Afghanistan: Development progress and prospects after 2014 - International Development Committee Contents

4  DFID's programme

93.  Since the fall of the Taliban, DFID has contributed to a number of important advances in Afghanistan. It has contributed substantially to the expansion of access to education and helped increase tax collection from 3% to 11% through support to the Afghan Government. In Helmand, the UK has helped construct more than 100km roads, improved access to markets and in the past year has supported Mercy Corps in enabling over 3,500 Afghans to graduate from technical and vocational training programmes.[146] It has supported the UN and Afghan Government to hold elections and provided sustained technical support to ministries in Kabul. DFID's programme in recent years has also focused intensively on private sector and market development, including support to the mining sector and improving the investment climate in Afghanistan.[147]

Overall strategy

94.   The DFID Afghanistan programme budget is £178 million per year up to 2014-15 having been increased in 2010 by 40%. The programme operates nationwide supporting fifty projects. DFID's 2011-15 Operational Plan for Afghanistan has three interrelated objectives: improving security and political stability; stimulating economic growth and job creation; and helping the Afghan Government deliver basic services. The UK also has a ten year Development Partnership Arrangement with the Government of Afghanistan (signed in 2005) which sets out shared commitments for deliverables around poverty reduction and aid effectiveness. The document is scheduled to be reviewed and updated by the end of 2012.[148]

Box 3
DFID goals for Afghanistan 2010-15
By 2015, DFID aims to:
  • Create 200,000 new jobs for men and women;
  • Provide technical and vocational education and training for 45,000 young people;
  • Enable over 200,000 more children to be in school - at least 40 % of them girls;
  • Build or upgrade over 47 kilometres of roads in Helmand;
  • Encourage at least 4.3 million Afghans (1.7m women) to vote in the 2013 local government and 2014 Presidential elections;
  • Help the Afghan Government increase food grain production to six million metric tonnes;
  • Help the Afghan Government improve public financial management, address corruption and strengthen delivery of basic services; and
  • Reduce the impact of conflict and natural disasters through effective humanitarian aid.

Source: DFID submission Ev 40

95.  Table 4 demonstrates which thematic DFID areas are being focused on in Afghanistan:

Table 4: DFID Afghanistan planned programme spend[149]
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15




















Wealth Creation 29,74721,140 65,165 95,27825,000 55,52219,000 61,00019,000
Climate Change
Governance and Security 34,168 75,835 17,746 59,778 59,5000
Education [150] 140 27,000 40,621 34,200 28,500
Reproductive, Maternal and Newborn Health
Other Health
Water and Sanitation
Poverty, Hunger and Vulnerability
Humanitarian [151] 17,000 10,000 1,350 9,500 10,000
Other MDGs
Global Partnerships
Total81,055 21,140178,000 0155,445 25,000159,000 19,000159,000 19,000

Source: DFID Afghanistan Operational Plan 2011-15

96.  Dr Gordon of the LSE congratulated DFID for its "balanced portfolio of approaches"[152] although he was concerned how DFID had originally assessed need in Afghanistan and to what extent it had sought to understand how the dynamics of the conflict could affect the prospects of success. Dr Gordon told us that DFID had not conducted a conflict assessment in Afghanistan until early 2008 and that there were questions over how effectively the assessment had been used to inform its programming—particularly as most of the strategies had already been set by then including the Interim Country Programme and the Helmand Roadmap. He said that there was a need to carry out conflict assessments early on and to integrate them into the planning stage. He recommended that DFID "recognise the conflict drivers, rather than simply superimpose template solutions"[153]

97.  There is great uncertainty about transition and upcoming elections in Afghanistan. DFID will need to be flexible enough in its work to be able to respond to developments on the ground. We recognise that there is an inherent tension between the pressure on DFID to be seen to be planning for a successful transition and elections—pursuing the line of the UK Government—and being able to plan for the unknown. We recommend that DFID carry out a portfolio review, that examines potential risks and impacts of transition on all of its programme. Such a review should contain actions which DFID and its partners could undertake to mitigate risks as well as contingency plans if transition and the election do not run as smoothly as hoped for. This review should be updated and re-examined on a routine basis as transition continues and we get closer to the elections.

Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund

98.  The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) is the main mechanism through which DFID distributes aid in Afghanistan. ARTF payments made by all donors, up to 2012, total $6.1 billion. The ARTF is seen as the main way by which donors can meet their Kabul Conference commitments to channel more aid through Afghan Government systems and to fund the National Priority Programmes (NPPs). To safeguard against corruption, the fund is managed by the World Bank, independently monitored and internationally audited.[154]ARTF funds are only transferred to the Afghan Government when it has demonstrated that actual expenditure, conforming to strict eligibility criteria, has been made.

99.  DFID said it was on track to channel up to 50% of development assistance through Government systems by July 2012 (as committed to by donors at the 2010 Kabul conference) and to align 80% of its programmes with the NPPs. Both commitments are expected to be met primarily via UK contributions to the ARTF.[155] DFID has supported the ARTF since its inception and until 2010-11, was its largest cumulative donor; ARTF funding comprises more than half of DFID's total spend in Afghanistan.[156] The total UK contribution to the ARTF is £602.6 million (or US$1,128.22 million) up to 2012-13, averaging £54.78 million per year since inception. DFID is committed to contributing up to a maximum of £360 million from 2011 until 2014 to the ARTF.

100.  When we inquired about the distribution of DFID's funding across the various programmes and sectors of ARTF, we received the following response from DFID:

It is notionally difficult and misleading to extrapolate sector spending on an annual basis because projects and programmes run in-between financial years. The best way to quantify spending by sector is to do it by cumulative spending and commitments from the inception of the ARTF up to now. As of June 2012, based on the total amount of money spent or committed for ARTF projects, $2.17 billion USD has gone into the Investment Window, which provides funding for development projects [...]. Applying DFID's approach of keeping ARTF funding unpreferenced, the UK spend in the different sectors reflects the proportion of ARTF spend in the various sectors.

Based on that DFID gave the following estimated sectoral breakdown of its funding to the ARTF:

Note: Human development refers to health, education and vocational training

Source: DFID supplementary submission

In addition to this, DFID explained that:

A further $2.76 billion has been spent (or committed) through the Recurrent Window which provides funding to help the Afghan Government pay salaries and 'operation & maintenance' costs incurred in providing essential services. The breakdown of such expenditure in sectoral terms follows Afghan Government budget priorities.[157]

101.  A joint donor review of the ARTF carried out this year foresees that more money is likely to be pooled in the ARTF to help governments meet their commitments to put more money on budget through and following transition. While this review is an important step towards ensuring that the ARTF remains effective and accountable through transition, the review also predicts new risks and greater responsibility emerging with transition.[158] DFID told us that specific recommendations and an action plan will be agreed by the end of 2012 by the ARTF Strategy Group which is comprised of key donors, including the UK and the Government of Afghanistan. [159] The then Secretary of State told us that DFID watches the ARTF 'like a hawk' so we were therefore a little surprised when we questioned him on it that he seemed unaware the review had taken place.[160]

Governance and security

102.  In line with the aim of creating a viable state, DFID says it will help the Afghan Government to deliver key functions better and improve how it responds to the demands of citizens, including reducing corruption and providing basic services.[161] Between now and 2015 DFID will be working towards the following governance and security results:

Table 5: DFID expected results for governance and security2011-15
Pillar/ Strategic Priority IndicatorBaseline (including year) Expected results (including year)
Governance and Security

Supporting Peace, Security

and Political Stability

Percentage of people who perceive their provincial government positively. 78% of people surveyed said their provincial government was doing a good or very good job (2010).[162] DFID Afghanistan will contribute to an increase in the number of people who say their provincial government was doing a good or very good job by 2015.
Number of men and women who vote in elections supported by DFID. 4.3 million voters in 2010 Parliamentary elections (including 1.7m women); 6.8m in 2005 and 8.5m in 2004. To help halt a worsening trend in voter participation: at least 4.3m voters (including 1.7m women) in 2013 Provincial and 2014 Presidential elections.[163]
Governance and Security

Helping the State to Deliver

In the ten Afghan Government ministries

with the biggest budgets in the Afghan financial year 1389 (2010/11) we will


  • Proportion (percentage) of projected budget actually spent [164]
  • Proportion (percentage) of funds made available to the ministries which are actually spent
  • Absolute spend.
In most recent Afghan financial year, 1388 (2009/10):
  • of projected budget actually spent.
  • of funds made available actually spent.
  • $849.2m total spend in the ten ministries with the biggest budgets.
DFID Afghanistan will contribute to:
  • percentage point annual increase in the projected budget actually spent up to 2015.
  • percentage point annual increase in the funds made available actually spent up to
  • annual increase in actual spend to 2015.


Peace, Security and Political Stability

Number of ministries who have completed pay and grading reform. 8 ministries had completed pay and grading reform in 2011. DFID will contribute to 13 ministries completing pay and grading reform by 2013.

Source: DFID Operational Plan 2011-15


103.  The capacity of formal Government structures, most of which did not exist or were only marginally functional under the Taliban, have grown significantly since 2001. Much of this progress, however, remains limited to Kabul, where donors have concentrated the majority of their efforts.

