The Committees' 2011 Quarter 3 (July - September)
questions and the Government's answers
Australia: The
Committees wish to have information on why SIELs for accessories
for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming
equipment, components for military improvised explosive device
decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, equipment for the
use of military improvised explosive device/decoying/detection/disposal/jamming
equipment and military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming
equipment were refused.
This application was refused under Criterion 5d:
the need to protect UK military classified information and capabilities,
as the company intended to use a non-government agency for the
shipment of explosive protective equipment. Government policy
is not to release such sensitive equipment to non-government agencies.
Bahrain: Given the large
scale unrest and human rights violations by the security forces
which occurred in Bahrain earlier in the year, why were SIELs
granted for gun silencers, rifles and weapon sights rather than
refused under the terms of Criteria 2, 3 or 4 of the Consolidated
Criteria?
A review of export licences was held in February
2011 and licences for equipment that could be used for internal
repression revoked. Since then we have continued processing licences
for Bahrain on a case-by-case basis, carefully reviewing the situation
on the ground. The SIEL for gun silencers, rifles and weapon
sights relates to exports to a named individual who intended to
use them in sporting shooting. Since they were not intended for
military end use, were not subject to any end user concerns and
no denial matches with EU Member States existed, we did not assess
that there was a clear risk of these goods being used contrary
to Criteria 2, 3 or 4.
China: Given the human rights record of
China the Committees request further information on why the SIELs
for body armour, technology for military communications equipment,
cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography; and
OIELs for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography
were issued when the listed items could be used for internal repression.
Given that the UK interpretation of the Madrid Council on 27
June 1989 states that the following items should not be licensed:
lethal weapons such as machine guns, large calibre weapons, bombs,
torpedoes, rockets and missiles; specially designed components
for these items and ammunition; military aircraft and helicopters,
vessels of war, armoured fighting vehicles and other such weapon
platforms; any equipment which might be used for internal repression
are embargoed to China, the Committees wish to have information
on why SIELs for aircraft military communications equipment; components
for combat helicopters and components for military helicopters
were issued.
All export
licences for China are assessed against the Consolidated Criteria,
which includes our international commitments under the EU embargo.
We are satisfied that UK exports are in line with the terms of
the embargo.
We receive a large number of licence applications
for China and the majority are for end users in the commercial,
low-cost/mass production, industrial or scientific research and
development fields. Some items are military-rated but are not
caught by the EU Arms Embargo, such as military-rated items for
non-lethal purposes i.e. industrial components or NBC equipment
for use by environmental agencies. The UK interpretation of Arms
Embargo on China, given in Parliament on 3 June 1998, was to include:
- Lethal weapons, such as machine guns, large
calibre weapons, bombs, torpedoes, rockets and missiles. Specially
designed components for these and ammunition.
- Military aircraft and helicopters, vessels
of war, armoured fighting vehicles and other such weapons platforms.
- Any equipment which might be used for internal
repression.
Detailed information about some of these exports
has already been given in a reply dated 6 February 2012 to Sir
John Stanley's letter of 25 January 2012 on behalf of the CAEC.
However, a summary of some of the licences approved is given below
with further information about the goods exported:
- Body Armour: The goods were for use by a global
technical textile manufacturing company with a site in China capable
of low-cost manufacturing. The armoured vests were sent for testing
at a police facility. After testing they would be damaged to the
point of destruction and sent back to the supplier in the UK for
examination and study. We assess that there were no Criterion
2 concerns in this case as there was no clear risk of internal
repression.
- Technology for military communications equipment:
In this case, the goods exported were technical drawings for use
in the manufacture (moulding) of parts to be used on cable assemblies.
The end user is a global electronics manufacturing services provider
that serves original equipment manufacturers in technology-related
industries such as communications and computer hardware. The moulded
parts would be sent to Singapore who would then integrate them
into headsets. There were no criteria concerns in this case as
the moulds were due to be sent to Singapore.
- Cryptographic software and equipment employing
cryptography: In all cases the equipment was for commercial end-use
such as incorporation into a wireless application for a portable
medical device for use in hospitals, a support system for smartcards
for a banking payment system, or to enable secure internet connectivity
across communications networks. As such we assess there was no
clear risk that the equipment might be used for internal repression.
- Components for combat and military helicopters:
Although the components were originally designed for military
applications, in these cases they were for commercial and civilian
end-use. The exports were consistent with the terms of the embargo
and therefore did not raise concerns against the Criteria.
Congo, Democratic Republic of: Given
that the Democratic Republic of Congo is one the FCO's "countries
of concern", as listed in the FCO's 2010 Human Rights and
Democracy Report, the Committees wish to have further information
on why a SIEL for sniper rifles was granted.
No SIEL was issued for sniper rifles.
The Government's Quarterly Report
shows an OITCL for the provision of insurance related
to a
list of military
equipment (as an act calculated to promote the supply or delivery
of that
equipment) as
well as the supply of sniper rifles.
Sniper rifles were not part of the original application
and an error in entering a later amendment to the licence led
to the Quarterly Report entry reading "sniper rifles"
instead of "promoting the supply of sniper rifles".
