Examination of Witnesses (Questions 20
- 39)
TUESDAY 20 OCTOBER 2009
DR NAOMI
HOSSAIN AND
PROFESSOR DAVID
HULME
Q20 Mr Sharma: Is that at the village
level?
Dr Hossain: Yes.
Q21 Mr Sharma: Is it a lower democratic
process, tribesman, or is it a Godfather in the village?
Dr Hossain: Yes, well, this is
where it gets tricky; they are not necessarily very nice institutions.
Q22 Mr Sharma: I thought as much.
Dr Hossain: There is a fine line
between a community informal security arrangement and a vigilante
group. No, there is not a very fine line, actually—they
are almost the same thing. In the urban areas it is what they
call the Mastaan, which is a kind of Godfather—or local
gangster—but, actually, local leaders. There is a real ambivalence
about whether they are really nasty or really nice.
Q23 Mr Sharma: The local leader as
well.
Dr Hossain: Yes. So those are
the people who are really in charge there. You know lots about
this.
Professor Hulme: Certainly the
difficult thing in urban areas is you have the mastangs who are
probably providing security and managing things and might even
get involved, maybe, in domestic violence if it gets too extreme,
but in a way they may also be involved in a number of illegal
activities, so it is very hard to see how any donor could actually
work with them. In an ideal world one would get the mastangs to
behave better—do a little bit less corruption and do a little
more justice—but, in practice, a donor's role in that would
be pretty difficult to imagine.
Q24 Chairman: You mentioned particular
insecurities experienced by women. To what extent are women getting
organised? We hear of specific examples of Bangladeshi women who
are organising themselves. Is it a significantly growing phenomenon
that women are getting organised to stand up for themselves? Are
there strong women's movements?
Dr Hossain: Yes, the women's movement
is quite strong in Bangladesh. I cannot think of anything specifically
organised around violence. Of course, there have been movements
in support of a women and children's act in the late 1990s/2000.
I do not really work on the women's movement but they are, yes,
quite strong. Specifically organising around domestic violence?
Possibly not.
Professor Hulme: It is very complicated.
Interfering with domestic violence, as in the UK, is seen as something
that people should keep their nose out of. We find that women
are, in a way, supporting other women against this, but then the
mother-in-law is quite likely to be saying: "My son should
beat his wife sometimes", and women will have different opinions
about it and older women will have different opinions.
Dr Hossain: The big problem is
dowry; dowry is very closely related to violence against women.
The trend of dowry used to be, in Bangladesh, one, it is specifically
"bride price" so the payment goes to the bride's family
but in the last 40 or 50 years it has reversed so that you are,
essentially, paying for husbands now, and it causes a lot of problems.
Dowry is very closely related to the violence. The World Bank
did a survey on gender norms—was it last year or the year
before?—a very good report on how gender has changed a lot
on domestic violence, and I suggest you see that on dowry as well.
Q25 Chairman: Thank you for that.
This is more your question, Professor Hulme, but, Dr Hossain,
feel free to come in if you have something to add. On the economic
issue, one thing that has been impressive, in spite of all this
background, is that Bangladesh has sustained quite a long period
of economic growth, but poverty is still very significant; there
have been some reductions but it is quite significant. How do
you explain that combination: the extent to which growth has been
sustained but it has not really translated into significant poverty
reduction? Are there any changes taking place underneath?
Professor Hulme: I think you have
to recognise that Bangladesh came from a very low base; it had
incredibly high levels of poverty—much of that was extreme
poverty—and there were extraordinary levels of vulnerability
and under-nutrition. So, in a way, progress has been quite remarkable
over the last 15 to 20 years—
Q26 Chairman: So you actually say
it was a success, it is just that the absolutes are very low.
Professor Hulme: It is a success
but it started from a low base, and 5% over 15 years is not enough
to eradicate poverty; you need 30 to 40 years at this rate or
you need a faster rate of growth, but the achievements have been
considerable. Particularly, whilst insecurity and vulnerability
may be a bit later, the threat of famine and coping with devastating
floods—the capacity to cope with that now—in a way,
is great; it is a poverty problem, not a starvation problem, which
back in the 1970s and 1980s was the way it was.
Q27 Chairman: Which are the groups
that are most vulnerable? Is it geographical or is it sectoral,
or what is it?
