Memorandum from the National Coordinator
Ports Policing (NCPP) (TS 36)
THE NATIONAL
CO -ORDINATOR
PORTS POLICING
(NCPP)
1. Assistant Chief Constable John Donlon
is the National Co-ordinator Ports Policing (NCPP). The NCPP post
is funded by the Home Office through the Association of Chief
Police Officers Council Committee on Terrorism & Allied Matters
[ACPO(TAM)]. Primarily this role is to co-ordinate Special Branch
activity at all ports in the UK. The NCPP reports to Deputy Chief
Constable Bryan Bell, the National Co-ordinator of Special Branch
(NCSB) who in turn reports to ACPO(TAM). In 2003 the role of the
NCPP was expanded to include the ACPO(Ports) Portfolio (the protective
services provided by uniformed police officers). This was to enable
an overview of all ports policing activity and ensure the co-ordination
of protective services at airports, seaports and international
rail terminals. Protective services include all policing functions
normally undertaken by uniformed police officers in addition to
their support of the National Aviation Security and National Maritime
Security programmes.
2. The NCPP works closely with the Home
Office, Department for Transport, Security Service, Industry representatives
and the other border agencies, in particular HMRC and UKIS, to
ensure that both policy and operational activity at ports are
synchronised and support the government's Counter Terrorism Security
Strategy (CONTEST).
3. The main functions undertaken by the
NCPP include:
— Co-ordinating the work and operational
activities of SB Ports Officers.
— Co-ordinating the delivery of policy
relating to ports policing.
— Co-ordinating the protective services
at ports and chairing the ACPO (Ports) portfolio group.
— Providing advice and assistance to
Chief Officers and the Home Office on all aspects of border control
and port security policing.
— Working in partnership with government,
industry and the other border agencies to ensure policy and operational
activity is synchronised.
— Developing effective partnerships
with the private sector.
— Quality assuring the Special Branch
port work throughout the UK.
— Liaising with international border
control organisations.
4. The NCPP liaises with partners at a senior
level and attends the Cabinet Office Official Committee on Domestic
& International Terrorism "Protect" Sub Group [TIDO(PROTECT)].
The Assistant NCPP attends the Transport—Protective Security
Work Group, chaired by the Director of Transec, which reports
to TIDO(PROTECT). The NCPP ensures appropriate support is provided
to the work-streams identified by these groups such as:
— Addressing the risk of seaward attack
on ships with an improved response/interdiction capability in
the maritime environment.
— The strengthening of cargo security
at airports.
— Enhancing the security "landside"
at airports.
ACPO(TAM)
5. ACPO(TAM) is responsible for
the development of national strategy and policy on behalf of the
police service to counter the threat from terrorism and extremism
and ensure its preparedness to investigate and respond to terrorist/extremist
activity. Within ACPO(TAM) Chief Constable Michael Todd (Greater
Manchester Police) has functional responsibility for aviation
& rail transport whilst Chief Constable Colin Cramphorn (West
Yorkshire Police) has functional responsibility for maritime issues.
6. ACPO(TAM) brings together senior police
officers and senior officials from key partners (ie Home Office
& Intelligence Services), thus providing a central point for
the strategic co-ordination of the police service for counter-terrorism
and counter-extremism.
7. The ACPO(TAM) Advisory Group is responsible
for delivering the operational police response to terrorism and
extremism issues. It is currently developing a national CT tasking
role through the introduction of a national menu of protective
security options. Annex A is a diagram of the relationships that
ACPO(TAM) has with other groups mentioned in this report.
ACPO(PORTS)
8. The ACPO(Ports) portfolio group deals
with the protective services provided at airports, seaports and
international rail terminals. This group meets twice a year when
officers of Assistant Chief Constable level discuss policy issues.
Their terms of reference are:
— To represent the interests of Chief
Police Officers in England, Wales & Northern Ireland on issues
appertaining to ports policing (Air, Sea & International Rail
Terminals) to ACPO(TAM), ensuring close liaison with ACPO Scotland
(ACPOS).
— To provide strategic advice for the
development of ports policing business (Protective Security).
— To respond to national ports policing
issues (arising from ACPO (TAM), Government and other agencies)
and to raise issues as appropriate.
— To provide leadership and direction
to the sub groups, to enable the development of national policy,
standard operating procedures and guidance to officers.
— To ratify policy and guidance produced
by practitioners sub-groups.
— To disseminate information/good practice
about ports policing to forces & other agencies.
