Conclusions and recommendations
The decision to reinstate budget support
1. None
of the above appears to back up the claims that the former Secretary
of State was a "rogue" minister acting without the knowledge
of the Foreign Secretary or the approval of the Prime Minister.
However, the former Secretary of State told us he judged that
Rwanda had moved significantly against two of the three conditions
set down by the Prime Minister. We are not privy to all the information
and advice upon which he made this judgement. However, on the
basis of the other evidence which we received, we do not understand
how he concluded that Rwandan support for M23 had ceased. (Paragraph
22)
The decision in December
2. Rwanda
is making significant progress towards the Millennium Development
Goal targets and is lifting people out of poverty. We have seen
for ourselves the tremendous improvements that Rwanda has made
since 1994 and consider that general budget support has proved
effective in reducing poverty in Rwanda. For this reason, we think
that UK aid should continue to benefit the people of Rwanda. However
questions arise about the best method to deliver it. (Paragraph
26)
3. We do not believe
that Rwanda has met the Prime Minister's conditions and we recommend
that the second tranche of general budget support should not be
provided in December. (Paragraph 27)
4. In the light of
the Memorandum of Understanding, and the partnership principles
contained therein, the conditions the Prime Minister set for
the resumption of general budget support—the Rwanda should
1) engage constructively in the peace process, 2) publicly condemn
the M23 group and 3) there should be a continuing ceasefire in
the Kivus and practical support to the M23 should end—are
not unreasonable. We recommend that the before further general
budget support is disbursed the Government must ensure Rwanda
unambiguously complies with all three of the Prime Minister's
conditions—general budget support should not be provided
if Rwanda is providing support to the M23 rebels. Until these
conditions are met in full, DFID should deliver its aid through
alternative channels. (Paragraph 28)
5. We also recommend
that DFID consult formally, at ministerial level, with other donors
before making a decision to reinstate general budget support.
While we understand that the UK Government will make its own
decision, it is important that there is some donor coordination
of response, even if those responses differ. Donors will need
to consider the impact of their individual and cumulative decisions
on different sectors. DFID has committed to work with other development
partners to improve alignment and harmonisation of development
assistance in the Memorandum of Understanding and we expect to
see evidence of this. (Paragraph 29)
The future: Regional peace processes
6. Continuing
unrest in the region threatens to undermine DFID's large aid programmes
there. The UK Government should give a higher priority to the
regional peace process.
(Paragraph 30)
The future: Renewed emphasis on human rights
7. We
welcome the Secretary of State's plan to have a more structured
dialogue with international and local human rights organisations
with experience and knowledge of the situation in Rwanda, and
to engage formally with the FCO's human rights process. We look
forward to receiving regular updates from the Secretary of State
on these issues. DFID is the second largest bilateral donor in
Rwanda and, consistent with the Memorandum of Understanding, it
can, and should, play a leadership role in encouraging human rights
reforms. (Paragraph 33)
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