The Committees' 2011 Quarter 2 (April - June)
questions and the Government's answers
Bahrain:
Given the large-scale unrest and human rights violations by the
security forces which occurred in Bahrain immediately prior to
this period, why were SIELs granted for components for military
aero-engines, components for military training aircraft, small
arms ammunition, training hand grenades, body armour, civil body
armour and components for body armour and OEILs issued for Components
for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components
for military support vehicles, technology for all-wheel drive
vehicles with ballistic protection, technology for military support
vehicles, components for small arms ammunition and small arms
ammunition rather than refused under the terms of either or both
Criteria 2, 3 or 4 of the Consolidated Criteria?
The Committees would also be grateful for information
on why SIELs for small arms ammunition were issued when the same
items were previously revoked, early in 2011, due to contravention
of Criteria 2 and 3, according to Annex 1 of The Government's
Response (Cm 8079) to the Committee's Annual Report (HC686). Further,
the Committees would like information on why an OIEL was issued
which included small arms ammunition when an OIEL including these
items was revoked, early in 2011, due to contravention of Criteria
2 and 3, according to Annex 1 of The Government's Response (Cm
8079) to the Committee's Annual Report (HC686).
A number of criteria concerns emerged for Bahrain
following protests in the region, particularly Criterion Two -
internal repression. Export licences were reviewed on the 18th
February 2011 and licences for equipment that could be used for
internal repression were revoked. The revoked licences cover equipment
that could be used for riot control: tear gas, crowd control ammunition,
assault rifles, body armour, radio communications equipment, and
components for military utility vehicles.
We have continued processing licences for Bahrain
on a case-by-case basis. The situation on the ground is being
constantly reviewed. The cases in question relate to a variety
of equipment and all were risk assessed individually.
- The components
for military aero-engines and for military training aircraft were
intended for maintenance purposes for training aircraft only.
In one case the goods were being exported back to Bahrain after
having been sent to the UK manufacturer for repair.
- The small
arms ammunition consisted of sporting shotgun cartridges and sporting
rifle cartridges. They were exported to a named individual who
intended to use them for sports shooting. Since they were not
intended for military end use and were not subject to any end
user concerns it was assessed that the export of this ammunition
did not constitute a clear risk under the Consolidated Criteria.
- A licence
for training hand grenades was approved. Our assessment was that
the training grenades (they give off a bang and a flash of light)
did not have an aggressive end use.
- A licence
for body armour was approved for a named individual end user.
The licence was issued with a proviso that the armour not be re-sold,
donated or loaned to any other entity in or external to Bahrain.
- The component
for small arms ammunition and small arms ammunition consisted
of sporting shotgun cartridges. It was assessed that the export
of this ammunition did not constitute a clear risk under the Consolidated
Criteria
The SIELs and OIELs revoked after the February
review of Bahrain licensing included licences for small arms ammunition
that was non-sporting. They included licences for small arms ammunition,
crowd control ammunition, training ammunition for wall and door
breaching projectile launchers, anti-armour "piercing"
ammunition, and ammunition for automatic and semi-automatic weapons.
The revoked licences involved military end users and some offensive
ammunition whereas the approved licence involved sporting ammunition
to a named individual end user. Whilst there was a clear risk
that the offensive ammunition could be used contrary to the Consolidated
Criteria, it could not be assessed that there was a clear risk
of the sporting ammunition being used contrary to C2, C3 or C4.
China: In connection with
the SEILs for components for NBC detection equipment, NBC detection
equipment and software for NBC detection equipment that were approved
for export, the Committees note that SIELs for components for
NBC detection equipment, NBC detection equipment and software
for NBC detection equipment were refused under Criterion 1, which
requires the UK, inter alia, to uphold the EU Arms Embargo
against China. Why were some SEILs approved and others refused?
The end users for all the SIELs approved were
government environmental agencies apart from one which was for
a centre for disease control. The UK interpretation of the EU
Arms Embargo on China is that it does not include military-rated equipment
for non-lethal purposes. The SIEL refused was not under Criterion
1 but under Criterion 5d. The company applying for the licence
did not have the correct assurances in place.
