Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and control issues - Business, Innovation and Skills Committee Contents

8  Arms export control policies

Arms exports and human rights

175. In their 2011 report (HC686) the Committees stated:

We recommend that the Government in its response to this report sets out how it intends to reconcile the potential conflict of interest between increased emphasis on promoting arms exports with the staunch upholding of human rights.[238]

In its Response (Cm 8079) the Government replied: "The Government believes that its security, prosperity and values agendas are mutually reinforcing." The Government went on to say: "Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are mandatory considerations for all export licence applications."[239]

176. The Committees conclude that, whilst the promotion of arms exports and the upholding of human rights are both legitimate Government policies, the Government would do well to acknowledge that there is an inherent conflict between strongly promoting arms exports to authoritarian regimes whilst strongly criticising their lack of human rights at the same time. The Committees further conclude that whilst the Government's statement that "respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are mandatory considerations for all export licence applications" is welcome, those considerations do not appear to have weighed sufficiently heavily on either the present Government or on its predecessor given the unprecedented scale of arms export licence revocations that the Government has made since the "Arab Spring" — the stated reason for revocation being in every single case "that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 and 3".[240] Criteria 2 is headed "The respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country of final destination", and Criteria 3 is headed "The internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions, or armed conflicts."

Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights Guidance

177. Giving overseas Governments assistance with improving their security and administration of justice may involve the UK Government supporting the commercial export or gifting of goods subject to export licensing. Table 2.4 of the Government's Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010 details equipment gifted by the Government in 2010.[241]

178. On 15 December 2011 the Foreign Secretary in a Written Ministerial Statement announced the publication of the Government's Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights Guidance.[242]

179. The UK Working Group submitted additional written evidence to the Committees giving its views on the OSJA Human Rights Guidance. The UKWG said that the UK Consolidated Criteria should remain the sole basis on which decisions are made regarding arms transfers. It stated that in some cases security and defence equipment is sold or gifted as part of a package including other types of assistance, such as the provision of training in crowd control methods. Such training should, in the UKWG's view, "in no way be seen as overriding the need to robustly implement the Consolidated Criteria." It pointed out that the OSJA guidance makes it clear that it currently applies only to the FCO, but that following a review in April 2012 will be applied to all Government Departments. The UKWG stated that currently the majority of UK overseas security and justice assistance is provided by DFID, MoD and the Stabilisation Unit, with only a minority of support provided by the FCO and was concerned that there did not appear to have been cross-departmental guidance on the delivery of security and justice assistance until now. Saferworld (part of UKWG) said that it looked forward to the cross-departmental guidance and hoped that the review in April would be conducted in consultation with external actors.[243] UKWG recommended that:

• The human rights guidance should be incorporated into a single operational toolkit which addresses the practical challenges of putting these many commitments into practice;
• The review of the OSJA, in April 2012, should make explicit what is meant by "overseas security and justice", setting out the full range of interventions to which the guidance applies. Security and justice assistance should be conceived more broadly than just "train and equip-type" programmes.
• The UK Consolidated Criteria should remain the sole basis on which decisions about arms transfers licensing is made, regardless of whether other types of security and justice assistance are delivered alongside.[244]

180. When the Foreign Secretary gave Oral evidence to the Committees on 7 February 2012, he was asked what impact he thought the OSJA Human Rights Guidance would have when considering applications for arms licences. The Foreign Secretary replied:

This is about providing security and justice assistance, which can be related to arms for the reasons we were discussing earlier. I was describing how, in the case of Libya, there were licences that related to a training programme. So the linkage here is that the specific reference to the consolidated criteria is contained in checklist A, as it is called, of the guidance, which requires staff to consult the consolidated criteria where the provision of equipment is part of the assistance. So although it is intended that information sought under this guidance can be used to help make decisions relevant to arms exports, the specific test set out in the consolidated criteria must apply when there is a question of exporting arms.[245]

The Chairman of the Committees then put the following proposal to the Foreign Secretary:

"[...]buried away in a microscopic footnote on page 14 of the guidance it does indeed say to officials conducting their checklist that it "is not intended to cover the export of military or security equipment. If the provision of equipment is part of your assistance, you must consult the Consolidated Arms Export Licensing Criteria." I put it to you, Foreign Secretary, particularly as you have said specifically in front of the Committees that assistance is provided through the making available of equipment, which could include items within the arms export control area, that you should reconsider whether this crucial sentence should be promoted from being dismally put in microscopic print in a footnote to having very strong prominence in your human rights guidance.[246]

The Foreign Secretary replied: "That may be a very good suggestion. We will have a look at that."[247]

181. The Committees recommend that the OSJA Human Rights Guidance is amended to make it prominently and unequivocally clear that if military or security equipment is being exported in an Overseas Security and Justice Assistance programme, the decision as to whether or not to approve such exports must be made solely and wholly in accordance with the Consolidated Arms Export Licensing Criteria and procedures. The Committees further recommend that the requirement on officials in the current guidance merely to consult the Consolidated Arms Export Licensing Criteria in such export cases should be replaced by a requirement to adhere strictly to the Licensing Criteria and procedures.

Surveillance technology and equipment

182. It has been reported that surveillance technology and equipment is being exported from the UK to repressive regimes who may use it against human rights activists. The report also referred to a letter from 10 Downing Street to Privacy International saying that the Government was actively looking at this issue and was working within the EU to introduce new controls on surveillance.[248]

183. The Committees recommend that the Government sets out in its Response to this Report:

a) what changes it will make to UK export control legislation and procedures to prevent surveillance technology and equipment being exported from the UK to repressive regimes who may use this technology and equipment to suppress human rights; and

b) what action the Government is taking to prevent such exports from EU Member States generally.

Export of Tasers

184. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the FCO, Alistair Burt, wrote to the Committees' Chairman on 8 February 2012 notifying him that the Minister would be making a Written Ministerial Statement the following day announcing a limited lifting of the ban on the export of Tasers (electric shock discharge guns) from the UK.[249] In his Written Statement on 9 February, the Minister said that the Government would now consider applications for the grant of a licence for the export of Tasers, but only under the following limited circumstance:

(i) Where the export of tasers is to the police service of a Crown dependency or UK overseas territory and where it has been specifically recommended by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary that such a police service adopts the use of such equipment by trained officers as an alternative to the use of lethal firearms, and that the use of the equipment is in line with the accepted standards set for UK police officers; or

(ii) Where tasers constitute officially issued equipment for use by suitably trained UK police officers who are being deployed in support of a police operation in a Crown Dependency or overseas territory, and where that deployment has been requested by the chief police officer of the Crown Dependency or overseas territory; or

(iii) Where the equipment belonging to a UK police force, the police service of a Crown Dependency or UK overseas territory, or to an authorised agent working on their behalf, is being returned to the original manufacturer for repair, or replacement of faulty equipment, or as unwanted goods.[250]

185. The Committees recommend that the Government informs them promptly of any breaches of the conditions under which Tasers may be exported under limited circumstances from the UK as set out in the Written Ministerial Statement made by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. Alistair Burt, on 9 February 2012.

Arms exports and internal repression

186. A central concern of the Committees has been whether or not there has been a change of policy on arms exports and internal repression by the present Government from that adopted by the previous Government. The question as to whether or not there had been a change of policy assumed key importance when the present Government, following repressive violence against civilian demonstrators in the "Arab Spring", revoked an unprecedented number of 158 extant UK arms export licences, stating that in every single case the licence now contravened Criterion 2, which reads that "the Government will not issues an export licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression."

187. The previous Government's complete policy on arms exports was set out by the then Minister of State in the FCO, Peter Hain, in a Written Answer given on 26 October 2000.[251] This Answer is reproduced in full in Annex 3 to this Report. In his summary of the then Government's policy in his Written Answer, Peter Hain said: "An export licence will not be issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed by [...]concern that the goods might be used for internal repression [...]". Later in his Written Answer Peter Hain, when setting out Criterion Two, headed "The respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country of final destination", also said that "the Government will: a. Not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression".

188. The two policy tests to be applied as set out in Peter Hain's 26 October 2000 Written Answer were faithfully and accurately reproduced by the present Government's FCO Minister Alistair Burt in his Press Statement of 18 February 2011 in which he said: "The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression."[252]

189. The policy importance of the two separate tests was highlighted by the Chairman of the Committees, Sir John Stanley, in the Westminster Hall debate on the Committees' last Report, when he said, referring to the 18 February 2011 statement of the FCO Minister Alistair Burt:

That is absolutely correct wording and punctuation, from which hon. Members will see that there are in fact two separate tests. There is the "clear risk" test as to whether the proposed export could aggravate conflict. If we had just the "clear risk" test, we could probably end up justifying the sale of pretty well anything to any country. We could say, "Well, there's a bit of a risk, but it's not a clear risk, so we can sell." We would probably draw the line at Chairman Kim Jong Il in North Korea, President Mugabe and the Burmese military junta, but for everyone else, we could say, "Well, the risk isn't clear. Let's get on and sell."

That is why the second part—the remainder—of the Minister's statement is critical:

"or which might be used to facilitate internal repression."

I say very firmly to this Minister and to the House that the Committees on Arms Export Controls attach the utmost importance to that wording and to its retention by the British Government, so that we can be assured that British weapons and equipment will not be used for internal repression.[253]

190. However, it did not become unequivocally clear that the present Government's policy on arms exports and internal repression remained unchanged from that of the previous Government until the Foreign Secretary gave Oral evidence to the Committees on 7 February 2012. The key exchange was as follows:

Chair: Secretary of State, I want to start with what is a major policy issue, if not the major policy issue for our Committees, which is whether there has been a change in Government policy on the approval of arms export licences for arms and ammunition and military equipment that could be used for internal repression. We took a deliberate decision in our report of last April to publish in full, as Annex 1, the Written Answer that was given by the then Minister of State in the Foreign Office, Peter Hain, on 26 October 2000 in which he set out in full the consolidated criteria for arms exports.

  As far as arms exports that involve weapons that could be used for internal repression are concerned, your junior Minister, Alistair Burt, in his press release statement on 18 February last year, entirely accurately and correctly summarised the previous Government's position carried forward by the present Government on policy in this area. He summarised that accurately in these words: "The longstanding British position is clear. We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression." Foreign Secretary, has that policy changed, or is it as correctly stated by Mr Alistair Burt?

Mr Hague: That is still the policy. The "or", as you have pointed out on other occasions, is important.

Chair: It is profoundly important, Foreign Secretary, and I am glad that you have acknowledged that.[254]

191. The Committees conclude that the Foreign Secretary's statement to the Committees that there has been no change of policy on arms exports and internal repression by the present Government from that stated by the previous Government is welcome, the present Government's policy being: "The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression." The Committees recommend that the Government adheres strictly to its stated policy on arms exports and internal repression for all export licence applications.

The Government's Arab Spring arms export policy review

192. Shortly after the Arab Spring commenced, in Tunisia in December 2010, the Government announced it was conducting a review of arms exports from the UK. The first announcement of the review was made by the FCO Minister, Alistair Burt, in a Press Statement made on 18 February 2011, the full text of which was as follows:

Commenting on a review of arms export in light of recent events, Minister for the Middle East and North Africa Alistair Burt today said:

"We are deeply concerned about the situation in Bahrain and the events which have led to the deaths of several protestors.

Under the legislative regime set up in 2000, exports to Bahrain were governed by the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria, which are administered by the Department for BIS. There has been no change to the Criteria since the general election.

As a result of the changing situation in Bahrain, we have conducted an immediate and rapid review of UK export licences. With advice from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, the licensing authority has taken a decision to revoke 24 individual licences and 20 open licences for Bahrain.

A separate decision has also been taken to revoke eight individual licences for Libya. The review of export licences to the wider region, including Yemen, is ongoing.

This Government takes extremely seriously its export control responsibilities.  Britain has some of the most rigorous export controls in the World. All export licence applications are considered on a case-by-case basis against the Consolidated EU and UK export licensing criteria and in the light of prevailing circumstances, paying particular attention to allegations of human rights abuses.  

The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression.  

We have no evidence of British equipment being used in the unrest in Bahrain." [255]

193. The Committees on Arms Export Controls compiled a table, from the information on the BIS Department's and the FCO's websites, detailing selected arms export licences approved since January 2009 to countries in the Middle East and North Africa of arms or components of arms that could be used for internal repression. The countries in the table to whom such arms export licences had been approved were Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. The table was published on 5 April 2011 as Annex 4 to the Committees' First Report in the present Parliament (HC686).[256]

194. In their 5 April 2011 Report, the Committees made the following conclusions and recommendations in relation to the Government's arms export review:

We conclude that both the present Government and its predecessor misjudged the risk that arms approved for export to certain authoritarian countries in the Middle East and North Africa might be used for internal repression. We further conclude that the Government's decision to revoke a considerable number of arms export licences to Bahrain, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia is very welcome.

We recommend that, in its response to this Report:

• The Government states what specific and systematic consideration of arms exports is carried out within the National Security Strategy and at meetings of the National Security Council;
• The Government states the outcome of its review of arms exports to the wider Middle East region as announced by the FCO Minister, Mr Alistair Burt, on 18 February;
• The Government states what changes it will make to improve both its arms export control procedures and its judgements about the risk of arms exported from the UK being used for internal repression by authoritarian regimes.[257]

195. The Government's Response to the conclusions and recommendations in Cm 8079 published in July 2011 was as follows:

Countering the proliferation of conventional weapons is a major driver of conflict and instability and is an element of security support within the National Security Strategy. We are committed to effective implementation of export controls at national level, and will also assist other states to develop and implement the governance mechanisms needed to ensure tough controls on arms transfers, and we will continue to play a leading role in pressing internationally for a legally binding Arms Trade Treaty. There have been to date no specific or systematic consideration of arms exports at meetings of the National Security Council. [...]

The Foreign Secretary has commissioned a review of Government policy and practice with regard to the export of equipment that might be used for internal repression, in particular crowd control goods. Although this review was originally commissioned in response to events in the Middle East and North Africa, any conclusions will apply to our procedures for arms exports to all countries. The FCO is leading this internal review in close collaboration with the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) and the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The Government will be reporting back on the review to Parliament. This will take place once the Foreign Secretary has fully considered the findings of the review.[258]

196. In his letter to the Foreign Secretary of 18 July 2011,[259] the Chairman of the Committees put a further 4 questions to the Government on its arms exports review which the Foreign Secretary answered with his letter to the Chairman of 30 September 2011.[260] The 4 questions and answers were as follows:

Committees' question: Why is the FCO not in close consultation with DFID as well as with the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and the Ministry of Defence on its arms exports review?

Government's answer: The FCO works closely with DFID on arms export controls. DFID was fully consulted on the FCO Review of Export Controls Policy.

Committees' question: By what date does the Government expect to have reported back to Parliament on its arms exports review?

Government's answer: The Foreign Secretary provided an update on the review to Parliament on 18 July through a Written Ministerial Statement. He said that the review concluded that further work is needed on how we operate certain aspects of our export controls. The Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills (who has responsibility for our export licensing operations) are considering how this should be done. Once the process is complete the Foreign Secretary will update the House on proposals, but we are unable to confirm exactly when this might happen at present.