Box 4
Key DFID programmes for national governance
  • Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, 2009-14, £364, 200,000 'on-budget' assistance to the Afghan Government to support the delivery of public service and governance reforms.
  • Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund, 2011-15, £35,091,200, which is managed by the Asian Development Bank and also receives funding from the Japanese Government, aims to improve transport networks and access to power and water supplies.
  • Tax Administration, 2012-15, £19,000,000, to continue to strengthen Afghanistan's domestic tax revenues.
  • Strengthening the National Budget, 2007-12, £17,882,000, focused on enabling the Ministry of Finance to coordinate aid funding and implement Public Financial Management reforms in key line ministries.
  • Strategic Support to the Ministry of Interior, 2010-14, £7,230,000, which aims to support the capability and accountability of the ministry.
  • Public Administration Reform, 2010-12,£7,040,000, which aims to extend representation and accountability within national and provincial level government.
  • Support for Forensic Audits, 2011-13, £7,000,000, to help implement the banking sector strategy so that banking services and customers are less at risk.
  • Improved Macroeconomic Governance, 2010-13, £6,000,000, supporting the IMF across multiple countries to improve macroeconomic governance and policy.
  • Advisory and Capacity Building Support for the Independent Directorate for Local Governance, 2011-12, £1,048,085, improving the performance of the IDLG in policy development, programme management and transition planning.
  • Statistical adviser, 2009-13, £843,324, to support capacity building of Government of Afghanistan in the area of Official Statistics and Results-Based Management.

Source: DFID website, Afghanistan Projects

104.  The table above shows where the DFID governance funds are spent. The majority of the money in the portfolio goes to the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) at £364,150,000 for the period from 2009 to 2014. As described earlier in the report the ARTF is used by the Afghan Government to provide basic services but it is also used explicitly to further governance objectives, such as pay and grading reform, through the public administration reform process and to strengthen Ministry of Finance budgeting and monitoring capacity. [165]

105.  DFID has supported a number of other capacity building and administrative reform programmes. This includes often seconding expatriate consultants to key ministries in Kabul to provide technical assistance to improve systems and processes. Current programmes include initiatives to further strengthen revenue collection and support to the Independent Directorate of Local Governance. DFID has been criticised for its reliance on such forms of technical assistance, which have sometimes been seen as inappropriate, costly and ineffective.[166] A recent study of Afghan perceptions of UK aid found that "senior Afghans within the Government express disillusionment with the 'support' they have been provided, claiming instead that they have been 'substituted' for a time, until a break comes and a different consultant arrives."[167]

106.  Taxation and revenue collection have been a key component of DFID's governance capacity building efforts at national level. DFID's operational plan 2011-15 says it will continue to help the Afghan Government raise and manage its own funds, including tax revenue, to help Afghanistan reduce dependence on aid over time.[168] It has funded several past projects, including an approximately £23million programme to strengthen tax administration within the Ministry of Finance, and it is now funding a £19million project to continue to increase domestic tax revenues. Tax revenue was approximately £1.65 billion in 2010-11, up 26% from the previous year.[169]

107.  DFID's most recent (2009) Country Programme Evaluation in Afghanistan assessed DFID's 'state-building' portfolio. The evaluation concluded these contributions were overly focused at central levels of the state and delivered only limited improvements in service delivery and the perceived legitimacy of the state at local levels.[170] According to Naysan Adlparvar, "recent discussions with DFID staff members and independent analysts indicate that circumstances have not greatly changed since 2009."[171] Additionally, DFID's viable state pillar appears to be premised on several assumptions that, at present, have not been borne out, including the establishment of a political settlement. Naysan Adlparvar argued that this approach ignored several important factors:

First, as a stable political settlement has not yet been achieved in Afghanistan, and violence is escalating across the country, the importance of demonstrating developmental results and improving perceptions of the state at local levels is paramount. This is unlikely to be achieved with the UK's present bilateral aid programme, as DFID's work is mostly focused at developing the functions of the central institutions of the state in Kabul. [172]

108.  While we recognise the importance of building the capacity of central Government, the value for money of the policy-focused approaches that DFID has implemented in recent years is still unclear.  Their sustainability is also highly questionable.  Through transition, the ability of the Government to perform tasks—such as delivering basic services and maintaining the rule of law—will be critical, especially with reduced international support. We recommend that DFID be prepared, as Afghanistan, moves closer to 2014 to be able to shift the focus of its governance programme away from consultants in Kabul towards helping the Afghan Government deliver basic services at a local level. 

109.  It may be necessary for the National Security Council (NSC) to redefine DFID Afghanistan's unique priority of "creating a viable state". Although it is preferable to build a better state it is not in the hands of DFID to achieve this when there are so many other factors at play such as the situation in Afghanistan's neighbour Pakistan. This priority set for DFID may become harder, if not impossible, to work towards in the absence of a political settlement and if the security situation deteriorates in Afghanistan. Instead the Government should consider setting DFID the objective of delivering measureable benefits for the people of Afghanistan and of working with partners who can operate under any Afghan Government.

Sub-national governance

110.  DFID provides additional support to governance at the sub-national level. It has a particular focus on reforming the sub-national governance legal and policy frameworks and improving local service delivery. It had also committed £23.5 million over five years to the UNDP-implemented Afghanistan Sub-national Governance Programme (ASGP). However, DFID's support to the ASGP was suspended in September 2011 two years prior to the planned end of the project following a poor joint evaluation.

111.  While in Afghanistan, we were consistently told of a substantial disconnect between the central Government in Kabul and government structures at the sub-national level. David Page of Afghanaid was concerned that government at local level:

is still not empowered and not well staffed. I think that is a very important area DFID should take an interest in, because we have been dealing with an extremely centralised Government, and people have been talking about the need to improve sub-national governance for a long time, but it actually has not happened.[173]

112.   In light of the continuing gap between the centre and sub-national government, we welcome DFID's recent review of its approach to sub-national governance. We were told that some of the headline findings and subsequent discussion had highlighted the need to strengthen the relationship between the centre and the provinces through longer term institution building, reforming the budgeting process and improving the participation and oversight of provincial government structures.[174]

113.  A concern we heard whilst in Afghanistan was about the appointments made to sub-national government being made from Kabul instead of locally. There needs to be more middle ranking provincial and local government officials with an understanding and the support of their local communities without the interference of central Government in appointments. There particularly needs to be more women in such positions.

114.  Strengthening sub-national governance, particularly at the district and village level, and improving funding flows between central Government and the provinces will be essential in the lead up to transition.

Provincial governance

Box 5
Key DFID programmes for provincial governance
  • The Governor's Performance Improvement Programme (GPIP), 2009-13, £9,500,000, aims to improve sub-national governance through financial incentives to provincial governors.

Source: DFID supplementary submission Ev 49

115.  In each of Afghanistan's 34 provinces, governance structures include Governor's office, Provincial Councils, Provincial Development Committees and Provincial Assemblies. While Provincial Councils are elected, the remainder of these are appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG). Additionally, most line ministries responsible for basic services maintain offices in provincial centres.

116.  The UK provides support to the Governors of a number of provinces including Helmand through the Governor's Performance Improvement Programme (GPIP) (£9.5 million over three years). The GPIP, which began in 2010, provides a monthly stipend of $25,000 for Provincial Governors to use for operational activities, contingent upon satisfactory quarterly evaluations of their performance. The second strand of GPIP is the Helmand Transitional Budget Support Fund (HTBSF) which provides $37,000 on the same performance terms to the Governor of Helmand, taking account of the particular needs of that province.

117.  ICAI points out that the Governors' Performance Improvement Programme is unlikely to enjoy continued support from other donors through transition. Several of DFID's core programmes in governance and other sectors rely on the continued support of other donors. It is important for DFID to assess thoroughly which multilateral partnerships remain viable through transition and the long term sustainability of incentive programmes such as the Governor's Performance Improvement Programme. DFID should consider the risks of other donors pulling out of or substantially reducing funding to multi-donor programmes and plan appropriate responses and risk mitigation measures.

District governance

Box 6
Key DFID programmes for district governance
  • The District Delivery Programme (DDP), 2011-2014, £18,407,490, which aims to increase state legitimacy at district level through targeted delivery of basic services.

Source: DFID website, Afghanistan Projects

118.  District governance remains weak and unclearly defined. Across Afghanistan's 398 districts, there are district governors appointed by the President on the recommendation of IDLG along with a variety of ad hoc bodies, often created through aid programmes. Planned district council elections have not been held and no date has been set for them. The Government has in principle agreed to a roadmap for the creation of a single district-level body by September 2012. What formal structures do exist at district level are often ill-equipped and lack funds: only slightly more than half of all district governors have any staff or vehicles.[175]

119.  The main programme of donor support at district level is the District Delivery Programme (DDP), which aims to increase Government legitimacy by improving the Government's capacity to deliver a tailored package of basic services according to local priorities. The UK supports the implementation of DDP in Helmand. To date, seven districts have developed plans following consultations with the local community and procurement has started for over 40 development projects worth £7.4 million. The UK has agreed to provide an additional £20 million to support the further roll out of DDP in Helmand and in up to five other provinces up to 2014.

120.  The DDP was set up in response to the need to establish the presence of the state in recently secured districts following military operations, not necessarily as part of an Afghan Government-led governance strategy. As such, we have heard criticisms that donor money going to district level was poorly coordinated and too driven by political and military counterinsurgency objectives.[176] We were told that DDP accompanied—and occasionally risked duplicating—other programmes such as the Afghan Social Outreach Programme, which was initially driven by US Special Forces (see section on donor co-ordination).[177]

Village governance

Box 7
Key DFID programmes for village governance
  • The National Solidarity Programme (NSP), £31,000,000, which aims to lay the foundation for community level governance through supporting community governance structures and supporting community-managed development and reconstruction projects. Funding was provided 2003-2010 directly, it is now funded by DFID through the ARTF.

