2 Aid to Rwanda and the UN Reports
DFID's aid programme in Rwanda
7. Rwanda is dependent on donors for approximately
40% of its budget. The UK is the second largest bilateral donor
after the USA. Over the period 2011-2015, UK aid to Rwanda will
increase by 24%, relative to the previous four-year period, to
reach £97 million in 2015.[10]
8. General budget support is the provision of funds
directly to the Exchequer of the recipient country. The funds
can be distributed according to the priorities of the recipient
government. Sector budget support, in contrast, is the provision
of funds directly to a specific ministry in the recipient country.
In Rwanda budget support represents 65% of the UK's programme
over the four year period, with 45% of funds provided through
general budget support and 20% through sector budget support in
health, education and agriculture.[11]
9. Mr Mitchell emphasised to us the importance, for
development objectives, of ensuring continuity in the provision
of general budget support:
In changing the conditions of budget support, you
endanger very important poverty programmes. I think that 6.5%
of the budget support goes to support the Rwandan Public Accounts
Committee and the Auditor General's office. That is very important
work and it shows the extent to which a large chunk of budget
support is being used to build systems in Rwanda that are very
important indeed in tackling corruption and promoting accountability.
If you change budget support, you have to recognise the danger
that you will not have an impact on the elite but you will degrade
or damage very important poverty programmes.[12]
10. Rwanda has made significant progress in poverty
reduction since 1994. DFID says:
Rwanda has achieved tremendous progress since the
devastating genocide of 1994. By 2020, the Government of Rwanda
aims to complete the country's transformation from a poor, post-conflict
nation to a thriving, middle income, regional trade and investment
hub. Rwanda uses aid very well, both in terms of the results it
achieves and accounting for its use.[13]
And, Mr Mitchell told us that Rwanda was a reliable
aid partner:
In terms of development and doing what they say with
our taxpayers' money, and enabling us to follow the money and
ensure that for a pound of British taxpayers' money we are getting
100 pence of development, Rwanda is probably one of the best in
the world. Over the last five years Rwanda has lifted more than
1 million people out of poverty. There is no question about that.
Budget support is the best way if you trust the systems. We
can trust the systems in Rwanda: Rwanda does exactly what they
say they will do with our taxpayers' money.[14]
11. Underpinning DFID's programme in Rwanda is a
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in 1999, and updated
in September 2012. The MoU sets out, among other things, the commitments
the Government of Rwanda must make in order for the UK to provide
budget support to the countrythe partnership principles.
These are:
- A focus on poverty reduction and the MDGs;
- respecting human rights and other international
obligations;
- improving public financial management, promoting
good governance and transparency and fighting corruption; and
- strengthening domestic accountability.
Both Mr Mitchell and the Secretary of State stressed
the important role these principles played in the relationship
between the UK and Rwanda.[15]
The interim UN Report and donor
responses
12. The interim UN Report raised questions about
whether Rwanda had breached the partnership principles. The interim
Report says:
Since the outset of its current mandate, the Group
has gathered evidence of arms embargo and sanctions regime violations
committed by the Rwandan Government. These violations consist
of the provision of material and financial support to armed groups
operating in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, including
the recently established M23, in contravention of paragraph 1
of Security Council resolution 1807 (2008). The arms embargo and
sanctions regimes violations include the following:
- Direct assistance in the creation of M23 through
the transport of weapons and soldiers through Rwandan territory;
- Recruitment of Rwandan youth and demobilized
ex-combatants as well as Congolese refugees for M23;
- Provision of weapons and ammunition to M23;
- Mobilization and lobbying of Congolese political
and financial leaders for the benefit of M23;
- Direct Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) interventions
into Congolese territory to reinforce M23;
- Support to several other armed groups as well
as Forces armées de la République Démocratique
du Congo (FARDC) mutinies in the eastern Congo;
- Violation of the assets freeze and travel ban
through supporting sanctioned individuals.[16]
The Government of Rwanda has denied these claims.[17]
Dr Phil Clark, from the University of London, has raised concerns
about the methodology of the research.[18]
13. As noted, the UK delayed making a decision about
its £16 million general budget support payment due in July,
but continued other aspects of its aid programme. Some other donors
also responded to the allegations by withholding or delaying decisions
on aid disbursements to Rwanda. For example, the USA suspended
$200,000 in military aid, but continued its $160 million development
aid programme; Germany suspended 18 million in budget support;
the Netherlands suspended 5 million in aid; Sweden froze
aid pending further details; and the African Development Bank
and the World Bank both delayed decisions about aid funding.