— To explore European and international
partnership working opportunities in a ports policing context.
9. There are two sub groups reporting to
ACPO(Ports):
— The UK Airport Commanders Group.
— The Sea Port & International
Rail Terminals Group.
10. The UK Airport Commanders Group
operates at senior practitioner level. It consists of 45 members
representing over 500 airports within the UK and reports directly
to the ACPO (Ports) Portfolio Group. Both the Home Office (Terrorism
Protection Unit) and Transec (Aviation) are members of this group.
The group, formed 15 years ago, has developed into an effective
co-ordinating body, which meets quarterly. The Group reviewed
its structure to create a Commanders Executive Group that consists
of an airport commander from each ACPO region plus representatives
from their Crime, Operations and Training sub groups.
11. Work-streams being undertaken by the
group include:
— Harmonising the reporting of aviation
related crime.
— Setting up a secure group web site
managed by the police to record best practice.
— Improved vetting & intelligence
flows to airport commanders.
— Common practice in relation to the
searching of aircraft.
— Preparation of standard training
packages.
— Agreeing protocols for dealing with
pilots etc who have been breath tested.
— Harmonising the police response to
new legislation such as the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality
Act.
12. The Sea Port & International
Rail Terminals (SPIRT) Group was formed to provide a platform
on which to base strategic level discussion between border and
government agencies and commercial operators. It aims to bring
a cohesive approach to managing crime & security at maritime
ports and international rail terminals. The SPIRT Group has rapidly
established itself as a forum where police commanders at seaports
& international rail terminals can develop a cohesive response
to crime and terrorism.
13. An Executive Group has been formed that
helps develop maritime issues on behalf of ACPO(Ports). Executive
Group members assisted with the development of the Police National
Maritime Security Strategy (a joint agency strategy to target
harden portal regions across the UK, the details of which are
discussed in paragraph 20) and will help manage its implementation
across the UK. The group also assisted other work-streams including:
the provision of feedback relating to the introduction of the
International Ship and Port Facilities (ISPS) code, representation
at the National Maritime Advisory Group Meeting, maritime Multi-Agency
Threat and Risk Assessment (MATRA), the DfT Maritime Working Group
and assists the implementation of Project Cylamen.
AVIATION SECURITY
14. Aviation protective services groups
supported by the NCPP include:
— National Aviation Security Committee
(NASC).
— NASC Multi Agency Threat & Risk
Assessment (MATRA) Sub Group.
— Airport CCTV Best Practice Group.
— Man Portable Air Defence Systems
(MANPADS) Programme Board.
— Airports Designation Working Group.
— Flying Training Programme Board.
— ACPO (Ports) Portfolio Group.
— UK Police Airport Commanders Group.
15. Sir John Wheeler's "Review
of Airport Security 2002" followed terrorist attacks
in the UK and the high profile thefts at Heathrow. Sir John published
his report setting out twenty-three recommendations for improvement.
One recommendation included the introduction of the Multi Agency
Threat & Risk Assessment (MATRA) process.
16. Sir John Wheeler's recommendations included:
— The formation of multi agency teams
to look at the threats and risks to the airport from serious and
organised crime.
— Changes to the NASC terms of reference.
— The DfT should survey the installation
of CCTV at airports.
— "Designation" was outdated
and a new more rational system was required.
— "Designation" should move
to a system based on multi agency assessments.
— Police powers should be simplified.
— Improved regulation of airport security
staff.
17. Multi Agency Threat & Risk Assessment
(MATRA). Sir John Wheeler's report resulted in the Home Office
leading multi-agency teams to examine threats and risks to airport
security from serious and organised crime. The Home Office and
Transec subsequently introduced a Multi-Agency Threat & Risk
Assessment pilot programme involving five airports (Heathrow,
Newcastle, Birmingham, Glasgow and East Midlands).
18. Following the success of the pilot programme,
the implementation of MATRA to over 50 UK airports was formally
launched in December 2003, and both the Home Office and TRANSEC
have subsequently been working hard in support of its roll-out
across the UK.
19. Part of the initial advice provided
to MATRA airport groups was that the analysis should be specific
to the respective airport and it is therefore for each group to
decide where the airports sphere of activity begins and ends,
and vulnerabilities beyond the perimeter fence should not be overlooked.
The membership of each group should include all key agencies that
have an interest in the operation of the airport, with the Chair
being the Airport Operator.