Source: DFID website, Afghanistan Projects and DFID supplementary submission Ev 51

121.  At village and community level, governance structures are largely informal, such as groups of elders or other esteemed community members, and their links to district, provincial and national government structures are often weak. For the purpose of implementing the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) has formed nearly 30,000 Community Development Councils (CDCs) across 70% of Afghanistan.[178] The CDCs are informally elected by community members. Our predecessor Committee saw the value of the CDCs and recommended that they should be formalised but it is unclear if this will happen. The 2009 evaluation of DFID's programme in Afghanistan urged DFID to prioritise the development of a "clear strategic view on the role of CDCs in sub-national governance."[179] DFID informed us that:

Formal discussions on the status of CDCs are on-going, and part of wider discussions on sub-national governance including district representation. The World Bank, in collaboration with the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, has commissioned three studies related to the sustainability of CDCs, including a study on how CDCs could be transitioned to village councils. The UK and other donors are working closely with the Afghan Government and the World Bank on this issue.[180]

122.  The UK supports the NSP through its contributions to the ARTF. CDCs are supported to identify community priorities and given a block grant (on average, approximately $35,000) to design programmes to address these issues. The Asia Foundation found that local communities had more confidence in the CDCs' ability to implement effective development projects in comparison with their local government departments, who are subject to budgets and priorities determined at the national level and often fail to effectively implement development projects that respond to community needs.[181]

123.  The future of the NSP, which is now nearly a decade old, and of CDCs (through the transition period) remains unclear. Dr Gordon questioned whether CDCs would be able to survive without donor money.[182]

124.  DFID should work with the World Bank, Afghan Government and National Solidarity Programme (NSP) stakeholders to develop a clear view on the future of Community Development Councils in formal governance frameworks. It should also push for greater links between these community-level structures with broader district and provincial government. While NSP has been regarded as a highly successful programme, we urge DFID to work with the World Bank to clarify its objectives, particularly with regard to governance, and improve monitoring of its impact on local governance.


Box 8
Key DFID programmes for civil society
  • Strengthening Civil Society (Tawanmandi), 2011-16, £19,950,000, aims to support civil society through a trust fund that will distribute small grants to Afghan organisations. Hopes to improve the Government's accountability, responsiveness and respect for human rights.
  • Civil Society Partnership, 2011-13,£506,268, aims to strengthen civil society ability to influence policy, development and aid effectiveness, together with the British and Irish Agencies in Afghanistan Group (BAAG).

Source: DFID website, Afghanistan Projects

125.  DFID says it recognises the need for a vibrant and effective civil society to ensure ordinary Afghans, including women and girls, can have a greater say in their lives and hold their government to account. It recently launched a major new Afghan civil society strengthening programme, co-funded with Denmark, Norway and Sweden called Tawanmandi.[183] Tawanmandi aims to see "a durable political settlement and democratic environment is fostered through more inclusive, issue-based politics and increased public confidence in the state" and "to improve the Government's accountability, responsiveness and respect for human rights."[184] It established a foundation that provides grants to civil society in the broad areas of human rights, justice, anti-corruption, peace building and conflict resolution and media.

126.  While civil society actors have grown significantly since the fall of the Taliban, 'civil society' remains a relatively new concept and is little understood by the wider population. Recent research on civil society actors found that they were still struggling with how to develop effective programmes and "have received little consistent, substantial or helpful international support."[185] The Afghan Government also appears to have a limited understanding of, or resistance, to their role.[186]

127.  The 2009 Evaluation found that DFID "has taken policy decisions that have seen the enhancement of some relationships at the expense of others, notably a diminishing link with civil society."[187] However, this has changed very recently with the advent of the Tawanmandi programme. BAAG commended DFID for being the lead agency and one of the main funders of the Tawanmandi programme. It believed it could be a highly effective tool to improve governance but it would take time and technical support, not just funding, to develop the capacity of civil society organisations, particularly at the district level.[188]

128.  It is important that civil society is supported not only to oversee the Afghan Government but also to help preserve the freedoms and rights won by Afghans during the past decade. Despite being a fairly new programme, Tawanmandi shows enormous promise as a vehicle to support civil society capacity and partnerships. DFID must closely monitor this programme, seek to learn from any shortcomings and proactively take steps to identify further avenues for support to civil society.


Box 9
Key DFID programme for elections
  • ELECTII, 2012-13, £12,000,000, to support elections through a UNDP-managed multi-donor pooled fund aiming to strengthen the Independent Electoral Commission.

Source: DFID supplementary submission Ev 49

129.  For the 2009 and 2010 elections, DFID provided £7 million to support the Independent Electoral Commission to manage the election process. It recently approved £12 million up to December 2013 for ELECT II, managed by UNDP and seeking to support the Independent Electoral Commission in their conduct of the 2014 and 2015 elections. Key areas of focus include: setting up a new voter registration system; building capacity of electoral officials at central and provincial levels; construction of provincial offices for the Independent Electoral Commission; and early voter outreach, particularly to women and other marginalised groups. DFID has also set aside an additional £3 million, which it will access if required. Underscoring the importance of the upcoming elections, the then Secretary of State commented:

I believe it is essential that the elections in 2014 are seen as freer and fairer than before, at the very least. […] the emphasis that I got during my visit was that there was more concern about the elections being a driver of greater stability than there was about fear of instability resulting from the drawdown of the troops. This is an extremely important area, where the international community will need to work together in a creative and effective way to help the Afghan authorities deliver elections that are credible and carry both local and international support. This was a point that was touched upon in Tokyo, and we will be working to do just that.[189]

130.  News reports indicate that preparations for the next round of elections appear to be behind schedule and insufficient to prevent the kind of fraud and contestation seen during the 2009 and 2010 elections. Ahmed Nader Nadery, chairman of the Free and Fair Election foundation, recently commented:

We don't see the movement right now on preparations for the elections. These early stages are critical for ensuring the processes work later on and the Afghan people elect a president that will lead the country through a critical transition.[190]

David Loyn told us that voter registration was key, stating that "the elections in these countries are stolen not at the ballot box; they are stolen at the registration points." He suggested:

Continuing oversight of election monitors and of the registration process, and financing it properly with proper international scrutiny.[191]

131.  Orzala Ashraf testified about the demand for democracy but also the anger and lack of public confidence in elections due to fraud. She recounted what a female member of a Community District Council told her in reference to the national elections: "democracy was good, but the elections ruined it".[192] Orzala explained that the woman had been involved in the National Solidarity Programme where there had been a relatively safe, clean, accountable and transparent process of elections for a Community Development Council. The problems came with the larger Presidential and Parliamentary elections where corruption and the practice of buying votes became widespread. The woman told her that "This kind of election ruined what we were going through in a very smooth way." Orzala believed that this demonstrated the need for a long term commitment to building democratic institutions from the bottom to the top, and not just through ad hoc programmes.[193]

132.  We welcome DFID's support for elections and we note our witnesses' emphasis on the importance of preparation for elections and in the registration of voters. We recommend that DFID give due emphasis to this. We also recommend that during the elections there is a strong international presence of election monitors alongside continued support for Afghan institutions such as the Independent Electoral Commission to try to mitigate the problems which plagued past Afghan elections.


133.  DFID supports the Foreign Office's lead on the Rule of Law. In the past, DFID has funded the position of an international Transitional Justice Advisor within the Ministry of Justice and an Aid Effectiveness Coordinator for Rule of Law. Both of these initiatives ended in 2011. DFID also provides support to the Justice Reform Project through the ARTF, which seeks to harmonise reform in the justice sector and aid the Afghan Government to operationalise its justice sector strategy. The project is being implemented by the three UK justice institutions: the Ministry of Justice, the Attorney General's Office and the Supreme Court. Of the project, DFID commented:

While this has been a broadly positive development, the sector continues to face major challenges and the project has been slow to implement. There are plans for a second phase of the Justice Reform Project, which would extend the scope of the programme to include the informal sector, improving access to justice by ordinary Afghans.[194]

134.  The 2009 DFID Evaluation found that "significantly greater attention to the justice system is warranted."[195] However, DFID currently appears to provide relatively little support to the justice sector aside from the ARTF-funded Justice Reform Project. DFID said that this is because the Foreign Office now leads on the justice sector.[196]

135.  Gerard Russell noted that there has been some progress is expanding the reach of the formal justice system, even though "the number of judges had never been adequate to cope with the cases" and "there is a perception that justice is a very corrupt process" because:

You pay money to the judge if you want the case resolved your way. Many Afghans have told me that they themselves have—for example, in civil disputes over land—paid according to the acreage, essentially, and the judge then will decide in their favour if the other side has not paid more.[197]

136.  Human Rights Watch said that Afghanistan's justice system remains weak and compromised, and a large proportion of the population relies instead on traditional justice mechanisms, and sometimes Taliban courts, for dispute resolution. Human rights abuses are endemic within the traditional justice system, with many practices persisting despite being outlawed. For example, the practice of 'baad', where a family gives a girl to another family as compensation for a wrong, continues even though it is banned by the 2009 Law on Elimination of Violence against Women.[198] We are therefore concerned by the then Secretary of State's apparent support for traditional justice shuras in Afghanistan. He told us that when he recently visited the country he was given:

Very encouraging evidence of the fact that shura-based justice had taken route and was re-emerging. [199]

On a more positive note the then Secretary of State informed us that there were now more than 400 female defence lawyers in Afghanistan—up from three nine years ago.[200] Although this figure pales against the fact that over half of woman in Afghan prisons and virtually all teenage girls in juvenile detention facilities are there for 'moral crimes' such as 'running away' known as 'zina' which is nowhere to be found under the Afghan Penal Code and contrary to Afghanistan's international legal obligations.[201]



137.  Education and skill levels for the adult population have slightly improved, although 81% of adults are illiterate with 93% of women illiterate and a high variance between rural and urban areas. This significantly constrains the adult population's access to information, skills advancement and personal development, and demonstrates the challenge facing Afghanistan in fully engaging its human capital to move the country away from aid dependency. DFID funds the INVEST programme implemented by Mercy Corps in Helmand, which has been highly successful in providing vocational skills.[202] Since starting last year, 7,000 people have qualified, including 1,200 women, and 80% of their programme graduates have either started their own businesses or have got jobs.[203] As Mercy Corps pointed out, adult education and training on technical and vocational skills are critical to alleviating Afghanistan's high unemployment and creating sustainable economic growth. [204]


138.  Twenty-six percent of DFID's annual ARTF contribution of £85 million goes to education. To date, DFID has played a key role in supporting education progress, including by paying the salaries of 160,000 teachers, building national planning systems and reaching communities in insecure regions via NGOs.[205] In addition, DFID's financial contribution to the Global Partnership on Education will help support Afghanistan's grant of $55.7 million to improve access for girls in 40 isolated and impoverished districts, as well as programmes to increase the number of female teachers.

