process in 2004-05?
What was the average time taken to process an application? What
performance measures does TRANSEC have in place to ensure that
its vetting processes are efficient? Does TRANSEC ask the transport
industry for feedback on its performance? If so, what do they
say?
In the financial year 2004-05 TRANSEC dealt with 10,733 applications.
Security vetting involves a check of Security Service records
and police records. The police check is completed by TRANSEC but
the Security Service checks are carried out by the Service's vetting
unit. The circumstances of each application will determine what
checks the Service need to make, so there is no standard turnaround
time for an application. On average, properly completed applications
took around six weeks to fully process in 2004-05.
Daily statistics help TRANSEC to monitor the performance
of the vetting process, although TRANSEC has no control over the
performance of the Security Service's vetting unit. TRANSEC invites
and receives feedback on the vetting process, principally through
regular NASC (National Aviation Security Committee) sub-committee
meetings with industry representatives. The most common area of
interest for the industry is turnaround timescales. We feel that
the industry generally understands how and why delays occur.
42. Is TRANSEC completely confident that you have sufficient
staff to deal efficiently with the current level of vetting applications?
The staffing of TRANSEC's vetting team is regularly reviewed.
We are confident that we have sufficient staff to deal with the
current level of applications.
43. Why is there no mandatory requirement to security
vet "general rail staff with security duties"? Who are
the staff referred to?
We are reviewing this issue and are considering a mandatory
requirement for the industry to carry out employment record checks
on staff intending to work in security related posts and to obtain
a declaration from each candidate that they have no disqualifying
criminal convictions. However the "open" nature of the
rail system compromises the value of extending Counter Terrorist
Check vetting beyond nominated security contacts and their deputies.
INFORMATION
44. Is there a database common to all the security, intelligence
and police agencies of those who may pose a threat to air and
other transport modes? If not, why not?
As far as screening passengers and goods are concerned, TRANSEC's
security programmes are based on a presumption that any individual
could potentially pose a threat and so the physical security measures
apply equally to all without reference to databases. In some cases,
staff engaged on security duties may require an appropriate level
of security clearance.
TRANSPORT MODAL
SECURITY
45. What proportion of TRANSEC's "front line"
resources are devoted to aviation, bus, maritime, rail and underground
respectively?
There are three modes within TRANSEC, and front-line staff
and their support are allocated as follows:
In addition, we have a team of 14 dedicated to industry training
and vetting, five on our R&D&E programme and a further
five working on threats and contingencies. These serve all the
modal branches.
AVIATION
46. What major problems and weaknesses of the overall
UK aviation security system has the TRANSEC inspectorate uncovered?
What is being done to remedy these?
In the period 1 January 2004 to 30 October 2005, 7,694 inspections
were undertaken of airports, airlines, regulated cargo agents
and caterers. Overall, the levels of compliance with the wide
range of UK requirements were good although a number of deficiencies
were noted and addressed. When deficiencies are found, TRANSEC
works closely with industry colleagues to rectify the situation.
Further information is shown at Annex A.
47. Why is the Multi-Agency threat and Risk Assessment
(MATRA) process at UK airports a voluntary one?
The MATRA process was recommended in Sir John Wheeler's report
"Review of Airport Security", published in 2002. His
report looked at arrangements for airport security including the
threat from serious and organised crime at airports and with particular
reference to the role of the police.
In his report, Sir John considered the need for legislative
change but recommended that the MATRA process should be a voluntary
one. Accordingly, the Government launched MATRA on a voluntary
basis. Looking ahead, MATRA will be one of the issues falling
within the scope of the review of policing at airports announced
by the Secretary of State on 21 November.
48. Do the present voluntary MATRA arrangements produce
a "gold standard" level of agency cooperation?
MATRA provides a methodical process for all stakeholders
at an airport to work together to identify the risks, mitigating
actions and lead responsibilities.