14. Mr Mitchell told the Committee that his decision
to delay £16 million in general budget support due in July
was based, in part, on the Government's assessment that Rwanda
had not met two of the four partnership principles. These were
respecting human rights and other international obligations, and
strengthening domestic accountability in relation to political
space. Mr Mitchell told us:
Those were the four conditions that we set, against
which we judged whether or not budget support should be disbursed
in Rwanda. The judgment of officials, with which I completely
concurred, was that on two of those principles Rwanda was doing
very well and on two of them they were standing still and not
doing so well. It was because of that judgment against those
principles, which we publishedagain as a result of the
changes the Coalition Government have made to budget supportthat
the decision was made.[19]
The decision to reinstate budget
support
15. While the decision to delay the payment was not
controversial, the decision in September, as Mr Mitchell left
office, to reinstate £8 million in general budget support
to Rwanda, was. The media, and some NGOs, accused Mr Mitchell
of ignoring the advice of officials in DFID and the FCO and of
breaking ranks with other donors because of his relationship with
President Kagame.[20]
16. We asked Mr Mitchell about the process: what
consultations he had had and whether he was acting as a "rogue"
minister? He said there had been extensive consultation with officials
in DFID, and the FCO, and with the Prime Minister and that both
himself and the Foreign Secretary had had discussions with the
President, members and officials of the Government of Rwanda before
the decision was made.[21]
We also asked about discussions with other donors. Mr Mitchell
assured us that officials talked all the time, but that this was
a UK decision reflecting UK positions.[22]
Mr Mitchell was clear that he had followed due process, and the
new Secretary of State confirmed this in her evidence to us.[23]
The Prime Minister's conditions
17. Mr Mitchell explained that as part of his discussions
with Number 10, the Prime Minister had set down three conditions
which must be met before budget support could be reinstated.[24]
The conditions, which are consistent with the partnership principles,
were:
- the Government of Rwanda should
engage constructively in the International Conference on the Great
Lakes Region (ICGLR) peace talks chaired by President Museveni
of Uganda;
- the Government of Rwanda should publicly condemn
the M23 Group; and,
- there should be continuing ceasefire in the Kivus
and practical support to the M23 should end.[25]
18. In August, following consultation with the Foreign
Secretary, and taking into account reports from the region, Mr
Mitchell judged that "two of the three conditions the Prime
Minister had set had seen progress".[26]
He added, "The British Government's judgement was that they
[the Government of Rwanda] met conditions one and three in part,
but they had not met condition two".[27]
On the basis of this assessment, the decision was made to provide
half of the due funding in direct budget support and the other
half in sector budget support for the education and agricultural
sectors.
19. This judgement has been questioned by some NGOs.
Christian Aid, for example, said:
There has been no evidence of the Government of Rwanda
ceasing support to M23 and other armed groups; regional discussions
at the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region have
failed to provide tangible results; and local reports indicate
increasing concerns about the protection of civilians in conflict
affected region.[28]
Human Rights Watch concurs, saying:
On the basis of on the ground events in Rwanda and
eastern DRC, there appears to have been no objective rationale
for the decision to resume UK aid to Rwanda in the absence of
progress on the very criterion which had triggered the decision
to delay the aid in the first place.[29]
20. Both Andrew Mitchell, and subsequently the new
Secretary of State, said in relation to the second condition,
that they could not comment on whether or not Rwanda had been
involved in funding or backing M23 and that the final UN Report
due to be made public at the end of November, would shed light
on this.[30]
21. Nevertheless it is clear that elements of the
UK Government did consider the allegations to be credible. For
example, on 13 November the Senior Minister of State, Department
for Communities and Local Government and Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, Baroness Warsi said:
We are aware that the embargoed report by the UN
Group of Experts has been leaked. It is not government policy
to comment on leaked documents. However, we have consistently
made it clear to the Rwandan Government, at the most senior levels,
that we find the existing body of evidence for Rwandan involvement
with the M23 credible and compelling. And that all such support
must stop.[31]
22. None
of the above appears to back up the claims that the former Secretary
of State was a "rogue" minister acting without the knowledge
of the Foreign Secretary or the approval of the Prime Minister.