Professor Hulme: It is really
messy and mixed. If you look geographically then the old analysis
used to be that the North—and what are called the monga
areas—are particularly problematic and the South is doing
better. The most recent work suggests, actually, that it is the
west of the country—Khulma, Barisal and Rajshahi—where
you have got the highest levels of poverty and some of the most
extreme poverty. Nowadays people talk about the West-East divide
and, again, the sort of detailed work by the World Bank actually
started that out, which is available—
Q28 Chairman: What are the reasons
for that?
Professor Hulme: The reasons for
that are several, partly because there are two big rivers you
have to cross to get to the West, and even though we have got
the Jamuna Bridge now that still isolates the West from the sort
of dynamo of Dhaka and Chittagong, and from the sort of connections
with the global economy. The West is disconnected from that. Historically,
because of disconnection, it has just got lower levels of infrastructure—roads,
electricity, schools, health centres, are all at lower levels.
Private investment is not occurring on that side the way it is
on the East. Also, for social and historical reasons the Diaspora
from Bangladesh does not come from the West, so remittances tend
to flow to Dhaka, Chittagong and do not tend to flow to the West,
so the West is disconnected. Added to that (and it is a problem
for the whole of the country) is the Indian border that is, economically,
relatively non-porous. The amount of trade that could occur with
India, because the two countries cannot agree on trade arrangements,
are limited. So the west of the country has got a difficult border
with India and then there is a sort of semi-border because of
the rivers and the history with the east of Bangladesh. Beyond
that, you have also got life-cycle factors that are spread around
the country; young parents with several children find it hard,
particularly if anything goes wrong; older people may be left
insecure, and there are high levels of vulnerability to shocks.
Sometimes the dramatic natural shocks, the floods, and the cyclones,
but, also, particularly, health shocks can often set households
back, and if you get a natural shock, a health shock and then
something goes wrong with your job, then households can very rapidly
fall into poverty, and although the economy might be working well
they will be finding it very hard to get out. Most recently there
has been a food price spike, which has certainly set back, probably,
millions of households in Bangladesh; it is impacting on everybody
but food prices have gone up the most at the bottom end of the
market, for the coarse grains.
Q29 Chairman: Is that still biting
or has that eased off?
Dr Hossain: No, it is come down
a lot.
Professor Hulme: It has come down,
but it is still 20-30% above what it was 18 months/ two years
ago.
Dr Hossain: It is still much higher
than it was in 2006, yes.
Professor Hulme: The spike has
gone but food prices have risen more than wages.
Dr Hossain: I think it is quite
volatile.
Professor Hulme: In rural areas,
people who are landless, female-headed households, will generally
be much more likely to be poor or extremely poor. In urban areas
the labour is female-headed but it is much messier in urban areas.
We know a lot less about poverty in urban areas than we do in
the rural areas, where things are somewhat easier.
Q30 Mr Singh: Bangladesh has an ambition
to become a middle-income country by 2021, but given the global
recession and given the impact that that is going to have on remittances
and Bangladesh's ability to export, or afford imports, how do
you see the economic situation developing in Bangladesh over the
next few years?
Professor Hulme: I am not a macroeconomist,
I am a self-trained economist who takes a look at Bangladesh,
but the difference between economists and fortune tellers over
the last 18 months is sometimes not very good. There is actually
an American economist who says that economists are an arrogant
bunch with very little to be arrogant about. Bangladesh has had
a knock because of what has happened to the world. If one makes
the assumption that growth will continue in China and will continue
in India and that the financial system will somehow be repaired,
then I see Bangladesh as steadily growing over the coming years,
as long as there is not some sort of governance crisis; as long
as it manages to have this "good-enough" governance
that allows the private sector and just human agency at the grass
roots to operate. I see Goldman Sachs still keep Bangladesh as
one of the next 11; they see it as one of the emerging nations
of the 2040/2050 period in the future. There are three main issues
as to whether it will make it: one will be on the capacity of
its businessmen to move beyond garments, beyond shrimps, beyond
the fishery sort of products into electronics and other areas,
and whether they have got the ability to do that and whether China
will be able to, in a way, dominate the world economy on that.