MATRA has been welcomed by stakeholders and has improved
co-operation between them. The process is still new and evolving
and is being supported by a joint Home Office and DfT Secretariat,
best practice guidance and by the NASC MATRA Sub-committee with
national representatives of stakeholder interests.
49. Explain the UK Government's policy to the successful
suicide hijacking of an aircraft in UK airspace
The Government's policy focuses on preventing such hijacks
from happening through the provision of effective civil aviation
security measures. These include ground-side security measures
at national and international airports and within the aviation
industry, as well as effective security measures onboard aircraft
flying within UK airspace. As a final resort the MOD's air defence
system provides a response to actual or potential hijacked aircraft.
The Ministry of Defence can provide the Committee with a
full, classified, briefing on the air defence response to renegade
aircraft.
50. Can the committee be confident that air traffic controllers,
and all agencies involved, including Government Ministers and
officials, are fully briefed and regularly trained to meet the
appalling eventuality of a suicide air hijacking in UK airspace?
How regularly does this training take place?
RAF personnel work permanently alongside NATS at all times.
The response to renegade aircraft forms a permanent element of
their activities, and therefore a basic element of the training
and daily business of relevant RAF and NATS personnel.
In addition there are two "end to end" tests of
the system each year, involving all those personnel and agencies
regularly involved. A number of smaller tests are also completed.
51. What training do UK aircraft cabin personnel, stewards
and stewardesses receive to deal with a hijacking?
All UK aircrew receive mandatory initial and refresher training.
Initial training includes a mandatory module on Hijacking which
includes training on countermeasures.
52. What view does TRANSEC have of Computer Assisted Passenger
Profiling? Is it a useful tool? If so, is it widely utilised in
the UK?
TRANSEC continues to stay in touch with current profiling
techniques of all kinds and remains open-minded about their use
if and when they prove suitable for aviation security applications.
In the event that a suitable technique were to become available
it seems more likely that an increased level of screening would
be applied to those who give cause for concern, rather than removing
screening altogether for those we are less concerned about. Certainly
TRANSEC are not currently considering any screening regime offering
less protection than the measures in place prior to 11 September
2001 attacks, even if systems suggested passengers are "safe".
TRANSEC has therefore decided that for the present the UK should
remain with the current model for aviation security of treating
all passengers and staff passing through the airport as potentially
a threat, and screens 100% of all persons (and items carried)
on entry to the Restricted Zone of the airport.
53. Is the device called "Robolander", which
is designed to enable air traffic controllers to take control
of aircraft and land them remotely, under active consideration
by TRANSEC?
Following the attacks of 11 September 2001, the "Robolander"
concept was proposed in the US as a way of preventing hijackers
mounting a successful attack. In concept, it is easy to understand;
removing control of the aircraft from those on board. In practice,
the challenges are significant—not least the fundamental
issue of whether such a necessarily complex system could be made
fail-safe. Air traffic management would also be an important issue
for remote piloting in crowded UK airspace. "Robolander"
remains a concept and is not under active consideration by TRANSEC
at present.
BUS
54. TRANSEC has plans to issue protective security advice
and guidance to bus and coach companies this month. Is this updated
advice, or has TRANSEC not issued advice previously?
TRANSEC issued best practice security guidance and advice
in November 2005.
55. Did TRANSEC offer urgent advice on protective security
to the bus companies (and the London Underground) after the 7
July bombings? If so, when, and what was that advice?
TRANSEC advised National Express and TfL after 7 July and
then subsequently produce best practice guidance which was circulated
to all operators in November 2005.
We were in immediate contact with the rail industry including
London Underground on 7 July to alert them to the increased threat
level and notifying them that they must implement security measures
required at the highest security response level. A meeting was
held the following day (8 July) with the Head of LU Operational
Security to agree additional measures, over and above those required,
appropriate to the circumstances.