Table 6: DFID expected -results for education 2011-15
Pillar/ Strategic Priority IndicatorBaseline (including year) Expected results (including year)


Getting the State to Deliver

Number of children attending primary school. 3,943,337 children attending primary school in 2009/10 (of which 1,534,725 were girls). DFID will contribute to 5,422,671 children attending primary school in 2013/14 (of which 2,169,068 are girls).

Source: DFID Operational Plan 2011-15

Box 10
Key DFID education programmes
  • Support to the ARTF for education, supporting salaries, training teachers and health workers, providing essential materials, and the repair and construction of schools.
  • Technical and Vocational Education Training Programme, 2011-14, £500,000, to support delivery of the Afghan Government's national priority programme on technical vocational education and training.
  • INVEST programme through Mercy Corps in Helmand for vocational training.

Source: DFID website, Afghanistan Projects

139.  There appears to have been fairly steady progress since 2005 in education indicators. Overall primary school enrolment rates have increased from 37% in 2005 to 52% in 2007-2008, with 42% enrolment of girls and 60% for boys. However, the UN still warns of a "silent crisis" for the 48% of children not in school, 60% of which are female. With major efforts focused on boosting enrolment levels, this is now positively reflected in illiteracy rates declining among youth in urban areas. The same, however, is not true in rural contexts, where literacy rates remain low—40% as compared to 70% in urban areas, and the gender gap is significantly wider. There is also some question over the reliability of enrolment figures, as a 2011 Oxfam report uncovered a significant number of "ghost" teachers on the payroll and a large gap between official enrolment and school attendance. Approximately 22% of female students and 11% of male students were classified as temporarily absent, absent for most or all of the year, or permanently absent, which suggests that many may have dropped out.[206]

140.  While enrolment has shown significant progress, there are growing concerns over the quality of education. Orzala Ashraf told us:

Students who graduate the 12th grade are not comparable with 12th grade students from 15 or 20 years ago. They are not, in some cases, even able to write their names when they have graduated after 12 years of education. Why? It is because of the very poor quality of education that we have. Too much focus, over the last 10 years, has been on the infrastructure and enrolment. What we hear all of the time about the very glorious picture of education is that 7 million girls are going to school [...]but nobody talks about how many are dropping out or what they are learning there. Quality of education is another thing that should be one of the priorities in this period. [207]

Research by Save the Children echoed this; in a sample school only 43% of children in grade 3 could read with comprehension.[208] Save the Children recommended enhancing teachers' literacy instruction skills and enhancing literacy habits at the community level by involving parents in their children's learning.[209]

141.  In line with donor pledges to channel more aid through the Government, donors have been channelling aid away from NGO-based programmes—the majority of which are implemented in coordination with or on behalf of the Ministry of Education (MoE)—directly to the MoE. While supporting the aim to put more money on budget, NGOs have cautioned against doing so too quickly. A lack of ministerial infrastructure and/or human resources in many areas (particularly outside of cities and towns), or a lack of community acceptance of Government presence, means that not all classes established by NGOs can or will be continued by the MoE once the transfer of those classes to ministry management is complete, particularly if the transfer process is rushed.[210] Of the 600 classes that CARE[211] handed over to the MoE, one-third of these classes were discontinued because the MoE was not able to incorporate them into their annual plans and budgets. Students were informed to report to the nearest formal MoE school instead, resulting in a lot of boys and almost all of the girls dropping out. In some cases the MoE replaced teachers with what they considered as more qualified teachers—from outside the community. As a result, many of the girls were withdrawn by their parents who did not know or trust the teacher. Additionally, in conflict areas the Government may not be able effectively to provide education, with Government officials and schools targeted by the insurgency. Mercy Corps pointed out that the reason they were able to facilitate secondary education for women in Helmand is because they were not associated with the Government and had long standing ties to the communities they worked in.[212]

142.  A further concern was the lack of secondary school education in Afghanistan. CARE highlighted that there was a large cohort of children approaching the end of their primary school education, with no options for further education ahead of them. It said that while the initial donor and Government focus on primary school enrolment had yielded significant results, there had been an insufficient focus on the quality and continuity of education at higher levels. There is enormous demand for high quality education: according to the 2011 Oxfam survey, 85% of girls attending school wanted to continue their education yet women comprise just under one-fifth of university students.[213] Whilst in Afghanistan we were encouraged to hear that parents were increasingly appreciative and supportive of education for their daughters and were wanting to carry on with their schooling. We also heard concern that the provision and quality of secondary and higher education was insufficient to stimulate jobs and economic growth, and fill the professional sectors with capable, qualified individuals.[214]

143.  We welcome DFID's continued funding to the ARTF to support the Afghan Government's efforts to expand and improve education services through support to teacher salaries and other means. However, there is greater scope for DFID to focus more on secondary and adult education, and to improve the quality of education. Important lessons on the added value of NGOs in some circumstances can be learned, particularly with regard to vocational and community-based educational programmes as DFID's support to Mercy Corps programmes in Helmand demonstrates.

Wealth creation

144.  Wealth creation encompasses a wide range of activities, with DFID's operation plan for 2011-15 stating its priority areas as: large-scale infrastructure, agriculture, business development, community infrastructure, and improving the conditions for private investment (including in the key minerals sector) and creating jobs.[215]

Table 7: DFID expected results for wealth creation 2011-15
Pillar/ Strategic Priority IndicatorBaseline (including year) Expected results (including year)
Wealth Creation

Promoting Economic Stability, Growth & Jobs

Number of jobs created for Afghan men and women (Full-Time Equivalent jobs). Zero jobs created for Afghan men and women at March 2011. 20,000 jobs created for Afghan men and women by 2015.

Wealth Creation

Economic Stability, Growth & Jobs

KMs of rural roads rehabilitated. 774 KMs of secondary rural roads and 887 kms of tertiary roads rehabilitated between 2008 and 2011. DFID will contribute to the rehabilitation of i)1,100 km secondary rural roads and ii) 1,195 km of tertiary rural roads by 2013.
Agricultural production under irrigated land. 2.5 tonnes per hectare in 2011. DFID will contribute to 2.75 tonnes per hectare

yield of wheat produced under irrigated land by


Source: DFID Operational Plan 2011-15


145.  DFID's wealth creation programme has a strong focus on private sector development. It is supporting reforms to regulatory and policy frameworks in leading economic sectors including the extractive industries and agri-business to create an appropriate investment climate. It is also encouraging international private sector investment, including in Afghanistan's mining sector, and access to finance for small and medium sized enterprises.[216]

Box 11
Key DFID wealth creation programmes
  • Supporting Employment and Enterprise, 2009-13, £36,000,000, to strengthen the private sector's ability to invest and compete, with a focus on small and medium enterprises.
  • Afghanistan Investment Climate Facility, 2008-14, £3,744,703, to improve investment policy and trade regulations.
  • Afghanistan Marketplace Expansion, 2008-12,£1,282,796, to increase procurement of local goods by national and international organisations in Helmand.
  • Private Sector Development Advisor, 2008-2013, £480,261, to provide technical support on the private sector. (spend £530,964)
  • Extractives Sector Support Programme, 2012-15, £300,000 to support and improve the capacity of the Afghan Government to develop Afghanistan's natural resources for the benefit of the Afghan people.

Source: DFID website, Afghanistan Projects

146.  Afghanistan's mineral wealth has enormous potential over the long term to support economic growth. The Afghan Government, through the Ministry of Mines, is seeking international partners to exploit Afghanistan's mineral wealth and has signed contracts for several mines with a number of international partners, including Chinese, Indian and US-based companies. When we met with the Minister of Mines in Kabul, he had high expectations of the Afghan mining potential. DFID has been far more cautious in their discussions with us. Mining is expected to contribute an additional 3.5% to economic growth and DFID projects revenue in 2025 to be around $0.9-1.6 billion, or 2-4% of GDP.[217]Such profits would require investment of about $6-10 billion from 2015.

147.  DFID also explained that:

Mining and oil/gas revenues are in any context subject to enormous uncertainty because of the volatility of commodity prices. That uncertainty is compounded in Afghanistan by the fact that most of its mineral deposits have neither been explored in detail nor have they been awarded to investors. [218]

In order for Afghanistan to profit from its mineral resources, the processes by which they are exploited must be transparent and carefully managed. The Afghan Government has taken some steps toward good governance of its resources, including candidacy for the Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), a Presidential decree requiring all signed contracts to be publically available and the establishment of an International Advisory Council, supported by the ARTF, to oversee the fairness of the allocation of resource rights and contracts.