However, the former Secretary of State told us he judged that
Rwanda had moved significantly against two of the three conditions
set down by the Prime Minister. We are not privy to all the information
and advice upon which he made this judgement. However, on the
basis of the other evidence which we received, we do not understand
how he concluded that Rwandan support for M23 had ceased.
The decision in December
23. The total amount of aid withheld by donors from
Rwanda since July is approximately £19.6 million (excluding
US military aid) with £92 million delayed. We were told that
the impact of the decision to re-allocate £8 million of general
budget support to sector budget support was twofold. On the one
hand the education and agricultural sectors had received additional
funding and DFID set out the results it expected from this.[32]
On the other hand the cumulative impact of reduced general budget
support has reduced the Government of Rwanda's flexibility to
focus on its own priorities and funding gaps, including for rural
infrastructure and justice programmes.[33]
24. The new Secretary of State has said she will
consider all options, and "very carefully reflect on the
partnership principles" when she comes to make her decision
in December.[34] She
also told us that the Prime Minister's three conditions were still
relevant,[35] and that
she would "wait to see the conclusion of the UN Group of
Experts' final report, and the whole process of the UN Sanctions
Committee and the UN Security Council" before making her
decision.[36]
25. Subsequent to our evidence session, the final
UN Group of Experts report has been published. It confirms, unambiguously,
earlier findings of the interim report about direct and indirect
support to the M23 rebels by the Government of Rwanda, including
its Defence Minister:
The Government of Rwanda continues to violate the
arms embargo by providing direct military support to the M23 rebels,
facilitating recruitment, encouraging and facilitating desertions
from the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
and providing arms, ammunition, intelligence and political advice.
The de facto chain of command of M23 includes Gen. Bosco Ntaganda
and culminates with the Minister of Defence of Rwanda, Gen. James
Kabarebe. Following the publication of the addendum to its interim
report, the Group met the Government of Rwanda and took into consideration
its written response. The Group has, however, found no substantive
element of its previous findings that it wishes to alter.[37]
26. Rwanda
is making significant progress towards the Millennium Development
Goal targets and is lifting people out of poverty. We have seen
for ourselves the tremendous improvements that Rwanda has made
since 1994 and
consider that general
budget
support has proved effective in reducing poverty in Rwanda. For
this reason, we think that UK aid should continue to benefit the
people of Rwanda. However questions arise about the best method
to deliver it.
27. We do not
believe that Rwanda has met the Prime Minister's conditions and
we recommend that the second tranche of general budget support
should not be provided in December.
28. In the light
of the Memorandum of Understanding, and the partnership principles
contained therein, the conditions the Prime Minister set for
the resumption of general budget supportthe Rwanda should
1) engage constructively in the peace process, 2) publicly condemn
the M23 group and 3) there should be a continuing ceasefire in
the Kivus and practical support to the M23 should endare
not unreasonable. We recommend that the before further general
budget support is disbursed the Government must ensure Rwanda
unambiguously complies with all three of the Prime Minister's
conditionsgeneral budget support should not be provided
if Rwanda is providing support to the M23 rebels. Until these
conditions are met in full, DFID should deliver its aid through
alternative channels.
29. We also
recommend that DFID consult formally, at ministerial level, with
other donors before making a decision to reinstate general budget
support. While we understand that the UK Government will make
its own decision, it is important that there is some donor coordination
of response, even if those responses differ. Donors will need
to consider the impact of their individual and cumulative decisions
on different sectors. DFID has committed to work with other development
partners to improve alignment and harmonisation of development
assistance in the Memorandum of Understanding and we expect to
see evidence of this.