Committees' question: The Government has now chosen to give a particular focus in its arms exports review to "crowd control goods". What arms and categories of arms does the Government consider to be "crowd control goods"?

Government's answer: There is no comprehensive list of "crowd control goods" but some equipment carries a risk a being used for internal repression (rather than legitimate public order needs or external defence); this includes:

• CS grenades, tear gas canisters, crowd control ammunition
• Water cannons
• Anti-riot shields
• Body armour
• Shotguns, small arms, semi-automatic pistols, assault rifles, sniper rifles, submachine guns, and ammunition
• Armoured personnel carriers, armoured fighting vehicles

Committees' question: Why has the Government apparently restricted the scope of its review by giving it a particular focus on "crowd control goods" when no such restriction was made when the FCO Minister Alistair Burt first announced the review on February 18?

Government's answer: The announcement of the review and its focus was made during the Foreign Secretary's appearance before the FAC on 16 March 2011. The focus on "crowd control goods" was a result of incidents during the Arab Spring, as well as the issues raised by the Foreign Affairs Committee about equipment being sold to Gulf states for external defence, and concerns about those states that use that equipment against their domestic populations. For example, Mr Baron MP sought a Government commitment to say: "When it comes to specific arms that can be used against a domestic population, the Government will promise to undertake a full review to ensure that we don't make the mistakes of the past"? Mr Hague confirmed that "We will have a review. There is no doubt about that. The area to concentrate on is the one you are talking about. I will go that far to meet your request".[261]

197. The Committees conclude that the Government's repeated use of the phrase "crowd control goods" in the context of its arms export review is misleading given that "crowd control goods" are generally associated with non-lethal equipment. The Committees further conclude that the Government's use of the phrase "crowd control goods" to include "shotguns, small arms, semi-automatic pistols, assault rifles, sniper rifles, submachine guns, and ammunition, armoured personnel carriers, armoured fighting vehicles" is not one that would be acceptable to Parliament or to the wider public. The Committees recommend that the Government discontinues the use of the phrase "crowd control goods" in this context, which as well as being misleading is also profoundly disrespectful to the thousands of unarmed civilians in the Arab Spring countries who have courageously demonstrated for human rights and fundamental freedoms and have put their lives at risk in doing so.

198. The Foreign Secretary made a Written Ministerial Statement on 18 July 2011 following, what he said at the time, was the completion of the Government's arms export review. The complete Statement was as follows:

The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr William Hague): I told the Foreign Affairs Select Committee on 16 March 2011 that the Government would commission a thorough review of the UK's policy and practice with regard to the export of equipment that might be used for internal repression, in particular crowd control goods, in the light of events in the middle east and north Africa and concerns in Parliament and the public about UK policy.

This review has now been completed. It was conducted by Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials in close consultation with their colleagues across Whitehall, and it examined our policy on arms exports. Its purpose was to determine whether improvements could be made to reduce further the risk of misuse of UK-origin controlled military goods and to increase confidence that goods exported from the United Kingdom would not be used for internal repression. It looked specifically at events in the middle east and north Africa region.

The review concluded that there was no evidence of any misuse of controlled military goods exported from the United Kingdom. There were some reports of the use of UK-origin crowd control vehicles in Libya, but these reports remain uncorroborated.

Consultations with our overseas posts revealed no evidence that any of the offensive naval, air or land-based military platforms used by Governments in north Africa or the middle east against their own populations during the Arab spring, were supplied from the United Kingdom.

However, the review also concluded that further work is needed on how we operate certain aspects of the controls. The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills has responsibility for our export licensing operations. The Secretary of State and I will consider how this should be done, and once that process is complete I will update the House on our proposals.[262]

No reference was made in the Statement to the UK Government's arms export licence approvals since 1 January 2009 for lethal and non-lethal equipment that could be used for internal repression in countries in the Middle East and North Africa as set out in Annex 4 of the Committees' Report (HC686).[263]

199. On 13 October 2011, the Foreign Secretary made a further Written Ministerial Statement in which he said he was announcing the outcome of the Government's arms exports review. The full text of the Foreign Secretary's Statement was as follows:

The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr William Hague): I am today announcing the outcome of a review of UK defence and security export policy in the light of events in the middle east and north Africa.

On 16 March 2011, I told the Foreign Affairs Committee that the Government would review policy and practice with regard to the export of equipment that might be used for internal repression, in particular crowd control goods, in the light of events in the middle east and north Africa. Government colleagues with responsibilities in this area, in particular the Secretary of State for Business, Innovations and Skills who has responsibility for our export licensing systems and operations, have been consulted in the course of this review.

The review concluded that there are no fundamental flaws with the UK export licensing system. But the review identified areas where our system could be further strengthened to enable Ministers to respond rapidly and decisively to the outbreak of conflict, instability or unpredictable events in other countries. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is already a mandatory criterion for all export licence decisions. The changes announced today will increase our confidence that UK-origin goods will not be misused for internal repression, and that our controls are being applied in an orderly and systematic way, informed and influenced by our values and interests. This will complement the Government's efforts to build Britain's prosperity by increasing exports and helping UK companies succeed in international markets.

The Government propose to introduce a mechanism to allow immediate licensing suspension to countries experiencing a sharp deterioration in security or stability. Applications in the pipeline would be stopped and no further licences issued, pending ministerial or departmental review.

We also propose the introduction of a revised risk categorisation, based on objective indicators and reviewed regularly, that keeps pace with changing circumstances; enhances our assessment against all export control criteria, including human rights violations; and allows specifically for ministerial scrutiny of open licences to ensure that the benefits of open licensing can be maintained while keeping the associated risks to acceptable levels. This will increase oversight by Ministers, including of individual licence applications.

As a result of these changes the Foreign and Commonwealth Office will ensure that export licensing policy is more responsive to rapidly changing circumstances, particularly political instability; bring more structure and consistency to the gathering of export-related information, provide more information on the human rights situation in country, including through following new security and justice assistance guidance and undertake end-use monitoring of controlled military goods, bearing in mind both the practical and resource limitations.

The Government will continue to work to improve public information on defence and security exports, including enhanced transparency of routine export licensing decisions and how we respond during a crisis. We welcome the scrutiny of the Committees on Arms Export Controls and will continue to assist in their important work.

The Government have also considered how we can strengthen our decision making when we provide security and justice assistance overseas. We must provide assistance to international partners to tackle threats such as terrorism, serious organised crime and conflict prevention. In doing so, we will ensure that this assistance supports our values, is consistent with our domestic and international human rights obligations, and seeks to promote human rights and democracy. To this end, guidance will be issued for all HMG officials on assessing the human rights implications of our overseas security and justice assistance. We will make this guidance public later this year.

We are committed to robust and effective national and global controls to help prevent exports that could undermine our own security or core values of human rights and democracy; to protect our security through strategic defence relationships; and to promote our prosperity by allowing British defence and security industries to operate effectively in the global defence market.

The Government are determined to learn the wider lessons of events in the middle east and north Africa. I believe that this package of improvements is the proper response to the lessons of this year. This does not preclude additional measures or further strengthening of the system.[264]

200. The main outcome of the review was the Government's proposal to introduce a new mechanism to allow the immediate suspension of arms export licences that had already been approved if "a sharp deterioration in security or stability" took place in a given country. However, little or no consideration appears to have been given in the Government's review as to whether the initial judgements to approve export licences to repressive regimes in the Middle East and North Africa for arms and equipment that might be used to facilitate internal repression were correct or not in the first place. The Chairman of the Committees, Sir John Stanley, highlighted this in the Westminster Hall debate on the Committees' 2011 Report when he said:

The Foreign Secretary stated:

"The review concluded that there are no fundamental flaws with the UK export licensing system."

It may—or may not—be true that there are no flaws in the system, but I am not persuaded that the Government are addressing the key point about flawed judgments within the system. The inescapable fact is that judgments have been shown to be wildly over-optimistic and rose-tinted regarding the sale to authoritarian regimes of weapons that could be used for internal repression.

The Foreign Secretary continued:

"The Government propose to introduce a mechanism to allow immediate licensing suspension to countries experiencing a sharp deterioration in security or stability,"

but that does not address the central problem, because suspension becomes relevant only after export licensed goods have moved out of the UK. Suspension means that a licence has already been granted and that the goods have left the UK and are out of the door—the bullets have bolted and are in the hands of an authoritarian regime. Although a better system of suspension would provide a good safety net, it does not deal with the central issue of making a correct initial judgment about whether to grant an export licence.[265]

201. The limitations of a control policy relying on the suspension or revocation of existing arms export licences was acknowledged by the FCO Minister Alistair Burt in his Answer to a Written Question from the Chairman of CAEC, Sir John Stanley, when the Minister said: "While we can, under certain circumstances, revoke export licences, we cannot recall equipment once exported [...]"[266]

202. A further Ministerial Written Statement headed "Strategic Export Licensing" was made by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable, on 7 February 2012. In his Statement Vince Cable provided more details about the Government's new mechanism for suspending arms export licences and about its proposals to improve the transparency of the export licensing system, which are considered in paragraphs 85-91 above. The full text of the Secretary of State's Statement is at paragraph 86 above.

203. When in the Oral evidence session on 7 February 2012 the Committees questioned the Foreign Secretary about the outcome of the review he replied that there had been increased ministerial oversight, with a substantial increase in the number of applications overseen by Ministers — in 2009 there had been 24 applications overseen by Ministers and in 2011 there would be 153. The Foreign Secretary added that there had been new requirements for more end-use monitoring, export licensing, specific training for desk officers, new security and justice guidance and "more systematic use of many sources of information, including NGOs and other organisation to assess" human rights situation by Foreign Office posts.[267]

204. In his Written Ministerial Statement on 13 October 2011 the Foreign Secretary said that: "The Government will continue to work to improve public information on defence and security exports, including enhanced transparency of routine export licensing decisions and how we respond during a crisis."[268] However, the UK Working Group, commenting on the review process, stated that the "review itself has been anything but transparent." It said that despite a statement made by the Director for National Security, Directorate for Defence and Strategic Threats in the FCO, during evidence to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, that NGOs were consulted during the course of the first stage of the review, [269] "there has been no consultation to date with external stakeholders (be they from civil society, industry or parliament)."[270] Civil servants gave an informal briefing to NGOs on progress in the review after the first set of recommendations had been sent to Ministers, "but despite numerous requests, at no point were consultations held." [271] When the Committees asked the UKWG about the consultation Roy Isbister (Saferworld) told us that the NGOs' degree of involvement had been "minimal."[272] Martin Butcher (Oxfam) said that NGOs had been requesting consultation meetings for some time and that their requests were not met.[273] Later in the evidence session we asked EGAD about its involvement in the consultation process: Barry Salzman (EGAD) told us that it had no meetings with Government officials before the review was concluded. He continued: "We are now trying to catch up to set a date for a meeting where we can be briefed on the outcome of the policy and its implementation."[274] UKWG concluded that the process had been "deeply unsatisfactory" and asked that a much wider and deeper review of the transfer licensing policy and its implementation should take place.[275]

205. In his Oral evidence the Foreign Secretary said that it had been an internal review. When he asked his officials to expand Sarah MacIntosh, Director of Defence and International Security, FCO, said: "There was some consultation. The Head of the Counter-Proliferation Department met with NGOs on 14 November last year, and with industry on 15 November."[276] David Hall, Deputy Head, Counter-Proliferation Department, FCO, added:

Prior to that, there were informal consultations, giving information about how the review was going ahead. Prior to that, Jill Morris, the Head of the CPD at the time, met a number of NGOs. We meet a number of these NGOs on a regular basis on export control issues all the time. We are aware of and interested in their views on the system.[277]

206. The Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 21 November 2011 requesting a copy of the review.[278] The Foreign Secretary wrote back to the Chairman on 9 December stating that the review of arms exports had been an internal FCO review and would, therefore, not be published.[279]

207. The Committees conclude that the Government's review of its policies and practices on arms exports following the Arab Spring should not have been carried out merely as "an internal review" and should instead have been the subject of public consultation in accordance with the Government's stated policy of transparency on arms exports. The Committees further conclude that whilst the Government's introduction of a new licence suspension mechanism is welcome, this is not sufficient to ensure that arms exported from the UK are not used for internal repression overseas because in many, if not most, cases the arms will have left the UK before suspension occurs. The Committees recommend that the Government in its response to this Report sets out whether the "revised risk categorisation" proposed by the Foreign Secretary in his Written Ministerial Statement of 13 October 2011 will, or will not, be applied to arms export licence applications when initially made, and whether he will make public the "revised risk categorisation" and explain fully how it would be applied to arms export licence decisions.

208. The Committees conclude that whilst the Government's revocation of an unprecedented number of 158 arms export licences following the Arab Spring is welcome, the scale of the revocations is demonstrable evidence that the initial judgements to approve the applications were flawed. The Committees further conclude that there were no significant changes in the repressive regimes concerned between the British Government's approval of the arms export licences in question and the start of the Arab Spring in December 2010, and that the Arab Spring simply exposed the true nature of the repressive regimes which had been the case all along. The Committees recommend that the Government should apply significantly more cautious judgements when considering arms export licence applications for goods to authoritarian regimes "which might be used to facilitate internal repression" in contravention of British Government policy.

Arms export licence revocations

209. The Committee recommended in its 2011 Report (HC686) that: "The Government provides us with full details on arms export licences it has revoked since the beginning of January 2011 when the recent uprisings and demonstrations in the Middle East and North Africa started."[280] The information requested was provided in the Government's Response (Cm 8079) to the Committee's Report and is set out in full on pages 21-45 of that Response.[281] In the case of each and every one of the 158 arms export licence revocations listed, the reason given by the Government for the revocation was that the licence now contravened both Criteria 2 (internal repression) and Criteria 3 (provoking or prolonging armed conflict). The Government cited the end user countries to be Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar and Tunisia.

210. With his letter to the Foreign Secretary of 18 July 2011, the Chairman asked a further 6 questions about the Government's arms export licence revocations for countries in the Middle East and North Africa and about the arms export licences that remained extant.[282] The Foreign Secretary provided the answers with his letter of 30 September 2011.[283] The Committees' 6 questions and the Government's answers are as follows:

(N.B. The tables referred to in the Government answers below can be found in the tables attached to the Foreign Secretary's letter of 30 September 2011 (see Ev 75-141).)

Committees' question: Why does the Government consider that, notwithstanding the events this year, in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, that the arms and components of arms that could be used for internal repression and which have been approved for export to Saudi Arabia and Yemen, as detailed in Annex 4 of the Committees' Report, remain in line with the Criteria and have not therefore been revoked by the Government?

Government's answer: Events of the Arab Spring have underlined the importance of ensuring that exports of UK defence equipment are subject to careful scrutiny. The Government takes its export responsibilities very seriously, and operates one of the most rigorous arms export control regimes in the world. All export licence applications are considered against the Consolidated EU and UK Export Licensing Criteria on a case by case basis, and in the light of prevailing circumstances. We pay particular attention to allegations of human rights abuses in our assessment. Each assessment takes into account the intended end use of the equipment, the behaviour of the end user, the risk of diversion and the prevailing circumstances in the country concerned.