148.  While potential profits from the mining industry are promising, Global Witness expressed concern over the "fast pace" at which the Government was selling off mineral rights and believed "there is a credible threat that the natural resource sector could become a possible source of conflict and instability in Afghanistan if not carefully managed."[219] It urged DFID to do more to support the Afghan Government in establishing due process and developing good governance in the mining sector. As David Loyn reminded us "the history of countries, particularly in Africa, which already had corrupt systems and had minerals is pretty bad."[220]

149.  High-level policy engagement and central Government support should be targeted on key issues where DFID has the comparative advantage. DFID should stay engaged on the development of mining revenues to ensure, with other donors, that a robust regulatory regime is in place to record Government progress towards good governance commitments for the sector. DFID should also support independent oversight by local communities and civil society as well as encourage the reinvestment of mining revenues into related industries and other parts of the economy that will create jobs.


150.  A large portion of DFID's wealth creation work on agriculture and rural livelihoods focuses on supporting the central Government in capacity building and policy development. This includes DFID support for a programme of institutional reform and capacity building in the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) through Increasing Agricultural Potential in Afghanistan, a £20 million agricultural programme approved in April 2011. Other key programmes are listed in the table below:

Box 12
Key agriculture and rural livelihoods programmes
  • Comprehensive Agriculture and Rural Development Facility, 2009-13, £30,000,000, encourages investment in agriculture and seeks to sustain the reductions in poppy cultivation.
  • Support to demining, 2008-13, £11,215,981, to return 160.2 million m2 of high priority mined land and explosive remnants of war contaminated land to productive use.
  • Support to Strategic Planning for Sustainable Livelihoods, 2003-12, £10,153,850, to strengthen Afghan Government institutions focused on agriculture.
  • Strengthening the Agriculture Sector, 2012-14, £5,630,000, to increase the value and productivity of agriculture.
  • Increasing Agriculture Potential in Afghanistan, 2009-12, £3,784,602, to ensure that the Afghan Government's policies are pro-poor and evidence-based through technical support in ministries and capacity building.

Source: DFID website, Afghanistan Projects and DFID visit briefing

151.  In addition DFID runs programmes implemented by partners at the community level. Two DFID programmes—the Horticulture & Livestock Programme and the Sustainable Agricultural Livelihoods in Eastern Hazarajat—have helped more than 75,000 rural families to organise themselves in farmer groups, improve livelihoods through the introduction of improved agricultural, horticultural and livestock technologies, and empower women through literacy and skill development training. [221] Through the ARTF, DFID supports the Afghanistan Rural Enterprise Development Programme, which has created over 2,300 savings groups of which 54% are female groups, involving over 12,000 women.[222] DFID has also just launched a project in Bamiyan which it hopes will transform the lives of 50,000 farmers. The Bamiyan Agricultural Support Programme works with 40 farmer cooperatives to give members access to modern farming equipment such as tractors, high quality wheat and potato seed, and support for small business development. DFID said the programme would ensure that farmers got greater financial returns from their activities and help reduce poverty in the region.[223]

152.  In Helmand the PRT and the Specialist Team of Royal Engineers have been helping to improve Helmand's canal irrigation system and equip farmers with the skills and tools needed for a viable agricultural economy. Helmand's fertile river valley and irrigation network makes it potentially the most agriculturally productive province in Afghanistan.[224]

153.  Land rights, important to increasing agricultural productivity remain a critical gap. David Loyn believed that this was one of the biggest lost opportunities of the past decade:

Getting land titles right is something that the international community has failed to do over the years. [...] You can imagine the issues that Afghans face, returning to their farm that has been fought over three times; refugees have come and refugees have gone. What you tend to do is to put the powerful land title into the hands of the man with the biggest gun—into the warlords rather than into any institutional structures. That has been a fantastic opportunity for the Taliban, who have succeeded in villages right across Afghanistan in providing what Afghans need, which is resolution with their neighbours.[225]

Dr Gordon agreed but told us that land tenure was recognised by DFID as a problem and it had invested in the land registry in Helmand. However there was not enough investment in it and there were significant difficulties due to insecurity in Helmand.[226]


154.  It has been questioned how well suited DFID's wealth creation priorities and programmes are to the current climate of active conflict in Afghanistan and with the uncertainty of transition ahead. Naysan Adlparvar commented:

Afghanistan has extremely high levels of poverty. […]The country also suffers from growing humanitarian challenges, including drought in eight of the last eleven years and major displacements due to conflict, drought and flash flooding. DFID's current approach to building the state and economy—which aims to meet the long term needs of the Afghan people—will likely do little to alleviate their more pressing and immediate needs linked to poverty and humanitarian crisis. [227]

He felt the best way, in one of the poorest countries in the world, to improve the economic situation was to focus on poverty alleviation and questioned the impact of some of the more Kabul-centric, consultant-focused programmes on wealth creation.

155.  Mercy Corps agreed to some extent, and saw the effective route to achieving poverty reduction as diversifying and developing the economy through the provision of skills and increasing the quantity and quality of goods and services. It felt that the establishment of revolving credit funds that could lend money and/or give grants to new businesses could foster economic growth at the local level.[228] BAAG also thought DFID should be placing more of a focus on enabling wealth creation within Afghan households and villages by supporting small business enterprise.[229] DFID told us when asked about its current position on microfinance:

The Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA) was set up in 2003 as a vehicle for donor funding of microfinance. DFID provided an additional £17 million to MISFA in 2008/09 through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), taking its contribution to a total of £40 million. A Project Completion Report (PCR) conducted by DFID staff from outside Afghanistan in February 2010 concluded that MISFA was sufficiently funded for the foreseeable future, and that the organisation should concentrate on consolidation and improvements to its lending portfolio, rather than expanding it.[230]

156.  DFID appears to have had greatest and most sustainable impact in the past on small-scale rural development projects implemented primarily by NGOs, often working along side or seeking to support Government agencies.[231] The 2009 evaluation of DFID programming was critical of DFID not having "fully used the accumulated expertise NGOs have in maximising farm-related income opportunities " and "employing a country-wide approach to reduce vulnerabilities to poverty."[232] It also found that "smaller projects performed better than the larger more complex Government-run" programmes.[233]

157.  DFID's wealth creation portfolio has yielded some success, although it may need to be reviewed and consolidated in light of transition. While DFID's prioritisation of wealth creation and improving Government structures has been important in many respects, few programmes are explicitly focused on poverty reduction, aside from the notable allocation to the ARTF. In one of the poorest countries in the world with significant humanitarian needs that derive primarily from the lack of development and a weak Government with limited reach outside of Kabul, DFID's approach to wealth creation seems out of balance with reality. It is overly centralised, with a disproportionate focus on Government ministries and policy in Kabul that is disconnected from the needs of ordinary Afghans. We recommend that DFID give priority to the needs of rural and poor populations, adopting a 'back-to-basics' aid approach focused on community-led development and sustainability. This should focus on poverty reduction and access to basic services.

158.   In terms of DFID's bilateral support, NGOs, both international and Afghan, will play an increasingly critical role through and after transition. The NGOs that DFID works with have shown significant results in extraordinarily difficult circumstances and a comparative advantage in improving rural livelihoods. Working in insecure areas is generally much easier for NGOs, especially those that have close links and long histories with communities. Such NGOs are perceived as impartial and independent, able to gain security guarantees from communities and thus are likely to have much greater access to remote and insecure areas than other actors after the international forces leave. It is highly unlikely that organisations with armed security or with little or no history in targeted locations will be able to demonstrate similar results, in terms of effectiveness or sustainability.


159.  DFID's operational plan 2011-15 states that it aims to "strengthen our humanitarian work to help address the direct impacts of conflict, exclusion and natural disasters on the most vulnerable groups."[234] While DFID's humanitarian assistance decreased after 2004 as its programme shifted focus toward development, DFID has recently increased humanitarian funding. It has two core humanitarian partners, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the World Food Programme (WFP). DFID supports the ICRC national emergency programme, helping to run seven hospitals and eleven health centres, train and equip staff in nine clinics in conflict-affected areas, and distribute food aid and essential household items to internally displaced people. Whilst in Kabul we visited the ICRC hospital which provides prosthetic limbs to the local Afghan population. One of the things which most impressed us was not only the provision of the prosthetic limbs but also the rehabilitation of the patients. Nearly all of the staff working at the hospital were disabled themselves. In 2011, DFID provided assistance to WFP to purchase nearly 5,000 metric tonnes of high-energy biscuits for distribution to schoolchildren nationwide, helping to improve school attendance and enrolment rates. DFID also currently channels emergency drought support through UNICEF and an NGO consortium. [235]

Table 8: DFID expected results for humanitarian programmes 2011-15
Pillar/ Strategic Priority IndicatorBaseline (including year) Expected results (including year)

Reducing impact of conflict and natural disasters on people's lives, well-being and dignity

Number of people assisted by humanitarian agencies (for example through the provision of health services,

food and water).

According to assessed need - variable by year. Target to be determined annually.

Source: DFID Operational Plan 2011-15

Box 13
Key DFID Humanitarian programmes
  • ICRC support to people in conflict-affected areas, 2010-13, £10,000,000, Humanitarian Support to conflict-affected civilians and non-combatants in Afghanistan 2011.
  • Protection and Prevention Humanitarian Assistance, 2012-13, £10,000,000, to help mitigate the vulnerability of civilian populations affected by the long standing conflict.
  • WFP humanitarian food security assistance, 2011-12, £7,020,000, targeting food insecure school-aged children.
  • Emergency drought response implemented by an NGO consortium, 2012-13, £6.1 million supporting up to 253,230 Afghans.

