The Committees' 2010 Quarter 3 (July - September)
questions and the Government's answers
The Committees would be grateful for more information
about why the following licences were granted or refused during
the third quarter (July-September) of 2011:
Angola: OIEL refused for
americium-241, devices for initiating explosives, hydrophones,
linear cutting explosive charges, materials containing natural
uranium, materials containing thorium, neutron generators, non-military
detonators, non-military firing sets, oxidisers, technology for
the use of devices for initiating explosives, technology for the
use of linear cutting explosive charges, technology for the use
of non-military detonators, technology for the use of non-military
firing sets.
This OIEL was rejected and the exporter advised
to apply for SIELs due to potential Criterion 5c (risk of reverse
engineering) and Criterion 7 (risk of diversion) concerns under
The Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria.
Argentina: SIELs issued
for components for destroyers, components for military utility
helicopters and products containing plutonium-239.
a) The goods (components for destroyers) were
components to complete repairs. The Government concluded at the
time of approval that despite previous hostilities there were
no Criterion 5 concerns.
b) The goods in this application (components
for military utility helicopters) were for helicopters used in
civil search and rescue operations. Approval was therefore recommended
in the absence of any sustainable reason under the Criteria to
the contrary.
c) The goods (samples containing plutonium-239)
were for use in a worldwide environmental radioactivity
proficiency (blind) test exercise. The countries who
took part in this proficiency test were then granted the correct
accreditation. The Government considered that no criteria thresholds
were breached.
Azerbaijan:
OIEL refused for cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography,
software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology
for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use
of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of
software for the use of equipment employing cryptography. Specifically,
the Committees would be grateful for further information about
why this OIEL was refused when two apparently identical OIELs
were issued.
This OIEL was rejected because of concerns related
to the value of the goods proposed for export. The exporter was
asked to apply for SIELs instead. Subsequently OIELs were approved
as the values of the exports did not raise any Criterion 8 concerns,
otherwise being similar to the previous OIEL.
Bahrain: OIEL issued for
CS hand grenades, demolition charges, demolition devices, exploding
simulation devices, fire simulation equipment for small arms ammunition,
illuminators, military devices for initiating explosives, signal
flares, signal hand grenades, smoke ammunition, smoke canisters,
smoke generators, smoke hand grenades, stun grenades, tear gas/irritant
ammunition, tear gas/riot control agents, thunderflashes, training
anti-aircraft ammunition, training hand grenades.
The application was approved in August 2010. On
the basis of the evidence available at the time we concluded that
there was no clear risk that these goods might be used for internal
repression or diverted to an undesirable end-use.
The Government reviewed export licences to Bahrain
in February 2011 in light of the changed circumstances in that
country. As a result Bahrain was removed as an eligible destination
from this OIEL.
Bulgaria: OIEL issued
for americium-241, devices for initiating explosives, hydrophones,
linear cutting explosive charges, materials containing natural
uranium, materials containing thorium, neutron generators, non-military
detonators, non-military firing sets, oxidisers, technology for
the use of devices for initiating explosives, technology for the
use of linear cutting explosive charges, technology for the use
of non-military detonators, technology for the use of non-military
firing sets.
This application was for equipment to be used
by, or under the supervision or instructions of employees of,
a private company in provision of oilfield production services.
The application therefore presented no Criteria concerns.
China:
SIELs issued for technology for the use of military infrared/thermal
imaging equipment, equipment employing cryptography (33 licences),
equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography,
software for the use of equipment employing cryptography (9 licences)
and technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography.
Licences for cryptographic software were granted
for export to commercial telecommunications companies who supply
secure communications, for example wireless network connectivity,
secure broadband networks and business radio networks. These applications
were in line with the Consolidated Criteria. The exports in question
cannot be used to mount cyber attacks.
The Committees would also be grateful for further
information about why two SIELs were issued for China for computer
analogue to digital equipment, given that two SIELs for identical
equipment were refused.
The two SIELs granted for computer analogue to
digital equipment were for civil end-uses such as provision
of wireless communications & networking. These applications
raised no concerns against the Consolidated Criteria.
The two licences were rejected under Criteria
5 and 7 as the equipment was a high specification and there was
a clear risk of diversion to the military.
Colombia:
OIEL refused for bomb suits, civil body armour, components for
bomb suits, components for civil body armour, components for explosive
ordnance disposal equipment, demolition devices, explosive ordnance
disposal equipment, improvised explosive device disposal equipment,
military devices for initiating explosives, military firing sets,
military helmets, mine detection equipment, non-military firing
sets.
This OIEL was rejected and the exporter advised
to apply for SIELS due to potential Criterion 7 (risk of diversion)
concerns under The Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing
Criteria. This was based on the type of equipment to be supplied
and the situation in Colombia at the time of the application.
Hong Kong Administrative Region:
SIELs issued for cryptographic software (8 licences) equipment
employing cryptography (20 licences), equipment for the development
of equipment employing cryptography, imaging cameras, semiconductor
process equipment, software for the use of equipment employing
cryptography (8 licences).
