Conclusions and recommendations
ANSF
1. In
its oversight advice role to the Ministry of Interior on accountability,
we recommend that DFID insist on the creation of an external oversight
body to provide a way to investigate and follow up allegations
of violations by not only Afghan Local Police but the whole of
the Afghan National Security Force. This body could potentially
be managed by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission which
is also supported by the UK Government. Such a body should be
empowered to receive and investigate complaints, make public
their findings and make recommendations about how to redress individual
complaints. (Paragraph
54)
Post 2014 scenario
2. As
this chapter demonstrates, the situation in Afghanistan is very
complex. There are great uncertainties about the political, security
and economic future of Afghanistan, notably: the outcome of the
2014 elections; whether there will be a political settlement;
economic growth; and the role of Afghanistan's neighbouring countries.
In the light of these uncertainties DFID will need to
be able to adapt. DFID will also need to continue to lead donors
in pledging and disbursing aid so that there will not be any sudden
drops in funding which could exacerbate an extremely fragile situation.
Based on the assessment of the likely economic impact of military
withdrawal, the UK Government should be prepared to do whatever
it can to address this potential shortfall in spending including
urging other governments to increase their aid commitments to
Afghanistan to fill the economic gap.
(Paragraph 66)
Helmand and the PRT
3. While
we agree with the then Secretary of State's assessment that DFID
staff should be relocated from Helmand to Kabul following the
closure of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)—due
to the lack of a secure base to work from following the departure
of the military—the UK should not abandon Helmand. DFID
and FCO staff should continue to monitor the situation closely
and provide advice and support to the provisional government
in Helmand, where it can help. While we support the shift towards
a less Helmand-focused portfolio and presence, DFID should ensure
this transition is gradual and continue to fund effective programmes
to encourage rural development, education and good governance
in the province managed by locally engaged DFID
staff. Security gains in Helmand have been achieved at a very
high cost in terms of British lives, injured service personnel
and support staff as well as military and development spending.
The UK must not walk away from the province after 2014.
(Paragraph 88)
Tokyo Conference
4. International
development funding to the Afghan Government must be carefully
monitored and conditions-based. If the transfer of aid 'on budget'
increases without sufficient monitoring and quality control corruption
could get worse and access to basic services for Afghans could
deteriorate. It needs to be made absolutely clear in an agreement
between the international community and the Afghan Government
at what level of not following through on commitments that aid
funds would be reviewed and suspended. The
Mutual Accountability Framework does not go far enough in this
respect. (Paragraph
92)
5. There is great
uncertainty about transition and upcoming elections in Afghanistan.
DFID will need to be flexible enough in its work to be able to
respond to developments on the ground. We recognise that there
is an inherent tension between the pressure on DFID to be seen
to be planning for a successful transition and elections—pursuing
the line of the UK Government—and being able to plan for
the unknown. We recommend that DFID carry out a portfolio review,
that examines potential risks and impacts of transition on all
of its programme. Such a review should contain actions which DFID
and its partners could undertake to mitigate risks as well as
contingency plans if transition and the election do not run as
smoothly as hoped for. This review should be updated and re-examined
on a routine basis as transition continues and we get closer to
the elections. (Paragraph 97)
National governance
6. While
we recognise the importance of building the capacity of central
Government, the value for money of the policy-focused approaches
that DFID has implemented in recent years is still unclear.
Their sustainability is also highly questionable. Through
transition, the ability of the Government to perform tasks—such
as delivering basic services and maintaining the rule of law—will
be critical, especially with reduced international support. We
recommend that DFID be prepared, as Afghanistan, moves closer
to 2014 to be able to shift the focus of its governance programme
away from consultants in Kabul towards helping the Afghan Government
deliver basic services at a local level. (Paragraph 108)
7. It may be necessary
for the National Security Council (NSC) to redefine DFID Afghanistan's
unique priority of "creating a viable state". Although
it is preferable to build a better state it is not in the hands
of DFID to achieve this when there are so many other factors at
play such as the situation in Afghanistan's neighbour Pakistan.