Source: DFID website, Afghanistan Projects

160.  BAAG emphasised that the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan was increasingly critical and Christian Aid said that the chronic nature of these crises were largely the result of unaddressed development needs, despite the billions in aid that have been invested in Afghanistan since 2001. In mid-2011 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) estimated that 4.1 million people were food-insecure and a further one million needed emergency agricultural assistance. There have been eight droughts in the past 11 years and natural disasters, such as floods and landslides, are chronic threats. The number of Afghans forced to flee their homes by the conflict and remain internally displaced rose 45% in 2011 and in the first four months of 2012 showed the sharpest increase in internal displacement since 2002.[236] Despite the growing need, the UN recently noted that there had been a "marked reduction in humanitarian assistance in 2012."[237] The 2012 UN Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) has received less than a third of requested funds from donors and the Emergency Response Fund, which funds rapid response to crises, has a balance of less than $200,000 and has received no funding to date this year.[238] A recent UN survey found that a third of children in southern Afghanistan are acutely malnourished with a level of malnutrition 'similar to famine zones'. However the problems is not necessarily availability of food but poverty.[239] Michael Keating, deputy head of the UN Mission in Afghanistan said of the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan:

This is the kind of malnutrition you associate with Africa and some of the most deprived parts of the world, not with an area that has received so much international attention and assistance.[240]

161.  Despite increased UK humanitarian funding in recent years, we have received persistent criticism regarding DFID's lack of humanitarian focus in Afghanistan. CARE remarked that there was in general a "neglect of humanitarian needs in the country because of this political focus on state building and counterinsurgency." [241] Amnesty International was concerned that there had been little attempt by international donors to address the scale of the displacement crisis in Afghanistan and urged the UK Government to do more on this issue. Naysan Adlparvar was also critical of DFID's lack of humanitarian aid and encouraged DFID to channel more aid not only to "humanitarian programming, at sub-national levels across Afghanistan" but also to poverty reduction, to reduce the underlying drivers of crises such as drought and natural disasters.[242] Afghanaid said that DFID was well placed to "take a leadership role in the humanitarian coordination structure in Afghanistan."[243] The then Secretary of State informed us that DFID had recruited two additional specialist humanitarian staff and that he recognised there was a "need to do more".[244]

162.  We recommend that DFID do much more to meet humanitarian needs and address the underlying causes of the crises such as child malnutrition and levels of internally displaced people. We recommend that more of DFID's budget should be spent on disaster mitigation in the rural and remote areas that are often most hard hit by natural disasters such as drought and flood. In addition, DFID should play a constructive role in leading and encouraging other donors to provide greater attention and resources to Afghanistan's growing humanitarian needs.


163.  The UK Government has said it is committed to protecting and promoting the rights of women and girls in Afghanistan. The then Secretary of State also emphasised this saying "Britain has been a staunch supporter of women's rights".[245] DFID said in its 2011-15 Operational Plan[246]:

Our work will support Afghan Women's empowerment. Our work will help build a peaceful state and society that will tackle poverty and create wealth for both Afghan men and women. Increased political and economic participation of women will improve their lives and help reduce the risk of Afghanistan remaining in conflict. The UK National Action Plan on UN Security Council Resolution 1325—Women, Peace & Security was launched by the Foreign secretary in 2010 and is the guiding strategy for DFID and the UK work on gender.

Box 14
The UK National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 Women, Peace & Security
DFID works with the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence and has four objectives:
  • PREVENTION: Mainstreaming gender into conflict prevention activities and strategies and strengthening efforts to prevent violence against women
  • PARTICIPATION: Promote and support women's participation in peace processes and representation in decision making
  • PROTECTION: Strengthening efforts to secure the well-being, economic security
  • and dignity of women and girls
  • RELIEF AND RECOVERY: Promoting women's equal access to aid programmes and services

164.  Between now and 2015, DFID has pledged to strengthen the gender impact of the ARTF and improve tracking of results for women and girls. It also aims to conduct a gender mapping exercise in 2012 of all DFID work and identify opportunities to do more to promote the rights and opportunities of women and girls. Internally, DFID aims to ensure all UK staff in Afghanistan are aware of the UK's gender commitments and increase the use of gender-disaggregated data across all programmes. However, the only results monitoring it has on gender is:

Table 9: DFID expected results for gender 2011-15
Pillar/ Strategic Priority IndicatorBaseline (including year) Expected results (including year)
Gender % of sampled women representatives in Community Development Councils (CDCs) that take active part in decision-making related to community development. To be determined for 2011. DFID will contribute to 65 % of sampled women

representatives in CDCs taking active part in

decision-making related to community development in 2013.

Source: DFID Operational Plan 2011-15

165.  Despite women's and girl's empowerment and gender equity being a departmental priority for DFID globally, there is concern that this has not translated into women and girls being a strategic priority for DFID in Afghanistan.[247] DFID funding for programmes explicitly focused on women and girls has been minimal. It previously provided £463,942 for a women's rights civil society empowerment programme and £300,225 for educational radio programming that included a gender equity theme, but both programmes ended in 2010. Instead, DFID appears to have taken a 'mainstreaming' approach. As ActionAid commented, it is difficult to assess how effectively mainstreaming is being implemented and what change if any it is bringing about in women's lives. It said that only 11 projects (of 92 listed) on the DFID projects database had published documents and out of these, only one contained an explicit commitment to gender or women's issues. [248] Women and girls have benefited from investment in the ARTF, which pays teachers' salaries, and from rural development programs as well as Tawanmandi, the general civil society trust fund. However, DFID has done very little explicitly on gender issues nor directed funding clearly towards women and girls programmes as can be seen by the lack of gender specific projects.[249]

166.  Orzala Ashraf warned of the risk of women "dropping off the agenda" as international forces withdraw. She believed that:

Whether the Government or the future Government will be supportive towards women or not is very much a question for the international community, because if the international community supports the kind of Government that does not support or consider the needs of Afghan women, then we will return back to the same situation. But if there is a clear conditionality that the gains and achievements that women have made and the activities that women are doing should not be sacrificed or compromised, the situation will be different.[250]

167.  There is a clear case to be made for DFID building up a more substantive and effective focus on gender in its Afghanistan country strategy, particularly with regard to education and wealth creation. Only 47% of Afghan women are active in the labour market and less than one in ten women are employed outside of the agriculture sector. The need for economic survival has resulted in families being increasingly willing to allow women to work, but women and girls face significant discrimination in terms of lower wages, access to markets and employment due to security and traditional gender roles and overall are more susceptible to poverty. The Afghan Government estimated women's annual per capita income to be $402, compared to $1,182 for men and concluded that "women are approximately three times economically worse off than men".[251] As BAAG highlighted efforts to reduce poverty through creating sustainable jobs must take into account the complexities faced by women.[252]

168.  DFID recognised that "implementation of legislation promoting and protecting women's rights has been weak."[253] ActionAid recommended that DFID prioritise women's rights, particularly the full implementation the National Action Plan for Women of Afghanistan and the 2009 Elimination of Violence Against Women law. ActionAid would like DFID to make resources available to women's rights organisations to raise awareness of the law, providing complementary services such as shelters and counselling for victims of violence against women, and engaging in advocacy for changes in policy and process to advance women's rights. [254] Human Rights Watch advocated the need for legal services for women including on family law issues.[255]

169.  We asked the then Secretary of State about the situation for women in Afghanistan and about the work DFID was doing. He told us that he did not agree that the position of women was getting worse in Afghanistan and that progress was still being made.[256] He also did not believe that there would be a return to the treatment of women as it was under the Taliban as through the international development effort there was now an "educated critical mass of women in Afghanistan" who were the "best bulwark against those policies being re-implemented." However, we are also aware that before Taliban rule there was a cohort of women in Afghanistan educated under the Russian system who in the 1970s and 1980s held jobs as scientists, teachers, doctors, and civil servants and had a considerable amount of freedom with significant educational opportunities.[257]

170.   We also asked DFID what progress there had been on recruiting women to the Afghan National Security Forces—following our predecessor Committee's recommendation that there should be more women in the police and the Department's response that EUPOL had an action plan on gender issues. As of July 2012 there were over 1400 female ANP representing almost 1% of the total force.[258] This was up from 180 in 2006 which at the time was less 0.3% of the police force.[259] The target is to reach 5000 female ANP members by 2015. DFID admitted that due " to the conservative nature of Afghan society the rate of progress is slow" and that women in the ANP had "ill-defined responsibilities" were given "menial tasks" and had "few dedicated facilities including sanitation, changing rooms and so on."[260]

171.  Human Rights Watch has suggested the need for a multi-donor analysis of gender programmes in Afghanistan with analysis of lessons learned. This should result in the production of a plan for how the international community should support women's rights in Afghanistan 2015-20. Human Rights Watch also recommended that it would require a lead donor, although the goal should be to get as many donors involved as possible, and that DFID should take this position because of its prominence and its commitment to research-based approaches.[261]

172.  Afghan women continue to suffer intense discrimination and abuse. While the UK Government says it is committed to protecting and promoting the rights of women and girls in Afghanistan there is little practical evidence of this in either programming or funding. We recommend that DFID seeks to combat violence against women through support for women's shelters and legal services. DFID should also continue to ensure women and girls are a major focus for its education and wealth creation programmes.

173.  We recommend the creation of a joint donor-government plan for women and girls during transition, which would encourage donors to commit to specific programmes and objectives based on evidence and consultation. This could help catalyse greater commitment and sustained political will to ensure that women and girls are not forgotten in transition. Such an approach would require a lead donor which DFID could take given its prominence and commitment to research-based approaches. In addition, we recommend that DFID exert pressure on other donors and the Afghan Government to back up their previous commitments to Afghan women.