The Government reacted quickly to events of the Arab Spring, reviewing all licences to all countries affected, including Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen. The Government moved swiftly to revoke licences where evidence existed that licences were no longer in line with the Consolidated Criteria. As the decisions to revoke licences demonstrate, our export licensing policy and process allow us to respond quickly and robustly to changing facts on the ground. Furthermore, one licence covering sporting gun ammunition for Syria was in fact revoked following introduction of sanctions.

At review, each application was considered against the Consolidated Criteria on a case by case basis taking into account the circumstances in the country concerned, the end user, and the likelihood that the product could be used to support internal repression. Revocations are also dependent on the number and type of goods reviewed which vary from country to country reflecting the export applications received and approved. For some countries like Syria and Yemen a small number of applications are received, and pre-existing concerns led to there being very few extant licences to review.

The reviews identified that there were significant differences between how Arab Governments reacted to the call for reforms. For example, the Syrian army's brutal repression of Syrian protestors differed markedly from the actions of the Saudi Arabian National Guard troops. We have no evidence that Saudi forces who were deployed to Bahrain as part of the Peninsula Shield Force, at the request of the Bahraini Government, did anything other than protect key installations.

Where a review was prompted by the repressive actions of law enforcement officials policing demonstrations in a country, it was consistent with the Criteria that licences for end users who had no role in policing demonstrations and were unlikely to help police demonstrations in the future, should remain in place.

The reviews also recognised that some types of equipment may be associated with far greater risks than others. For example machine guns could be deployed for internal repression far more easily that components for naval equipment. The Criteria were applied consistently, but the different circumstances, including in relation to the issues referred to above, meant that different conclusions were reached as regards different countries and end users. This result is inevitable given the case by case analysis we conduct.

In line with our standard export licensing policy for all destinations the Government continues to monitor the situation across the Middle East, and will continue to take into account any changes in circumstances in its assessment of future export licence applications or further reviews of existing licences.

Committees' question: Since the Government announced its arms export licence review on 18 February 2011 into licences approving arms exports to countries in North Africa and the Middle East, how many (a) SIEL and (b) OGEL licences have been revoked in respect of each country; and what was the date of revocation in each case?

Government's answer: a) Bahrain 23, Libya 61, Syria 1

b) Bahrain 14, Bahrain & Egypt 4, Egypt 3, Libya 7

See Table 1 and 2 for details of revocation dates.

Committees' question: In respect of each of the licences revoked what was the item of military goods and quantity of them that had previously been granted an export licence?

Government's answer: See Table 1and 2 for details.

Committees' question: In respect of each of the licences revoked, what was the value of each order which has had its licence revoked?

Government's answer: See Table 1 and 2 for details.

Committees' question: In respect of each country for which licences have been revoked, how many (a) single and (b) open licences remain unrevoked; and what (i) quantities of which military goods and (ii) military services are covered by each of those licences? In each case, what was the value of these goods and services?

Government's answer:

a)  SIELs

a)  Bahrain:

• Total number of SIELs 51 (49 Permanent and 2 Temporary)
• Military SIELs 31 (None Temporary and 31 Permanent)

b)  Libya

• Total number of SIELs 18 (12 Permanent and 6 Temporary)
• Military SIELs 5 (5 Temporary and None Permanent)

c)  Syria

• Total number of SIELs 6 (6 Permanent and None Temporary)
• Military SIELs 0 (None Temporary and None Permanent)

b) OIELs

a.  Total OIELs Bahrain 52 (29 Military OIELs)

b.  Total OIELs Egypt 63 (31 Military OIELs)

c.  Total OIELs Libya 9 (4 Military OIELs)

d.  Total OIELs Syria 8 (No Military OIELs)

See Tables 3(a) and 3(b) for (i) and (ii) and (b) details of value of licences. Also, see Table 4 for details of OIELs

Committees' question: Having regard to the Government's information made public to date, why have no (a) individual and (b) open licences been revoked for exports to:

a)  Saudi Arabia

b)  Syria

c)  The Yemen

In respect of each of the above countries what quantities of which military goods and which military services remain approved for export to them, and what is the value of these goods and services?

Government's answer: Please refer to the answer to Annex 1 Paragraph 24 Q1 [See Ev 72 of this Report] for an explanation as to why licences to Saudi Arabia and Yemen have not been revoked. As referred to in the above answer, one licence for Syria has been revoked.

Please refer to Tables 3 (a) and 3(b) (i) and (ii) for details of existing licences and their value, and Tables 4(a) and (b) for details of OIELs.

211. The Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 19 October 2011[284] asking if the Government accepted that the scale and content of its revocation of extant arms export licences to countries in the Middle East and North Africa represented a serious failure by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Department for International Development, Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs and the UK Border Agency to fulfil their first Guiding Principle of the Export Licensing Community's Joint Mission Statement, namely: "We shall implement effectively the UK's framework of strategic export controls so as to ensure that sensitive goods and technology are kept out of the wrong hands [...]"[285] The Foreign Secretary replied on 7 January 2012 saying that the revocations showed how seriously the Government took the Guiding Principle. He continued: "Given the significant changes in the region, it would seem entirely right and reasonable that risk assessments should be updated and, in some cases, lead to a change in decision where the licence is no longer consistent with the Consolidated Criteria."[286]

212. The Committees have scrutinised closely the Government's continuing approval of export licences to countries in the Middle East and North Africa of arms and controlled goods that might be used to facilitate internal repression. An Annex setting out some of these licence approvals from 1 October 2010 to 31 December 2011 is at Annex 6, and updates Annex 4 of the Committees' last Report (HC686) published on 5 April 2011.

213. The Committees recommend that the Government continues to monitor all extant licences for arms exports to authoritarian regimes worldwide which might be used to facilitate internal repression in contravention of British Government policy and to make public promptly any further revocations that it makes.

Countries of concern

BAHRAIN

214. In its Response (Cm 8079) to the Committees' last Report (HC686) the Government said that two arms export licences to Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar had been revoked because increasing tension in Bahrain put them in contravention of Criteria 2 (internal repression) and Criteria 3 (provoking or prolonging armed conflict).

215. In his letter to the Foreign Secretary of 16 January 2012, the Chairman of the Committees put a further question to the Government about UK arms exports to Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar.[287] The question and the Foreign Secretary's answer with his letter of 6 February 2012 are reproduced in full as follows:

Committees' question: In table 1 [of Foreign Secretary's letter to the Chairman dated 30 September 2011] , details are provided of arms export licences to Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar. The CAEC asked for details of all extant arms export licences in respect of each country for which licences have been revoked. No details of extant arms export licences to Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar appear in any of Tables 3(a), 3(b), 4 or 4(b). Please could these details be provided for Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar in the same format as in Tables 3(a), 3(b), 4 and 4(b).

Government's answer: The two licences which were revoked for Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar included Bahrain as a destination and were revoked for this reason only. As there have been no reports of civil unrest in Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar and we judged that licences for these countries would still be consistent with the Criteria, licences have not been revoked for these countries unless they are linked with another destination for which licences are being revoked.[288]

216. Bahrain is not listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's latest Human Rights report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, published 30 April 2012.[289]

217. Following the Arab Spring Bahrain has witnessed essentially peaceful demonstrations which have been responded to by often violent internal repression with deaths, imprisonments and torture. Trials in special security courts have taken place which, according to International Crisis Group, lacked even the semblance of due process of law, including of medical professionals who treated casualties of the protests. International Crisis Group reported that: "More significant for the long term perhaps, the violence further polarised a society already divided along sectarian lines and left hopes for political reform in tatters, raising serious questions about the island's stability."[290]

218. In its Response (Cm 8079) to the Committees' last Report (HC686) the Government said that 41 arms export licences to Bahrain had been revoked because increasing tension in Bahrain put them in contravention of Criteria 2 (internal repression) and Criteria 3 (provoking or prolonging armed conflict).[291]

219. In his letter to the Foreign Secretary of 16 January 2012, the Chairman of the Committees put 4 further questions to the Government about UK arms exports to Bahrain.[292] The 4 questions and the Foreign Secretary's 4 answers with his letter of 6 February 2012[293] are reproduced in full as follows (The Tables referred to in the Government's responses can be found in the evidence to this Report at Ev 75-141):

Committees' question: Why are there arms export licences still extant for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography (Tables 3(a) and 3(b)) when licences for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography have been revoked (Tables 1 and 2)?

Government's answer: Table 3(a) and 3(b) identifies extant SIELs for Bahrain. There are still 11 extant licences for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography. Seven of these licences were granted for civil end use for telecommunications systems, internet/network connectivity and data connectivity. The remaining four licences are for Government end use to be used as a telecommunications system between two buildings and for internet connectivity. Following the review of licences for Bahrain in 2011 we judged that these licences remained consistent with the Criteria following a consideration of the goods, end user and purpose of export.

Committees' question: Why are there export licences still extant for small arms ammunition (Tables 3(a) and 3(b)) when licences for small arms ammunition have been revoked (Tables 1 and 2)?

Government's answer: Table 3(a) and 3(b) identifies extant SIELs for Bahrain. There are five extant licences for small arms ammunitions. These licences are for sporting shooting and vermin control. Following the review of licences for Bahrain in 2011 we judged that these licences remained consistent with the Criteria following a consideration of the goods, end user and purpose of the export.

Committees' question: Why are there arms export licences for body armour (Tables 3(a) and 3(b)) when licences for body armour have been revoked (Table 2)?

Government's answer: Table 3(a) and 3(b) identifies extant SIELs for Bahrain. There is one extant licence for a small quantity of body armour for personal protection use only. Following the review of licences for Bahrain in 2011 we judged that this licence remained consistent with the Criteria following a consideration of the goods, end user and purpose of the export.

Committees' question: Is the Government still satisfied that none of the extant arms export licences to Bahrain listed in Table 3(a), 3(b), 4 and 4(b) with values for SIELS "now contravenes Criteria 2 and 3" this being the Government's "Reason for Revocation" for every revoked arms export licence listed in Annex 1 of the Government's Response (Cm 8079) to the CAEC's last Report (HC 686)?

Government's answer: We are satisfied that none of the extant arms export licences listed in Tables 3(a), 3(b), 4 and 4(b) contravene Criteria 2 and 3. We continue to monitor the situation in Bahrain. In line with normal practice, export licences for Bahrain are kept under constant review and every licence is scrutinised in light of changing facts on the ground.

220. In the Committees' Oral evidence with Ministers on 7 February 2012, the Foreign Secretary was asked for further clarification of the Government's arms export policy towards Bahrain.[294] The Foreign Secretary's reply in his letter of 28 February 2012 and attachment headed "Export licences for Bahrain in 2011" were as follows:

At the CAEC Evidence Session on 7 February I undertook to write with further information about the type of equipment which is being exported to Yemen and Bahrain.

I enclose lists of all the types of licences which have been approved and refused for both countries in 2011. All applications are assessed carefully against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. As you will see from the lists we will only export equipment if we are satisfied that it will not be used for internal repression, taking into account the equipment and specified end user.

I have included information for the whole of 2011 in order to ensure that the Committees have as full a picture as possible and in view of your request to receive this information quickly.

Annex: Export licences for Bahrain in 2011

Three SIELs for Bahrain were refused in 2011 for:

• Communications equipment;
• Components for armoured personnel carriers'
• Anti-riot/ballistic shields

These applications were refused due to concerns that the goods could be used for internal repression (Criterion 2 of the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export L:icensing Criteria).

Equipment licensed for export to Bahrain in 2011:

SIELs approved in 2011

Dual Use items

• corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment for civil end use;
• communications equipment for civil end use;
• communications equipment for Government end use (to be used as a telecommunications system between two buildings and for internet connectivity);
• inertial equipment for mapping civil end use;
• NBC detection equipment for chemical agent detection for the Government;
• air traffic control software for civilian aviation authorities;
• toxin test kit for the detection of toxins in food samples for civil end use;
• x-ray accelerators for border control screening purposes.

Military rated Goods

• military aircraft ground equipment, aircrew breathing equipment, military training aircraft, military engines and components for Hawk aircraft for use by the Government;
• body armour for personal use by a named individual;
• small quantities of small arms ammunition, guns, rifles and silencers for sporting shooting and vermin control;
• military radars for Government end use;
• artillery and equipment for naval or coastal use by the Government;
• non-lethal training hand grenades for Government end use. They are designed as an aid to basic military training to produce a realistic loud report and a bright flash. They are not designed for use in crowd control.

OIELs approved in 2011

Dual Use Items

• inertial equipment for mapping for use on civil aircraft;
• hydrophone arrays for the oil and gas industry;
• corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment for civil end use;
• radioactive sources for civil end use.

Military Rated Goods

• tyres and inner tubes for combat aircraft, combat helicopters, military surveillance aircraft, military training aircraft, military transport aircraft, military utility aircraft, military utility helicopters and tanker aircraft for Government end use;
• engines for installation onto trainer and combat aircraft for Government end use;
• military improvised explosive device disposal equipment and military utility vehicles for defusing devices for Government end use;
• electronic warfare equipment for naval intelligence gathering, threat warning and naval surveillance for Government end use;
• aircraft cannon to be used on aircraft for Government end use;
• small arms ammunition for sporting shooting;
• components for all wheel drive vehicles for the repair and replacement of parts for Government end use;
• general naval vessel components for Government end use;
• communications equipment for temporary export to support sales.

No OIELs for Bahrain were rejected in 2011.