A majority of these applications were for cryptographic
software and equipment employing cryptography for communications
companies who supply secure communications, for example to provide
banks with secure network data transfer. Only one licence was
issued for imaging cameras and one issued for semiconductor process
equipment. Both were issued to Universities for civil research
purposes into medical science and electronics. All these applications
were assessed against the Consolidated Criteria and we had no
concerns for the stated end use and end users.
India: SIELs issued for
components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment,
corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment (3 licences).
a) Corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing
equipment. This was equipment to be used in manufacturing a chemical
which is used as a fungicide and parasiticide.
b) Corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing
equipment. The application related to a part which was to be incorporated
into equipment used in a steel manufacturing plant.
c) Corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing
equipment. This was equipment to be used in an oil refinery.
d) Components for corrosion resistant chemical
manufacturing equipment. This equipment was spare parts for other
equipment exported for end use in an oil refinery.
Iran: Given the existence
of an extensive regime of international sanctions against Iran,
the Committees would be grateful for further information about
why SIELs were granted, inter alia, for materials testing equipment
and valves. The Committees note that other licence applications
for these items were refused during this period.
Some applications were for goods controlled on
the UK national control list (PL9009 - civil aircraft and equipment)
Such civil aviation equipment is not caught by any of the sanctions
regimes against Iran and we assessed there was no clear risk of
the goods being used for internal repression or being diverted
to military end-use. Other licences granted related to exports
where an export licence was required for normally non-controlled
goods under the WMD End-Use control. The licences were approved
because in each case it was assessed there was no clear risk of
the goods being used in a programme of concern.
Iraq: OIEL refused for
equipment employing cryptography.
The application for an OIEL was rejected and the
exporter advised to apply for SIELs. The goods were intended
for Government-linked end-users and this raised concerns that
the goods may potentially be used for military applications.
As a result, and because there is still an arms embargo against
Iraq, we decided that an open licence was not appropriate for
this type of export. This is consistent with the approach we
have taken for other such OIEL applications for Iraq for this
kind of equipment.
Israel: SIELs issued for
components for naval electronic warfare equipment (2 licences),
naval electronic warfare equipment, imaging cameras and nuclear
grade graphite.
Naval electronic warfare equipment
These goods were for use in submarines. We have
no evidence to suggest that the use of this class of submarine
by the Israeli Defence Forces would cause concern under the Consolidated
Criteria.
Imaging cameras
Applications included:
a) equipment being returned to the Israeli manufacturer
after demonstration in the UK. The unit was a demonstration unit
which was originally manufactured in Israel and so would not supply
Israel with additional capability it did not already have. Therefore
the export did not raise concerns under the Criteria.
b) a camera intended for academic experimental
research. Given that these goods were intended for use in a university
for research purposes we had no concerns under the Criteria.
c) an application for a temporary SIEL for a
camera for use by the applicant's distributor in Israel to be
demonstrated in Jerusalem and compared to standard CCTV cameras.
As the goods were to be returned to the UK the application did
not raise concerns under the Criteria.
d) a camera being returned to Israel after repair
carried out by the UK manufacturer. The camera was to be used
for research purposes by a scientific institute. Therefore the
export did not raise concerns under the Criteria.
e) an application for a temporary SIEL for a
camera to be loaned for demonstration to potential clients for
commercial applications. The goods were to be returned to the
UK. Therefore the export raised no concerns under the Consolidated
Criteria.
Nuclear grade graphite
These goods are to be machined into consumable
products (crucibles, dies etc) to be used in the metallurgical
industry. Given the legitimate end-use of these goods this
export raised no concerns under the Consolidated Criteria.
OIELs refused for: americium-241, devices for initiating
explosives, hydrophones, linear cutting explosive charges, materials
containing natural uranium, materials containing thorium, neutron
generators, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets,
oxidisers, technology for the use of devices for initiating explosives,
technology for the use of linear cutting explosive charges, technology
for the use of non-military detonators, technology for the use
of non-military firing sets; software for the use of test equipment
for aircraft missile protection systems, test equipment for aircraft
missile protection systems.
Given the nature of the goods and the destination
the applications for OIELs were rejected and the exporter advised
to apply for SIELs instead so that greater scrutiny could be given
to specific exports.
Kenya: Temporary OIEL
issued for technology for the development of nuclear fuel reprocessing
equipment, technology for the development of nuclear reactor fuel
element fabrication equipment, technology for the development
of nuclear reactors, technology for the production of nuclear
fuel reprocessing equipment, technology for the production of
nuclear reactor fuel element fabrication equipment, technology
for the production of nuclear reactors, technology for the use
of nuclear fuel reprocessing equipment, technology for the use
of nuclear reactor fuel element fabrication equipment, technology
for the use of nuclear reactors.