Oversight of DFID programmes


174.  The DFID office in Afghanistan is its fourth largest in the world, reflecting its status as a priority country for DFID and the UK Government. In the years up to 2014-15, DFID Afghanistan is expected to become its sixth largest country office, behind those in Ethiopia, India, Bangladesh, Nigeria and Pakistan. There are currently 75 staff, including 39 international staff and 36 Afghan staff, working in both the Kabul and Helmand offices. DFID staff work a five day working week in Kabul, and a six day working week in Helmand, although weekend working is a regular occurrence. Both locations work six weeks in country followed by a two week break (plus 1.5 travel days for Kabul and 3.5 for Helmand). Annual leave accrues while at post and is then taken at the end of the posting as "decompression leave" (usually 2-3 months depending on the length of service). DFID staffing in Afghanistan, both among Afghan nationals and British staff, has increased in recent years. DFID told us:

The longest period a current or past [...]member of staff has worked on the subject of Afghanistan is 5 years and 1 month -2 periods in Kabul divided by a posting in London. We also have other staff who have been working on Afghanistan issues between two and five years. The new Deputy Head of Office, starting in the autumn, is returning to work on Afghanistan following a number of previous Afghanistan postings between 2005 and 2009.

Source: DFID supplementary submission Ev 45

175.  We heard from witnesses that staff turnover and the frequency of breaks has created some difficulty in maintaining institutional memory and continuity. Human Rights Watch told us:

UK embassy and DFID staff in Kabul in general enjoy a reputation for being relatively informed and active, although the strengths of the UK staff are sometimes undermined by the short tours and the fact that such a large proportion of staff are junior and often on their first overseas posting.[262]

While recognising the strenuous environment in which DFID staff operate, our predecessor Committee highlighted the detrimental impact of short tours of duty and the six weeks on and then two weeks off schedule. ICAI highlighted how such policies impact programming and oversight:

DFID relationships with partners and managing agents are disrupted: in the long term, by staff being in post for a shorter time than most programmes; and in the short term, by the practice of a two-week break every eight weeks. As a result, DFID staff in Afghanistan have to spend time managing handovers with each other.[263]

176.  Dr Gordon highlighted that length of tour was not just a problem for DFID but also for the military:

For every DFID person who spends six weeks on, two weeks off, and spends six months to a year there, you have got an army private who spends six months in theatre, for two of which he knows nothing, for two of which he is very competent and for two of which he is looking to go home.[264]

He believed that: "the UK would never have pursued a policy in Northern Ireland with that degree of personnel churn and I think that has been an enormous restriction on their capacity to make effective change."[265]

177.  Naysan Adlparvar was critical of the high levels of security enforced by DFID which meant that staff members were potentially unable to visit project sites and resulted in "staff with a limited awareness of Afghan realities, and an inability to monitor project implementation."[266]

178.  In its recent audit of DFID programming, ICAI concluded that while DFID had made improvement to staffing " it remains exposed to the risk of leakage as a result of insufficient staff with financial skills" and "found significant scope to improve the capacity of financial management support to these staff (few of whom hold a relevant accounting qualification) and to grasp fully each programme's financial risks and to quantify the leakage in delivery."[267]

179.  While we appreciate that working in Afghanistan is extremely difficult and commend DFID staff for the job they have done under these circumstances, we are concerned about the short postings, resultant loss of capacity and knowledge and weak institutional memory. We recommend that DFID create a cadre of experts with knowledge of Afghan language and culture, who will work on Afghanistan, in London or in country; this could greatly improve the quality and consistency of DFID's work. Longer tours and routine rotations to Afghanistan would also aid in this.

180.  Whilst in Afghanistan we met locally employed Afghan DFID staff. We were impressed with their commitment to their work for DFID and the huge risks they took working for the UK Government—being unable to tell people other than close family where they worked for fear of violence or kidnap to not only themselves but also their friends and families. We recommend that HMG does all that it can to protect the Afghan staff working for its embassy both now and particularly if the security situation in Kabul deteriorates.


181.  DFID tracks the effectiveness of its programme in Afghanistan through a range of monitoring and evaluation systems. At National Security Committee (NSC) level Ministers and officials monitor progress against an agreed set of indicators. Regular, Afghanistan specific NSC meetings were recently instituted to provide more time for discussions. DFID's work forms an integral part of the FCO led UK Country Business Plan, which supports the NSC strategy. Within the British Embassy in Kabul, thematic "strands" bring together all HMG programme activity - DFID, Conflict Pool and FCO funds, including in Helmand—and are monitored by the Afghan Delivery Group (ADG), chaired by the Ambassador. The ADG meets every two months and the DFID Head of Office is on the Board.

182.  DFID monitors progress with the Operational Plan annually, with a 'light' review at the mid-year stage. An Afghanistan Programme Board, chaired by the Head of Office, meets quarterly to review progress across DFID's portfolio to examine financial issues, risk assessment and lesson learning. At the project level, they annually review progress against logical frameworks.

183.  As DFID acknowledged, data in Afghanistan is scarce due to decades of conflict and continuing lack of access to certain areas due to insecurity. For example, population estimates are based on a partial census last conducted in 1979. The quality of data is slowly improving, in part due to DFID Afghanistan's support for improving national statistics.[268]

184.  The recent audit conducted by ICAI raised significant concerns about DFID oversight and accountability, particularly with regard to how it operates with partners, and its lack of effective risk management. While it found no evidence of leakage, ICAI found that DFID did not complete a detailed risk assessment of leakage at the programme design stage and it identified several shortcomings in assessing and monitoring risk. ICAI also expressed concern about excessively long delivery chains (in the example of the Helmand Growth Programme, there were at least four layers of subcontracting, each exposing DFID to further waste and impeding the overall programme value for money). Given other shortcomings identified by ICAI in DFID's risk assessment, such long delivery chains are problematic - especially in light of DFID's inability to monitor directly partners operating in insecure environments. The subject of sub-contracting was a matter which was raised with us both by the Chambers of Commerce in Kabul and with members of the Afghan diaspora who we met in London. The concern was that money was being lost in each level of sub-contracting and that very little of it in the end got to where it was meant to.[269]

185.  With regard to whether sufficient systems were in place, ICAI found that:

DFID in Afghanistan has not yet established systematic, robust and detailed financial management systems to manage risks in the delivery of aid in the Afghan context. Our conclusion is that, while DFID has taken steps in the right direction, it remains exposed to the risk of leakage as a result of insufficient staff with financial skills, the lack of clear and detailed financial reporting and a deficiency in risk management procedures beyond the first managing agent in the delivery chain.[270]

They also found that DFID lacked a comprehensive approach to counter fraud and corruption in its programmes. Additionally, neither DFID nor its managing agents had conducted a comprehensive assessment of leakage, so ICAI was unable to analyse this. The report found no evidence of leakage but whether this was because there was no leakage or because of the weaknesses of DFID's systems in detecting it, is unclear.

186.  DFID has since responded to the audit and continues to work to address ICAI's concerns. A DFID Task Team visited Kabul in April to develop an Action Plan to reduce further the risk of leakage or fraud. A portfolio assessment tool has been developed to assess portfolio risk and will be regularly at the quarterly programme board. For each project, it assesses both fiduciary and delivery risk and assesses this against the performance of the project. DFID has also pledged to develop an anti-corruption strategy by the end of September 2012. A six-month update on progress about the commitments made to ICAI in the DFID management response is due for publication in mid-September.

187.  We heard a wide range of views on whether DFID appropriately balanced risk and reward. Gerard Russell agreed that the balance of risk was something that needed further thought, asking:

Have we got the balance of risk right between the risk of money going astray, if there is insufficient supervision by internationals, and the risk that the international presence, being relatively expensive and limiting, holds us back from the effect that we could have if we put more money through Afghans at a local level and took just a slightly higher level of risk?[271]

He also warned:

If you say that avoiding corruption must be the number one rule, you risk choosing projects that are entirely safe but maybe do not deliver as much as slightly riskier projects.[272]

188.  ICAI emphasised the importance of considering risks at programme inception, particularly with regard to transition:

It is important to take full account of risks at the design stage, not only because the current political, economic and security situation is unstable but also due to the planned military withdrawal by the end of 2014. […] DFID's decisions about its post-2014 programmes will have implications for the UK's reputation as a partner in Afghanistan. It will also have implications for the stabilisation of some areas—principally Helmand— and for Afghan organisations' ability to run services and function with integrity.[273]

189.  Working in insecure environments often entails a higher acceptance of financial and programme risk and a nuanced understanding of how effectively to design and monitor programmes without creating undue burden on DFID staff and its partners. Gerard Russell believed that those "most likely to be sustainable are the projects, I would guess, at a local level, which have community support. In provinces that are relatively insulated from fighting, like Bamiyan".[274] However he argued that high-risk did not necessarily mean they were the wrong ones.[275] Nonetheless, capacity to manage risk effectively and invest in high impact programming will likely be impacted by the withdrawal of UK troops, particularly if security further deteriorates.

190.  As security restrictions often prevent DFID from directly monitoring projects it often relies on others to report and monitor. We heard that there could be problems with this from people we met at the Afghan Chambers of Commerce, one member told us: "most of the time what implementing partners do is that they misrepresent these reports to show their achievements". He suggested that "Reporting (facts, data, statistics, quotations from people etc) should be cross checked at field level and by different stake holders other than the ones carrying out the reports to make sure they are accurate."[276] Orzala Ashraf believed that there were more creative ways that DFID could monitor projects. She highlighted that many of the younger generation now used social media and that there was telephone coverage all over Afghanistan. She also believed the media had an important role and said that there had been some good programmes following cases of corruption. Orzala Ashraf argued that post 2014 such mechanisms should be supported and strengthened. She particularly saw the strength in Community Development Committees as a strong force in participatory monitoring and evaluation.[277] Naysan Adlparvar agreed saying "where security regulations cannot be amended to improve staff mobility, innovative approaches to remotely monitoring project delivery should be devised and employed."[278] While in Afghanistan we heard about the use of satellites to monitor the building of schools and the drilling of wells. In DFID's management response to ICAI evaluation, they said they were currently "considering the use of third party verification and continuous audit."[279]

191.  We are pleased to note that in its management response to ICAI's audit, DFID states that it is considering the use of 'third party verification and continuous audit'. We welcome the exploration of third party verification and other forms of new thinking about how DFID can most effectively monitor its programmes. Third party monitoring, especially when involving the local community, has been extremely effective in reducing corruption and enhancing community oversight. It can also contribute to the creation of a more accountable government and a culture of local and national accountability. However even with the introduction of new forms of monitoring, ensuring the previous Secretary of State's desire that every penny of every pound is spent effectively is unlikely to be possible in countries such as Afghanistan.