20. In brief, the MATRA group is obliged
to agree their objectives, the scope of work, methodology, critical
success factors and document their achievements. The risk analysis
and joint working of the pilot MATRA groups is now well established.
The establishment of a joined-up approach to funding and identification
of a method to feed all findings from the MATRA work into a security
plan, agreed by all participating agencies, is proving more difficult.
21. The MATRA Programme Board, which is
jointly chaired by Transec and the Home Office, is now a sub group
of National Aviation Security Committee (NASC). The NASC MATRA
Sub Group last met on 20 October 2005.
22. The police view is that the MATRA process
is not delivering the necessary results. The police would prefer
a mandatory process, similar to Crime & Disorder partnerships,
with:
— Deadlines, rather than "guidelines",
for activity.
— Measuring success on outcomes, not
processes.
— Resolution of the funding issue.
23. The industry partners would prefer to
avoid direction/regulation and want to continue with a voluntary
process. They have committed resources to enable the process to
take place but are concerned about subsequent costs. They wish
to introduce cost sharing, are not keen on common scoring mechanisms
and are opposed to bench marking. They chair most MATRA groups
and some have started to develop security plans.
24. "Designation" under
Section 25 of the Aviation Security Act 1982 means that nine airports
(Heathrow, Gatwick, Manchester, Stansted, Birmingham, Glasgow,
Edinburgh, Aberdeen and Prestwick) within the UK are currently
"designated" and the airport operator has to pay the
full policing costs. Sir John Wheeler recognised the value of
having a predictable police presence at airports.
25. After the publication of the Wheeler
report, the multi agency Designation Working Group (chaired by
Transec) tried to establish new criteria for "designation".
In a draft paper, airport policing was broken down into three
categories with the intention of introducing cost sharing. The
police are opposed to this, as it was never intended that the
costs of policing an airport should fall to the ratepayer.
26. The Designation Working Group last met
in January 2004. The DfT agreed that greater police representation
was needed and that Police Authority representation at future
designation meetings.
27. An airport policing strategy that offers
a framework for determining policing level decisions has been
prepared. There are concerns that MATRA alone would not properly
determine police numbers. This is a complex piece of work where
some aspects rely upon the professional judgement of police managers.
The methodology has been agreed by ACPO Council and is being tested
at some airports prior to its being shared with our Government
and Industry partners.
28. The team that prepared the framework
for determining policing levels decisions also developed a Trigger
Document that provides criteria upon which an objective assessment
can be made as to whether an airport can be "Designated".
29. "Determination". Where
an airport operator is unable to reach agreement with a chief
constable as to the level of policing or the costs at the airport,
they can seek "Determination" by the Secretary of State
for Transport.
30. On 21 November 2005 the Secretary of
State for Transport announced to Parliament the Government's intention
to propose changes to the Aviation Security Act 1982. These proposals
aim to ensure that there is a clearer basis upon which the Police
and airport operators at "Designated" airports can reach
agreement on the provision and funding of policing services. When
they are unable to agree, there is a clearly defined process for
reaching a decision on the "Determination". The defined
process will involve the appointment of an expert who will consult
all parties and then make a decision as to the appropriate level
of policing for which the aerodrome manager should pay.
31. The DfT also announced their intention
to commission a thorough, wide-ranging and independent review
to identify a sustainable approach to the policing of airports.
This will take account of the roles and responsibilities of all
stakeholders in protecting an airport and in particular addresses
the need for funding arrangements that are objective and transparent.
Mr Stephen Boys-Smith a retired Director General from the Home
Office has been appointed to lead the review.
32. Man Portable Air Defence System
(MANPADS). The National MANPADS Patrol and Launch Site Denial
Strategy was published in December 2003. The strategy was further
developed during 2004 after which the MANPADS Programme Board
(chaired by Director of Transec) accepted the new patrolling methodology
and recommended it to Ministers. The revised strategy was then
circulated to airports in June 2004 so that the cost implications
could be established.
33. Airport Operators are unwilling to cover
MANPADS costs because the sites lie outside the airport perimeter.
Potential launch sites often cut across two or three force areas,
necessitating a cohesive approach. The policing of the potential
launch sites requires additional funding which thus far has been
met from an SR2004 bid and ACPO(TAM) monies amounting to £6.2
million.
34. The MANPADs Programme Board is chaired
by the Director Transec and meets twice yearly to keep abreast
of international developments; the last meeting was on 10 January
2006.