Djibouti: Given the human
rights record of the Government of Djibouti, why were SIELs granted
for assault rifles, body armour, components for body armour, gun
silencers, machine guns, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition
and weapon sights and SITCLs for assault rifles, components for
assault rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights, rather
than refused under the terms of Criteria 2 of the Consolidated
Criteria?
All of the items on this specific licence application
were exported to a private company (rather than the Djibouti government)
for the purposes of carrying out anti-piracy work. It was assessed
that the company had a legitimate need for such items and that
there was no evidence of human rights abuses by the end user.
Accordingly, the Government deemed that there was no clear risk
that the goods would be used in internal repression, diverted
to an undesirable end use or aggravate existing tensions. Furthermore,
approval of this application was in line with our approach to
anti-piracy applications concerning Djibouti.
Egypt: The Committees
would be grateful for information on why a number of SIELs for
equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment employing
software were issued when the same items were included in SEILS
previously revoked, due to contravention of Criteria 2 and 3,
in 2011, according to Annex 1 of The Government's Response (Cm
8079) to the Committee's Annual Report (HC686).
The licences in question that were approved, comprised
of software upgrades and equipment for network security between
office premises for a commercial bank. After consideration of
the goods, end use and end user we judged there was no clear risk
under Criterion 2 and insufficient risk under Criterion 3.
As referenced above, a number of licences for
secure communications equipment were revoked after a review of
export licences for Egypt in February 2011. We monitored events
in Egypt very closely during the uprising in January/February
2011. We judged that these licences were no longer in line with
the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria.
Hong Kong: Given the human
rights record of the Government of China, how were concerns about
diversion under Criteria 7 - and then by extension, Criteria 2
-- of the Consolidated Criteria allayed with regard to the SIELs
granted for anti-riot/ballistic shields and components for machine
guns and OIELs for, inter alia, components for small arms ammunition,
small arms ammunition, body armour and components for ballistic
shields?
Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region of
the People's Republic of China. Exports of Wassenaar-controlled
and certain military equipment to anywhere in China require a
licence.
Israel: Given the controversy
that occurred over 'Operation Cast Lead' in Gaza, which is part
of the Palestinian Occupied Territories, in late 2008 and early
2009, the Committees would be grateful for further information
regarding the following SIELs that were granted, inter alia,
during this period: components for electronic warfare equipment,
components for military aircraft head-up/down displays, equipment
for the use of military equipment for initiating explosives, launching/handling/control/support
equipment for unmanned air vehicles and why these SIELs were granted.
The Government considers all applications case
by case against the Consolidated Criteria. We recognise Israel's
right to self defence but pay particular attention to risks.
In several instances electronic warfare equipment
was exported to Israel for incorporation, after evaluation or
repair, into an electronics system that was destined for ultimate
end use in a third country. As the end user was not Israel, no
criteria concerns for export to Israel were noted. In other instances,
electronic warfare equipment was exported to end users within
Israel for laboratory use only. Assurances were received that
the goods would not be re-exported, sold or otherwise transferred.
It was judged that, since the equipment was for testing purposes
only, this did not breach the Consolidated Criteria.
Several of the components for military aircraft
head up/head down displays that were approved were to be incorporated
in Israel into other parts being sent on to other ultimate end
user countries. Since the end user was not Israel and there was
documentation linking the equipment to third party end users outside
of Israel, this equipment was approved for export. Other components
for different military aircraft head up/head down displays were,
however, destined for end use in Israel. These components were
to be installed on decommissioned military aircraft that are now
used exclusively for training purposes. Based on this assessment
it did not breach the Consolidated Criteria. Several licences
for equipment used to initiate explosives were also approved.
The end user stated in both cases that the goods were to be used
for defensive purposes in explosive ordnance disposal and destruction
of improvised explosive devices within the Israeli state. Given
the legitimate use of the goods in the disposal of explosive devices
the decision was made to approve the export applications. In a
further case, similar equipment was exported to Israel after it
was returned to the exporter for repair. Again the stated end
use is explosive ordnance destruction. Given its legitimate use,
the export was approved.