Twenty years ago people did not think that Bangladeshi entrepreneurs
had the capacity to do what they have done, so I think that is
quite possible. The important thing on the poverty front is whether
the growth continues to be relatively egalitarian. I differ; the
World Bank says that the growth has been spread across the whole
population; I think there has been some increasing equality but
it has not been as much, probably, as in India and China, but
if the growth could remain reasonably broad based then that would
mean it impacts on poverty rather than simply creating a middle-class
and elite. The real joker in the pack, I think, is climate change.
Bangladesh, probably, is going to experience climate change more
severely than any other nation. It depends on which sort of scenario
you take with it: we have the Tyndall Centre at Manchester who
tell us that 2% is guaranteed, which means, certainly, that 20-30
million Bangladeshis will have to move, but as the Tyndall Centre
says: "3 or 4% is what we will be moderating to", but
other climatologists say: "No, they are being too alarmist".
That parameter is the very important one. If climate change does
not kick in too badly, if China does not manage to dominate all
world manufacturing, then I would see steady rates of growth so
a middle income country, perhaps, sometime in the late-2020s.
Q31 Mr Singh: Are there any significant
barriers to private sector development in Bangladesh?
Professor Hulme: Yes and no. The
businessman will say to you: "The bureaucrats and the politicians
are our best friends because they help us make things work and
our worst enemies because, at times, what they are doing does
not allow us to compete with China and Vietnam." It depends.
There are some with trade, but the one that sometimes comes up
with me is health and education; in some sense saying, you know,
if the Government could just move on to getting health and education
to work then that would give us a labour force that will allow
us to compete with China and Vietnam.
Dr Hossain: The barriers to doing
business in Bangladesh are not that great compared to other places.
You know the World Bank does that survey every year, and Bangladesh
fares quite well compared to some places. The port has historically
been a significant obstacle. That has been improved a lot, actually.
That was possibly one of the things that the Caretaker Government
helped to sort out and that could, potentially, deteriorate again
under a political government. The big thing has always been the
power sector. It is not so much a state barrier but it is the
inability of successive, political governments to invest in energy
infrastructure. It is really, really difficult for most industrial
production to operate because of power. Land is also a problem
as well—access to land to develop plant is also very difficult.
So those things, really.
Professor Hulme: If Chittagong
port was allowed to work as it could do then that would really
allow the private sector to operate much more effectively than
it does.
Q32 Chairman: We are going to be
looking at the Charls Livelihood Programme while we are visitors
in Bangladesh. What is your understanding of how that programme
has helped—or has it helped—to reduce poverty? Does
it have scope for further development?
Professor Hulme: I have not looked
at a recent evaluation; did look at it when it was being set up—I
have got a PhD student working on it at the moment, but it is
more on hearsay than detailed knowledge. First of all, I have
to say I was really pleased—actually, proud—that the
UK and DFID worked in the Chars because if the government keeps
away from the Chars, even the most committed NGOs keep away from
the Chars, then the private sector keeps away from it. DFID decided
to work in extremely difficult, physical circumstances—
Q33 Chairman: Is it because it is
so vulnerable and volatile?
Professor Hulme: It is so vulnerable
and volatile. As a rule of thumb, on average, your island will
disappear every six years, so your whole asset base has gone.
You then have to retreat to the shore and then re-establish. However,
that is on average; for some people it is every two or three years,
for others they may spend 30 years on an island. It is an extraordinary
environment.
Q34 Chairman: Ministers and officials
from DFID have quoted this programme to us as an example in a
number of different contexts, which is one of the reasons we want
to go and see is it really as good as it is cracked up to be.
For example, this business of raising houses up on plinths—well,
that is all very well but if your island disappears your plinths
are not going to be of much use. How practical, how successful,
is that in actually securing longer-term stability and what other
measures are involved, if you are trying to compensate people
for losing their livelihood and re-investing it and for all the
other insecurities that go with it?
Professor Hulme: On the plinths,
certainly people who have got plinths when it floods and their
house does not flood because the plinth has given them enough
space, they appreciate it very much! On plinths, you are putting,
in a way, an asset there of which probably a high proportion will
be destroyed, so you would have to work out whether it is worthwhile.
I think that is where probably you will need to look at the detailed
evaluations, if they have been done. The livestock development
certainly appears to work extremely well. People appreciate it.