Two further written communications were sent on 15 and 28
July and there was regular phone contact between TRANSEC officials
and LU security representatives throughout the period. We recommended
that industry continued to draw on guidance TRANSEC had circulated
earlier in the year for use at heightened threat levels. That
guidance recommended additional security measures over and above
the regulatory requirements including baggage reconciliation checks
on trains, train walkthroughs and greater frequency of public
security awareness announcements and messages on trains and at
stations.
MARITIME
56. Outline the main benefits to the travelling public
of the National Maritime Security Programme, and the main aspects
of the Programme
The travelling public will see the benefits of enhanced security
through our programme of measures to search a percentage of passengers,
their luggage and vehicles as they pass through port terminals.
They will also see fencing and access controls applied to restricted
areas in port facilities and on board the ships. They will also
see evidence of increased levels of CCTV coverage of specific
areas.
The travelling public will also benefit from a raft of measures
that will not be visible to them. These will include staff and
crew training, ship security alert systems, drills and exercises.
Also under the national programme we have an active compliance
monitoring regime. TRANSEC Maritime Compliance Inspectors assess
the security arrangements in place at UK ports and on UK registered
passenger ships to ensure that required standards are being met.
We pay particular attention to all UK flagged cruise ships
and we issue timely threat advice to the maritime industry and
guidance on appropriate counter measures that they should take.
Cruise ship operators may adjust schedules as a result, and rarely
may be advised not to go to certain locations.
57. Why are exemptions for some domestic maritime operators
from provisions of the new regulations due in 2007 being envisaged?
Given the present general security threat is this not a step in
the wrong direction?
The EC Regulation obliges Member States by 1st July 2007
to have conducted security risk assessments of our sea going domestic
operations and the port facilities that serve them. The purpose
of the risk assessments is to determine the extent to which security
measures should be applied to those operations. The risk assessments
take account of the nature of the operations, the threat posed
by terrorists to them and their vulnerability to terrorist attack.
The risk assessment may identify a number of additional maritime
operations that should be subject to the full regulatory regime.
The risk assessment may also show that full application of the
security regime would be disproportionate to the risk and unsustainable
in the long term for many domestic operations. These operations
may be exempt from at least some of the regulatory provisions.
Certain maritime operations are exempt from regulation but
nevertheless they fall within the overall scope of the national
maritime security programme. The exempt operations are:
(a) passenger vessels carrying 12 or fewer passengers
on international and domestic voyages;
(b) cargo ships of less than 500 gross tonnage on international
and domestic voyages;
(c) all passenger and cargo ships operating solely in
non-sea areas (ie those plying tidal estuaries, inland lakes and
waterways);
(e) vessels not used for commercial activities (ie, recreational
craft); and
(f) the port facilities that serve all of the above.
TRANSEC has already identified the domestic passenger vessels
operating on the tidal Thames to be a sector that warrants the
issuance of security advice. Advice has been issued to operators
by the multi-agency Thames Counter Terrorism Partnership and this
will be supplemented by more detailed advice to be issued by TRANSEC.
More generally, the first step towards establishing the policy
for sectors such as the fishing, recreational and small commercial
vessels is to undertake a risk assessment based on threat and
vulnerability in order to establish the priority of further work.
There are no plans to regulate the pleasure cruises in non
sea-going areas, nor the fishing industry, nor the recreational
sector. If a particular need arose, there is provision within
the Aviation and Maritime Security Act to issue directions to
maritime transport operations within the jurisdiction of a harbour
authority and to UK registered ships wherever they may be. The
case for continuing exemption of low-risk maritime sectors will
be kept under close review in the light of the prevailing threat
and security climate.
58. Is TRANSEC responsible for protective security on
off shore oil installations and related energy infrastructure?
TRANSEC is not responsible for protecting offshore installations
and energy related infrastructure. Policy responsibility rests
with the Department of Trade and Industry. However, TRANSEC does
apply security measures to the maritime transport operations that
interface with offshore installations such as supply vessels.