Equipment for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
was approved for export. In one instance the equipment was to
be used solely by the commercial end user. Given that the goods
were not going to be used in an operational manner and were destined
for a commercial end user, the licence application was approved.
Another application proved similar: the goods were being exported
for test and evaluation purposes at the commercial end user's
facilities and were to be handled by the end user's employees
only. The goods in this case were for small surveillance UAVs
which were unarmed.
Jordan: Given that pro-democracy
demonstrations which started in the beginning of 2011 and continued
during this period, the Committees would be grateful for further
information about why the SEILs, inter alia, were granted:
assault, components for assault rifles, components for pistols,
equipment for the production of pistols, components for the production
of rifles, military combat vehicles, pistols, small arms ammunition,
weapon sights and weapon night sights rather than refused under
the terms of Criteria 2.
There were several pro-democracy demonstrations
in Jordan at the start of 2011, the vast majority of them peaceful.
The vast majority of licence applications were
to known end users for whom no human rights concerns under the
Consolidated Criteria currently exist. We therefore had no grounds
to refuse any of the licences under Criterion 2 (internal repression)
or Criterion 3 (human rights abuses).
In other cases the licences were for temporary
exports, and the goods were then returned to the UK. These goods
were either exported for trial and evaluation purposes, or in
one case, for use on a film set.
Kazakhstan: Given the
human rights record of the Government of Kazakhstan, why were
SIELs granted for sniper rifles, rather than refused under the
terms of Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria?
The Government continues to monitor the internal
situation in Kazakhstan very closely. For this export licence
application, a specialist single bolt-action rifle was approved
for a private collector/sportsman known to the exporter and was
intended for personal use. On this occasion the assessment was
made that these goods did not meet the clear risk threshold under
the Consolidated Criteria and the equipment could not be directly
linked to any possible diversion, tensions or abuses in the region.
Kenya: Given that many
observers judge that there is a clear risk of renewed violence
in Kenya in the context of the 2012 national elections, why were
SIELs granted for, inter alia, components for assault rifles,
components for machine guns, components for rifles, pistols, small
arms ammunition, sniper rifles and weapon sights and SITCLs issued
for assault rifles, components for assault rifles and small arms
ammunition, rather than refused under the terms of Criteria 2
of the Consolidated Criteria?
For the SIELs in question (as listed below) the
decision to issue the licences was reached after concluding that
there was no clear risk under Criterion 2 and that none of the
other Criteria were engaged. An application for various
components for assault rifles, machine guns and pistols, was approved
for delivery to a government end user. We have regularly reviewed
the actions of this end user concluding that we have no Criteria
2 concerns. Consequently this application was approved.
An application for various ammunition and cartridges
were approved for a non-government end user for sporting purposes
and vermin control. Given that there are no concerns for this
end use by private users, that we have confirmation that the nature
of the ammunition is suitable for the end use of sporting/vermin
control, and that there is no indication that these ammunition
are intended for onward supply to military or security forces,
this application was approved.
An application for pistols to be used for sporting
purposes, was approved for a non-government end user. The Government
concluded that the application was to support a legitimate sporting
end use and was therefore approved.
Another application was for a single rifle for
individual use. An end user undertaking was supplied including
an import permit from the Kenya Police Central Firearms Bureau.
Further information provided by the end user indicated that the
goods were for his personal use for hunting small game. There
were no Criteria concerns about this end use. Therefore we were
satisfied there was no clear risk under Criterion 2 or risk of
diversion under Criterion 7.
Lebanon: The Committees
note that, inter alia, the following SIELs were granted
during this period: components for machine guns, components for
pistols, components for rifles, grenade launchers, machine guns,
pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights. We would
be grateful to know whether any of these licence applications
were approved on the grounds that they were authorised by the
Government of Lebanon and so not covered by the prevailing arms
embargo. If so, we would also be grateful to know which ones were
so authorised.
The single licence in question was approved because
it was authorised by a body which is exempt from the prevailing
arms embargo in Lebanon.