Since January 2011, 23 single licences and 18 open licences for Bahrain have been revoked.[295]

221. In a subsequent Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Committees' Chairman, Sir John Stanley, asked which UK strategic export control licences to Bahrain are currently extant, and what the nature and quantity of the licensed goods or services are under each licence. The Business Minister, Mark Prisk, replied on 27 March 2012:

A list of the strategic export control licences that remain extant for Bahrain will be placed in the Libraries of the House.[296]

The following strategic export control licences remain extant for Bahrain:

Application Type	Annual Report Summary	Goods Value (£)
SIEL	assault rifles (1), components for assault rifles	3,620
SIEL	components for military training aircraft	6,585
SIEL	components for military training aircraft	630
SIEL	equipment for the use of NBC detection equipment	12,198
SIEL	sporting guns (1)	4,600
SIEL	high performance air traffic control software	100
SIEL	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	1,154,800
SIEL	components for pistols, components for sporting guns, gun silencers, pistols (1), small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (1), sporting guns (1)	21,204
SIEL	military aircraft ground equipment	4,421
SIEL	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	282,712
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography	2,870,000
SIEL	components for military aircrew breathing equipment	19,778
SIEL	components for military radars	1,034
SIEL	artillery, components for artillery, components for naval guns, equipment for the use of artillery, equipment for the use of naval guns, naval guns, technology for artillery, technology for naval guns	1,248,000
SIEL	components for military training aircraft	86,281
SIEL	inertial equipment	115,000
SIEL	inertial equipment	15,500
SIEL	components for military training aircraft	4,845
SIEL	components for military aircrew breathing equipment	5,984
SIEL	components for military aero-engines	40,429
SIEL	small arms ammunition	3,638
SIEL	technology for equipment employing cryptography	5,547
SIEL	X-ray accelerators	1,161,185
SIEL	body armour, civil body armour, components for body armour, direct view imaging equipment	21,000
SIEL	technology for equipment employing cryptography	1,068
SIEL	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2,357,700
SIEL	training hand grenades	72,300
SIEL	components for military training aircraft	627
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	233,080
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	6,108
SIEL	components for military aircrew breathing equipment	759
SIEL	components for combat aircraft	253
SIEL	small arms ammunition	76,320
SIEL	gun silencers, sporting guns (2), sporting guns (3)	19,900
SIEL	components for military aircrew breathing equipment	4,443
SIEL	components for military training aircraft	692
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	101,108
SIEL	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2,390
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography	361,500
SIEL	components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, equipment for the use of launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions	1,232,387
SIEL	components for combat aircraft	15,840
SIEL	components for military training aircraft	5,123
SIEL	components for chemical agent detection equipment, technology for the use of chemical agent detection equipment	20,339
SIEL	components for military training aircraft	1,510
SIEL	components for combat aircraft	6,724
SIEL	components for military training aircraft	404
SIEL	components for military training aircraft	552
SIEL	general military aircraft components	1,937
SIEL	equipment for the use of aircraft cannons	1,875
SIEL	shotguns (2), small arms ammunition	1,840
SIEL	software for the use of military aero-engines	100
SIEL	components for military training aircraft	426
SIEL	components for military training aircraft	6,390

Application Type	Annual Report Summary
OIEL	aerial target equipment, airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, components for equipment for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the use of military training aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for test equipment for aerial target equipment, components for test equipment for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for training airborne electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, equipment for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, military training aircraft, technology for the use of aerial target equipment, technology for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, technology for the use of military training aircraft, technology for the use of training airborne electronic warfare equipment, test equipment for aerial target equipment, test equipment for airborne electronic warfare equipment, training airborne electronic warfare equipment
OIEL	software for the use of test equipment for inertial equipment, test equipment for inertial equipment
OIEL	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
OIEL	aircraft cannons, components for aircraft cannons
OIEL	components for improvised explosive device disposal equipment, improvised explosive device disposal equipment
OIEL	cryptographic software, technology for the use of cryptographic software
OIEL	aerial target equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for missile scoring equipment, decoy flares, missile scoring equipment, software for the use of aerial target equipment, technology for the use of aerial target equipment
OIEL	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment
OIEL	components for military devices for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, military devices for initiating explosives, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives
OIEL	inertial equipment
OIEL	components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
OIEL	components for military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military flying helmets, technology for the use of military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, technology for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of military electronic equipment, technology for the use of military flying helmets
OIEL	software for military communications equipment, technology for the use of software for military communications equipment
OIEL	cryptographic software
OIEL	fibrous/filamentary materials
OIEL	components for military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military flying helmets, technology for the use of military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, technology for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of military electronic equipment, technology for the use of military flying helmets
OIEL	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment
OIEL	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays
OIEL	aerial target equipment, airborne electronic warfare equipment, aircraft radars, components for aerial target equipment, components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for aircraft radars, components for military aircraft navigation equipment, components for military training aircraft, components for military video recording equipment, components for training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, components for weapons simulators, equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, equipment for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of aircraft radars, equipment for the use of military aircraft navigation equipment, equipment for the use of military video recording equipment, equipment for the use of training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, equipment for the use of weapons simulators, military aircraft navigation equipment, military training aircraft, military video recording equipment, technology for the use of aerial target equipment, technology for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, technology for the use of aircraft radars, technology for the use of military aircraft navigation equipment, technology for the use of military training aircraft, technology for the use of military video recording equipment, technology for the use of training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, technology for the use of weapons simulators, test equipment for aerial target equipment, test equipment for airborne electronic warfare equipment, test equipment for aircraft radars, test equipment for military aircraft navigation equipment, test equipment for military video recording equipment, test equipment for training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, test equipment for weapons simulators, training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, weapons simulators
OIEL	aerial target equipment, airborne electronic warfare equipment, aircraft radars, components for aerial target equipment, components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for aircraft radars, components for military aircraft navigation equipment, components for military training aircraft, components for military video recording equipment, components for training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, components for weapons simulators, equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, equipment for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of aircraft radars, equipment for the use of military aircraft navigation equipment, equipment for the use of military video recording equipment, equipment for the use of training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, equipment for the use of weapons simulators, military aircraft navigation equipment, military training aircraft, military video recording equipment, technology for the use of aerial target equipment, technology for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, technology for the use of aircraft radars, technology for the use of military aircraft navigation equipment, technology for the use of military training aircraft, technology for the use of military video recording equipment, technology for the use of training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, technology for the use of weapons simulators, test equipment for aerial target equipment, test equipment for airborne electronic warfare equipment, test equipment for aircraft radars, test equipment for military aircraft navigation equipment, test equipment for military video recording equipment, test equipment for training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, test equipment for weapons simulators, training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, weapons simulators
OIEL	accessories for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for military devices for initiating explosives, components for military firing sets, components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, military devices for initiating explosives, military firing sets, military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives
OIEL	ballistic shields, body armour, bomb suits, civil body armour, components for body armour, constructions for ballistic protection of military systems, military helmets
OIEL	hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays
OIEL	components for gun laying equipment, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights, equipment for the use of weapon sights, gun laying equipment, military image intensifier equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of weapon sights, technology for the use of gun laying equipment, technology for the use of military image intensifier equipment, technology for the use of weapon night sights, technology for the use of weapon sight mounts, technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights
OIEL	accessories for airborne targeting equipment, accessories for bombing computers, accessories for film processing equipment, accessories for imaging counter-countermeasures equipment, accessories for imaging countermeasure/counter-countermeasures equipment, accessories for imaging countermeasures equipment, accessories for military cameras, accessories for military image intensifier equipment, accessories for military imaging radar equipment, accessories for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, accessories for military photographic equipment, accessories for military video processing equipment, accessories for military video recording equipment, accessories for night vision goggles, accessories for optical target acquisition equipment, accessories for optical target designator equipment, accessories for optical target surveillance equipment, accessories for optical target tracking equipment, accessories for sensor data recorders, accessories for sensor integration equipment, accessories for simulators for military training aircraft, accessories for training equipment for military training aircraft, accessories for weapon control systems, airborne electronic warfare equipment, airborne refuelling equipment, airborne targeting equipment, aircraft radars, aircrew protective masks, anti-g/pressure suits, automatic piloting systems for parachuted loads, bomb handling equipment, bombing computers, chaff equipment, components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for airborne refuelling equipment, components for airborne targeting equipment, components for aircraft radars, components for aircrew protective masks, components for anti-g/pressure suits, components for automatic piloting systems for parachuted loads, components for bombing computers, components for ejector seats, components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for equipment for the use of military aero-engines, components for equipment for the use of military training aircraft, components for film processing equipment, components for helmet mounted display equipment, components for imaging counter-countermeasures equipment, components for imaging countermeasure/counter-countermeasures equipment, components for imaging countermeasures equipment, components for liquid oxygen converters, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft navigation equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, components for military cameras, components for military containers, components for military flying helmets, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for military imaging radar equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military parachutes, components for military parachutist equipment, components for military photographic equipment, components for military training aircraft, components for military video processing equipment, components for military video recording equipment, components for night vision goggles, components for optical target acquisition equipment, components for optical target designator equipment, components for optical target surveillance equipment, components for optical target tracking equipment, components for sensor data recorders, components for sensor integration equipment, components for simulators for military training aircraft, components for training equipment for military training aircraft, components for weapon control systems, control equipment for air-to-air missiles, control equipment for bombs, control equipment for decoy flares, control equipment for fragmentation rockets, control equipment for practice bombs, ejector seats, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, film processing equipment, handling equipment for air-to-air missiles, handling equipment for bombs, handling equipment for decoy flares, handling equipment for fragmentation rockets, handling equipment for practice bombs, helmet mounted display equipment, imaging counter-countermeasures equipment, imaging countermeasure/counter-countermeasures equipment, imaging countermeasures equipment, launching equipment for air-to-air missiles, launching equipment for bombs, launching equipment for decoy flares, launching equipment for fragmentation rockets, launching equipment for practice bombs, liquid oxygen converters, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft navigation equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, military cameras, military containers, military flying helmets, military image intensifier equipment, military imaging radar equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military parachutes, military parachutist equipment, military parametric technical databases, military photographic equipment, military video processing equipment, military video recording equipment, night vision goggles, optical target acquisition equipment, optical target designator equipment, optical target surveillance equipment, optical target tracking equipment, sensor data recorders, sensor integration equipment, simulators for military training aircraft, software enabling equipment to function as military training aircraft, software for military training aircraft, software for the evaluation of weapon systems, software for the modelling of military operation scenarios, software for the modelling of weapon systems, software for the simulation of military operation scenarios, software for the simulation of weapon systems, software for the use of military training aircraft, technology for the use of military training aircraft, test equipment for military training aircraft, test models for the development of military training aircraft, training equipment for military training aircraft, weapon control systems
OIEL	goods specified by Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Export Control Order 2008 excluding: [1] Goods specified by PL5001; [2] Landmines specified by ML4 and all goods related to landmines; [3] Man Portable Air Defence Systems MANPADS and test equipment/production equipment/software/technology therefor [4] RDX or HMX explosive material or explosive material containing RDX or HMX; [5] Chemicals specified in Schedule 1 of the Chemical Weapons Convention and specified by ML7a or ML7b and associated technology; [6] Complete rocket systems including Ballistic Missile Systems/Space Launch Vehicles/Sounding Rockets and Unmanned Airborne Vehicle systems including Cruise Missile Systems/Remote Piloted Vehicles/Target Drones/Reconnaissance Drones capable of at least a 300km range; [7] Complete subsystems designed or modified for the rocket systems specified in 6 above as follows: [i] individual rocket stages; [ii] re-entry vehicles and equipment designed or modified therefore and electronics equipment specially designed for re-entry vehicles; [iii] solid or liquid propellant rocket engines having a total impulse capacity of 1.1MNs; [iv] guidance sets capable of achieving system accuracy of 3.33% or less of the range; [v] thrust vectors control systems; [vi] weapon or warhead safing/arming/fusing/firing mechanisms; [8] Specially designed production facilities or production equipment for the goods specified in 6/7 above; [9] Software specially designed of modified for the use of goods specified in 6/7/8 above
OIEL	equipment employing cryptography
OIEL	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military surveillance aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for military transport aircraft, components for military utility aircraft, components for military utility helicopters, components for tanker aircraft
OIEL	inertial equipment
OIEL	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays
OIEL	technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon sights
OIEL	military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military utility vehicles
OIEL	components for electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of electronic warfare equipment, software for electronic warfare equipment, technology for electronic warfare equipment
OIEL	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment
OIEL	components for aircraft cannons, equipment for the use of aircraft cannons, software for aircraft cannons, technology for aircraft cannons
OIEL	components for small arms ammunition, small arms ammunition
OIEL	inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment
OIEL	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for military support vehicles, technology for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, technology for military support vehicles
OIEL	general naval vessel components
OIEL	command communications control and intelligence software, technology for command communications control and intelligence software
OIEL	components for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, software for military aero-engines, technology for military aero-engines
OIEL	equipment employing cryptography
OIEL	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment
OITCL	bomb suits, military helmets

Source: A list of the strategic export control licences that remain extant for Bahrain placed in the Libraries of the House in response to PQ from Sir John Stanley answered on 27 March 2012, see HC Deb 27 March 2012 col. 1136W

Values of items licensed for export have been provided for extant Standard Individual Export Licences. No values are given for extant Open Individual Export Licences because there is generally no limit to the quantities that may be exported under these licences and it is not possible for exporters to provide this information when they make a licence application.[297]

222. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it remains satisfied that none of the 97 extant UK arms export licences to Bahrain now contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression" including those licences for assault rifles, sniper rifles, body armour, gun silencers, shotguns, small arms ammunition, pistols, weapon sights and equipment employing cryptography.

EGYPT

223. Egypt is not listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's latest Human Rights report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, published 30 April 2012.[298]

224. In its Response (Cm 8079) to the Committees' last Report (HC686) the Government said that 47 arms export licences to Egypt had been revoked because increasing tension in Egypt put them in contravention of Criteria 2 (internal repression) and Criteria 3 (provoking or prolonging armed conflict).[299]

225. In his letter to the Foreign Secretary of 16 January 2012, the Chairman of the Committees put 2 further questions to the Government about UK arms exports to Egypt.[300] The 2 questions and the Foreign Secretary's 2 answers with his letter of 6 February 2012[301] are reproduced in full as follows (The Tables referred to in the Government's responses can be found in the evidence to this Report at Ev 75-141):

Committees' question: Why are there arms export licences still extant for military communications equipment (Tables 4 and 4(b)) when licences for military communications equipment have been revoked (Table 2)?

Government's answer: Extant licences for military communications equipment

Table A and 4 (b) identifies export licences (OIELs) that are still extant for military communications equipment (three in total). These permit i) temporary exports of software modules for use during exhibitions, demonstrations, consultancy and personal use by company employees ii) software for military equipment to authorised agents, value added resellers and area partners for marketing and support purposes in country iii) communications equipment and subassemblies for military use such as software for headsets. Following the review of licences for Egypt in February 2011 we judged that these licences remained consistent with the Criteria following a consideration of the goods, end user and purpose of export.

Revoked licences for military communications equipment

Table two identifies two applications for military communications equipment and software for military communications equipment. These two OIELs were revoked following the review of Egypt extant licences in February. We noted that the goods would offer capability for situational awareness, command and control. Furthermore the second OIEL contained goods for military helmets and components for an integrated helmet system. As the OIELs permitted export to government linked end users, which would in practice enable exports to the internal security forces and the police we judged that these applications were no longer consistent with the Criteria and the Government would request SIEL licences for exports of this nature.

Committees' question: Is the government still satisfied that none of the extant arms export licences to Egypt listed in Tables 3(a), 4 and 4(b) with values for SIELs contravene Criteria 2 and 3?

Government's answer: We are satisfied that none of the extant arms export licences listed in Tables 3(a), 4 and 4(b) contravene Criteria 2 and 3. We continue to monitor the situation in Egypt. In line with normal practice, export licences for Egypt are kept under constant review and every licence is scrutinised in light of changing facts on the ground.