This priority set for DFID may become harder, if not impossible,
to work towards in the absence of a political settlement and if
the security situation deteriorates in Afghanistan. Instead the
Government should consider setting DFID the objective of delivering
measureable benefits for the people of Afghanistan and
of working with partners who can operate under any Afghan Government.
(Paragraph 109)
Sub-national governance
8. There
needs to be more middle ranking provincial and local government
officials with an understanding and the support of their local
communities without the interference of central Government in
appointments. There particularly needs to be more women in such
positions. (Paragraph 113)
9. Strengthening sub-national
governance, particularly at the district and village level, and
improving funding flows between central Government and the provinces
will be essential in the lead up to transition. (Paragraph 114)
10. ICAI points out
that the Governors' Performance Improvement Programme is unlikely
to enjoy continued support from other donors through transition.
Several of DFID's core programmes in governance and other sectors
rely on the continued support of other donors. It is important
for DFID to assess thoroughly which multilateral partnerships
remain viable through transition and the long term sustainability
of incentive programmes such as the Governor's Performance Improvement
Programme. DFID should consider the risks of other donors pulling
out of or substantially reducing funding to multi-donor programmes
and plan appropriate responses and risk mitigation measures.
(Paragraph 117)
11. DFID should work
with the World Bank, Afghan Government and National Solidarity
Programme (NSP) stakeholders to develop a clear view on the future
of Community Development Councils in formal governance frameworks.
It should also push for greater links between these community-level
structures with broader district and provincial government. While
NSP has been regarded as a highly successful programme, we urge
DFID to work with the World Bank to clarify its objectives, particularly
with regard to governance, and improve monitoring of its impact
on local governance. (Paragraph 124)
Civil society
12. It
is important that civil society is supported not only to oversee
the Afghan Government but also to help preserve the freedoms and
rights won by Afghans during the past decade. Despite being a
fairly new programme, Tawanmandi shows enormous promise as a vehicle
to support civil society capacity and partnerships. DFID must
closely monitor this programme, seek to learn from any shortcomings
and proactively take steps to identify further avenues for support
to civil society. (Paragraph 128)
Elections
13. We
welcome DFID's support for elections and we note our witnesses'
emphasis on the importance of preparation for elections and in
the registration of voters. We recommend that DFID give due emphasis
to this. We also recommend that during the elections there is
a strong international presence of election monitors alongside
continued support for Afghan institutions such as the Independent
Electoral Commission to
try to mitigate the problems which plagued past Afghan elections.
(Paragraph 132)
Education
14. We
welcome DFID's continued funding to the Afghanistan Reconstruction
Trust Fund to support the Afghan Government's efforts to expand
and improve education services through support to teacher salaries
and other means. However, there is greater scope for DFID to
focus more on secondary and adult education, and to improve the
quality of education. Important lessons on the added value of
NGOs in some circumstances can be learned, particularly with regard
to vocational and community-based educational programmes as DFID's
support to Mercy Corps programmes in Helmand demonstrates.
(Paragraph 143)
Mining
15. DFID
should stay engaged on the development of mining revenues to ensure,
with other donors, that a robust regulatory regime is in place
to record Government progress towards good governance commitments for
the sector. DFID should also support independent oversight by local
communities and civil society as well as encourage the reinvestment
of mining revenues into related industries and other parts of
the economy that will create jobs. (Paragraph 149)
Wealth creation
16. In
one of the poorest countries in the world with significant humanitarian
needs that derive primarily from the lack of development and a
weak Government with limited reach outside of Kabul, DFID's approach
to wealth creation seems out of balance with reality. It is overly
centralised, with a disproportionate focus on Government ministries
and policy in Kabul that is disconnected from the needs of ordinary
Afghans. We recommend that DFID give priority to the needs of
rural and poor populations, adopting a 'back-to-basics' aid approach
focused on community-led development and sustainability. This
should focus on poverty reduction and access to basic services.
