International DevelopmentWritten evidence submitted by British & Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group

The British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) is an information and advocacy network of 29 British and Irish NGOs that support humanitarian and development programmes in Afghanistan. This written submission has been prepared by BAAG’s Secretariat, its content may not represent the views of all BAAG member agencies.

Acronyms

ACBAR	Agency Co-ordinating Body for Afghan Relief
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
APRP	Afghanistan Peace & Reintegration Programme
BAAG	British & Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group
CAFOD	Catholic Agency for Overseas Development
CAP	Consolidated Appeal Process
CDC	Community Development Council
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CPIA	Country Policy And Institutional Assessment
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DFID	Department for International Development
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
ERF	Emergency Response Fund
EVAW	Elimination of Violence Against Women Law
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
HDI	Human Development Index
HERR	Humanitarian Emergency Response Review
HPC	High Peace Council
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
INGO	International Non Governmental Organisation
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JCMB	Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
NAPWA	National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan
NDS	National Directorate of Security
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NSP	National Solidarity Programme
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Executive Summary

The men, women and children of Afghanistan face a variety of challenges during and beyond the transition phase. As international and national stakeholders look ahead into the “Transformation Decade” from 2015–25 and begin to negotiate, plan and strategise, DFID must endeavour to continue as one of the stronger donors in Afghanistan, capable of leading the way in lobbying other actors to provide technical support and accountable and effective programming.

As we approach 2014, the anticipated reduction in foreign aid is likely to bring economic consequences which must be mitigated. The inability of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) to pay public servants will threaten service delivery. The closure of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) may affect the number of employment opportunities available. Any escalation of conflict during or after transition will have dire economic consequences. A range of viable livelihoods must be funded. Replacing revenues with money generated from Afghanistan’s mineral wealth is a process that must be carefully managed and monitored within a pro-poor framework. DFID should engage with GIRoA and other donors ahead of the Tokyo conference to secure an agreement on how mineral revenues will be used.

Efforts to strengthen civil society are welcome and are vital in order to hold the GIRoA to account and to make the government and international programmes more responsive to peoples’ needs. Women are still largely excluded from decision making processes and their participation in civil society is important, particularly in an inclusive peace process. Civil society must have buy-in and involvement in any monitoring process during the transition phase.

Justice systems must also be made more responsive to people’s requirements. Governance reforms are essential together with capacity development, especially at the district and provincial level.

Good progress, especially for girls has been made in education since 2001. There remain a number of challenges and thus gains could be put at risk. Resources are still inadequate, with a continuing lack of school buildings and teachers, especially female teachers. Opportunities for secondary and tertiary education are limited. Efforts to promote and implement a community based education model in more remote and conservative areas of the country would enable more children, especially girls who struggle to access schools, to gain an education. The Ministry of Education continues to lack capacity and professionals to deliver effectively.

Providing skills training for sustainable livelihoods and access to markets for produce is important for real wealth creation. There is a need for the British government to continue and expand its support to market opportunities, especially in rural areas, and to encourage access and opportunities for women.

Humanitarian conditions have steadily deteriorated in Afghanistan due to the ongoing conflict and periodic natural disasters. Humanitarian reform, taking into account lessons learned from the past few years, is needed to ensure that government institutions, the UN and aid agencies have the necessary resources, information and support to meet humanitarian needs as and when they arise. The Emergency Response Fund Afghanistan is only 75% funded. The UN integrated mission approach combines political, development and humanitarian roles whereas the delivery of principled humanitarian aid would be enhanced were the UNOCHA office to be separate.

DFID should recognise the benefits that building a more substantive and effective focus on gender in its Afghanistan country strategy can bring in enabling change.

Greater effort should be put into ensuring citizen participation in decision making.

More support should be given to Afghan initiated and run peacebuilding programmes.

Introduction

Afghanistan is an extremely complex environment in which to operate. Ten years on since the international intervention that toppled the Taliban, Afghanistan remains one of the world’s poorest countries despite the vast sums of aid that have flowed in to the country.

Progress has been made in some areas, notably in education and women’s involvement in public life. However numerous constraints remain; insecurity threatens to reduce or reverse the gains made and Afghans are trapped in poverty due to the lack of sustainable livelihoods.

A deteriorating security situation, which differs across the country, is making some areas harder for NGOs to operate in, including major cities. With the timeline for the withdrawal of international combat troops fixed for 2014, it is likely that donors will also struggle to work in a worsening security situation. It will be important to involve Afghans in decisions about their future and to support community based peacebuilding.

The international community at present works on the assumption that the Government in Kabul will remain in situ in one form or another, either through power sharing or peace agreements. An inclusive and transparent political settlement with respect for human rights is urgently needed. GIRoA is widely perceived by Afghans as being corrupt at all levels, which engenders little support. In many areas, including Helmand, there is a preference for the former Taliban regime to resume its role, albeit with a more enlightened stance towards key areas including education for women. As the Taliban attempt to transition from an insurgency to a recognised political power, they are likely to be keen to deliver public services, the absence of which left them criticised and unpopular prior to 2001. The engagement of civil society in its widest sense in the future of Afghanistan is a major challenge, which will be essential to meet.1

The economic consequences of the military draw down and how this can be mitigated

1. The military drawdown will result in the shifting of responsibility of security from International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF). This is significant in economic terms because the annual security bill for Afghanistan will be approximately USD $4 billion.2 The question of where this money will come from remains to be resolved.3