226. In a Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Committees' Chairman, Sir John Stanley, asked which UK strategic export control licences to Egypt are currently extant, and what the nature and quantity of the licensed or services are under each licence. The Business Minister, Mark Prisk, replied on 27 March 2012:

A list of the strategic export control licences that remain extant for Egypt will be placed in the Libraries of the House.[302]

The following strategic export control licences remain extant for Egypt:

Application Type	Annual Report Summary	Goods Value (£)
SIEL	machine tools	100,000
SIEL	explosive ordnance disposal equipment, military firing sets	6,065
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography	1,725
SIEL	Toxins	8,547
SIEL	cryptographic software, software for the development of equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	2
SIEL	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	200
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography	57
SIEL	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	1,900
SIEL	towed hydrophone arrays	1,698,300
SIEL	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	6,896
SIEL	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,540
SIEL	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	120,500
SIEL	anti-g/pressure suits	90,300
SIEL	submersible equipment	5,639
SIEL	submersible equipment	21,540
SIEL	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	28,710
SIEL	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	10,038
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography	1,225
SIEL	inertial equipment	3,427
SIEL	body armour, military helmets	1,884
SIEL	components for military radars	77,100
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography	4,000
SIEL	machine tools	92,660
SIEL	inertial equipment	100,000
SIEL	chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes	304
SIEL	submersible equipment, submersible vehicles	991,666
SIEL	inertial equipment	1,286,075
SIEL	submersible equipment	4,308
SIEL	components for military helicopters	1,054
SIEL	components for military aero-engines	348,496
SIEL	submersible equipment	9,947
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	38,944
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography	558
SIEL	components for weapon control equipment	27,802
SIEL	components for targeting equipment, military electronic equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	108,650
SIEL	components for targeting equipment	10,063
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography	26,191
SIEL	components for military combat vehicles	367,560
SIEL	weapon night sights, weapon sights	41,800
SIEL	components for military radars	363,254
SIEL	cryptographic software	2,746
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography	11,700
SIEL	towed hydrophone arrays	2,891,566
SIEL	cryptographic software	840
SIEL	submersible equipment	9,947
SIEL	components for marine location systems, inertial equipment, submersible equipment, underwater electronic imaging systems	248,000
SIEL	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	24,030
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography	3,217
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography	1,894
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography	1,908
SIEL	pressure transducers	850
SIEL	numerical control software	7,500
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography	99,880
SIEL	machine tools	155,500
SIEL	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	200
SIEL	military aircrew protective equipment	83,980
SIEL	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	1,810
SIEL	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	6,097
SIEL	components for semi-automatic pistols, components for submachine guns, training small arms ammunition	8,591
SIEL	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	26,582
SIEL	components for military guidance/navigation equipment, software for military guidance/navigation equipment	50,507
SIEL	software for machine tools	7,500
SIEL	components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, equipment for the use of decoying/countermeasure equipment, software for decoying/countermeasure equipment	49,703
SIEL	components for military parachutes and equipment, military parachutes and equipment	112,748
SIEL	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	18,100
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	1,699
SIEL	inertial equipment	15,500
SIEL	toxic gas monitoring equipment	334
SIEL	submersible equipment	32,300
SIEL	submersible equipment	97,940
SIEL	submersible equipment	64,620
SIEL	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	63,522
SIEL	direct view imaging equipment	100,000
SITCL	promoting the supply of all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	135,000

Application Type	Annual Report Summary
OIEL	software for military communications equipment, technology for the use of software for military communications equipment
OIEL	software for the use of military communications equipment, software to simulate the function of military communications equipment, technology for the use of software to simulate the function of military communications equipment
OIEL	anti-friction bearings
OIEL	components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
OIEL	components for military devices for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, military devices for initiating explosives, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives
OIEL	airborne refuelling equipment, aircraft cannons, aircrew protective masks, anti-g/pressure suits, attack alerting/warning equipment, chaff equipment, components for airborne refuelling equipment, components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for fire control equipment, components for imaging countermeasures equipment, components for military aero-engines, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, fire control equipment, guided missile decoying equipment, imaging countermeasures equipment, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military containers, military electronic equipment, military flying helmets, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military parachutes, software for the use of combat aircraft, technology for the use of airborne refuelling equipment, technology for the use of aircraft cannons, technology for the use of aircrew protective masks, technology for the use of anti-g/pressure suits, technology for the use of attack alerting/warning equipment, technology for the use of chaff equipment, technology for the use of combat aircraft, technology for the use of ejector seats, technology for the use of equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, technology for the use of fire control equipment, technology for the use of guided missile decoying equipment, technology for the use of imaging countermeasures equipment, technology for the use of military aero-engines, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military aircraft pressure refuellers, technology for the use of military containers, technology for the use of military electronic equipment, technology for the use of military flying helmets, technology for the use of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for the use of military parachutes
OIEL	equipment employing cryptography
OIEL	aerial target equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for missile scoring equipment, decoy flares, missile scoring equipment, software for the use of aerial target equipment, technology for the use of aerial target equipment
OIEL	components for launching equipment for torpedoes, components for mine countermeasures equipment, components for mine sweeping equipment, components for naval mines, components for torpedoes, components for training equipment for mine sweeping equipment, equipment for the use of launching equipment for torpedoes, equipment for the use of mine countermeasures equipment, equipment for the use of mine sweeping equipment, equipment for the use of naval mines, equipment for the use of torpedoes, equipment for the use of training equipment for mine sweeping equipment, launching equipment for torpedoes, mine countermeasures equipment, mine sweeping equipment, software for the use of launching equipment for torpedoes, software for the use of mine countermeasures equipment, software for the use of mine sweeping equipment, software for the use of naval mines, software for the use of torpedoes, software for the use of training equipment for mine sweeping equipment, technology for the use of launching equipment for torpedoes, technology for the use of mine countermeasures equipment, technology for the use of mine sweeping equipment, technology for the use of naval mines, technology for the use of torpedoes, technology for the use of training equipment for mine sweeping equipment, test equipment for launching equipment for torpedoes, test equipment for mine countermeasures equipment, test equipment for mine sweeping equipment, test equipment for naval mines, test equipment for torpedoes, test equipment for training equipment for mine sweeping equipment, torpedoes, training equipment for mine sweeping equipment
OIEL	cryptographic software, technology for the use of cryptographic software
OIEL	NBC filters, chaff, chaff equipment, command communications control and intelligence equipment, components for chaff equipment, components for command communications control and intelligence equipment, components for corvettes, components for defensive systems against NBC agents, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for fast attack craft, components for frigates, components for heavy machine guns, components for military distress signalling equipment, components for military inflatable craft, components for military navigation equipment, components for naval acoustic equipment, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval engines, components for naval gun mountings, components for naval radars, components for naval sonar equipment, components for semi-automatic pistols, components for surface-to-air missiles, components for surface-to-surface missiles, control equipment for surface-to-air missiles, control equipment for surface-to-surface missiles, defensive systems against NBC agents, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of corvettes, equipment for the use of fast attack craft, equipment for the use of frigates, equipment for the use of naval radars, equipment for the use of surface-to-air missiles, general naval vessel components, handling equipment for surface-to-surface missiles, heavy machine guns, launching equipment for surface-to-air missiles, launching equipment for surface-to-surface missiles, military distress signalling equipment, military inflatable craft, military navigation equipment, naval acoustic equipment, naval communications equipment, naval electrical equipment, naval electronic equipment, naval engines, naval gun mountings, naval radars, naval sonar equipment, semi-automatic pistols, surface-to-air missiles, surface-to-surface missiles, test equipment for military communications equipment, test equipment for naval radars, test equipment for surface-to-air missiles
OIEL	components for improvised explosive device disposal equipment, improvised explosive device disposal equipment
OIEL	equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
OIEL	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
OIEL	components for guided missile decoying equipment, components for weapon control systems, decoy flares, equipment for the use of guided missile decoying equipment, equipment for the use of weapon control systems, software for the use of guided missile decoying equipment, software for the use of weapon control systems, technology for the use of guided missile decoying equipment, technology for the use of weapon control systems, test equipment for guided missile decoying equipment, test equipment for weapon control systems
OIEL	software for the use of test equipment for inertial equipment, test equipment for inertial equipment
OIEL	accessories for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for military devices for initiating explosives, components for military firing sets, components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, military devices for initiating explosives, military firing sets, military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives
OIEL	hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays
OIEL	components for submersible equipment, components for submersible vehicles, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, metal alloy cylindrical forms, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment
OIEL	equipment employing cryptography
OIEL	accessories for ground based radars, accessories for naval radars, components for ground based radars, components for naval radars, equipment for the use of ground based radars, equipment for the use of naval radars, software for ground based radars, software for naval radars, technology for ground based radars, technology for naval radars, test equipment for ground based radars, test equipment for naval radars
OIEL	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military surveillance aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for military transport aircraft, components for military utility aircraft, components for military utility helicopters, components for tanker aircraft
OIEL	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
OIEL	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
OIEL	inertial equipment
OIEL	components for military aero-engines
OIEL	cutters/severing tools, detonating cord, devices for initiating explosives, explosives, linear cutting explosive charges, linear shaped cutting charges, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets, shaped charges, underwater telecommunications systems
OIEL	inertial equipment
OIEL	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays
OIEL	fibrous/filamentary materials
OIEL	inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment
OIEL	equipment employing cryptography
OIEL	components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for equipment for the use of artillery, components for military electronic equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the use of artillery, general naval vessel components, military electronic equipment
OIEL	components for submersible vehicles, composite structures, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, imaging cameras, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment, syntactic foam, underwater electronic imaging systems
OIEL	general naval vessel components
OIEL	towed hydrophone arrays
OIEL	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for military electronic equipment, ejector seats, equipment for the use of ejector seats, equipment for the use of general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, technology for ejector seats, technology for general military aircraft components, test models for ejector seats, test models for general military aircraft components
OIEL	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military equipment for initiating explosives, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment
OIEL	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment
OITCL	components for demolition devices, demolition devices
OITCL	body armour, components for rifles, military communications equipment, military helmets, rifles, small arms ammunition, weapon night sights, weapon sights
OITCL	body armour, combat shotguns, military helmets, military image intensifier equipment, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles
OITCL	all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
OITCL	assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, military helmets, small arms ammunition, wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition
OITCL	assault rifles, body armour, machine guns, military helmets, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, sporting guns
OITCL	body armour, components for body armour, components for rifles, military helmets, rifles, small arms ammunition
OITCL	assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for body armour, military helmets, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, weapon cleaning equipment, weapon sights
OITCL	assault rifles, components for assault rifles, small arms ammunition, weapon cleaning equipment, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights
OITCL	assault rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, military helmets, pistols, small arms ammunition, weapon night sights, weapon sights
OITCL	promoting the supply of assault rifles, promoting the supply of clips for assault rifles, promoting the supply of clips for rifles, promoting the supply of clips for sniper rifles, promoting the supply of clips for sporting guns, promoting the supply of combat shotguns, promoting the supply of components for assault rifles, promoting the supply of components for rifles, promoting the supply of components for sniper rifles, promoting the supply of components for sporting guns, promoting the supply of rifles, promoting the supply of small arms ammunition, promoting the supply of sniper rifles, promoting the supply of sporting guns, promoting the supply of weapon night sights, promoting the supply of weapon sights

Source: A list of the strategic export control licences that remain extant for Bahrain placed in the Libraries of the House in response to PQ from Sir John Stanley answered on 27 March 2012, see HC Deb 27 March 2012 col. 1136W

Values of items licensed for export have been provided for extant Standard Individual Export Licences. No values are given for extant Open Individual Export Licences because there is generally no limit to the quantities that may be exported under these licences and it is not possible for exporters to provide this information when they make a licence application.[303]

227. On 26 April 2012 the FCO Minister Alistair Burt wrote to the Chairman of the CAEC, Sir John Stanley, as follows:

Egypt and Arms Export Licensing

The presidential elections in Egypt are due to take place next month. I thought it would be helpful to provide you with a view of the current political situation, together with information on how we are handling export licence applications to that country.

Current Political Situation

There continues to be frustration among the political class about the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces' (SCAF) handling of the transition. The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is increasing the pressure on the interim government and threatening to call for its replacement by one based on Parliamentary representation, through a vote of no-confidence. This reflects increasing public signs of tension between the MB and the SCAF.

The parliamentary elections marked an important step in Egypt's political transition. The MB's block, Democratic Alliance, secured about 47% of the sets in the Lower House and the Salafi alliance 24%. Secular/liberal groups have about 16%, former regime elements 3%, and other parties and independents the rest. Elections for the Upper House passed peacefully, and delivered another commanding Islamist performance: the MB secured 58% of the seats, and the Salafis 25%.

Voting for the Presidential elections is scheduled for 23/24 May, final results on 21 June and handover to civilian rule by 1 July. The Supreme Presidential Election Committee (SPEC) announced on 14 April 12 that ten of the 23 Presidential candidates had been disqualified, including the Muslim Brotherhood candidate Khairat el Shater, and former Head of the Ghad party Ayman Nour. We understand that the SPEC has now upheld rulings disqualifying all ten candidates.

On 24 March, both Houses of the Egyptian Parliament elected the Constitutional Assembly (CA) in charge of drafting Egypt's new Constitution. Many of the liberal and secular parties walked out in protest at what they regarded as Islamist domination of the process and the nominees. On 10 April, an Egyptian court suspended the CA - as a result of a lawsuit filed by activists and liberals. It now seems unlikely that the drafting of the new Constitution will be in place before the handover of power on 1 July. We believe it is important that the drafting of a new Constitution is completed through an inclusive process, and delivers a Constitution which represents the interests of all the Egyptian people.

There are a number of areas where we have concerns about human rights in Egypt. These include limits imposed by the authorities on freedom of expression; the use of unacceptable violence against peaceful protesters; an increase in the number of prosecutions of bloggers and activists for criticising the authorities; increasing use of military trials for civilians; virginity tests on women and allegations of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment at the hands of the security services.

In May 2010 amendments had been introduced to limit the application of the Emergency Law to terrorism and drug crimes. However, on 11 September 2011, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) reinstated the full powers of the Emergency Law, as a response to growing concerns about the security situation, including the storming of the Israeli Embassy in Cairo.

Freedom of association has been progressively restricted over the past year, with some civil society groups, particularly those working on human rights and transparency, facing Government obstruction and harassment. This culminated in raids on 29 December against local and international NGOs accused of taking foreign funding illegally while not being properly registered. Employees of these NGOs were summoned to stand trial and placed under a travel ban. On 1 March, after intense negotiations and US lobbying, the Egyptians lifted the travel ban on some NGO staff, allowing US nationals to leave Egypt. However, broader NGO issues (registration requirements, harassment of Egyptian NGO staff) and wider concerns about commitment of the SCAF and Egyptian government to democracy remain.

We continue to raise these and other concerns with the Egyptian authorities.

Export Licences for Egypt

You will already be aware that, as events unfolded in Egypt in February 2011, the Government urgently reviewed all existing export licence applications and those already issued. We started a revocation process within 3 days of the events unfolding. We revoked 36 individual licences and removed Egypt as a destination from eight open licences, with immediate effect. The goods included components for aircraft, components for armoured personnel carriers and secure communications equipment.

Subsequently we have taken steps to ensure that export licence applications for Egypt are scrutinised very carefully. Applications are assessed on a case-by-case basis, taking account of the current political situation and other events on the ground, factoring in the latest information and analysis from our Embassy in Cairo. We pay particular attention to and make a full assessment of the risk that goods might be used in internal repression (Criterion 2) and/or used to aggravate existing tensions in the country (Criterion 3).

Given the use of excessive force against demonstrators in Egypt, all applications for police and military end-users are scrutinised particularly carefully. Ministers have been and continue to be consulted on all applications for equipment where there is a potential risk that the goods could be used for internal repression. Taking into account the end user and the nature of the equipment, applications will only be approved where we are satisfied that there is not a clear risk that the goods might be used in contravention of Criteria 2 and 3.