(Paragraph 157)
Role of NGOs
17.
In terms of DFID's bilateral support, NGOs, both international
and Afghan, will play an increasingly critical role through and
after transition. The NGOs that DFID works with have shown significant
results in extraordinarily difficult circumstances and a comparative
advantage in improving rural livelihoods. Working in insecure
areas is generally much easier for NGOs, especially those that
have close links and long histories with communities. Such NGOs
are perceived as impartial and independent, able to gain security
guarantees from communities and thus are likely to have much greater
access to remote and insecure areas than other actors after the
international forces leave. It is highly unlikely that organisations
with armed security or with little or no history in targeted locations
will be able to demonstrate similar results, in terms of effectiveness
or sustainability.
(Paragraph 158)
Humanitarian
18. We
recommend that DFID do much more to meet humanitarian needs and
address the underlying causes of the crises such as child malnutrition
and levels of internally displaced people. We recommend that more
of DFID's budget should be spent on disaster mitigation in the
rural and remote areas that are often most hard hit by natural
disasters such as drought and flood. In addition, DFID should
play a constructive role in leading and encouraging other donors
to provide greater attention and resources to Afghanistan's growing
humanitarian needs.
(Paragraph 162)
Gender
19. Afghan
women continue to suffer intense discrimination and abuse. While
the UK Government says it is committed to protecting and promoting
the rights of women and girls in Afghanistan there is little practical
evidence of this in either programming or funding. We recommend
that DFID seeks to combat violence against women through support
for women's shelters and legal services. DFID should also continue
to ensure women and girls are a major focus for its education
and wealth creation programmes. (Paragraph 172)
20. We recommend the
creation of a joint donor-government plan for women and girls
during transition, which would encourage donors to commit to specific
programmes and objectives based on evidence and consultation.
This could help catalyse greater commitment and sustained political
will to ensure that women and girls are not forgotten in transition.
Such an approach would require a lead donor which DFID could
take given its prominence and commitment to research-based approaches.
In addition, we recommend that DFID exert pressure on other donors
and the Afghan Government to back up their previous commitments
to Afghan women.
(Paragraph 173)
DFID staffing
21. While
we appreciate that working in Afghanistan is extremely difficult
and commend DFID staff for the job they have done under these
circumstances, we are concerned about the short postings, resultant
loss of capacity and knowledge and weak institutional memory.
We recommend that DFID create a cadre of experts with knowledge
of Afghan language and culture, who will work on Afghanistan,
in London or in country; this could greatly improve the quality
and consistency of DFID's work. Longer tours and routine rotations
to Afghanistan would also aid in this. (Paragraph 179)
22. We recommend that
HMG does all that it can to protect the Afghan staff working for
its embassy both now and particularly if the security situation
in Kabul deteriorates. (Paragraph 180)
Evaluation and monitoring
23. We
are pleased to note that in its management response to ICAI's
audit, DFID states that it is considering the use of 'third party
verification and continuous audit'. We welcome the exploration
of third party verification and other forms of new thinking about
how DFID can most effectively monitor its programmes. However
even with the introduction of new forms of monitoring, ensuring
the previous Secretary of State's desire that every penny of every
pound is spent effectively is unlikely to be possible in countries
such as Afghanistan. (Paragraph 191)
24. DFID may need
to re-evaluate the type of work that it is ultimately able to
effectively and accountably support after international troops
withdraw. Some sectors or geographic areas may be more difficult
to monitor than others. DFID cannot avoid risk altogether, but
it must carefully balance the risks it takes with the potential
reward. This will require rethinking how DFID can support work
in insecure areas of the country, assessing what kinds of programming
may be particularly susceptible to fraud or disruption by insurgents
and developing stronger partnerships with trusted non-governmental
and other organisations that can absorb significant funding and
work effectively.
(Paragraph 192)
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