RAILWAYS
59. Explain the outcomes of the "comprehensive"
review of rail security TRANSEC undertook in the wake of the Madrid
rail attacks in March 2004
The review was designed to examine and re-appraise the security
measures already in place on the railways and to consider new
ideas and ways of improving the existing security regime. The
result was 18 recommendations for further work to produce specific
measures designed to enhance protective security and be proportionate,
pragmatic, sustainable without placing an undue burden on industry,
requiring a significant shift in the open nature of the rail system
or restricting the ability of the public to travel. There was
a mix of short and long measures. These are summarised in Appendix
B.
60. What steps are you taking to enhance protective security
on the rail network?
Earlier this year and in conjunction with the industry and
BTP, we developed and circulated guidance on a range of issues
including security of rail lines, covert testing protocols and
baggage reconciliation. We also produced a programme of enhanced
security measures for industry to draw upon at a time of heightened
threat. Operators used this post 7 July to introduce measures
over and above regulatory requirements.
We have also instigated work on identifying and dealing with
vulnerabilities arising from vehicle access to stations, and a
practical trial of screening techniques on the network commencing
with a study at Paddington. We are also supporting other Government
departments and agencies such as the Home Office and the NSAC
in their related research activities such as the development of
"intelligent vision" CCTV systems; bomb blast effects
and mitigation techniques and behavioural sciences such as the
recognition of suspicious behaviour.
CCTV
61. How would TRANSEC describe the state of the CCTV throughout
the London Underground? How many cameras are in place and what
is their age?
Whilst they may have a deterrent effect, CCTV cameras are
primarily used for crime reduction and investigation and general
operational purposes rather than as a key plank of TRANSEC's protective
security regime. We require CCTV coverage of certain locations
where an item may be secreted. From that perspective, LU's cameras
are fit for purpose but we support the work that LU is undertaking
to improve the system generally.
Throughout the London Underground network there are currently
6,000 CCTV cameras in operation with plans to increase this to
over 12,000 by 2010. Some of the existing CCTV systems are over
20 years old; however there is a strict maintenance regime in
place that ensures the best possible quality is maintained from
every CCTV system.
The data from all CCTV cameras is sufficient to provide operational
information to LU staff and is of sufficient quality to be submitted
as evidence for a criminal prosecution. With the refurbishment
or modernisation of all LU stations, the existing CCTV cameras
and associated recording equipment will be replaced and upgraded
with digital technology.
As well as replacing or upgrading the cameras, LU has a project
to replace its radio, data and video systems which will also improve
the quality of transmission of CCTV images to remote location,
for instance control rooms. This is due for completion in the
next two years.
62. What enhancements to CCTV could "Intelligent
Vision Systems" bring? Will IVS be implemented?
Intelligent Vision Systems (IVS) are often known as "smart
CCTV" systems. The term covers all systems designed to automatically
or semi-automatically detect unusual or unauthorised behaviour
in a CCTV image. IVS has been available for some time, and can
be used for simple tasks such as monitoring if a door is open
or closed. It is not at the moment suitable for the analysis of
a complex crowd scene. However, potential security applications
include watching access points or perimeters for movement, looking
for unattended bags or vehicles at vulnerable sites and spotting
an individual in a crowd acting "suspiciously".
Such systems could assist CCTV operators by alerting them
to an event that they need to monitor more closely thereby reduce
the burden on the CCTV operators and/or allow more cameras to
be monitored. IVS may also help speed up post incident analysis.
One of the problems is that environmental conditions can cause
high false alarm rates, so additional development and evaluation
work is needed before such systems will be suitable for widespread
use.
63. Is TRANSEC concerned that Transport for London report
that the programme of replacement radios for London Underground
trains is now running over budget and four years late? What security
implication does this delay have? What is it doing to help ensure
that the radio replacement programme is completed speedily?
London Underground (LU) new communications system, known
as "Connect", will provide an integrated digital communications
system for LU, allowing all staff at station, train and depot
level to talk to each other, and provide greater CCTV capacity.