I was amazed at the way that private traders have come into the
Chars and you have got a milk purchasing operation, entirely informal
networks, that are coming in and going round the islands purchasing
the milk that women have produced. So it has actually increased
the resource base like that. Whether it is really worthwhile,
I think, one needs to look at the short-term parameters. The key
issue will be whether it actually manages to strengthen some of
the institutions. It is meaning the areas are getting more, potentially,
knowledge and understanding; there is some newspaper coverage
now of life in the Chars. So, in a way, it has actually helped
the Chars to enter Bangladesh and be recognised more fully, but
those changes are obviously much slower than the sorts of promises
that aid programmes make.
Q35 Chairman: I do not know whether
it is a helpful follow-up question, because we are just about
to publish our report on urban poverty and slum development—if
you want to call it that. Dhaka is said to be one of the biggest
cities in the world; is there anything from this Chars programme,
in terms of protection intervention, that is transferable to an
urban environment?
Professor Hulme: Not the plinths;
in urban areas you do need to get things higher but you have to
think across a whole community and ward, not against individual
houses. In terms of promoting micro-enterprise and self-enterprise,
to be honest, the Chars Livelihood Project took lessons from BRAC's
Ultra Poor Programme, in terms of going for these asset transfers.
So if one was looking, I would be saying look at BRAC and the
other NGOs to be having experiments. The Chars Livelihood Project
is managed by a high-cost, international consultancy company with
high-cost, expatriate staff. So if you were looking for lessons
for urban areas I would be looking at how you could get the NGOs
to create those lessons.
Q36 Chairman: Is that its problem,
that it is high-cost, or could it be taken over by the local community?
Professor Hulme: Certainly, in
a way, introducing the cows and the milk industry is something
which is being copied. People who have got resources now will
think: "I'll get an extra cow next time and I'll move into
that", so, in a way, it is diffusing through the market anyway.
The Chars Livelihood Project is a project; the NGOs are institutions,
they learn and develop things over time. As soon as the money
stops on the Chars Livelihood Project most of the people will
be going, so it is the NGOs that you have to look for and/or government
agencies (if you can find ones that are functioning well) to come
up with these things. I think the urban frontier is really important.
I know BRAC are looking at it, but I have been encouraging BRAC
to try and learn a bit more because the rural-to-urban transfers
are extremely difficult—it is a different world.
Q37 John Battle: I think DFID funds
some of BRAC, but it is this notion of the trickle-down theory
of how do you get to the poorest of the poor. I get the impression
that BRAC has this programme for Targeting the Ultra Poor that
cannot be reached by other programmes, but who, though, are the
main participants in BRAC's Targeting the Ultra Poor programme?
Professor Hulme: It is not trickle
down; BRAC goes straight to—
Q38 John Battle: No, I meant in an
economic, normal system, which might not reach the people it ever
needs to—it is the Heineken theory of economics; it never
reaches the poor. However, underneath what we might define the
poor are the ultra-poor, and you seem to be going there when others
do not. Is that programme working, really, is what I am asking.
Professor Hulme: Yes, certainly
everything that I see in the field, read about it (and I also
had a student studying it) suggests that it really is achieving
its goals, quite extraordinarily. It is largely going to female-headed
households—often women who have been widowed or divorced—and
the processes by which they are selected are extremely intensive,
but BRAC seem to be able to operate them at very low cost. You
get community assessment and then you get a technical assessment
and, usually, there is an agreement. If you visit there you can
often see—the women are stunted; physically, you can see
that these women have had different lives than average poor people,
if one uses that awful term.
Q39 John Battle: What, as it were,
are the kind of essential differences with the other social protection
programmes that you might see round the world? They seem to be
still based on the trickle-down reach them model. What is going
on differently, or have I missed—
Professor Hulme: BRAC is being
looked at, and the Ford Foundation and the Consultative Group
to Assist the Poor are looking at replicas in other parts of the
world. In a way, it has challenged things conceptually because
it has put together social protection with enterprise promotion
and with this idea of an asset transfer—people need to have
social protection to stabilise their lives; you have to give them
a resource because they are asset-less to such a high degree,
and then they need, in a way, support to develop a micro-enterprise.
So conceptually it has done that and then, practically, it has
managed to do that. It has trained large numbers of highly motivated
staff. I have been to the offices where the staff are and they
are often in parts of Bangladesh that are not regarded as good
postings and you are not well-paid but you have high-morale staff
trying to deliver. Practically, BRAC has had the capacity to look
at poultry, look at ducks, look at cows—even look at small-scale
trading and work out which enterprises can work.
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