This temporary OIEL application was made to cover
the transmission of information (technology) to a number of overseas
destinations including Kenya. The intended recipient of this information
was an individual employed by a UK energy company. The purpose
of the information transfers was to enable him to undertake work
whilst travelling overseas and remain contactable. The licence
was granted as there were no Consolidated Criteria concerns on
this end use.
Lebanon: OIEL refused
for equipment employing cryptography.
The application for an OIEL was rejected and the
exporter advised to apply for SIELs. The goods were intended for
Government-linked end-users and this raised concerns that the
goods may potentially be used for military applications. As there
is a UN Arms Embargo on Lebanon we decided that an open licence
was not appropriate for these exports.
Libya: SIELs issued for
crowd control ammunition (3 licences), small arms ammunition,
tear gas/irritant ammunition (2 licences), equipment employing
cryptography and neutron generators.
Crowd control ammunition, small arms ammunition,
tear gas/irritant ammunition
These applications were approved with the proviso
that the goods would not be released to Libyan control until after
successful completion of a training programme. The training was
audited by MOD police officials and our Post in Tripoli confirmed
that the training was carried out successfully. We concluded that
there was no clear risk that the goods would be used for internal
repression in contravention of Criterion 2. All these applications
have subsequently been revoked.
Equipment employing cryptography
This application was for equipment to be demonstrated
at a defence and security exhibition. The equipment was
to remain under the exporters control at all times whilst abroad.
This temporary licence was subsequently revoked.
Neutron generators
The neutron generator was a tool to be used to
gather geological data. The equipment was to remain under
the control of the exporter's (an international company) employees
at all times.
Malaysia: OIEL refused
for CS hand grenades, demolition charges, demolition devices,
exploding simulation devices, fire simulation equipment for small
arms ammunition, illuminators, military devices for initiating
explosives, signal flares, signal hand grenades, smoke ammunition,
smoke canisters, smoke generators, smoke hand grenades, stun grenades,
tear gas/irritant ammunition, tear gas/riot control agents, thunderflashes,
training anti-aircraft ammunition, training hand grenades.
Given the nature of the goods and the destination
the OIEL was rejected and the exporter advised to apply for SIELs
so that greater scrutiny could be given to specific exports to
specific end-users.
Russia: OIEL refused for
components for armoured fighting vehicles, components for armoured
personnel carriers, components for combat aircraft, components
for combat helicopters, components for military aero-engines,
components for military search and rescue aircraft, components
for military surveillance aircraft, components for military training
aircraft, components for military utility aircraft, components
for military utility helicopters, components for military utility
vehicles, components for naval engines, components for patrol
craft, components for tanker aircraft.
Given the nature of the goods and the destination
this OIEL was rejected and the exporter advised to apply for
SIELs so that greater scrutiny could be given to specific exports
to specific end-users.
Saudi Arabia: SIEL issued
for components for combat aircraft.
The goods were components for end-use by the Royal
Saudi Air Force. In assessing the application we took all relevant
information into account including the events during the Saudi-Yemen
border conflict in 2009. We concluded that there was no clear
risk that the goods might be used in internal repression, external
aggression or diverted to an undesirable end-use.
Turkey: SIELs issued for
components for combat aircraft (2 licences), toxins
and products containing plutonium-239.
NB. When researching the answer to the above
question we found 6 SIELs issued for components for combat aircraft.
Details of all these applications can be found below.
Applications included:
a) The export licence application was for parts
to be installed in equipment in a combat aircraft. The ultimate
end user was a third party government. The proposed export did
not raise any concerns against the Criteria.
b) The export licence application was for parts
to be used in a combat aircraft. The Government judged that the
equipment would be used for legitimate national defence and NATO
operation purposes only and therefore did not raise concerns under
the Criteria.
c) The export licence application was for parts
to be installed in equipment in a combat aircraft. The ultimate
end user was a third party government. The criteria thresholds
were not met and the equipment could not be directly linked to
any possible diversion, tensions or abuses in the region.
d) The goods exported were spare parts for a
combat aircraft. The FCO considered that criteria thresholds
were not met for this export licence application.
e) The export licence application was for parts
to be installed in equipment in a combat aircraft. The ultimate
end user was a third party government. The criteria thresholds
were not met and the equipment could not be directly linked to
any possible diversion, tensions or abuses in the region.
f) The export licence application was for parts
to be installed in equipment in a combat aircraft. The ultimate
end user was a third party government. The criteria thresholds
were not met and the equipment could not be directly linked to
any possible diversion, tensions or abuses in the region.
g) The 'toxins' were for use in the veterinary
medicine department of a major university. The Government considered
that they would be used for legitimate scientific purposes and
there were no concerns under the Criteria.
h) The products containing Plutonium-239 were
for use in a worldwide environmental test exercise by an end-user
who was assessed to be the competent national authority to handle
these goods. The FCO considered that this sample would be used
for legitimate scientific purposes and there were no concerns
under the Criteria.
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