Connect will replace over 20 fragmented systems, many of which
are life-expired and overdue for replacement. It is an essential
component to improve LU's operational communications and will
provide higher levels of resilience and increase LU's ability
to respond to major incidents. Therefore LU is pressing its contractors
to complete the project as early as possible. Subject to on-going
contract negotiations this may be early 2007, but this will be
a challenging timetable for the contractors.
Following July's events, LU instigated work to strengthen
the resilience of its existing radio system. This included checking
the most vulnerable and inaccessible elements of the train radio
network, and from this prioritised the work to be done to improve
the resilience and reduce the risk of failures. All high priority
work has been completed and most of the medium priority work completed.
On July 7, and in subsequent events, LU's existing radio system
worked well, other than where it had been directly damaged by
the explosions.
64. Are more British Transport Police officers required
on the London Underground? Is TRANSEC aware if London Underground
has requested increased numbers, as has been reported in the media?
If so, will extra officers be deployed and how many?
Through its Police Services Agreement (PSA) with the BTP
Authority, TfL/LU directly fund the London Underground Area of
the BTP. Each year the Authority and TfL/LU agree the policing
service level required and the charge payable on the agreed service
level.
Throughout the year, the BTP Area Commander is in regular
contact with LU senior managers to discuss strategic and tactical
issues and there is also a close working relationship between
local police commanders and LU managers.
The close working arrangements between TfL/LU and BTP provide
a high level of accountability and transparency around deployment
decisions. The PSA contractual arrangement enables TfL/LU to agree
the appropriate level of policing directly with BTP and, if more
officers are required, TfL/LU can agree the extra funding requirement
with BTP through the PSA.
Since 2003-04, TfL/LU has funded an additional 200 police
officers bringing the total for LU to 677.
65. What has been the delay in providing security advice
to the Glasgow subway? Is TRANSEC going to deliver it on schedule?
There has been no delay. TRANSEC has been liasing with the
operator of the Glasgow Subway to provide informal security advice
for some years during which time they have also been represented
on the National Rail Security Committee. Following consultation
with them, they were formally regulated with effect from 1 November
2005 in line with the programmed internal timetable for this work.
TRANSEC compliance inspectors have begun inspections of the system
and have reported a good level of compliance and co-operation.
OLYMPICS 2012—LONDON
66. Explain TRANSEC's role in the security of the 2012
Olympics in London
The Government will establish a Cabinet-level Olympic Security
Committee (OSC) in early 2006, to be chaired by the Home Secretary,
which will have ultimate responsibility for the security arrangements.
In addition to Cabinet members, including the Secretary of State
for Transport who is responsible for regulating transport security,
the Committee will be comprised of senior representatives from
the Security Service, the police, local authorities and the London
Fire Brigade.
At official level the OSC will be served by a steering group,
chaired by the Home Office, comprising other Government Departments,
TRANSEC, the Security Service, Association of Chief Police Officers
(ACPO), the British Transport Police (BTP), TfL and all other
key stakeholders. Through the OSC structure, TRANSEC will be closely
involved with the overall security of the Olympic Games and the
development of Olympic transport plans to ensure that transport
security is given due regard in the planning for the Games.
TRANSEC is responsible for developing, regulating and, where
appropriate, enforcing through its own team of inspectors, the
security standards placed on the transport industry. Again, this
will be the position for the regulated transport industry in 2012.
These measures currently include: security searches at stations;
CCTV covering specific locations at stations; restrictions on
the placing and type of litter bins; screening of left luggage;
photopasses; and passes for vehicles in non-public areas of stations.
In the build up to the Games, the OSC, in conjunction with
TRANSEC, will examine what further regulatory and non-regulatory
measures might be necessary to mitigate the security risks to
the travelling public and the transport systems. In doing so,
we will work with partners to ensure that not only are the transport
protective security regimes built into the Games but the reservoir
of other expert Government advice (eg from building design to
mitigate the blast effects of explosives, to measures to restrict
vehicle access and to personnel and building security) is taken
fully into account by organisers.