35. Serious and Organised Crime at Airports.
The MATRA process, introduced at airports, was initially designed
to help tackle serious and organised crime. The extension of MATRA
to all National Maritime Security Committee (NMSC) seaports and
international rail terminals is now being considered. Operation
"Grafton" at Heathrow developed a very successful joint
agency approach to high value cargo crime at Heathrow. The lessons
learned have been shared with airports across the UK. The key
themes from this learning will also benefit seaports and international
rail terminals. Consideration is also being given to the impending
changes resulting from the introduction of the Serious and Organised
Crime Agency (SOCA).
36. A multi-agency approach to the target
hardening of cargo areas at airports "AIMS" has been
prepared with substantial industry support. This has adopted the
learning from "Grafton" and presents an achievable menu
of activity that can be applied to all airports. This has been
recommended to MATRA groups across the UK and we are supporting
its introduction through the Airports Commanders group.
37. The Airport Commanders Crime Sub-Group
meets with National Crime Squad (NCS), National Criminal Intelligence
Service (NCIS), Schiphol Airport Crime Managers (Holland) and
Guernsey Police at their routine meetings. A similar cross border
arrangement exists within the SPIRT group where regular and productive
liaison with Rotterdam port ensures a cohesive approach to crime.
Recent liaison with the Maltese Police helped reduce the incidence
of organised baggage crime that had been reported at several UK
airports.
38. General Aviation. To ensure
a co-ordinated response to General Aviation issues, NCPP asked
all police forces to prepare profiles and risk assessments of
all General Aviation (GA) sites and Flying Training Establishments
within the UK. This work has now been completed and these profiles
are held centrally at the National Ports Office (NPO) Heathrow.
This information is a national resource for Special Branch officers.
39. Flight Training Security. All
flying schools and flight training establishments have been systematically
visited in order to raise their counter-terrorism awareness and
develop further the close partnerships that were already in place.
This was followed by a poster campaign targeting all airfield
staff and airfield users making them aware of the Anti-Terrorist
Branch hotline.
40. The NCPP recognises the importance of
Special Branch officers throughout the UK routinely visiting flying
schools, simulator training establishments and Universities (as
part of the community involvement package) to ensure good relationships
are maintained. The NCPP routinely sends messages reminding Special
Branch Units of the continuing need to visit flying training establishments.
This ensures that contact details are exchanged, counter-terrorism
advice given and that the sanitised profile of potential terrorists
is discussed (as provided by the Security Service). In addition
the Anti Terrorist Branch hotline number is given and officers
ensure that the posters provided by police are prominently displayed.
This encourages the trainers to remain vigilant and draw any suspicious
activity to the attention of police.
41. In addition to this bottom-up approach,
NCPP staff and Metropolitan Police Special Branch continue to
visit flying trainers when they undertake their bi-annual validation
training at Bristol & London University. Their attention is
again drawn to the need for vigilance and they are reminded of
the Anti-Terrorist Branch hotline number.
42. All this is ongoing work that will ensure
that the training fraternity remains vigilant recognising that
the terrorist threat is long and enduring.
43. Whilst this work is being undertaken
a cross government Flight Training Security Programme Board (FTSB)
seeks to introduce background checks on those seeking to learn
to fly. The FTSB identified three categories of flight trainees:
— Those training for a private pilots
licence (PPL).
— Those training for a commercial pilots
licence and type rating with a valid UK Restricted Zone (RZ) pass.
— Those training for a commercial pilots
licence and type rating not in possession of a valid UK Restricted
Zone (RZ) pass.
44. Holding a valid UK RZ pass guarantees
a satisfactory level of background checking. Having considered
a number of options the Programme Board has been asked by the
Secretary of State for Transport to do further work to introduce
(through secondary legislation under Section 60 Civil Aviation
Act 1982) the requirement that Flying Training Providers collect
data on each trainee and refer any suspicions to the police. The
board will keep under review the need for primary legislation.
MARITIME SECURITY
45. Maritime protective services groups
supported by the NCPP include:
— National Maritime Security Committee
(NMSC).
— NMSC Ports & Shipping sub groups.
— UK Sea-Port & International Rail
Terminals Commanders Group.
— National Maritime Advisory Group.
46. MATRA (Maritime). The membership
of the National Maritime Security Committee (NMSC) has also been
reviewed. They have two sub groups: a Ports Sub-Group and a Ships
Sub-Group. The first Maritime MATRA group met on the 19 July 2004.
Albeit this is a voluntary process, some agreed to participate.