2. Some evidence provided by the GIRoA suggests that foreign money is being rerouted to insurgent groups.4 With the shrinking of the war economy, it is likely that anti-government elements will seek alternate means of funding. Afghanistan is estimated to hold up to USD $3 trillion worth of mineral reserves under its soil.5 In Helmand province for example the ancient volcano of Khanneshin is thought to hold more than USD $89 billion of rare earth deposits. Given the magnitude of revenues that GIRoA needs for public expenditure requirements, the mining sector provides a promising source of funding for development beyond the military drawdown and the waning of foreign aid flows. However, there is a credible risk that any significant source of money available after 2014 could become subject to competition, contributing to instability and conflict rather than development if not properly managed and monitored. There is a risk that financial resources coming into Afghanistan will be used to open up mines, (which will not begin to deliver profits until beyond the decade of transformation 2014–25), without addressing the needs of Afghans.

3. There is likely to be a reduction in the amount of Official Development Assistance (ODA) received by Afghanistan. Given that approximately 90% of the GIRoA budget comes from ODA,6 a reduction in foreign development assistance will correlate directly to a reduction in the GIRoA’s ability to provide services, infrastructure projects, government salaries, and security.

4. Many Afghan public servants are partly or wholly paid for through international donors. 1,500 Afghans in the civil service receive donor top-ups to their salaries.7 It is likely that if support drops, many educated Afghans currently benefitting from this additional pay and support will have the ability to leave and go elsewhere, creating large gaps in the country’s capacity.

5. The UK’s military efforts have been focused in Helmand where the drawdown will have a range of consequences. Construction and related industries in Helmand that are bolstered by contracts currently awarded from the UK managed PRT are likely to experience a sharp downturn. Contracts include those for the building of police checkpoints, road repair and school construction. Without an international presence overseeing the awarding of these contracts, it is likely that the number and value will decrease sharply, and that those which remain, will be awarded to a small number of companies, often based outside of Helmand and even Afghanistan, that have political support at a higher level. The construction boom that Helmand has experienced of late could therefore stall and previously working men of fighting age will be faced with fresh economic choices and challenges. This could be mitigated through offering diverse skills training to reduce the dependence on construction as a sector, and offer increased opportunities to start micro-businesses. Investment in agriculture remains crucial along with support to farmers that will allow them to maximise yield and income in areas such as water supply, sustainable land use and value added processing. This would also contribute to food security in Helmand and provinces across the country.

6. As geographical areas are handed over to the ANSF, and the ISAF presence reduces, there is the risk that security will worsen. Without a relatively secure environment, it is unlikely that economic prosperity can be achieved or maintained. If conflict re-emerges in places such as Nahr-e-Sarraj or Lashkar Gah, the economy will almost certainly suffer. Enabling the people of Helmand to learn transferable skills could prove a significant benefit in mitigating the economic impact of reduced stability. Whilst there is a significant drive for people to join the public sector, which is sensible in a stable environment, transferable skills could increase people’s economic resilience.

7. The drawdown may result in many internally displaced people (IDPs) returning home.8 They will need economic opportunities and skills training. Such opportunities can be offered by the international community and delivered at significantly lower cost than many other types of initiative. Mercy Corps’ INVEST and DASTGAH programmes for example, funded by DFID, demonstrate that these principles work in a cost effective and successful manner. A downturn in spending will bring implications for remittances and households that rely on urban migration and seasonal work. With the new UNHCR/MoRR reintegration strategy, urban centres could see an influx of recent returnees who have come to rely on urban based livelihoods and this could create further stress on an already troubled economy.

Recommendations

8. Investment in agriculture, diverse and transferable skills training and support for micro-businesses would mitigate some of the economic consequences of the military drawdown

9. Continued effort should be made to collaborate with other donors to ensure best practice in aid programmes.

Co-ordination with other donors and multilateral organisations, and where DFID can best add value through its bilateral programme which focuses on:

Governance — and security: Whether DFID can “tackle the root causes of instability and the effects of insecurity” and the scope for building bridges with opposition and insurgent groups to do this

10. GIRoA is widely perceived by Afghans as corrupt, ineffective, centralised, and lacking control over or even access to much of the country. As a result, Afghans continue to suffer some of the worst development indicators in the world. Improvements in local and national governance as well as greater support to civil society are urgently needed to ensure GIRoA is more accountable both to donors and its people. DFID is the lead agency and one of the main funders of the new five-year Tawanmandi programme designed to strengthen civil society and enable its actors to hold the government to account. This could be a highly effective tool to improve governance but it will take time and technical support, not just funding, to develop the capacity of civil society organisations, particularly at the district level.

11. There are a small number of Afghan non state actors attempting to hold the government to account at the local level. However, they have limited reach and capacity to effectively challenge or bring change in the status quo and are not supported by a large proportion of constituents as is required for more effective accountability. During a series of roundtable discussions on sub-national governance, hosted by Afghanaid during 2011, it was clear that neither the Afghan Government nor the Independent Directorate of Local Governance more specifically, yet fully understand their role in engaging with civil society and facilitating their participation in good governance at the local level in Afghanistan.

12. The UK is one of the major funders of the national Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP), designed to reintegrate low-level fighters. However, the APRP has been criticised for its slow rollout nationwide: as of February 2012, around 3,000 fighters had joined. Whilst finding widespread support for the national peace process, a recent PTRO survey on the reintegration scheme pointed to limited gains and a general lack of credibility among the Afghan population.9 Women continue to be marginalised in the process. There are just 9 women on the 70-member High Peace Council and, usually, just three in the Provincial Peace Committees out of 25–30 members. Those female members have complained they are kept out of decision making processes.10 However, without the support of women in the peace process, it will be harder to build and promote a just and lasting peace.