67. Is there an allocated security budget for the Olympics?
If not, why not, and when will there be one?
For the regulated transport industry, the policy is that
the cost of security should be borne by those that use the transport
systems rather than by the general taxpayer. Thus, the costs of
providing security measures on the ground fall to each transport
industry, and are passed on to the end user, the passenger, as
appropriate.
Under the terms of the Olympic bid document, some £190
million will be allocated towards the cost of wider Olympic security.
It is intended to cover all public security costs which will include
the provision of counter-terrorism measures. Following the London
July events, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) are working
closely with other stakeholders and KMPG to review potential security
costs.
68. Who is the official who will have operational responsibility
for the security of the Olympic Games?
Responsibility for the strategic, tactical and operational
security of the Games will rest with the MPS. It is anticipated
that a full time Assistant Commissioner will be appointed to take
the lead in due course.
In terms of the regulated transport security regime, the
lead official is the Director of TRANSEC.
69. Are you confident that the security and police agency
co-ordination arrangements will be completely satisfactory?
The security governance structures put in place for the Games
will ensure appropriate measures are established to mitigate the
risk of a security incident. The security planning involves all
relevant security stakeholders including the various police interests
(primarily the MPS and the British Transport Police) at a strategic,
tactical and operational level for the Games.
This co-ordinated approach to the security planning is designed
to provide a common forum for discussion and agreement between
its various stakeholders responsible for aspects of security policy
and policing. On the basis of this approach, the governing structures
will determine what additional work and measures are required
to improve and promote overall security for the Games in a manner
that is visible to the security community.
RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT
70. Where does TRANSEC believe more research and development
money is needed if we are to cope adequately with emerging threats
to the security of transport networks?
Research and Development (R&D) is a cross-government
activity, since the same research can potentially benefit many
sectors. We also work closely with international partners to coordinate
and where possible burden share. We believe that the resources
available to this national and international effort are adequate.
71. Is TRANSEC satisfied with the level of research and
development in the application of technology in aviation security?
Yes. TRANSEC's R&D programme on aviation security has
always been focused on those projects which have the best potential
for delivering enhancements to security. In this area, as in other
research areas, the Department collaborates closely with other
government departments and with international partners.
72. What progress has been made in research and development
to detect the "home made" explosives used in recent
attacks?
TRANSEC was funding research on the detection of home-made
explosives, before the recent attacks happened. CONTEST is co-ordinating
the R&D activities of several government departments to ensure
that we develop a fuller understanding of these materials.
73. As a result of TRANSEC's research and development,
what additional protective security measures are being considered
for the heavy rail, underground and light rail networks?
In terms of the screening aspect of protective security,
the series of trials which the Secretary of State for Transport
announced during his recent appearance before the Committee are
designed to inform decisions on what is, or is not, practical
in terms of protective security on rail and underground networks,
and whether such measures are appropriate and proportionate. Those
trials draw on the experience of technologies gained from the
R&D programme.
74. What progress has been made in finding possible measures
to help to protect information technology—particularly aviation
computer systems—against the threat of terrorist use?
The government centre of expertise for the protection of
information technology is the National Infrastructure Security
Co-ordination Centre (NISCC). The role of NISCC is to minimise
the risk to the critical national infrastructure from electronic
attack.
CONTINGENCIES AND
RESPONSE
75. Which industries are TRANSEC in liaison with on contingency
planning?
TRANSEC works through other parts of the Department to support
contingency planning in the transport industries. The Department
works directly with those industries/operators operating at a
national/strategic level such as aviation and airports, over-ground
rail, London Underground/TfL, shipping and ports and the haulage
industry. TRANSEC also liases closely with the Department's executive
agencies (the Highways Agency and the Maritime and Coastguard
Agency).