We are aware of the reports that UK-manufactured tear gas has been used in Egypt. No licences for the export of tear gas to Egypt have been granted since 1999. Since that time UK export controls have been radically overhauled including through the passing of the Export Control Act 2002 and the adoption of the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria.[304]

228. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it remains satisfied that none of the 124 extant UK arms export licences to Egypt now contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression" including those licences for body armour, weapon night sights, weapon sights, components for semi-automatic pistols, semi-automatic pistols, components for submachine guns, components for rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition, combat shotguns, assault rifles, sniper rifles, pistols and cryptography .

LIBYA

229. Libya is listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's latest Human Rights report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, published 30 April 2012.[305]

230. In its Response (Cm 8079) to the Committees' last Report (HC686) the Government said that 72 arms export licences to Libya had been revoked because increasing tension in Libya put them in contravention of Criteria 2 (internal repression) and Criteria 3 (provoking or prolonging armed conflict).[306]

231. In his letter to the Foreign Secretary of 16 January 2012, the Chairman of the Committees put a further question to the Government about UK arms exports to Libya.[307] The question and the Foreign Secretary's answer with his letter of 6 February 2012[308] are reproduced in full as follows (The Tables referred to in the Government's responses can be found in the evidence to this Report at Ev 75-141):

Committees' question: Is the Government still satisfied that none of the extant licences for Libya listed in Tables 3(a), 3(b), 4 and 4(b) with values for SIELs contravene Criteria 2 and 3?

Government's answer: We are satisfied that none of the extant arms export licences listed in Tables 3(a), 3(b), 4 and 4(b) contravene Criteria 2 and 3. We continue to monitor the situation in Libya. In line with normal practice, export licences for Libya are kept under constant review and every licence is scrutinised in light of changing facts on the ground.

232. In a Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Committees' Chairman, Sir John Stanley, asked which UK strategic export control licences to Libya are currently extant, and what the nature and quantity of the licensed or services are under each licence. The Business Minister, Mark Prisk, replied on 27 March 2012:

The following strategic export control licences remain extant for Libya:

Application type	Annual report summary	Goods value (£)
SIEL	neutron generators	272,023
SIEL	inertial equipment	32,579
SIEL	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	77,093,000
SIEL	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	77,093,000
SIEL	cryptographic software	43,354
SIEL	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	2,032,500
SIEL	cryptographic software	210
SIEL	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	3,122
SIEL	devices for initiating explosives, linear cutting explosive charges	102,725
SIEL	components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military equipment for initiating explosives, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	137,152
SIEL	bomb suits, components for bomb suits, military helmets	94,490
SIEL	components for military equipment for initiating explosives	2,500
SIEL	components for military equipment for initiating explosives, military equipment for initiating explosives	16,950
SIEL	Libyan bank notes and coins	1,088,560
SIEL	Libyan bank notes and coins	31,000,000
SITCL	all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	163,500
SITCL	all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	145,000
SITCL	all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	233,170

Application type	Annual report summary
OIEL	cryptographic software, technology for the use of cryptographic software
OIEL	components for improvised explosive device disposal equipment, improvised explosive device disposal equipment
OIEL	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
OIEL	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays
OIEL	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
OITCL	all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection

Source: HC Deb 27 March 2012 col. 1136-37W

Values of items licensed for export have been provided for extant Standard Individual Export Licences. No values are given for extant Open Individual Export Licences because there no [sic] generally no limit to the quantities that may be exported under these licences and it is not possible for exporters to provide this information when they make a licence application.[309]

233. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it remains satisfied that none of the 24 extant UK arms export licences to Libya now contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression" including those licences for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection and cryptography .

SAUDI ARABIA

234. Saudi Arabia is listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's latest Human Rights report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, published 30 April 2012.[310]

235. In Annex 4 to its last Report (HC686) published on 5 April 2011, the Committees listed selected UK arms export licence approvals to countries in the Middle East and North Africa of arms or components of arms that could be used for internal repression. Those listed as approved for Saudi Arabia in 2009 were: components for combat aircraft, CS hand grenades, tear gas/irritant ammunition, tear gas/riot control agents, sniper rifles, small calibre artillery ammunition and small arms ammunition. Those listed and approved in 2010 up to 30 September of that year were: components for combat aircraft, sniper rifles, armoured personnel carriers, small arms ammunition and components for combat aircraft.[311]

236. Following the Government's Response (Cm 8079) to the Committees' last Report, the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 18 July 2011 asking why no individual or open licences had been revoked for exports to Saudi Arabia, and also asking which military goods and which military services remain approved for export to Saudi Arabia and the value of those goods and services.[312] The Committees question and the Foreign Secretary's reply with his letter to the Committees' Chairman of 30 September 2011[313] as to why no arms export licences to Saudi Arabia have been revoked are reproduced in paragraph 210 above.

Details of the extant licences to Saudi Arabia, including the values of extant Military SIELs, provided with the Foreign Secretary's reply to the Committees' Chairman of 30 September 2011, can be found in the evidence to this Report at Ev 99-121.

237. In the House of Commons debate on the Committees' last Report, which took place on 20 October 2011, the Chairman of the Committees highlighted the possible use for internal repression of some of the UK arms exports approved to Saudi Arabia, as detailed in the Tables set out in Ev 75-141. He said:

[...]I intend to offer hon. Members the details of just one little box among the multitude of boxes relating to extant export licences to Saudi Arabia. It refers to

"assault rifles, blank ammunition, components for assault rifles, components for general purpose machine guns, components for machine pistols, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for semi-automatic pistols, components for submachine guns, general purpose machine guns, machine pistols, pistols, rifles, semi-automatic pistols, submachine guns, training small arms ammunition".

That is just one little box among a multitude, and hon. Members will immediately see that each and every one of the items to which I have referred is usable for internal repression.[314]

238. In his letter to the Foreign Secretary of 16 January 2012, the Chairman of the Committees put a further question to the Government about UK arms exports to Saudi Arabia.[315] The question and the Foreign Secretary's answer with his letter of 6 February 2012 are reproduced in full as follows (The Tables referred to in the Government's responses can be found in the evidence to this Report Ev 75-141):

Committees' question: Is the Government still satisfied that none of the extant arms export licences to Saudi Arabia listed in Tables 3(a), 3(b), 4 and 4(b) with values for SIELs contravene Criteria 2 and 3?

Government's answer: We are clear that the identified SIELs do not contravene Criteria 2 and 3. We examined extant licences following the unrest in Saudi Arabia and we were satisfied that licences remained and continue to remain consistent with the Criteria. To date, there is no evidence that UK supplied equipment has been used in breach of the Criteria in Saudi Arabia, or in Bahrain where Saudi forces were deployed to protect installations as part of the Peninsula Shield force, at the legitimate request of the Bahraini Government, In line with normal practice, export licences for Saudi Arabia are kept under constant review and every licence is scrutinised in light of changing facts on the ground.[316]

239. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report whether it applies different or the same considerations in deciding whether or not to approve arms export licences to Saudi Arabia to those applied to other countries in the region and, if different, what those considerations are. The Committees further recommend that the Government in its Response states whether it remains satisfied that none of the 288 extant UK arms export licences to Saudi Arabia now contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression" including those licences for:

Components for armoured fighting vehicles, components for armoured personnel carriers, armoured personnel carriers, ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for military combat vehicles, components for military communications equipment, components for water cannon, components for sniper rifles, components for weapon sights, weapon sights, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, technology for military communications equipment, technology for sniper rifles, technology for the use of sniper rifles, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for general purpose machine guns, components for machine pistols, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for semi-automatic pistols, components for submachine guns, general purpose machine guns, machine pistols, pistols, rifles, semi-automatic pistols, submachine guns, hand grenades, components for machine guns, components for military support vehicles, military combat vehicles.

SYRIA

240. Syria is listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's latest Human Rights report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, published 30 April 2012.[317]

241. In its Response (Cm 8079) to the Committees' last Report (HC686) the Government indicated that no arms export licences to Syria had been revoked.[318] However, the Foreign Secretary in Table 1, SIEL revocations since 18 February 2011, provided details of one licence to Syria for military cargo vehicles and components for military cargo vehicles that had been revoked.[319]

242. In his letter to the Foreign Secretary of 16 January 2012, the Chairman of the Committees put 2 further questions to the Government about UK arms exports to Syria.[320] The 2 questions and the Foreign Secretary's 2 answers with his letter of 6 February 2012[321] are reproduced in full as follows (The Tables referred to in the Government's responses can be found in the evidence to this Report at Ev 75-141):

Committees' question: Is the figure of only one arms export licence revocation to Syria stated in Annex B, paragraph 1, this being for military cargo vehicles and components for military cargo vehicles, correct given that a further licence revocation of small arms ammunition to Syria was detailed by the BIS Minister Mark Prisk in his Written Answer to Sir John Stanley on October 10 (Column 258W)?

Government's answer: There has been one licence revocation for Syria for small arms ammunition. The licence for military cargo vehicles and components for military cargo vehicles is in fact a licence that was revoked for Libya and not for Syria.

Committees' question: Is the Government still satisfied that none of the extant licences for Syria listed in Table 4 with values for SIELs, including the licences relating to equipment employing cryptography, contravene Criteria 2 and 3?

Government's answer: We are satisfied that none of the extant arms export licences listed in Table 4 contravene Criteria 2 and 3. We continue to monitor the situation in Syria. In line with normal practice, export licences for Syria are kept under constant review and every licence is scrutinised in light of changing facts on the ground.

243. In a Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Committees' Chairman, Sir John Stanley, asked which UK strategic export control licences to Syria are currently extant, and what the nature and quantity of the licensed or services are under each licence. The Business Minister, Mark Prisk, replied on 27 March 2012:

The following strategic export control licences remain extant for Syria:

Application type	Annual report summary	Goods value (£)
SITCL	Promoting the supply of all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	201,064
SITCL	All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	201,064
SIEL	Components for general industrial production equipment	137,737
SIEL	Chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes	10,000
SIEL	Chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes	10,200
SIEL	Personal protective equipment	13,454
SIEL	Equipment employing cryptography	199,209

Application type	Annual report summary
OITCL	All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
OIEL	Heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays

Source: HC Deb 27 March 2012 col. 1137W

Values of items licensed for export have been provided for extant Standard Individual Export Licences. No values are given for extant Open Individual Export Licences because there no [sic] generally no limit to the quantities that may be exported under these licences and it is not possible for exporters to provide this information when they make a licence application.[322]

244. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it remains satisfied that none of the 9 extant UK arms export licences to Syria now contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression" including those licences for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection and cryptography .

TUNISIA

245. Tunisia is not listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's latest Human Rights report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, published 30 April 2012.[323]

246. In its Response (Cm 8079) to the Committees' last Report (HC686) the Government indicated that 2 arms export licences to Tunisia had been revoked because increasing tension in Tunisia put them in contravention of Criteria 2 (internal repression) and Criteria 3 (provoking or prolonging armed conflict).[324]

247. In his letter to the Foreign Secretary of 16 January 2012, the Chairman of the Committees put 2 further questions to the Government about UK arms exports to Tunisia.[325] The questions and the Foreign Secretary's 2 answers with his letter of 6 February 2012[326] are reproduced in full as follows (The Tables referred to in the Government's responses can be found in the evidence to this Report at Ev 75-141):

Committees' question: Why were the arms export licence revocations to Tunisia detailed in the Government's response (Cm 8079) not included in Table 1 and/or 2?

Government's answer: Tables 1 and 2 were produced in answer to a question which asked about revocations made since the Government announced its review of licences on 18 February 2011. The licences in question were revoked earlier.

Committees' question: The CAEC asked for details of all extant arms export licences in respect of each country for which licences have been revoked. No details of extant arms export licences to Tunisia appear in any of Tables 3(a), 3(b), 4 or 4(b). Please could these details be provided for Tunisia in the same format as in Tables 3(a), 3(b), 4 and 4(b).

Government's answer: As noted above the tables were produced in response to a question which excluded the Tunisia revocations and therefore we did not include details of the extant licences for Tunisia. Tables with details of the extant licences for Tunisia similar to those provided for other countries are enclosed with this reply. [The Tables are included in the evidence to this Report at Ev 160]

248. In a Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Committees' Chairman, Sir John Stanley, asked which UK strategic export control licences to Tunisia are currently extant, and what the nature and quantity of the licensed or services are under each licence. The Business Minister, Mark Prisk, replied on 27 March 2012:

The following strategic export control licences remain extant for Tunisia:

Application type	Annual report summary	Goods value (£)
SIEL	Components for control equipment for man portable air defence systems	16,320
SIEL	Equipment employing cryptography	4,200,000
SIEL	Components for aircraft radars	58,232
SIEL	Military helmets	2,568
SIEL	Corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	7,381
SIEL	Components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment	15,058
SIEL	Animal pathogens	10
SIEL	Equipment employing cryptography	320,000
SIEL	Equipment employing cryptography	544
SIEL	Components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	20,854
SIEL	Goods treated for signature suppression for military use	3,114,000
SIEL	Equipment employing cryptography	270
SIEL	Military support vehicles	25,000
SIEL	Components for equipment employing cryptography	170
SIEL	Equipment employing cryptography	750,100
SIEL	Controlled atmosphere furnaces	825,000
SIEL	Equipment employing cryptography	9,570
SIEL	Civil NBC detection systems, components for civil NBC detection systems	28,591
SIEL	Equipment employing cryptography	194
SIEL	Equipment employing cryptography	268
SIEL	Equipment employing cryptography	1,867
SIEL	Components for military support aircraft	720,170
SIEL	Components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas	480,127
SIEL	Goods treated for signature suppression for military use	65,000
SITCL	All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	135,000

Application type	Annual report summary
OIEL	Cryptographic software
OIEL	Software for military communications equipment, technology for the use of software for military communications equipment
OIEL	Software for the use of military communications equipment, software to simulate the function of military communications equipment, technology for the use of software to simulate the function of military communications equipment
OIEL	Components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
OIEL	Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
OIEL	Heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays
OIEL	Components for military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military transport aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of military transport aircraft, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military transport aircraft
OIEL	Cutters/severing tools, detonating cord, devices for initiating explosives, explosives, linear cutting explosive charges, linear shaped cutting charges, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets, shaped charges, underwater telecommunications systems
OIEL	Inertial equipment
OIEL	Heading sensors for hydrophone arrays
OIEL	Components for military radars, military software, technology for military radars
OIEL	General naval vessel components, technology for general naval vessel components
OIEL	Components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment
OIEL	Fibrous/filamentary materials
OIEL	Inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment
OIEL	Components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for naval engines, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat helicopters, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, equipment for the use of military aircrew breathing equipment, equipment for the use of military helicopters, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, equipment for the use of naval engines, general military aircraft components, technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military support aircraft, technology for military training aircraft, technology for naval engines
OIEL	Components for submersible vehicles, composite structures, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, imaging cameras, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment, syntactic foam, underwater electronic imaging systems
OIEL	Command communications control and intelligence software, technology for command communications control and intelligence software
OIEL	Small arms ammunition
OIEL	Aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment
OIEL	Neutron generators, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets
OITCL	All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection

Source: HC Deb 27 March 2012 cols. 1137-39W

Values of items licensed for export have been provided for extant Standard Individual Export Licences. No values are given for extant Open Individual Export Licences because there are generally no limit to the quantities that may be exported under these licences and it is not possible for exporters to provide this information when they make a licence application.[327]

249. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it remains satisfied that none of the 47 extant UK arms export licences to Tunisia now contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression" including those licences for military support vehicles, all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, small arms ammunition and cryptography .

