Memorandum from Network Rail (TS 28)
1. Further to the Committee's announcement
of its inquiry into Transport Security, Network Rail would like
to take the opportunity to provide the Committee with an outline
of the ongoing efforts being undertaken on and around the railway
in a range of areas relating to security.
2. We note that the Committee's inquiry
is focusing on the threat posed by terrorism and that the inquiry
seeks to "throw light on the nature of the threat to our
transport systems, and what is being done by those responsible
for the safety of the travelling public to counter that threat".
3. Historically, terrorist groups have sought
to damage railway assets and create operational disruption. The
July bombings and 9/11 show the changing face of the terrorist
threat and Network Rail works in close partnership with the Police
and transport partners in order to meet this threat.
4. Bodies which Network Rail liaise with
on security matters include the Department for Transport (TRANSEC),
Department of Trade and Industry (Office of Civil Nuclear Security),
the Ministry of Defence, the British Transport Police, the Security
Services and various railway undertakings. Following Madrid, a
review of arrangements took place including an update of Network
Rail's National Railway Security Programme. We have continued
to update catastrophic event management plans and participate
in the London Resilience forum. In addition, Network Rail has
taken part in a range of planning exercises.
5. The most significant investment in security
equipment in recent months is the £17 million upgrade of
Network Rail's CCTV network of 2,500 cameras across our 17 directly
managed London stations. This represents a 48% increase. There
are also ongoing plans to develop CCTV standards at non-London
stations. Each station's system is controlled from a central point
and all can be accessed from national control rooms. The system
can monitor all those who enter the stations and records images
digitally for 31 days. The system played a key role in the investigations
that followed the events of 7 and 21 July.
6. Whilst subsequent debate on transport
security will understandably focus on threats from acts of terrorism,
we would however urge the Committee to consider the wider range
of related safety and security issues that the railway handles
on a daily basis.
7. Many of the skills and procedures employed
at times of heightened risk, or in the aftermath of any incident,
are developed and maintained in the process of dealing with less
high-profile challenges and are regularly employed. Such events
include hourly security checks at Network Rail managed stations,
the management of regular security incidents often caused by suspect
packages, and the handling of significant crowds on the network—often
seen around events such as protests, sports meetings, and music
festivals.
8. Regular guidance is issued by the Transport
Security Division (TRANSEC) whose responsibilities are drawn from
the security elements of the Railways Act 1994 and the Channel
Tunnel (Security) Order 1994. TRANSEC coordinates the National
Railways Security Programme, issues dangerous goods security/chemical/biological
guidance, conducts inspections and feedback, and advises on background
threat levels.
9. The Office for Civil Nuclear Security
(OCNS) within the Department for Trade and Industry is responsible
for the regulation of industrial nuclear material. Guidance on
this issue and transport instructions are given in the Nuclear
Security Industries Regulations 2003.
10. The Security Services liaise with TRANSEC,
OCNS, the Police and ourselves on a range of security and counter-terrorism
matters. They provide security advice for key facilities and research
on physical security measures. In addition, they have to manage
the security of their own movements around the network of explosives
and occasional MoD nuclear cargos.
11. Network Rail implements TRANSEC and
OCNS instructions, the production of a security programme for
Network Rail managed stations and the overall security of the
national infrastructure. We also determine industry coordinated
arrangements for handling specific threats, responding to security
incidents, sensitive freight security and Royal Family travel.
12. Specific measures at Network Rail managed
stations include multi-agency station emergency plans. These are
set by the National Railway Security Programme's Station Security
Programme which defines requirements at each notified security
level. Basic measures include controlled access to non-public
areas, the issue of vehicle and access passes, regular inspection
of rubbish bins/containers/compactors, and CCTV monitoring of
designated areas.
13. Other issues at stations include: handling
luggage and lost property, screening for prohibited articles,
approval of x-ray equipment, responses to identified prohibited
articles, training of station employees ("Hidden, Obvious,
Threatening" principle used for all suspect devices), and
passenger announcements regarding security. All station measures
are tested regularly and are subject to unannounced inspections
by TRANSEC.
14. Sensitive freight movements are subject
to a range of coordinated security arrangements including threat
assessments and incident response plans. Secure sites are subject
to special arrangements affecting site fencing, lighting, staffing,
and inspection. Lines of communication are identified and regularly
tested, and the carriage of goods requires a security plan stating
security arrangements along the complete carriage chain.
15. The protection of the network has to
encompass not just dramatic incidents, but the daily risk posed
by acts of vandalism, sabotage and criminal damage. We have to
regularly deal with suspect packages at stations and we are constantly
working to protect the network from potentially catastrophic incidents
resulting from third party incursions onto the network (eg level
crossings).
16. Train Operators are, in turn, responsible
for the application of TRANSEC and OCNS Instructions and the security
of train operator managed station, trains, and stabling and maintenance
depots. They also have a key responsibility for co-ordinated threat/security
incident responses, and combating trespass and vandalism.
17. Finally, we would seek to add a note
of reassurance to the Committee that while there has certainly
been a step-change in the level of inter-agency planning and security
investment since 9/11 and the bombing of the Madrid public transport
system, the planning and coordination that ourselves and other
transport operators are engaged in to counter terrorist threats
is not new.
The railway in Britain, like other forms of
transport, has had to cope with security threats for some decades.
The railway particularly suffered from a series of bombings and
bomb alerts throughout the 1990s—indeed, the last incident
in that series was as recent as November 2001, when an explosion
occurred in a car parked close to Birmingham New Street railway
station.
I hope that the above overview of the arrangements
we are involved in provides some reassurance that this issue is
one that has deservedly received a significant amount of attention
over recent months.
December 2005
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