13. A widespread culture of impunity and the weak rule of law are major contributors to insecurity. The transfer of security responsibilities to a poorly trained, unaccountable ANSF, coupled with ineffective and unresponsive systems of civilian and military justice threaten to worsen the situation. The responsiveness of the justice and security sectors to womens’ needs is a particular concern. Accelerated governance reforms are needed across these sectors to prevent a rise in the number of abuses and to strengthen accountability.

14. One of the root causes of instability is a lack of sustainable livelihood opportunities. Little support is currently being offered to groups and NGOs working with producers and small enterprises to identify and access markets. During a monitoring visit to Western Afghanistan in March 2012, CAFOD was informed by saffron growers that if the market does not pick up, they may turn to the narcotics industry within the next 2 years. This is a grave concern, as any move or return to poppy growing and opium production further propels instability both locally and nationally. Support for packaging, food storage, preservation and marketing is required. Skills’ training is necessary so the value chain remains in Afghanistan, for example in gem cutting. The health and safety of men and women working in such trades should also be safeguarded.

15. Ongoing conditions of vulnerability can fuel insecurity. Independent research conducted in Faryab province in 2009 also indicates that increasing insecurity in that province is directly related to a persistent lack of employment opportunities and deepening levels of poverty across the province.11 At the time of research, young, educated males were returning to their home villages after acquiring university degrees and were frustrated at not being able to secure work in order to provide for their families. When an offer for employment as a Taliban mercenary was put on the table, some young men were unable to refuse the opportunity.

16. As the transition process continues, the insufficient capacity of local government to assume their new responsibilities has repeatedly been raised as one of the most significant barriers to effective transition and security. Weak local governance can act as a barrier to good quality service provision for the most vulnerable people in remote and neglected areas of Afghanistan and the populations’ access to their basic human rights. The ongoing failure to provide good quality services is one of the root causes of instability in Afghanistan and enables anti-government elements to build support in remote inaccessible areas.

17. On the governance scale, Afghanistan tops the list of 36 fragile states, having a 2.592 CPIA score (World Bank).12 Local officials often disagree with Kabul ministries on the priorities that have been identified at the national level or the implementation mechanisms for ministry budgets; however, currently they are simply unable to do anything about it at the local level, mainly due to lack of capacity, influence, and the required technical skills. Consequently, local communities have more confidence in the local community development councils’ (CDCs) ability to implement effective development projects in comparison with their local government departments who consistently fail to effectively manage and implement development projects that respond to community needs.13 Unfortunately the CDCs primarily implement infrastructure based development projects. Social services such as the provision of good quality healthcare and education remain a critical gap and communities still rely on NGOs to provide these.

18. Over the decades-long protracted conflict, local governance institutions have been undermined and manipulated by the different interest groups to their own advantages. There is the risk that this will become more acute during and after transition as the retreating international forces leave a de facto or perceived vacuum that many power holders are preparing to exploit. Afghanaid’s assessments conducted in late 2009–10 in Dawlatyar district of Ghor province for example, found that the key decision making positions within the government are occupied by the influential local leader ie commanders, and landlords, who work to protect their own interests rather than for the communities that they serve.

19. The UK is working with the Ministry of Mines to mitigate the risks inherent in the development of natural resources. In the context of ongoing conflict, weak rule of law and high levels of corruption, these risks are particularly acute in Afghanistan. Transparent and accountable governance in the provision of natural resources, and good regulatory frameworks can reduce the room for corruption and help to strengthen government legitimacy. Consideration of the impact on local populations and their environment, and providing avenues for consultation can reduce the scope for disputes and develop local buy-in. In turn, this can help build stability. DFID should actively promote mechanisms for the transparent and accountable governance of the country’s natural resources. The health and safety of men and women working in such trades should also be safeguarded.

20. Phase 1 of the Central Statistics Office survey of men and women in decision making in the Afghan Government, clearly demonstrates the ongoing exclusion of women in the government’s decision making processes, both at the central and local level. They reviewed all positions above a specific pay grade (focusing on director and above) and only 8.2% were women within the central ministries and it was almost zero when one looked at the provincial level government. While government programmes such as NSP are working with local communities to establish governance structures and are promoting the value of gender equality, in reality the role of women remains tokenistic, particularly in leadership and decision making.

21. There is an absence of government led, bottom-up consultative mechanisms. Priorities are defined by the central government, often with no engagement from rural populations and particularly women, about their concerns and needs. This is coupled with the general absence of grassroots civil society institutions which can hold state institutions to account and there remain no institutionalised processes for the interaction to take place. The gap between the population and the local government institutions that serve them; the lack of technical, financial, project management and good governance skills; along with the corruption and manipulation that is chronic at the local level and can flourish in the absence of well informed and good quality civil society; culminate in the waste of development funds that are channelled through the central ministries and then directed on ill informed priorities or to corrupt individual and institutions. The result is the continued failure to deliver good quality services in accordance with the needs of communities and the omission of women from consultation and decision making processes. This is one of the fundamental causes of instability and crucially it means that the most vulnerable populations’ basic needs and human rights go unmet.

Recommendations

22. HMG should continue to press GIRoA, both privately and publicly, for inclusive peace and reconciliation processes which ensure the effective participation of civil society, minority groups, women, and regional actors as appropriate.