The future: Regional peace processes
30. DFID will provide £1,510 million in bilateral
aid to Rwanda, DRC and Uganda over the period 2011-15,[38]
in addition to its contributions to the UN agencies and the UN
Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). We are concerned about
the effectiveness of this aid in the context of continuing regional
conflicts. These undermine poverty reduction efforts and greatly
reduce the results our aid can achieve. There is a regional peace
process which the UK is involved in. However it has made limited
progress despite the presence of MONUSCO, the world's largest
peacekeeping force. Continuing
unrest in the region threatens to undermine DFID's large aid programmes
there. The UK Government should give a higher priority to the
regional peace process.
The future: Renewed emphasis on
human rights
31. When we visited Rwanda in 2011 we discussed with
human rights organisations and lawyers the difficulties they faced
in operating in Rwanda. Some of the submissions we received commented
on the limited democratic freedoms in Rwanda,[39]
and on illegal detention and torture by military intelligence.[40]
Some people expressed a desire to remain anonymous, or for their
submissions not to be published. We therefore asked the new Secretary
of State whether she intended to place a greater emphasis on human
rights as set out in the partnership principles.
32. The Secretary of State told us she intended to
consider this in making her decision about future funding:
My plan is that I will have a more structured engagement
with human rights organisations, so that I can understand what
their views are about this situation, and indeed more broadly
in relation to DFID programmes. I will aim to be more formally
part of the human rights assessment process that the FCO has set
up, which I think is a very good one, and involves a twice yearly
meeting of the key human rights organisations. I will also seek,
in a more structured way, to have those organisations brief me
on key issuesfor example this issuewhen I am forming
a decision, because I think it is important that I hear from relevant
partners.[41]
33. We
welcome the Secretary of State's plan to have a more structured
dialogue with international and local human rights organisations
with experience and knowledge of the situation in Rwanda, and
to engage formally with the FCO's human rights process. We look
forward to receiving regular updates from the Secretary of State
on these issues. DFID is the second largest bilateral donor in
Rwanda and, consistent with the Memorandum of Understanding, it
can, and should, play a leadership role in encouraging human rights
reforms.
10 DFID, Operational Plan 2011-15, DFID Rwanda,
June 2012 Back
11
DFID, Operational Plan 2011-15, DFID Rwanda, June 2012 Back
12
Q 47 Back
13
DFID, Operational Plan 2011-15, DFID Rwanda, June2012 Back
14
Q 2 Back
15
Qqs 35,47,59, 86 Back
16
Addendum to the interim report of the Group of Experts on the
DRC concerning violations of the arms embargo and sanctions regime
by the Government of Rwanda, S/2012/348/Add.1 Back
17
Qqs 13-14 Back
18
Ev w23-24 Back
19
Q 7 Back
20
Ev w5, and, for example, "He put friendship and connections
before his country", The Times, 20 October 2012; Why
did Andrew Mitchell reinstate aid to Rwanda on his last day at
DFID? New Statesman, 27 September, 2012 Back
21
Q 1 Back
22
Qqs 41-43, 49 Back
23
Q 99 Back
24
Q 1 Back
25
Ev 25 Back
26
Q 2 Back
27
Q 12 Back
28
Evw9 Back
29
Ev w6 Back
30
Qqs 14, 39-40, 45,93,98,127.The final report was leaked in October
2012. Back
31
HL Deb, 13 November 2012, col 286WA Back
32
Ev 24 Back
33
Ev 26 Back
34
Q 89 Back
35
Q 90 Back
36
Q 93 Back
37
UN Security Council, Letter dated 12 November 2012 from the chair
of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution
1533 (2004) concerning the DRC, addressed to the President of
the Security Council, 15 November 2012 Back
38
Although we note that aid to Uganda is currently suspended. Back
39
Ev w7 Back
40
Amnesty International, Rwanda: shrouded in Secrecy: illegal
detention and torture by military intelligence, 2012 Back
41
Q 100 Back
|