Pilot MATRA groups have been set up at Dover, Milford Haven, Rosyth,
Harwich and Felixtowe.
47. National Maritime Security Strategy.
The Police National Maritime Security Strategy recommends
a systematic approach to portal security that will ensure the
consistent protection of portal regions across the UK. Learning
from good practice at home and abroad the strategy utilises the
resources of all agencies that have an interest in the portal
business area. It includes the following elements:
— The identification of portal regions
across the UK.
— Identify Vulnerable sites and Installations
& Develop Domain Awareness.
— Maritime MATRA Process.
— Regional Maritime Information and
Intelligence Teams.
— Regional Maritime Response Teams.
— Joint Portal Operational Plans.
— Joint Portal Contingency Plans.
— Joint Operations Command & Control
Arrangements.
48. The initial roll out of the strategy
includes the Thames, Solent, Bristol Channel, Mersey, Clyde, Firth
of Forth and Humber. Police Force Command Teams were visited where
the strategy was explained and their participation encouraged.
This has been well received to date and first steps have been
taken to set up strategic partnership groups.
49. The Sea-Port & International Rail
Terminal (SPIRT) Commanders Group has been reshaped to help operational
managers with the delivery of the strategy. Superintendent Andy
Sigsworth (Humberside Police) is the Chair of the group.
50. One of the features of the strategy
is the development of Regional Maritime Intelligence Teams. This
will build upon the work being undertaken by the NCPP where the
alignment of intelligence is being developed by a multi agency
team working to the Border Management Programme Board. A multi
agency Maritime Intelligence Group met in January to develop a
common maritime intelligence picture amongst the agencies.
51. Cyclamen. The Cyclamen project
aims to install radiological detection equipment at all major
airports and seaports costing in excess of £125 million.
These trial sites at Felixstowe, Dover and Portsmouth tested the
systems and processes. In April 2003 the Government agreed to
introduce the screening of traffic entering the UK. All forms
of traffic by Air Sea and Channel Tunnel will be routinely screened.
52. The long-term goal is to install screening
equipment at all main points of entry in the UK over the next
three years, and forms part of the Governments long-term counter-terrorism
strategy.
53. Maritime Security Issues. A
multi-agency meeting was held on 10 October 2005 at the Home Office
to consider our preparedness for an off shore Counter Terrorism
incident. The group clarified the arrangements for responding
to maritime terrorist incidents and in particular to review the
responsibilities of government departments and agencies having
a locus in maritime security. The agreed response to a maritime
incident is laid out in the Home Office Counter-Terrorism Manual.
54. DfT (Transec), Home Office & Police
have collectively considered the UK's response capabilities. The
Home Office prepared a summary paper clarifying the maritime response
drawing on the Home Office Counter Terrorism Manual entry for
circulation to the interested parties in Whitehall and in ACPO.
55. National Maritime Advisory Group
(NMAG). Reporting to the National Co-ordinator of Terrorist
Investigations, this is a multi-agency group whose purpose is
to develop a joint understanding of each organisation's roles
and ensure an appropriate joint response to any terrorist incident
at sea. The group includes members from: Foreign & Commonwealth
Office, Joint Terrorist Assessment Centre, Ministry of Defence,
Maritime Coastguard Agency, Transec, Chief Fire Officers Association,
Metropolitan Police Counter Terrorism Branch. Metropolitan Police
Special Branch, Special Forces, Royal Naval Central Fleet Command
320, HMRC and Port Authorities. CC Colin Cramphorn intends to
broaden the remit of this group to consider wider policing issues
off shore.
BORDER PROTECTION
56. Border Management Programme. The
Border Management Programme (BMP) has been set up by the Association
of Chief Police Officers, HM Revenue & Customs and the Immigration
& Nationality Department to promote closer working between
the three border agencies.
57. The objective of the programme is to
strengthen border security whilst minimising the impact on legitimate
traffic. Trials have been taking place throughout 2005 in the
UK and British Control Zones in France. The programme has been
evaluated and restructured at the end of 2005. The BMP has a strategic
steering group, a delivery group and a number of worksreams co-ordinated
by a joint agency programme office. The current workstreams are:
58. Interventions—Trials have
been established at a number of locations to test various aspects
of closer working. This includes joint profiling, single passenger
intervention, joint search teams and a joint mobile enforcement
team.