23. HMG should continue to provide civil society organisations with technical and other support to develop their capacity, for example through the Tawanmandi programme; a good long-term initiative which has the potential to improve governance, particularly at the local level.

24. Local government requires a much better understanding of what good governance means at the sub-national level and how civil society consultation, participation and partnership is crucial. Building on this understanding more concrete steps need to be taken to institutionalise this relationship, or current civil society capacity building initiatives will remain redundant regardless of their capacity and people will be omitted from decision making, planning and implementation processes.

25. HMG should continue to develop the capacity and sustainability of local government departments. As the transition process continues, significant responsibilities will fall to the government’s provincial and district departments. It is crucial that they have the technical and project management capabilities, financial management and budget utilisation skills, to ensure that they are able to assume their new and fast approaching responsibilities. With improvements in the capacity of local government institutions, more authority can be handed to the provincial and district level authorities, but powers should be placed with elected bodies.

26. The success of the National Solidarity Programme—as demonstrated by the recognised improvements in service provision infrastructure, and as borne out by the 2011 opinion survey and report from ACBAR, and the communities’ confidence in the CDCs capacities as referenced earlier in this section—need to be recognised. In turn, the model needs to be replicated for other national objectives such as building the capacity of local government, local CSOs and improving their substantive working relationship. By working in partnership with existing NGOs which are the primary service deliverers in many areas, the most significant progress can be made.

27. A more coherent long-term plan to promote womens’ participation at the decision making level of government is needed which will allow more women to assume leadership roles. This will require working with women and building their capacity to assume these new positions as well as working with existing government staff and decision-makers to create a well informed and enabling environment that ensures that they are recruited for such positions and crucially that they enjoy substantive participation in real decision making.

28. DFID should see that the PRT-led projects are sustainable with sufficient resources to ensure the gains made are not lost as they are transferred.

29. DFID should assess how aid can have a long-term impact beyond what it is able to directly fund, with effective monitoring and evaluation of international programmes.

30. HMG should work to intensify efforts to improve the quality of the ANSF, especially the police, including better vetting and training, and more recruitment of women. Military and civilian justice systems should also be strengthened and made more accessible to both men and women.

31. HMG should encourage the GIRoA to complete validation of their candidacy for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), to abide by its standards and to include transparency in the award of licenses and in any future revenue management/sharing arrangements.14 Rather than concentrating on developing the industry as quickly as possible to generate state revenue, DFID’s support should focus on developing good governance in the sector to guard against the risks of the resource curse and ensure good practice in health and safety. DFID should encourage the reinvestment of revenues generated from the mineral sector into related industries and other parts of the economy that will create jobs.

32. DFID should work with GIRoA to establish clear, credible and transparent processes for the award of concessions that provide the Afghan people with information on how, to whom and on what grounds contracts are awarded. Legal regulatory and contractual frameworks which safeguard the economic interest of the Afghan people and address social, environmental and human rights risk must be established. Continuous processes of local consultations and appropriate grievance mechanisms to ensure the ‘buy-in’ of the Afghan people, particularly those directly affected by mining activities must be ensured. DFID should encourage publication of existing and future concession contracts including associated infrastructure agreements to allow risk issues to be identified and addressed, implementation to be monitored and resource revenues to be tracked through the budget.

33. DFID should boost the oversight capacity of the government and civil society, alongside providing support to bolster the regulatory regime and put in place robust, shared monitoring and evaluation frameworks to record government progress towards good governance commitments for the mining sector.

Education: what progress has been made, especially for girls, and how to ensure Afghanistan meets the MDG target of completion (rather than enrollment) of primary schooling

34. Significant and welcome progress has been made in access to education since 2001, especially for girls. There are now 7.3 million children enrolled in school compared to less than a million in 2001: 38%, or 2.7 million, are girls. However there are still too many barriers to education and many children leave school before their primary education is complete. The gains in girls’ education are at most risk as a result of poverty, growing insecurity, a lack of trained teachers, neglect of post-primary education and poorly equipped schools. There are currently 4.5 million children, mostly girls, still out of school. Beyond primary schooling, there remains a pressing need for greater provision and quality of secondary and tertiary education along with vocational training.

35. In order to achieve MDG2 on primary education, the essential components to support are teacher training and Community Based Education (CBE). Less than 22% of teachers meet minimum requirements set by Ministry of Education. There should be a focus on training female teachers to counter the shortage and because families are often reluctant to let their daughters be taught by men after puberty. Many boys and girls still drop out of school due to poor teaching standards.

36. Teacher training should be conducted locally, especially in rural areas as many potential female teachers are unable to go for training in the cities. The Worsaj Eduction Project supported by Afghan Connection and the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan is a good model for this type of community training.

37. In rural isolated areas such as Worsaj, many young children, especially girls, are denied an education because of long distances to the nearest school and parents are reluctant to allow their daughters to make long journeys on foot. CBE provides a solution to this problem and gives young children the chance to benefit from schooling at the primary level. Classes are provided for children in villages more than 3 km from the nearest formal Government primary school. Classes are held in houses or mosques and the teacher generally comes from the village. As demand increases and the number of classes expand upwards to grade 6, these community-based schools (CBS) will represent the equivalent of primary schools covering grades 1–6. There is still a need to encourage and support CBS and Local Education Authorities to lobby the Ministry of Education to take these schools on.