Oman: Given that unrest
in Oman continued until May 2011 the Committees would be grateful
for information about why SEILs, inter alia, for assault
rifles, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles,
components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, small arms
ammunition and weapon sights were granted, why an OIEL that included
components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection,
components for military support vehicles, technology for all-wheel
drive vehicles with ballistic protection and technology for military
support vehicles, an OIEL for components for small arms ammunition
and small arms ammunition, an OIEL which included components for
military combat vehicles, components for military support vehicles
and components for tanks and SITCLs for assault rifles, components
for assault rifles, components for tanks and small arms ammunition
were issued.
The cases above relate to a variety of equipment
and all were risk assessed individually.
- The components
for rifles, components for sniper rifles, weapon sight mounts,
small arms ammunition were exported for resale for hunting, target
shooting and vermin hunting. Since they were not intended for
military end use and were not subject to any end user concerns,
it was assessed that the export of these goods did not constitute
a clear risk under the Consolidated Criteria.
- A number
of licences have been granted for a range of equipment including
components for assault rifles, components for rifles, combat shotguns,
weapon sights , assault rifles, components for assault rifles,
small arms ammunition, assault rifles, components for assault
rifles, small arms ammunition, sporting guns, weapon sights and
weapon cleaning equipment. These are for use by private security
companies who are undertaking maritime security work (anti-piracy)
on behalf of commercial shipping companies in the Gulf of Aden
and authorised by the Government of Oman. We therefore judged
there was not a clear risk that such weapons would be used in
contravention of Criterion 2. Additional conditions were applied
to these licences to ensure that none of the items would be resold,
donated or loaned to any entity in or external to Oman.
- An OIEL
for components for ground vehicle military communications equipment,
components for military combat vehicles, components for military
support vehicles and components for military trailers was approved.
, There was no specific evidence that the end user would use them
to support activity resulting in internal repression.
- The components
for assault rifles were spare parts. We assessed that as the
end user has no involvement in crowd control operations and as
they were not involved in the unrest there was not a clear risk
that this could be used for internal repression.
A licence for components for tanks was approved.
There is no specific evidence that the end user will use them
to support activity resulting in internal repression.
Pakistan: The Committees
would be grateful for more information about why SEILs for dimensional
inspection equipment, materials testing equipment and mechanical
measurement equipment were refused.
The various types of equipment in question were
refused due to concerns that they might be used in a programme
of concern.
Saudi Arabia: Given that
unrest continued in Saudi Arabia until June 2011 the Committees
would be grateful for more information about why SIELs for components
for sniper rifles, components for water cannons, equipment for
the use of weapon night sights, hand grenades, small arms ammunition,
weapon night sights and weapon sights were granted.
We would like further information about why an OIEL
which included ballistic shields, body armour, bomb suits, civil
body armour, components for ballistic shields, components for
body armour, components for bomb suits and components for civil
body armour and an OIEL for components for small arms ammunition
and small arms ammunition were refused given that an OIEL for
ballistic shields, body armour, bomb suits, civil body armour,
components for body armour, constructions for ballistic protection
of military systems, military helmets was issued in Quarter 1
of 2011.
When we processed these applications, full consideration
was given to the goods, their intended end use and the final end
user against the Criteria, drawing from all information available
to us and the prevailing situation not only in Saudi Arabia but
the wider region. In all cases, we concluded that there
was no clear risk under Criterion 2 and insufficient risk under
Criterion 3 to recommend refusal of the applications.
To date, there is no evidence that UK supplied
equipment has been used in breach of the Criteria in Saudi Arabia,
or in Bahrain. We concluded that there was no clear risk under
Criterion 2 and insufficient risk under Criterion 3.
Slovakia: The Committees
would be grateful for more information about why an OIEL for gun
silencers was refused.
Occasionally OIELs are considered to be too broad
for certain destinations and for certain types of goods when it
is judged that a higher level of scrutiny may be required. This
OIEL was issued for a number of other destinations but the company
was asked to submit SIEL applications for these goods for Slovakia
so that they could be assessed on a case by case basis.
Somalia: Given that Somalia
has been described as a failed state and is one of the
poorest and most violent states in the world the Committees would
be grateful for an explanation of why over £1.34m of SEILs
were issued during this period, including SEILS for armour plate,
body armour, components for body armour, military equipment for
initiating explosives, cryptographic software, equipment employing
cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
and technology for equipment employing cryptography.