The Department, with TRANSEC support, also liases with the
Government Offices in the Regions and their regional resilience
teams to contribute to their work on putting robust contingency
planning in place in regions, and involving local transport operators.
76. How would TRANSEC characterise the current state of
these industries contingency planning? What remains to be done?
TRANSEC and the Department work closely with operators to
bring to their attention all relevant key risks and ensure they
are aware of the possible implications for their business. The
operators are then best placed to work to mitigate the risk as
befits their business, and identify any links between their contingency
and business continuity planning.
New situations constantly arise—for example the risks
of pandemic flu and a severe winter in recent months, or suicide
bombings in terms of terrorism. We are satisfied from discussions
with operators that they have the basics in place (for example
resilient command systems, plans for cooperating with the emergency
services, evacuation plans and plans for operating reduced services)
and are working dynamically to adapt their plans to meet new risks.
77. Why does the Department not audit transport operators'
contingency plans? If TRANSEC does not do this, who does?
The Department actively engages with transport operators
on key and emerging risks as part of a normal dialogue with them.
Where possible, we provide tailored advice with suggestions for
possible action that reflect the Government's assessment of these
risks, and encourage businesses to make their own plans about
how to meet these risks and their obligations to their customers
and employees. TRANSEC does not audit transport operators' contingency
plans as the industry knows its own business best and needs to
have clear ownership of these arrangements. This is a general
principle across the economy.
Some transport operators (large air and sea ports, Network
Rail, TOCs and TfL) are Category 2 responders under the Civil
Contingencies Act 2004 and as such will receive guidance on appropriate
business continuity planning. The Act's supporting guidance also
provides advice on self assessment.
NOTES: DIRECT
REQUEST FROM
2 NOVEMBER EVIDENCE
SESSION
78. Note on the treatment of passengers travelling through
UK domestic airports, including Northern Ireland
The Committee asked, following Mr Donaldson's questions,
for an explanation as to why passengers travelling through domestic
airports were photographed. We should put on record that this
requirement does not form any part of the National Aviation Security
Programme and as such is not a Department for Transport initiative.
Further information is available in Appendix A.
79. Note on the reasons why security is not included in
a PSA
Public Service Agreements (PSAs) link the allocation of public
expenditure to published targets with the aim of delivering modern,
responsible public services. PSA targets are set for services
or outcomes that the Government sees as key national priorities.
They express outcomes sought by the Government, defining clear,
long term goals to provide ambition and a sense of direction,
as well as representing a contract between the public and Government.
PSA targets are used sparingly and do not cover the full
range of the Department's responsibilities. They are negotiated
and agreed with HM Treasury and thus reflect Treasury's wider
view of Government priorities.
PSA targets are framed in such a way as to be objectively
measurable. Setting objective, outcome-based, targets in respect
of transport security is intrinsically difficult. It seems inevitable
that such a target would have to be based on a reduction in the
number of security incidents and, perhaps, numbers of people killed
or seriously injured in such incidents, as is the Department's
PSA target on road accidents. Unlike safety-related targets, however,
the over-riding factor in the number of security incidents is
the intent and capability of the terrorist; and it is impossible
to ascertain, for example, whether the absence of attacks in a
given period is due to the deterrent effect of security measures
or the fact that terrorists had no desire to carry out an attack
during that time. Thus, success or failure to deliver a target
to reduce the number of attacks (which thankfully is already low)
or the number of people killed or injured in such attacks, would
not necessarily be directly related to the effectiveness or otherwise
of security measures.
Nevertheless, the Department's current Business Plan does
include an objective that recognises the role that effective transport
security plays:
OBJECTIVE III
Balance the need to travel with the need to improve quality
of life by improving safety and respecting the environment
Flowing from this very high level objective, TRANSEC's Business
Plan includes specific objectives for maintaining and improving
security across the industries it regulates. Much of this Business
Plan is, however, necessarily classified as publication of areas
needing improvement would, in effect, be advertising vulnerabilities
to potential terrorists.
December 2005
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