38. Work is needed to create safe working environments in existing schools and to build the capacity of local education authorities. More than half of schools are in non-existent or inadequate buildings. Parents can refuse to let their daughters attend school if they deem the environment unsafe, and even the addition of a surrounding wall can encourage them to do so. Given the right infrastructure, education and girl’s education especially, will have a chance to continue in Afghanistan despite the threats from armed opposition groups. Establishing schools within communities, training teachers and creating safe working environments are essential to this.

39. Given the continued influence of insurgent groups in Helmand, facilitating female education is a delicate process. This process is much easier for NGOs that have close links and long histories with communities, and are able to negotiate from an impartial perspective. To facilitate real change, in the absence of government provision much will depend on national and international NGOs that have the trust of the population and can work unmolested, even in high risk conflict environments.

40. In addition to conflict, Afghanistan suffers from chronic vulnerability to droughts, floods and other natural disasters that affect children’s daily lives. In August 2011, the Internally Displaced Person (IDP) population of Afghanistan reached 472,601 IDPs.15 More than 54% of IDPs registered since 2009 are children; and children also account for 60% of forced displacement victims.16 Education opportunities suffer as a result, particularly where no provision is made for education in emergencies, both within the government’s planning and the overall humanitarian response.

41. Only 2% of the education in emergencies provision under the UN’s 2010 Humanitarian Action Plan, has been funded, with a gap of USD 32.5 million. Such consistent underfunding of education needs across Afghanistan’s diverse humanitarian contexts is an example of a failure to focus on children and community needs. The approach also fails to acknowledge education’s key role in securing children’s continuous access to learning, building children’s resilience and implementing key disaster risk reduction (DRR) curricula.

42. Some donors are running competitive vocational training programmes in Helmand. Mercy Corps INVEST programme, funded by DFID, currently has 5,200 vocational training students, with a post-graduation employment rate of 80% and students are not paid or compensated for the time spent training. As a result, the programme attracts only those students that genuinely wish to learn. There are USAID funded programmes that do compensate students, this is undermining and unsustainable in the long term as, by definition, it means that the GIRoA will never be able to adopt the programme. Closer donor coordination and collaboration with best practice is therefore strongly recommended.

43. The Ministry of Education, like many Afghan ministries, continues to face serous challenges. It is thought to be spending barely half its annual budget. It lacks trained professional staff at all levels. It is a highly centralised system and links between and among the national, provincial and district levels are weak; procurement procedures are complicated and bureaucratic, resulting in delays in implementation; monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are extremely weak. Off-budget funding to education is decreasing and the Ministry of Education currently lacks the capacity to handle greater on-budget support.

44. It is therefore highly unlikely that Afghanistan can meet MDG2 by 2020. This is particularly so as international aid to Afghanistan has already begun to decrease. Aid agencies are already seeing funding of basic services such as health and education being affected. However, studies show that an educated girl will benefit not just her own family, as she will be more likely to ensure that her children go to school and receive healthcare, but also the whole of society through greater access to job opportunities and enhanced contributions to the economy.

Recommendations

45. Community based education needs to be at the heart of education policy and funding must be assured. Efforts are needed to improve the quality and accessibility of secondary and higher education, with an enhanced focus on learning outcomes.17

46. Vocational training programmes need to be provided in accordance with market assessments and identified gaps as well as potential new growth markets.

47. The GIRoA must be supported in developing a specific strategy to tackle the challenges faced by girls in education, including measurable indicators of success and support for meaningful capacity building within the Ministry of Education, both at the national, provincial and district level to enable it to implement its national strategy. DFID should lobby both the GIRoA and the international community to prioritise the Education NPP (National Priority Programme) at Tokyo.

48. DFID’s Strategic Plan 2015–20 should maintain education funding at current levels and well into transition in order for these gains to have meaningful impact on completion and learning outcomes for boys and girls. Moreover, as with other sectors, it should be ready to fill gaps created by other donors’ withdrawal (or encourage new donors to fill the gaps) that will have a negative impact on education progress.

49. DFID should match its development funding for education with humanitarian funding. This could be achieved by funding education in emergencies interventions through the Education Cluster and Afghanistan’s UN Humanitarian Consolidated Appeals Process.

Wealth creation: DFID’s role in creating sustainable jobs, increasing investment and tax revenues and contributing to poverty reduction and economic stability

50. Ten years after reconstruction efforts began, Afghanistan continues to exhibit one of the highest human poverty indexes in the world at 59.8 and HDI at 0.349 against South Asia’s HDI of 0.516, ranking it 155 out of 169 countries; 42% of its population live below the poverty line of US$1.25 PPP per day.18 Afghanistan used to be in the bottom three countries and aid programmes have contributed to improvements so should be continued. However as a result of multiple determinants, including low ownership of productive assets, insecurity, indebtedness, poor support infrastructure and economic exclusion, the rural poor are often worst affected.

51. The Afghan economy is largely dependent on the agriculture sector. With around 85% of the population entirely dependent for their livelihoods on agriculture and livestock, any impact on agricultural yields is felt across the country.19 Agriculture and livestock based livelihoods are dependant upon the success of rainfed crops and pasture. Unfortunately, Afghanistan experienced its eighth drought in 11 years in 2011 devastating the rainfed crops and pasture land across almost half of Afghanistan. Once again unsustainable livelihoods were exposed and households were forced to rely on destructive coping mechanisms that further eroded household’s productive assets and contributed to the alarmingly high levels of food insecurity and malnutrition. Thus, households are trapped in a cycle of poverty, food insecurity and debt—which partly accounts for the high proportion of the population that are chronically vulnerable.