59. Risk—To provide a risk
assessment process for UK borders. This is to identify and manage
risks in terms of the border control. The methodology developed
is the Border Agency Risk Assessment Tool (BARAT). The risks are
those relevant to the movement through the border control of both
passengers and goods. The risks are likely to have an impact away
from the port. The MATRA risk assessment process addresses risk
relating to the physical protection of the infrastructure at ports.
60. Intelligence—This new
workstream is to consider the alignment of intelligence structures
and how they can more effectively support border security. A national
border intelligence model will need to be developed.
61. Legal—This new workstream
will look at the legal powers for operational delivery and human
resources issues.
62. Technology—This workstream
will undertake to consider new technology which may provide operational
support to border control activities.
63. To assist with the development of the
BMP, a programme office is now being established to manage a number
of issues outside the formal workstreams. These include:
— Office support—to provide a
programme secretariat and ensure the workstreams are managed under
a properly formatted process.
— Training—to develop training
and awareness packages in support of joint working.
— Stakeholders—to provide liaison
with industry representatives and relevant business groups.
— Communications—to ensure that
an effective communications strategy is in place to support the
objectives of the BMP.
— Evaluation—to provide a process
of formal evaluation for all workstreams.
— Human Resources—to deal with
issues such as terms and conditions, Health & Safety etc.
64. From a police perspective, the BMP evaluation
to date has not provided sufficient or significant benefits in
terms of counter-terrorism, crime and intelligence. There have
been limited benefits with some of the joint working initiatives
but we remain fully supportive of the new structure and workstreams.
Further programme evaluation later this year will present a clearer
picture of progress within the BMP.
65. Single Border Agency. In September
2003, ACPO agreed that the future of border management lay in
the creation of a single border agency. However in March 2004
the Government White Paper "One Step Ahead" sought closer
working between the three border agencies to deliver "co-ordinated
strategically driven operational activity". Following this
the Border Management Programme was introduced.
66. In the spring of 2005, the issue of
a single border agency was again raised in government with political
opinion being divided. At the request of ACPO(TAM), CC Colin Cramphorn
circulated, in July, a discussion paper to UK police forces and
the other border agencies to further the consultation within the
police service. In the same month, a number of senior police officials
met with the Prime Minister when the ACPO position was re-asserted.
67. As a result of this, the NCPP prepared
a comprehensive paper, which sets out the value, from a police
perspective, of a single border agency. In this paper a number
of options are considered. The difficulties encountered in the
planning and projected implementation of the Serious and Organised
Crime Agency (SOCA) have been noted. In October, the Cabinet Office
Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator submitted a paper to the
Prime Minister that favoured the continuance of the BMP.
68. The onset of new technology (e-Borders
& the Schengen Intelligence System) has been considered but
the options require further scoping and investigation, which is
currently being undertaken by the office of the NCPP.
69. e-Borders/Project Semaphore. The
e-Borders programme will provide every police force in the UK,
as well as UKIS and HMRC, with a powerful intelligence tool that
exploits information on every passenger and crew member and potentially
provide the opportunity for the relevant agencies to take action
if required.
70. e-Borders functionality allows bulk
passenger manifest information to be passed through enforcement
agency databases (Police National Computer, Home Office Warning
Index, and HMRC's "CEDRIC" database, etc). These search
results being examined and prioritised by a Joint Border Operations
Centre (JBOC) before being returned to the border agencies to
consider a suitable response and deploy resources as appropriate,
either at the port or elsewhere to meet operational or intelligence
requirements.
71. e-Borders will also use current intelligence
relating to known terrorist, criminal and immigration offenders
to identify travellers with similar traits but not yet known to
the border agencies.
72. The programme will also seek to utilise
biometric systems to automate entry through some UK ports.
73. Project Semaphore has been set up to
test elements of this e-Borders concept. The JBOC opened in January
2005 and now monitors long haul flights at five major airports.
74. Police National Computer data was linked
to Semaphore on 13 June 2005 and has already resulted in arrests
for murder, rape and other sexual offences in addition to intelligence
traces connected with crime and national security.
SUMMARY COMMENT
75. The current and numerous threats to
the UK make it essential that the UK's borders and ports are as
secure as they can be for the travelling public and provide, from
a police perspective, an effective and efficient counter-terrorist
function as well as being able to deal with other police responsibilities.
Developments in technological opportunities are being coupled
with the progress made in joint working across the border agencies
and the security and intelligence agencies. These, together with
the enhancement of protective security policing, aim to meet the
demands of the future, as well as the present.
February 2006
Annex A
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