192.  Tight security restrictions that inhibit or prevent travel to project sites by DFID staff is likely to make appropriate levels of monitoring difficult—particularly if security deteriorates through transition. DFID may need to re-evaluate the type of work that it is ultimately able to effectively and accountably support after international troops withdraw. Some sectors or geographic areas may be more difficult to monitor than others. DFID cannot avoid risk altogether, but it must carefully balance the risks it takes with the potential reward. This will require rethinking how DFID can support work in insecure areas of the country, assessing what kinds of programming may be particularly susceptible to fraud or disruption by insurgents and developing stronger partnerships with trusted non-governmental and other organisations that can absorb significant funding and work effectively.

146   Ev 40 Back

147   Ev 40 Back

148   DFID Afghanistan, Operational plan 2011-15, June 2012 Back

149   Figures for 2010/11 to 2014/15 are planned budgets.  Back

150   DFID Afghanistan support to the education sector is made indirectly through our annual contribution to the ARTF. It is therefore an estimate based on -i) Current levels of support required by the Afghan Government remaining constant - ii) The proportion allocated to each sector byt the Government of Afghanistan remaining constant. Back

151   DFID Afghanistan will adjust its indicative resource allocation for 2012/13 to ensure at least £10m is allocated to the humanitarian pillar. This is in line with DFID Afghanistan's humanitarian strategy. Back

152   Q10 Back

153   Q8 Back

154   Ev 41 Back

155   Ev 41 Back

156   DFID, Business Case Support to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, 2011-14, v 1.25, 11 November 2011 Back

157   Ev 47 Back

158   Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund: Stock-taking and Looking Ahead, Steering Committee Meeting, Kabul, 25 June 2012 Back

159   Ev 147 Back

160   Q66 Back

161   DFID Afghanistan Operational plan 2011-15, June 2012 Back

162   This indicator can be found in the Asia Foundation's Survey of the Afghan People 2010, an opinion poll carried out across Afghanistan. It provides an indication of the impact of Government of Afghanistan and donor efforts on Afghan people by asking for their opinion on the performance of the government. Support for the provincial government relates to security and political stability. The current baseline (78 %) provides an overly positive picture, real support is likely to be less than this as the interviewers were unable to go to some insecure areas and studies have shown that people refrain from criticising government and authority when questioned for opinion polls in Afghanistan. Despite this the survey is a useful indicator of the trend of progress. Back

163   The number of voters in Afghanistan has declined from 8.5m in 2004 to 6.8m in 2005 and 4.3m in 2010. DFID aims to help reverse this trend by providing support to maintain the current level, which will ensure 1.5 million additional voters take part, who will not vote if the decline continues. Back

164   The rate at which projected and actual budgets are spent is a good measure of public financial management in a country where government capacity is low. The proportion of projected budget actually spent is technically referred to as the "budget execution rate" and the proportion of funds made available actually spent is referred to as the "allotment execution rate". Back

165   DFID website: Afghanistan Programmes, ARTF Logical Framework Back

166   Matt Waldman, Falling Short: Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan, ACBAR, 2008 Back

167   Edwina Thompson, Losing the Ability to Dream: Afghan Perceptions of UK Aid, BAAG, p 30  Back

168   DFID Afghanistan, Operational plan 2011-15, June 2012 Back

169   Ev 40 Back

170   DFID, Country Programme Evaluation in Afghanistan, Evaluation Report EV696, May 2009 Back

171   Ev w55 Back

172   Ev w55 Back

173   Q31 Back

174   DFID visit briefing Back

175   Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections and Government Performance, Congressional Research Service, 5 June 2012, p39 Back

176   Q32  Back

177   Q33 Back

178   NSP website,  Back

179   DFID, Country Programme Evaluation in Afghanistan, Evaluation Report EV696, May 2009, p xviii Back

180   Ev 49 Back

181   Ev w38 Back

182   Q2 Back

183   Ev 41 Back

184   DFID Intervention Summary: Tawanmandi Back

185   Elizabeth Winter, Civil society development in Afghanistan, London School of Economics and Political Science/Centre for Civil Society/ Economic and Social Science Research Council Non-Governmental Action Programme, 2010 Back

186   Ev w37 Back

187   DFID, Country Programme Evaluation in Afghanistan, Evaluation Report EV696, May 2009, p35  Back

188   Ev w37 Back

189   Q94 Back

190   Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections and Government Performance, Congressional Research Service, 5 June 2012 Back

191   Q6 Back

192   Q31 Back

193   Q31 Back

194   Ev 49 Back

195   DFID, Country Programme Evaluation in Afghanistan, Evaluation Report EV696, May 2009, p xviii. Back

196   Ev 49 Back

197   Q19 Back

198   Ev w31 Back

199   Q99 Back

200   Q54 Back

201   Human Rights Watch, "I had to run away":The imprisonment of Women and Girls for "Moral Crimes",2012 Back

202   Ev 37 Back

203   Q42 Back

204   Ev 37 Back

205   Ev w10 Back

206   Ashley Jackson, High Stakes: Girls' Education in Afghanistan, Oxfam International, February 2011.  Back

207   Q45 Back

208   Ev w12 Back

209   Ev w12 Back

210   Ev 38 Back

211   CARE International has been present in Afghanistan since 1961providing assistance to vulnerable Afghans Ev 37 Back

212   Ev 37 Back

213   Ashley Jackson, High Stakes: Girls' Education in Afghanistan, Oxfam International, February 2011.  Back

214   Ev 39 Back

215   DFID Afghanistan, Operational plan 2011-15, June 2012 Back

216   Ev 41 Back

217   DFID visit briefing Back

218   DFID visit briefing Back

219   Ev w17 Back

220   Q23 Back

221   DFID visit briefing  Back

222   Ev 51 Back

223   DFID visit briefing Back

224   Ev 50 Back

225   Q8 Back

226   Q8 Back

227   Ev w56 Back

228   Ev 37 Back

229   Ev w42 Back

230   Ev 49 Back

231   DFID, Country Programme Evaluation in Afghanistan, Evaluation Report EV696, May 2009, p. 63. Back

232   DFID, Country Programme Evaluation in Afghanistan, Evaluation Report EV696, May 2009, p. 63. Back

233   DFID, Country Programme Evaluation in Afghanistan, Evaluation Report EV696, May 2009, p. xiv. Back

234   DFID Afghanistan, Operational plan 2011-15, June 2012 Back

235   Ev 42 Back

236   UNOCHA, Consolidated Appeals Afghanistan: Mid Year Review, July 2012, p. 1 Back

237   UNOCHA, Consolidated Appeals Afghanistan: Mid Year Review, July 2012, p. 3 Back

238   UNOCHA, Consolidated Appeals Afghanistan: Mid Year Review, July 2012, p. 3 Back

239   The Afghanistan Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS), September 2012 Back

240   "Prevalence of malnutrition in southern Afghanistan 'shocking'", Guardian, 4 September 2012 Back

241   Q36 Back

242   Ev w57  Back

243   Ev 55 Back

244   Q123 Back

245   Q53 Back

246   DFID Afghanistan, Operational plan 2011-15, June 2012 Back

247   Ev w28 Back

248   Ev w28 Back

249   DFID website: Afghanistan projects and Ev 46 Back

250   Q48 Back

251   Development Cooperation Report 2010, Ministry of Finance, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Back

252   Ev w42 Back

253   DFID Afghanistan, Operational plan 2011-15, June 2012 Back

254   Ev w29  Back

255   Ev w32 Back

256   Q113 Back

257   Rostami-Povey, Elaheh, Afghan Women: Identity and Invasion, Zed Books, (2007) Back

258   Ev 47 Back

259   International Development Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2007-08, Reconstructing Afghanistan, HC 65-I Back

260   Ev 47 Back

261   Ev w62 Back

262   Ev w31 Back

263   Independent Commission for Aid Impact, Programme Controls and Assurance in Afghanistan, Report 6, March 2012, p11 Back

264   Q8 Back

265   Q8 Back

266   Ev w56 Back

267   Independent Commission for Aid Impact, Programme Controls and Assurance in Afghanistan, Report 6, March 2012, p10  Back

268   DFID Afghanistan, Operational plan 2011-15, June 2012 Back

269   Ev w65 Back

270   Independent Commission for Aid Impact, Programme Controls and Assurance in Afghanistan, Report 6, March 2012, p10  Back

271   Q8 Back

272   Q12 Back

273   Independent Commission for Aid Impact, Programme Controls and Assurance in Afghanistan, Report 6, March 2012, p6 Back

274   Q24 Back

275   Q24 Back

276   Ev w51 Back

277   Q41 Back

278   Ev w57 Back

279   DFID, Management Response to ICAI Recommendations on Programme Controls and Assurance in Afghanistan, 2012, p1 Back

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© Parliamentary copyright 2012
Prepared 25 October 2012