52. The most effective route to achieving poverty reduction and building tax revenue and investment is by diversifying and developing the economy through the provision of skills, increasing the quantity and quality of produce and facilitating access to external markets, both domestic and international. In practical terms this means the development of vocational skills and enabling Afghans to start businesses and to be entrepreneurial. A significant step would be to establish a revolving credit fund that could lend money and/or give grants to new businesses that demonstrate success at a small scale. CARE International Afghanistan run start-up grants for women’s producer groups which have proved highly successful. It should be recognised that widespread illiteracy often denies people access to such schemes.

53. In DFID’s operational plan for 2011–15, the goal is to increase the number of jobs and the amount of food grain produced in order to reach its objective of wealth creation and economic stability. However, as part of this strategy there is an implied component of a successful marketing strategy for any food grain (or food product). The key importance of markets as part of any livelihoods strategy and how DFID can support and encourage market opportunities must be made explicit as a necessary component of wealth creation. CAFOD is supporting farmers to produce and process high-quality saffron, however the marketing opportunities for the product are currently limited to the local level.

54. There is still a significant lack of vocational skills training provided across Afghanistan. Where vocational training exists, this is concentrated in a few areas and often in low-value sectors. With all the discussion around the economic potential in Afghanistan’s mineral wealth, one of the key considerations for ensuring that the economic value remains in country is to ensure that there is available skilled labour.

55. Recent investments to develop the rural economy have often failed due to their inability to tackle more complex issues related to an underlying lack of market knowledge and modern agricultural and business skills.

56. Similarly, the remoteness and inaccessibility of many areas combined with poor infrastructure mean that some communities have no access to markets and the associated income and jobs. This is one of the greatest challenges faced in cross border trade, improvements along the border between Herat and Iran have brought significant trade and investment, it is hoped that the recent railway line to Uzbekistan will bring similar benefits.

57. GIRoA estimate women’s annual per capita income to be $402, compared to $1,182 for men and conclude that ‘women are approximately three times economically worse off than men.20 The preoccupation with economic survival has resulted in families being increasingly willing to allow women to work. However, women and girls face significant discrimination in terms of lower wages, access to markets and employment due to security and traditional gender roles and overall are more susceptible to poverty. Efforts to reduce poverty through creating sustainable jobs must take into account the complexities faced by women.

Recommendations

58. DFID should play a leading role encouraging HMG and others to open trade links with Afghan enterprises. The GIRoA should also be pressured to provide support to the development of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), perhaps examining Afghanistan’s previous industries, such as manufacturing fertilisers and exporting dried fruits for opportunities, to support producers and SMEs in ensuring products meet international trade standards and to facilitate the passing of legislation that enables international trade linkages to flourish.

59. Farmers and their households are not currently making the most of their livelihoods, many lack the skills and assets to add maximum value to the inputs at their disposal. Consequently, many natural resources and products are exported to be used in manufacturing, or to be packaged abroad, thus the added value and income is lost to other countries and markets. More needs to be done at the family and household level to assist them with moving up the value chain and benefiting from the additional jobs and income that this creates.

60. DFID should fund projects involving SMEs and producers that increase product quality and supports linkages between producers, SMEs and domestic and international markets. DFID should be placing more of a focus on how to promote and enable wealth creation within Afghan households and villages, taking into account the need for investment in rural areas, by supporting small business enterprise. The UK government should look to provide further support to long term development projects that assist rural communities to adopt alternative sustainable livelihoods for households that are currently relying on volatile rainfed crops and rain dependent livelihoods. These will require assisting farmers to switch to high value cash crops and adopt the corresponding modern agricultural techniques to allow for maximum production levels and corresponding income. It is important that this investment comes in the form of multi-year funding to ensure sustainable results.

61. Market dynamics must be considered and a more effective investment made in interest groups, cooperatives and associations that have already delivered positive impacts which successfully challenge market dynamics and allow small-scale businesses or entrepreneurs to access local, provincial or regional markets. Again multi-year funding would allow for sustainable results.

62. The UK should engage more broadly and nationally on Afghan women’s rights through long-term and substantive investment in Afghan women’s skills development and economic opportunities, particularly in the rural areas where progress has been seen over the last few years.

Humanitarian Assistance: the role of donors and of the UN as co-ordinator and lead on humanitarian assistance;

63. Millions of Afghans continue to have significant and chronic humanitarian needs and will require humanitarian assistance well beyond 2014. Humanitarian conditions have steadily deteriorated in recent years due to the ongoing conflict and periodic natural disasters, including drought and flash floods. Reform is needed to improve systems and structures based on lessons learning to ensure that government institutions, the UN and aid agencies have the necessary resources, information and support to meet humanitarian needs as and when they arise.

64. Problems associated with a lack of access plague humanitarian responses in Afghanistan: poor needs analysis and post-disaster assessments make it difficult to prioritise responses or design appropriate interventions; there is an inability to reach some of the most affected communities who live in the most insecure areas; and a recognised inability to monitor all humanitarian response work so that a significant percentage of assistance does not actually reach the intended beneficiaries. DFID has played a positive role in encouraging greater coordination among donors and aid agencies and a greater donor alignment with Afghan government strategies. However, some problems persist. For example, in relation to the drought in 2011, some donors failed to make it clear that they had funding available and hardship ensued. NGOs also have a responsibility to participate in the coordination process rather than looking only at their own programmes.