YEMEN

250. Yemen is listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's latest Human Rights report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, published 30 April 2012.[328]

251. In its Response (Cm 8079) to the Committees' last Report (HC686) the Government indicated that no arms export licences to Yemen had been revoked.[329]

252. In his letter to the Foreign Secretary of 16 January 2012, the Chairman of the Committees put a further question to the Government about UK arms exports to Yemen.[330] The question and the Foreign Secretary's answer with his letter of 6 February 2012[331] are reproduced in full as follows (The Tables referred to in the Government's responses can be found in the evidence to this Report at Ev 75-141):

Committees' question: Is the Government still satisfied that none of the extant arms export licences to Yemen listed in tables 3(a), 3(b) and 4 with values for SIELs, . including licences relating to equipment employing cryptography, military cameras and body armour, contravene Criteria 2 and 3?

Government's answer: We are clear that the identified extant SIEL licences for equipment employing cryptography, military cameras and body armour do not contravene Criteria 2 and 3. In line with normal practice, export licences for Yemen are kept under constant review and every licence is scrutinised in light of changing facts on the ground.

253. In the Committees' Oral evidence with Ministers on 7 February 2012, the Foreign Secretary was asked for further clarification of the Government's arms export policy towards Yemen.[332] The Foreign Secretary's reply in his letter of 28 February 2012 and attachment headed "Export licences for Yemen in 2011" were as follows:

At the CAEC Evidence Session on 7 February I undertook to write with further information about the type of equipment which is being exported to Yemen and Bahrain.

I enclose lists of all the types of licences which have been approved and refused for both countries in 2011. All applications are assessed carefully against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. As you will see from the lists we will only export equipment if we are satisfied that it will not be used for internal repression, taking into account the equipment and specified end user.

I have included information for the whole of 2011 in order to ensure that the Committees have as full a picture as possible and in view of your request to receive this information quickly.

Export licences for Yemen in 2011

We receive very few export licence applications for Yemen. Equipment licensed for export in 2011:

SIELS approved in 2011.

Dual Use Items

• A portable chemical identifier returned after repair in the UK to be used by the security authorities in Yemen.

Military Rated Goods

Body armour and one vehicle to be used by UN personnel;

Armoured vehicle for use by the UN;

One engine for the C130 Hercules military transport aircraft used in Yemen to assist international partners.

Two SIELS for Yemen were refused in 2011 for:

• body armour
• riot shields

These applications were refused due to concerns that the goods could be used for internal repression (Criterion 2 of the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria).

Open Licences refused

• components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment to a civil end user.

No export licences for Yemen were revoked in 2011.[333]

254. In a Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Committees' Chairman, Sir John Stanley, asked which UK strategic export control licences to Yemen are currently extant, and what the nature and quantity of the licensed or services are under each licence. The Business Minister, Mark Prisk, replied on 27 March 2012:

The following strategic export control licences remain extant for Yemen:

Application type	Annual report summary	Goods value (£)
SITCL	All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	70,000
SIEL (Permanent)	Body armour	43,288
SIEL (Permanent)	Military aero-engines	819,930
SIEL (Permanent)	Body armour	1,444
SIEL (Permanent)	Components for military cameras, equipment for the use of military cameras, technology for the use of military cameras, test equipment for military cameras	85,858

Application type	Annual report summary
OIEL	Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
OIEL	Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
OIEL	Heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays
OIEL	Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
OIEL	Components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment
OIEL	Components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography

Source: HC Deb 27 March 2012 cols. 1139-40W

Values of items licensed for export have been provided for extant Standard Individual Export Licences. No values are given for extant Open Individual Export Licences because there no [sic] generally no limit to the quantities that may be exported under these licences and it is not possible for exporters to provide this information when they make a licence application.[334]

255. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it remains satisfied that none of the 11 extant UK arms export licences to Yemen now contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression" including those licences for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, body armour, components and equipment for military cameras and cryptographic equipment and technology.

ARGENTINA

256. Argentina is not listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's latest Human Rights report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, published 30 April 2012.[335] The Committees have compiled from the Government's quarterly arms export reports details of the arms export licences to Argentina that the Government approved from 1 April 2010 up to 31 December 2011. These are set out in Annex 9.

257. On 26 April 2012, the Foreign Secretary wrote to the Committees' Chairman advising the Committees of a change in the Government's export controls to Argentina and of a Written Ministerial Statement being made by the Business Secretary that day.[336] The Foreign Secretary's letter was as follows:

I am writing to advise you about a change in our export controls to Argentina.

The Business Secretary has today laid before the House a Written Ministerial Statement relating to a tightening of our export controls to Argentina. I enclose a copy. Since 1998 our approach has been to refuse exports which would allow Argentina to enhance her military capabilities but to approve licences for goods which maintained existing capability. As members of the Committees are aware from our response to questions on the BIS quarterly reports, our exports to Argentina have included components for aircraft and naval vessels for maintenance purposes.

In view of recent Argentine actions aimed at the economic interests of the Falkland Islanders, the Government has concluded that it is now appropriate to review this policy. With effect from today we are introducing new restrictions on the export of licensable trade and brokering to the Argentine military. In future no licences will be granted for military or dual use goods for military end users in Argentina unless there are compelling exceptional reasons to do so. Extant licences will be reviewed with a view to revoking any which are not consistent with this new policy.

The Business Secretary's Written Ministerial Statement was as follows:

Export Control Policy

The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills (Vince Cable): I would like to inform the House of a change of policy on the licensing of exports of, and trade by British persons (trafficking and brokering) in, controlled goods and technology to military end-users in Argentina. Previous policy dating from 1998 required the refusal of licences for exports and trade which would enhance Argentine military capabilities but permitted licences for goods which maintained existing capability. In practice this has meant the authorisation of the export and trade of components for maintenance purposes.

The Government have reviewed this policy in the light of recent actions by the Argentine Government aimed at harming the economic interests of the Falkland Islanders. We are determined to ensure that no British licensable exports or trade have the potential to be used by Argentina to impose an economic blockade on the Falkland Islanders or inhibit their legitimate rights to develop their own economy.

New restrictions on the export and trade of licensable goods with the Argentine military will now be introduced with immediate effect. In future no licences shall be granted for any military or dual-use goods and technology being supplied to military end-users in Argentina, except in exceptional circumstances. We will review extant licences for military goods to the Argentine armed forces with a view to revoking any that are not consistent with the revised policy. This decision will not affect licences for items intended for end-users other than the Argentine military.[337]

258. The Committees conclude that the Government's decision to tighten controls on the licensing of, and trade in (trafficking and broking), controlled goods and technology to military end users in Argentina is welcome. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report:

a) what are the exceptional circumstances in which the Government is still willing to consider approving export licences for military or dual-use goods being supplied to military end users in Argentina;

b) what licences for military goods to Argentine armed forces have been revoked;

c) what UK strategic export control licences for Argentina remain extant; and

d) what steps the Government is taking to get the US Government, the Governments of EU Member States, and the Governments of other countries who export military goods, military technology and dual-use goods to Argentina to make the same change of policy as that announced by the British Government.

CHINA

259. China is listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's latest Human Rights report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, published 30 April 2012.[338]

260. The EU arms embargo to China was adopted by the European Council on 27 June 1989 in response to the events in Tiananmen Square in June 1989.[339] The arms embargo, was adopted in the form of a European Council Declaration (or Common Policy) prior to the creation of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and so is not legally binding on Member States. Our predecessor Committees examined the arms embargo in detail and concluded that it was of political importance in that it provided a strong message in relation to the promotion of human rights in China.[340]

261. The potential lifting of the embargo was first discussed at an EU-level in 2004, when both France and Germany argued that the reasons for first imposing the embargo (chiefly Tiananmen Square) were out-dated. The 2004 European Council "reaffirmed the political will to continue to work towards lifting the arms embargo" and recalled the importance of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports in particular criteria regarding human rights, stability and security in the region and the national security of friendly and allied countries in preventing an increase in arms sales to China from EU Member States.[341] Some in the EU, led by France and Spain, have again called for the lifting of the embargo.[342]

262. In its last Report (HC686) published on 5 April 2011, the Committees made the following recommendation with regard to the arms export embargo on China:

We recommend that in view of the continuing serious human rights violations taking place in China, the Government maintains its position of fully supporting the retention of the EU arms embargo on China.[343]

In its Response (Cm 8079) the Government replied:

There is a broad consensus within the EU that the time is not right to lift the EU Arms Embargo on China. We would need to see clear progress on the issue that necessitated the Embargo in the first place, namely civil and political rights.[344]

263. On 25 January 2012, the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Foreign Secretary as follows:

The quarterly Arms Export Licence approvals published by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills for the first three quarters for 2011 included the following licence approvals of arms exports to China:

1^st January - 31^st March 2011

• body armour
• equipment for the production of military communications equipment
• general military vehicle components
• small arms ammunition (2 licences)
• technology for military communications equipment
• weapon sights

1^st April - 30^th May

• aircraft military communications equipment (2 licences)
• components for combat aircraft (2 licences)
• components for combat naval vessels
• components for military aero-engines
• components for military patrol/assault craft
• unfinished products for military aero-engines (2 licences)

1^st July - 30^th September

• body armour
• technology for military communications equipment (2 licences)
• cryptographic software
• equipment employing cryptography
• aircraft military communications equipment
• components for combat helicopters
• components for military helicopters

Please would you provide the Committees with an explanation of why licences were granted for the export of these arms to China notwithstanding the UK/EU Consolidated Criteria and the Declaration by the Madrid European Council on 27 June 1989 that established an arms embargo on China.

The Committees have noted that the UK Government's interpretation of the embargo, as stated in the quarterly Arms Export licence approvals, is that the embargo applies to; "lethal weapons such as machine guns, large calibre weapons, bombs, torpedoes, rockets and missiles; specially designed components of these item and ammunition; military aircraft and helicopters, vessels of war, armoured fighting vehicles and other such weapons platforms; and any other equipment which might be used for internal repression."[345]

On 6 February 2012 the Foreign Secretary replied to the Chairman's letter. The Foreign Secretary's reply was as follows:

Thank you for your letter of 25 January in which you raise concerns about the Arms Export licence approvals for China that were published by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills for the first three quarters of 2011.

All export licences for China are not only assessed against the terms of Consolidated Criteria and the EU Arms Embargo, including the possibility of diversion. Please be assured that we take the China arms embargo very seriously and are confident that it was not breached in the cases that you have highlighted.

All export licences for China are not only assessed against Criteria One of the Consolidated Criteria which covers our commitment to the EU Arms Embargo, but also taking into account the remaining Criteria. A full assessment is carried out covering a number of factors including the nature of the goods, the stated end-use and end-user, the risk of diversion to an undesirable end-user, the risk of the proposed export being used for internal repression, and the regional peace, security and stability.

We receive a large number of licence applications for China and the majority are for end users in the commercial, low-cost/mass production, industrial or scientific research and development fields. Some items are military rated but are not caught by the EU Arms Embargo, such as military rated items for non-lethal purposes i.e. industrial components or NBC equipment for use by environmental agencies.

The UK interpretation of the China Arms Embargo covers:

• lethal weapons such as machine guns, large calibre weapons, bombs, torpedoes, rockets and missiles
• Specially designed components of the above and ammunition
• Military aircraft and helicopters, vessels of war, armoured fighting vehicles and other such weapon platforms
• Any equipment which might be used for internal repression

Please note components of complete military platforms such as helicopters and aircraft are not covered by the Embargo.

We have taken each of the general goods descriptions in your letter and have endeavoured to provide you with further details that will explain the nature of the goods and therefore the reasons for approval. These are attached in the Annex to this letter.

I hope this addresses your concerns.[346]

The unclassified Annex was as follows:

Annex A

Breakdown of Licences Approved for China

• Body Armour

The goods were for use by a global technical textile manufacturing company with a site in China capable of producing low cost manufacturing. The armoured vests were sent for testing at a police facility. After testing they would be damaged to the point of destruction and sent back to the supplier in the UK for examination and study. There were no criteria 2 concerns in this case as there was no clear risk of internal repression.

• Equipment for the production of military communications equipment

The goods in this case (Multi Socket Connection Box and Frontier 1600 Cable Test Box) were Equipment Test Units to be used in the manufacture of cable assemblies which would then be incorporated into headsets for worldwide distribution by the exporter in the UK. There were no criteria concerns raised.

• General military vehicle components

The equipment exported under this licence was Lightweight Crew Seats to a University for research into whether the seats would be suitable for internal and military security vehicles but not for "military vehicle projects". There was no clear risk that the proposed export would be used for internal repression. The interpretation of the embargo has consistently been taken to mean that whilst the lethal weapons or whole weapon platforms may be embargoed non-lethal equipment or components of weapons platforms are not. Therefore, these seats were not covered by the embargo.

• Small arms ammunition

In the two cases highlighted, the equipment was for sporting and training purposes and for the sporting purpose of target shooting.

In both cases, the equipment was supplied by a specialist manufacturer of sporting ammunition. The ammunition supplied were sports shooting cartridges, specially designed for training and sporting purposes. Sports ammunition is not caught under the arms embargo and as there was no clear risk of diversion, no criteria 2 concerns were raised. The interpretation of the embargo has consistently been taken to mean that whilst the lethal weapons or whole weapon platforms may be embargoed non-lethal equipment or components of weapons platforms are not. This product is not caught by the UK interpretation of the arms embargo on China.

• Technology for military communications equipment

In this case, the goods exported were technical drawings for use in the manufacture (moulding) of parts to be used on cable assemblies. The end user is a global electronics manufacturing services (EMS) provider that serves original equipment manufacturers in technology-related industries such as communications and computer hardware. Singapore is one of their manufacturing sites.

The moulded parts would be returned to Singapore who will then integrate them into headsets. These headsets will be distributed globally by the exporter in compliance with UK Export Control. This was confirmed by the British manufacturer.

There were no criteria concerns in this case as the moulds were due to be returned to Singapore.

• Weapon sights

These goods were telescopic sights originally designed for target shooting purposes (day time, not night vision). In this instance the goods were being returned to the original manufacturer in China as they were faulty. They were being returned for study and evaluation of defects and subsequent scrapping. The equipment was therefore deemed exempt from the China arms embargo.

• Aircraft military communications equipment

In one case, the applicant was returning the unaltered items (antennas) to the manufacturer as they were beyond economic repair. As such the parts were not expected to be fitted into any form of aircraft. As the goods were faulty and did not pose any risks, there were no criteria concerns.

In the other case, the items were analogue aircraft band transceivers capable of working in Amplitude Modulation on both the Civilian 108 - 135 MHz Aircraft band and the Military 225 - 400MHz aircraft band. The transmitters were to be used by the end user for communication during construction and maintenance of a communications network and an EUU check confirmed they would not be used for military purposes. Open sources indicated that the end user is a provider of communication access equipment and network solutions. As the civil end use was considered legitimate, there were no criteria concerns raised for this application.

