5 Conclusion
193. The future of Afghanistan is uncertain with
changes expected to its leadership, the withdrawal of international
forces and a reduction in overseas aid. It is not known what attitude
neighbouring countries, particularly Pakistan will take. The Taliban
is stronger in many parts of Afghanistan than it was when our
predecessor Committee visited the country in 2007, but millions
of Afghan are strongly opposed to the Taliban. The UK should have
a major aid budget in the country. While we cannot guarantee success,
many Afghan people want their country to succeed and we owe it
to them and to the many British soldiers who have died there to
support them in their fight against oppression.
194. In a changing political, security and economic
climate DFID will need to be flexible in its planning and programming.
For example, there might come a point at which DFID would need
to stop funding the Afghan Government through the ARTF; in which
case it should ensure it has other channels open to it such as
NGOs to which funding can then flow so that Afghan communities
are not suddenly cut off from aid.
195. The UK Government's overarching strategy
for its engagement in Afghanistan has given DFID the lead on creating
a viable state. DFID has had some successes, for example in increasing
tax revenue, but these gains will be difficult to sustain and
further progress will not be made unless the Afghan Government
is determined to achieve a similar outcome.
196. The UK Government may have to recognise
that a viable state may not be achievable in Afghanistan, but
that does not mean that DFID cannot deliver development projects
to help the Afghan people. DFID's own evaluation in 2009 found
that its most successful work was on small-scale rural development
projects and not on large scale government projects. We recommend
the UK Government reconsider the 'viable state' ambition for DFID
in Afghanistan, giving greater emphasis to the provision of services
and alleviating poverty.
197. While the situation for women in Afghanistan
improved after the fall of the Taliban, it remains difficult and
even appeared to us to have deteriorated in some respects since
our last visit in 2007. The women we met on our visit including
female politicians were nervous about what would happen when international
combat troops departed in 2014. We believe that the treatment
of women in Afghanistan post-2014 will be the litmus test as to
whether the military and development spending over the last ten
years has succeeded in improving the lives of ordinary Afghans.
Although DFID and the UK Government have spoken at length about
women's rights and women in Afghanistan, we are concerned that
this has not been followed by adequate and specific action and
funding. We support the funding DFID gives to Tawanmandi[280]
and the AIHRC, but this is not enough. We recommend that DFID
give girls' education greater priority and that it provide funding
for women's shelters and legal services for women.
198. It was estimated that over a third of Afghan
children in the south were acutely malnourished and that there
was about half a million internally displaced people in February
2012.[281] If transition
does not go smoothly the crisis will get worse. While we recognise
that DFID is looking to give a higher priority to its humanitarian
work in Afghanistan, there is much more to be done. In the absence
of another donor taking a lead, DFID may have to fulfil this role.
199. A serious problem for DFID in Afghanistan
is the difficulty in monitoring its programme since security
conditions prevent DFID staff getting out and about to visit projects.
This does not mean that work in Afghanistan should cease and we
acknowledge that DFID is considering new and innovative monitoring
methods for its projects. However, it needs to be recognised that
the previous Secretary of State's ambition of ensuring that every
penny of every pound is spent effectively is almost impossible
to achieve in this country.
200. While we appreciate the great difficulty
in working in Afghanistan and commend DFID staff for the job they
have done in these circumstances, we are concerned about the
high turnover, resultant loss of capacity and knowledge, weak
institutional memory and, at times, lack of staff with adequate
training and skills. We recommend that DFID create a cadre of
experts with knowledge of Afghan language and culture, who will
work in London or in country; longer tours and routine rotations
to Afghanistan would also improve the situation.
201. There will also need to be a reconsideration
of how DFID can support work in insecure areas of the country,
developing stronger partnerships with trusted NGOs and other organisations
which can absorb significant funding and work effectively. This
is an especially compelling case where NGOs have strong links
with and support from local communities. It may also involve switching
funding to poorer, safer areas such as Bamiyan, which have been
relatively ignored by donors who have concentrated their spending
in insecure regions where they have had a military presence.
280 A fund for civil society in Afghanistan backed
by the UK and the Nordics Back
281
Amnesty International, Fleeing war, finding misery, February
2012 Back
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