65. The humanitarian situation in Afghanistan is increasingly critical. In mid 2011 UN OCHA estimated 4.1 million people were food-insecure and a further 1 million needed emergency agricultural assistance. Yet the provision of humanitarian assistance is dwarfed by development aid and foreign military expenditure. Humanitarian aid has fallen year on year from its peak of $890 million in 2002 when it comprised the majority of total aid to Afghanistan. By 2009, development assistance was more than 12 times that of humanitarian aid.

66. UN humanitarian agencies suffer a disproportionate lack of access and restricted operations. They have significant concerns over their ability to maintain their field presence as international forces withdraw and the UN mission becomes more integrated, thus, affecting their capability to effectively target assistance and monitor the impact of their work. This has implications for coordinated humanitarian work—it is becoming harder for NGOs to work alongside the UN at the field level and for NGOs as implementing agencies to operate under the minimal operational costs they provide, which then allows the UN agencies to fund their own cumbersome and expensive operational costs.

67. The UN has launched humanitarian appeals, the Consolidated Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and established an Emergency Response Fund (ERF) in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has received just under 3% of global CERF allocations since the fund’s launch in March 2006, a total of slightly over $71 million, making it the 13^th largest recipient. All funds go to UN agencies and the IOM. The ERF was established in February 2010 and responds to both natural disasters and conflict related crises. It is primarily available to national and international NGOs (which received 58% and 42% of funds respectively) and to the Afghan Red Crescent Society.

68. DFID’s financing response to these funds has been variable: while they should be applauded for being the largest single donor to the CERF, providing over $546 million since the fund’s launch, in 2010 they provided no funds for the Afghanistan ERF which has provided $6.4 million to fund 25 emergency projects since 2010. The ERF has a target of $8 million for funding in 2012, the same level as 2011. However it is only 75% funded.

69. Emergency pooled funds have been shown to improve coordination. The 2011 CERF five year evaluation noted the role of the Fund in complementing and reinforcing humanitarian reform when there was effective leadership from the Humanitarian Country Team (led by the Humanitarian Coordinator) and solid coordination arrangements in place. The evaluation also noted the importance of clarifying the accountability of the Humanitarian Coordinator in the planning, coordination and use of CERF resources. However, there is a limit to the oversight, time and attention any one individual can devote to humanitarian leadership if there are also imperatives related to additional duties of Resident Coordinator and DSRSG (Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General).

70. There is still a lack of clarity within the UN appeal process between ‘chronic vulnerability’ and “pure humanitarian needs”. Chronic vulnerability falls into a grey area that is neither eligible for humanitarian nor development funding. It is a question of resilience that requires a commitment from actors such as DFID in order to mitigate the impact of shocks in the longer term. There is currently a large chronically vulnerable population in the country but this does not detract from the need to provide emergency assistance to these populations when as a result of a shock they face an acute situation. The ongoing chronic needs surrounding food security and access to water in particular are an indictment of development efforts in that sector, however this is often as a result of a failure to provide long term-funding that is necessary to bring about the long term sustainable changes that are required to help communities cope with the regular shocks they are exposed to in Afghanistan.

71. There has been welcome progress recently in improving humanitarian coordination, led by UN OCHA and the DSRSG. However, there is still a long way to go in creating an effective and nation-wide “cluster system” of sectoral coordination. Despite the system being launched in Afghanistan in 2008, regional clusters have only recently been established, and links between the national level clusters and humanitarian staff based in the regions remain weak. There are still significant gaps in the quality of contingency and emergency preparedness planning, in needs assessments and in the coordination of responses. The recent drought response has highlighted the lack of resources and capacity in the UN.

Recommendations

73. DFID should invest in early warning systems, water conservation schemes and support disaster risk reduction and improved resilience in Afghanistan, particularly in relation to drought as it becomes a cyclical problem of increasingly frequency.

74. DFID should continue to work with other donors to ensure that there is adequate and reliable support in response to new and chronic crises in Afghanistan. Donors and the UN should work together to improve NGOs’ access to pooled funding such as the CAP and ERF. DFID should build on its positive efforts with respect to donor coordination so that communication and collaboration between donors, UN and NGOs is improved.

75. DFID should work with humanitarian actors and other donors to ensure that UN appeals are based on up to date, quality needs assessments, and that they are fully funded.

76. DFID should continue to call for strong and capable independent humanitarian leadership through OCHA, which can support effective and timely needs assessments and humanitarian programme evaluations. In the interests of effectiveness of humanitarian aid and the safety of humanitarian workers, DFID should ensure support for OCHA’s continued strategic and physical independence from UNAMA.

77. UNOCHA is in need of greater financial support in order to bolster it’s regional presence and information management capacity. Simultaneously however, it is crucial that it demonstrates clear value added for humanitarian agencies in order to promote participation and to substantively contribute to humanitarian response particularly in relation to needs assessments and emergency preparedness.

78. DFID should support the separation of the function of Humanitarian Coordinator in Afghanistan from that of Resident Coordinator and DSRSG.

79. DFID should encourage the UN Humanitarian Country Team to adopt a more action orientated approach and lead advocacy efforts centred on meeting humanitarian needs in the country during and post transition.

80. Beyond its support to UN agencies, DFID should look to alternative funding channels for humanitarian funding, including to INGOs and national NGOs (as per the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review recommendations),21 and to ensure greater transparency in the publication of how and where funds have been disbursed and what their impact has been for people in crisis.

81. DFID should ensure that the recommendations of the HERR in relation to improved accountability are implemented in Afghanistan.