We would like more detailed information on the intended
use of the military combat vehicles for which a SITCL was issued.
- Somalia
is subject to an arms embargo and other restrictions as set out
in various UN Security Council Resolutions. Certain exemptions
under the embargo allow for the export of non-lethal military
equipment for the UN and the supply of weapons and military equipment
for the UN and the supply of weapons and military equipment intended
for the sole use of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM),
and supplies of non-military equipment intended solely for humanitarian
or protective use. The applications referred to
were approved for the following reasons:
- The items
of body armour were intended for a humanitarian agency for the
purposes of self-protection. Given that these items are
noted as falling under the exemption in UNSCR 1356 which allows
"Protective clothing, including flak jackets and military
helmets, temporarily exported to Somalia by UN personnel, representatives
of the media and humanitarian and development workers and associated
personnel for their personal use only", this application
was approved.
- The items
of armoured plate were intended for a humanitarian agency acting
under the auspices of AMISOM for the purposes of self-protection.
Given that these items are noted as falling under the exemption
in UNSCR 1772 which allows "supplies of weapons and military
equipment, technical training and assistance intended solely for
the support of or use by AMISOM", this application was approved.
- The items
of military equipment for initiating explosives were intended
for a humanitarian end user acting under the auspices of AMISOM
for the purposes of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). Given
that these items are noted as falling under the exemption in UNSCR
1772 which allows "supplies of weapons and military equipment,
technical training and assistance intended solely for the support
of or use by AMISOM", this application was approved.
- The various
items of cryptographic equipment, including cryptographic software,
equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment
employing cryptography and technology for equipment employing
cryptography, were intended for various humanitarian end users
acting under the auspices of AMISOM. As dual-use items they
are not subject to the arms embargo and were approved given the
identity of the end-user and the stated end-use.
- The armoured
shield items were intended for a humanitarian NGO for the purposes
of self-protection. Given that these items fall under the
exemption in UNSCR 1356 which allows "supplies of non-lethal
military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective
use", this licence was approved.
Thailand: Given that tensions
continue between Thailand and Cambodia over territorial issues
along their mutual border and that there were several deaths of
troops in April 2011, the Committees would like more detailed
information of the use of the military SIELs granted during this
period.
We continue to monitor the tensions on the Cambodian
border. This factor is kept under review and considered in our
recommendations in light of its implications for refusals under
Criterion 4. Each of the licences referenced were assessed individually
and there were no Criterion 4 refusals during the period under
review
- The application
for night vision tubes was for the maintenance of surveillance
cameras already in operation with the end user and therefore did
not grant any new capability that could escalate tensions. They
were primarily to be deployed in the south of the country away
from the border dispute, further reducing concerns.
- The application
for a portable jammer system was for use in protection against
remote detonated IED/EOD devices and has a wholly protective utility.
Additionally there is no evidence of the end user presenting a
clear risk under Criterion 4
- The application
for mask assemblies and filters was for protection against chemical
and biological agents and does not pose a clear risk of increasing
tensions on the Cambodian border.
- The application
for batteries and chargers was for use in radio equipment already
in operation by the end user and does not therefore grant any
new capability that could escalate tensions.
- The EOD/IED
protection and disposal equipment was intended as protection for
law enforcement in detecting and neutralising IED/EOD threats
and would not raise any concerns with the Cambodian border dispute.
- Two licences
granted for aviation counter-measures were for an end user for
whom there is no evidence of risk under Criterion 4
- An application
for equipment to maintain naval radar equipment currently in service
was granted as they would not be deployed on the disputed Cambodian
border and did not grant any new capability.
- A licence
was granted for a lighting assembly for the maintenance of aircraft
already in service as this did not represent an increase in capability
and there is no evidence of concerns for the specific end user.
- Two temporary
applications for weapon sights were granted as these were exported
for demonstration, trial and evaluation purposes and were to be
returned to the UK following these trials
- An aircraft
insulator was approved for the maintenance of aircraft that were
already in service therefore not adding any new capability that
could escalate tensions.
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