• Components for combat naval vessel /Components for Military patrol/assault craft

In both cases, the goods in question were propeller shaft seals and spares that do not fall under the arms embargo. We will allow non lethal equipment with a military end use to be exported. These parts were standard components originally designed for commercial cruise liners 40 years ago and had not been designed or modified for military use. They would not provide any enhancement of combat capabilities once fitted onto the vessels. As the parts have a degree of wear and tear these seals are routinely inspected and replaced once they have deteriorated.

• Unfinished products for military aero-engines

The products were spare parts for the aero-engine and Rear end Forgings for an Engine. The components were sent to China to be machined to a certain specification by the exporter in the UK and will be used for spares, with eventual incorporation into the engines by the ultimate end user, the exporter, based in the UK. .

Despite the classification of military, this equipment is for industrial purposes only. The UK interpretation of the embargo has consistently been taken to mean that whilst the lethal weapons or whole weapon platforms may be embargoed, non-lethal equipment or components of weapons platforms are not. These products did not fall under the categories listed above and is therefore not caught by the arms embargo on China as the current UK interpretation stands.

• Cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography

End users in these cases were consumer services and the products were dual use. Some examples are:

In two cases the equipment would be used for patient monitoring and care in emergency rooms, intensive care and critical care units and incorporated into a wireless application for a portable medical device for use in hospitals.

In some cases the equipment was used for a support system for smartcards based around a banking payment system, whilst other equipment was used to enable secure internet connectivity across communications networks.

• Components for combat and Military helicopters

These were for commercial and civilian end use. Some examples are:

Two disposable filter elements that were exported for permanent exhibition use in China initially for a Heli Expo Show, whilst a Fan Assembly Unit exported for scientific research into the potential use on a commercial airship.

Other goods exported were automatic reservoir bleed valves used to release entrapped air and/or other gases during repair and overhaul of components in aircraft.

These valves were parts of a hydraulic system which the end user would use to release gas after carrying out tests and are therefore a maintenance tool. The goods were low specification and would not add to the capabilities of a military aircraft. The export of such components and any resulting military aircraft operations is too far removed in cases such as this, so there were no criteria 4 concerns. [347]

264. The EU's 13^th Annual Arms Export Report was published on 30 December 2011.[348] Pages 348-351 of the Report detail arms exports to China (Hong Kong), China (Macao) and China (Mainland) from EU Member States in 2010 notwithstanding the EU Embargo. The UK Government, according to the EU Report, in 2010 approved 180 out of the total 199 arms export licences to China (Hong Kong), 3 out of the total of 18 to China (Macao) and 349 out of the total of 550 to China (Mainland). On the EU's published statistics the UK Government appears to have approved more arms export licences to China than any other EU Member States.

265. The Committees conclude that given the lack of clear progress on civil and political rights in China, the Government's support for the EU Arms Embargo on China to continue is welcome. The Committees recommend that the Government provides in its Response to this Report an explanation as to why, according to the EU's latest Report, the UK Government in 2010 gave a larger number of arms export licence approvals to China than any other EU Member State notwithstanding the EU Arms Export Embargo on China.

Extension of the Review to authoritarian regimes and to countries of concern worldwide

266. The Committees' scrutiny of the Government's arms export policy review for countries in the Middle East and North Africa, first announced on 18 February 2011, is set out in paragraphs 192-208 above.

267. In their last Report (HC686), published on 5 April 2011, the Committees made the following recommendation:

We further recommend that the Government extends immediately its review of UK arms export licences announced by the FCO Minister, Mr Alistair Burt, on 18 February 2011 to authoritarian regimes worldwide in respect of arms or components of arms which could be used for internal repression.[349]

The Government in its Response (Cm 8079) replied:

The Foreign Secretary has commissioned a review of Government policy and practice with regard to the export of equipment that might be used for internal repression, in particular crowd control goods. Although this review was originally commissioned in response to events in the Middle East and North Africa, any conclusions will apply to our procedures for arms exports to all countries. The FCO is leading this internal review in close consultation with the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) and the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The Government will be reporting back on the review to Parliament. This will take place once the Foreign Secretary has fully considered the findings of the review.[350]

As the Chairman of the Committees pointed out in the House of Commons debate on the Committees' last Report on 20 October 2011, the Government's statement in its Response that any conclusions from its review would apply to its procedures for arms exports to all countries was a different matter from the Committees' particular recommendation, which was whether the Government would extend its review to "to authoritarian regimes worldwide".[351]

268. The Committees returned to their recommendation in the Oral evidence session with the Foreign Secretary on 7 February 2012. The complete exchange was as follows:

Chair: Foreign Secretary, we are going to move on to an important recommendation which we made in our last report, in which we recommended that you should extend your review of arms export policy to authoritarian regimes worldwide.

  Q134 Chris White: Secretary of State, extending that, we were just thinking it should not just be the Middle East and North Africa, it should be to authoritarian regimes worldwide. Why was this recommendation not implemented?

  Mr Hague: Our review covers our global policy—covers the whole thing, whatever the nature of the regime. Of course, it is events in the Middle East and North Africa that have given rise to it. But this is a change to our procedures overall, including authoritarian regimes. As the Chairman has pointed out, such issues can arise in other countries as well. So for the purposes of this policy, we are not only concerned with authoritarian regimes. The change in procedures that I have announced and that Vince Cable has been talking about, are changes in procedures globally.

  Q135 Chair: Yes, Foreign Secretary, but that does not answer the particular question that the Committees have put to you. It is one thing to look at the global application of the results of your review. We put a different recommendation to you, that you should extend your review to authoritarian regimes worldwide. Why did you not accept that recommendation?

  Mr Hague: For this reason, Mr Chairman, this is a worldwide review. It is about our policy towards all regimes of any kind. If you are saying should we have had a particular study of authoritarian regimes—

  Q136 Chair: That was the recommendation of this Committee. We asked you to extend your review not just to authoritarian countries in North Africa and the Middle East, but to authoritarian countries worldwide. That was our recommendation, and you chose not to accept it.

  Mr Hague: Yes, because it was not confined to the Middle East. If we implement thoroughly, as we certainly intend to do, the changes in procedures that I talked about earlier—more systematic reporting of human rights risks, using a wider range of information, more systematic use of predictive tools and the requirement of end-use monitoring by overseas posts—it will capture what is going on in authoritarian regimes, as well as the rest of the world. So, of course they are included; what is going on all over the world is included in these changes of procedures.

  Q137 Chair: The Committees understand that the outcome of the review is going to be applied globally by the Government, but the issue that the Committees put to you was that you should extend your review to authoritarian regimes worldwide—authoritarian regimes in Africa, in Asia and conceivably in one or two countries in South America—and ask yourselves the same questions that you have posed to yourselves on North Africa and the Middle East: do all the extant export licences that we have granted to these authoritarian regimes still comply with criteria 2 and 3? You have not done that. Why not?

  Mr Hague: It is a global review. I go back to the same answer. Really you are saying that there should be a bigger change in policy.

  Q138 Chair: No, we are saying that there should have been a bigger change in the geographical scope of the review that you carried out.

  Mr Hague: I am saying that there is no limit to its geographical scope. Every kind of regime and every kind of country is captured in this review. Clearly, we do not have a meeting of minds here, and I have not seen any other country where we should change our policy and revoke the licences, because the circumstances have not changed. We focused the review on practical change, and I have adopted all the recommendations of the review. I think I see what the Committee is getting at, but we chose to do it in a different way. I did not agree with the recommendation of the Committee.[352]

269. In its latest Human Rights Report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, the FCO has listed a total of 28 countries of human rights concern. These are: Afghanistan, Belarus, Burma, Chad, China, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Fiji, Iran, Iraq, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Libya, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, South Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen and Zimbabwe. The Committees have set out in Annex 7 examples of export licence applications approved by the Government from 1 January to 31 December 2011 to these countries of controlled goods that might be used to facilitate internal repression.

270. The Committees conclude that the Government's stated policy is to refuse arms export licences "which might be used to facilitate internal repression" and not merely to await internal repression becoming patently clear. The Committees therefore continue to recommend that the Government extends its arms export policy review from countries in the Middle East and North Africa to authoritarian regimes and countries of human rights concern worldwide.

---

238   CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, para 18 Back

239   Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, p4 Back

240   The arms export licence revocations in question and the reason for revocation in each case are detailed in Annex 5. Back

241   Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, HC 1402, p 20 Back

242   HC Deb, 15 December 2011, Cols 123-124  Back

243   Ev 60 Back

244   Ev 59 Back

245   Q 142 Back

246   Q 144 [Chairman of CAEC] Back

247   Q 144 [William Hague] Back

248   "UK 'exporting surveillance technology to brutal regimes': Fears software is being supplied to repressive governments that use it to monitor dissidents", The Observer, 8 April 2012

 Back

249   EV 164 - Letter from Alistair Burt dated 8 February 2012 Back

250   HC Deb, 9 February 2012, Cols 46-47WS Back

251   HC Deb, 26 October 2000, Cols 199-203W Back

252   FCO Press Notice, "Foreign Office Minister comments on review of arms exports", http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=News&id=553955182# Back

253   HC Deb, 20 October 2011, Col 244WH Back

254   Q 109 Back

255   FCO Press Notice - http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=News&id=553955182#

 Back

256   CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, Annex 4 Back

257   CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, para 135 Back

258   Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, pp18-19 Back

259   Ev 63 - Letter from the Chairman to the Foreign Secretary dated 18 July 2011 Back

260   Ev 67 - Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 30 September 2011 Back

261   Ev 67 - Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 30 September 2011, Annex A Back

262   HC Deb, 18 July 2011, Cols 78-79WS Back

263   CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, Annex 4 Back

264   HC Deb, 13 October 2011, Cols 41-42WS Back

265   HC Deb, 20 October 2011, Col 341WH Back

266   HC Deb, 16 April 2012, Col 198W Back

267   Q 110 Back

268   HC Deb, 13 October 2011 col 42WS Back

269   Foreign Affairs Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2011-12, The FCO's Human Rights Work 2010-12, HC 964, Qq 101-103 Back

270   Ev 42 Back

271   Ev 42 Back

272   Q 12 Back

273   Q 13 Back

274   Q 38 Back

275   Ev 42  Back

276   Q 113 [Sarah MacIntosh] Back

277   Q 113 [David Hall] Back

278   Ev 149 - Letter from the Chairman to the Foreign Secretary dated 21 November 2011 Back

279   Ev 150 - Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 9 December 2011 Back

280   CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, para 135 Back

281   Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, pp21-45 Back

282   Ev 63 - Letter from the Chairman to the Foreign Secretary dated 18 July 2011 Back

283   Ev 67 - Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 30 September 2011, Annex A  Back

284   Ev 143 - Letter from the Chairman to the Foreign Secretary dated 19 October 2011 Back

285   Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, HC 1402, page 3 Back

286   Annex 11 - Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 7 January 2012, Annex A  Back

287   Ev 152 - Letter from the Chairman dated 16 January 2012 Back

288   Ev 156 - Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 6 February 2012  Back

289   FCO, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, Cm 8339, April 2012 Back

290   "Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VIII): Bahrain's Rocky Road to Reform",International Crisis Group,16 March 2012, www.crisisgroup.org  Back

291   Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, Annex 1 Back

292   Ev 152 - Letter from the Chairman dated 16 January 2012 Back

293   Ev 156 - Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 6 February 2012  Back

294   Qq 123-125 and Qq 130-133 Back

295   Ev 178 - Letter and annex from the Foreign Secretary dated 28 February 2012 and Ev 183 - Letter and Annex from the Foreign Secretary dated 1 May 2012 Back

296   HC Deb, 27 March 2012, Col 1136W Back

297   HC Deb, 27 March 2012, col. 1136W Back

298   FCO, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, Cm 8339, April 2012 Back

299   Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, Annex 1 Back

300   Ev 152 - Letter from the Chairman dated 16 January 2012 Back

301   Ev 156 - Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 6 February 2012 Back

302   HC Deb, 27 March 2012, Col 1136W Back

303   HC Deb, 27 March 2012, col. 1136W Back

304   Ev 181 - Letter from Alistair Burt dated 26 April 2012 Back

305   FCO, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, Cm 8339, April 2012 Back

306   Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, Annex 1 Back

307   Ev 152 - Letter from the Chairman dated 16 January 2012 Back

308   Ev 156 - Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 6 February 2012 Back

309   HC Deb, 27 Mar 2012, cols 1136-37W  Back

310   FCO, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, Cm 8339, April 2012 Back

311   CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, Annex 4 Back

312   Ev 63 - Letter from the Chairman to the Foreign Secretary dated 18 July 2011 Back

313   Ev 67 - letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 30 September 2011,  Back

314   HC Deb, 20 October 2011, col 343WH Back

315   Ev 152 - Letter from the Chairman dated 16 January 2012 Back

316   Ev 156 - Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 6 February 2012 Back

317   FCO, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, Cm 8339, April 2012 Back

318   Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, Annex 1 Back

319   Ev 67 - Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 30 September 2011, Table 1 Back

320   Ev 152 - Letter from the Chairman dated 16 January 2012 Back

321   Ev 156 - Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 6 February 2012 Back

322   HC Deb, 27 Mar 2012, col 1137W Back

323   FCO, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, Cm 8339, April 2012 Back

324   Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, Annex 1 Back

325   Ev 152 - Letter from the Chairman dated 16 January 2012 Back

326   Ev 156 - Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 6 February 2012 Back

327   HC Deb, 27 Mar 2012, cols 1137-39W Back

328   FCO, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, Cm 8339, April 2012 Back

329   Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, Annex 1 Back

330   Ev 152 - Letter from the Chairman dated 16 January 2012 Back

331   Ev 156 - Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 6 February 2012 Back

332   Qq 123-125 and Qq 130-133 Back

333   Ev 178 - Letter and annex from the Foreign Secretary dated 28 February 2012and Ev 183 - Letter and Annex from the Foreign Secretary dated 1 May 2012 Back

334   HC Deb, 27 Mar 2012, cols 1139-40W Back

335   FCO, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, Cm 8339, April 2012 Back

336   Ev 181 - letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 26 April 2012 Back

337   HC Deb, 26 April 2012, Col 43WS Back

338   FCO, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, Cm 8339, April 2012 Back

339   EU Declaration on China Arms Embargo - European Council: Madrid 26-27 June 1989 Back

340   CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2009-10, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2010): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2008, Quarterly reports for 2009, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC 202, paras 114-119 Back

341   European Council, 16-17 December 2004, Presidency Conclusions Back

342   "The EU and arms for China", The Economist, 1 February 2010 Back

343   CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, para 120 Back

344   Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, p 16 Back

345   Ev 154 - Letter from the Chairman to the Foreign Secretary dated 25 January 2012 Back

346   Ev 156 - Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 6 February 2012 Back

347   Ev 156 - Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 6 February 2012  Back

348   Official Journal of the European Union, Thirteenth Annual Report according to Article 8(2) of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment, 30 December 2011  Back

349   CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, para 135 Back

350   Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, Pp 19-20 Back

351   HC Deb, 20 October 2011, Col 343WH Back

352   Qq 134-138 Back

---

Prepared 13 July 2012