82. DFID should provide funding to the Afghanistan ERF which primarily funds national and international NGOs and increase the percentage of its humanitarian aid relative to development aid to Afghanistan.

Co-ordination between DFID, the FCO and the MoD and the value-added of the cross-Departmental Conflict Pool in Afghanistan

83. BAAG has welcomed the establishment of a Contact Group, some ten years ago, which brings together staff from DFID, the FCO, and the MOD with members of BAAG and others, such as the Stabilisation Unit, as appropriate. It is a good opportunity to exchange information and analysis on a quarterly basis which can lead to other useful meetings taking place. BAAG has also taken part in a variety of co-ordination meetings in Kabul and the UK and worked to ensure the civil society voice plays a part in international conferences on Afghanistan, (for example Bonn 1 and 2 London, Paris and now Tokyo).

84. Engaging on issues of peace, conflict and security is difficult (they are excluded from the MDGs) and it can seem as if various policies and positions are put together rather than being strategically co-ordinated. Despite countless meetings in the field and capitals, attempts to develop and improve civil military relations have seemed to produce little more than reports. The civil military guidelines in Afghanistan are a case in point, signed but not implemented and unknown to succeeding generations of the military.22

How effective DFID has been and what lessons should be learned in relation to its work in fragile and conflict affected states;

85. Afghan women have borne the brunt of the conflicts in Afghanistan over the past three decades, and have continued to experience a high rate of discrimination and violence. According to a report released in 2011, 87% of Afghan women continue to experience domestic violence or forced marriage. There is a clear case to be made for DFID building up a more substantive and effective focus on gender in its Afghanistan country strategy. A focus on gender relations can enable meaningful change by involving both men and women in initiatives that promote women’s rights and opportunities to increase their financial contribution to their household which can contribute to a more peaceful, collaborative environment and equity in the justice system.

86. Militarised aid is an ineffective way to deliver assistance so the move to close PRTs by 2014 is welcome. There are still instances occurring where civil-military guidelines are not complied with, for example reports of PRTs visiting health facilities to inspect them has created suspicion in the local population accessing services and placed aid workers at risk. It is vital that the PRT-led projects are handed over in a way that ensures they are sustainable and positive results are not undermined.

87. In its participation in the HLF4 on Aid Effectiveness at the end of 2011 in Busan the British government welcomed the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. The United Kingdom is also a member of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding and as such is committed to the five peacebuilding and statebuilding goals of legitimate politics (a state for all), security (for all), justice (for all) economic foundations (jobs for all) and revenue and services (services for all). Afghanistan has volunteered to be a pilot country for the New Deal, which is to be welcomed. There are real concerns however that this will be process heavy and place undue burden on actors as they struggle to ensure multi-stakeholder approaches and widespread public participation as well as seeking to develop relevant expertise/capacity building on conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity, and participatory quantitative and qualitative monitoring and evaluation.

How DFID will ensure progress towards development goals, and that progress made since 2001 is not reversed, after the departure of combat troops, and how it will monitor such progress.

91. It is essential that there is a process for the transferring of power in decision making to aid recipients. This will require engagement with people other than the government; creating the conditions for and supporting dialogue and trustbuilding.

92. Civil society, particularly groups involving and representing women’s interests must have buy-in and involvement in any monitoring process during the transition phase. Evidence from one Afghan women’s-led organisation suggests that there have been some positive changes since the Bonn conference in 2001 with some civil society groups reporting an increase in opportunities to provide input to GIRoA processes. The Ministry of Mines (MoM) and Ministry of Finance (MoF) held consultation meetings in January and February 2012 with a selection of civil society groups, including at least one women’s-focused organisation, in Kabul. These kinds of meetings should become an accepted part of every Ministry’s work.

93. Beyond the short term, the mineral sector is one of the few that has the potential to cover the public expenditure shortfall as aid is reduced. This underscores the importance of good governance around the revenues generated by this sector, particularly the need for a clear strategy detailing how these revenues will be used to fund sustainable development. It is therefore of concern that Hamid Karzai has indicated that the mineral sector will be used to generate money to feed and supply the ANSF.23

Recommendations

94. DFID should work to support Afghan ownership of the monitoring of commitments made on peacebuilding and statebuilding in the Busan Partnership and New Deal and ensure that country level processes are not overly onerous, whilst at the same time ensuring multi-stakeholder participation.

95. Stronger efforts should be made to ensure that women’s rights are truly embedded through gender mainstreaming in DFID’s programming in Afghanistan. These efforts should be augmented by direct funding of organisations and programmes that are leading the struggle to end violence against women, given the scale of the problem and its inherent links to peace and development in Afghanistan. The UK must support the full implementation of the NAPWA and the 2009 EVAW law, and work to ensure the full participation of women’s rights organisations in decision-making processes for the transitional period in Afghanistan. DFID’s operational strategy should include a component that aims to improve gender relations by working with both men and women within a peacebuilding programme.

96. DFID should engage in debate with GIRoA and other donors ahead of the Tokyo conference to secure an agreement on how mineral revenues will be used.

97. Evaluation of the impact of programmes, including by longitudinal studies, should be carried out with Afghan researchers wherever possible to assess their impact on peoples’ lives. It is essential that the views of Afghan men, women and children are taken into account in policy decisions.

98. Efforts should be made to encourage a comprehensive approach to peacebuilding, including at the community level. Recommendations arising from the work of BAAG and its Afghan colleagues will be available in early summer 2012.

May 2012