An amendment to the Quarterly Report will issue shortly.
Djibouti: Given the human
rights record of the Government of Djibouti, why were SIELs granted
for assault rifles, components for assault rifles and small arms
ammunition and OITCLs for assault rifles, components for assault
rifles and small arms ammunition, rather than refused under the
terms of Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria.
A number of Single and Open (OITCLs) licences
have been granted for a range of equipment including weapons and
ammunition. These are for use by private security companies who
are undertaking maritime security work on behalf of commercial
shipping companies in the Horn of Africa/Gulf of Aden. The assessment
was that this equipment was not for end use by the Government
of Djibouti but for use by commercial organisations undertaking
legitimate anti-piracy work. The security companies had confirmed
that they were authorised by the Government of Djibouti to undertake
such work and the equipment would be held in secure conditions
whilst vessels were docked in Djibouti.
We therefore judged there was not a clear risk
that such weapons might be used for internal repression as they
were not for use by the armed forces or internal security forces
of Djibouti.
The OITCLs were approved for the named maritime
and private security companies undertaking this anti-piracy work
on the basis that the equipment was being moved between destination
countries and would be held in secure conditions at each port
after docking before being embarked onto vessels for their next
destination.
Hong Kong: Given the
human rights record of the Government of China, how were concerns
about diversion under Criteria 7 - and then by extension, Criteria
2 - of the Consolidated Criteria allayed with regard to the SIELs
granted for components for assault rifles, components for sniper
rifles, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, hand grenades,
small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, technology for assault rifles,
technology for sniper rifles, weapon sights, equipment for the
use of weapon night sights and weapon night sights? Why was an
incorporated SIEL with the ultimate destination of China for military
infrared/thermal imaging equipment approved?
Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region of
the People's Republic of China. Exports of Wassenaar-controlled
and certain military equipment to anywhere in China require a
licence.
Two of the licences in question were for temporary
exports for demonstration purposes and the equipment will ultimately
be returned to the UK. Three of the licences were destined for
the Hong Kong Police Force and its various sub-sections, and as
such, we assessed there were no Criteria concerns raised. The
licence that was issued for the final destination of China was
for equipment that would be used in search and rescue operations
and we assessed it unlikely to be used for internal repression
purposes.
Israel: Given the controversy
that occurred over "Operation Cast Lead" in Gaza, which
is part of the Palestinian Occupied Territories, in late 2008
and early 2009, the Committees wish to have further information
regarding the following SIELs that were granted, inter alia, during
this period: components for weapon sights, general military vehicle
components and weapon sights and why these SIELs were granted.
The Government considers all applications case
by case against the Consolidated Criteria. We recognise Israel's
right to self defence but pay particular attention to risks.
The components for weapon sights were intended
solely for marketing and demonstration purposes to a range of
customers. Any actual supply of product would require further
licence applications which would be assessed fully against the
Criteria, taking into account full end user details, specific
end use, quantities and prevailing circumstances.
The general military vehicle components were a
protective seat designed to absorb blast shock in the event of
a vehicle going over an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) or mine.
The licence was approved on the basis that the goods were for
use in a development programme for a foreign government and were
not for operational use by the Israeli Defence Force (IDF).
Weapon sights were approved as they were for use
by an individual for competitive target shooting and not for military
use.
Ivory Coast: Given the
arms trade sanctions against the Ivory Coast, adopted by UN Security
Council resolution 1572 and EU Council Decision 2010/656/CFSP,
why was an OITCL for sniper rifles granted?
No SIEL was issued for sniper rifles. The
Government's Quarterly Report shows an OITCL for the provision
of insurance related to a
list of military
equipment (as an act calculated to promote the supply or delivery
of that
equipment) as
well as the supply of sniper rifles.
Sniper rifles were not part of the original application
and an error in entering a later amendment to the licence led
to the Quarterly Report entry reading "sniper rifles"
instead of "promoting the supply of sniper rifles".
An amendment to the Quarterly Report will issue shortly.
Jordan:
Given that pro-democracy demonstrations
took place immediately prior to this period, the Committees wish
to have further information about why the SIELs, inter alia, were
granted: all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components
for machine guns, components for military communications equipment,
components for military helmets and components for military support
vehicles rather than refused under the terms of Criteria 2.
The majority of protests in Jordan passed peacefully.
However, in one particular protest in March 2011, the gendarmerie
used water cannon to disperse protestors. One man died during
this protest, although it was later found that he died from a
heart attack, and not directly from force used by the gendarmerie.
We continue to look at all licence applications closely, and assess
any offensive goods extremely carefully.
The all-wheel drive vehicle with ballistic protection
was to be used as a customer evaluation vehicle for test driving.
As such, the end-use did not raise any concerns against the Criteria.
The licence for components of military support vehicles was granted
for a steering column. There is no information of the vehicles
being linked to human rights abuses.
Components for machine guns were to be used for
the maintenance and repair of the end users' existing weapon stock.
The goods were intended for military use. The end user was not
involved in policing the pro-democracy protests that took place
in Jordan and we assessed that given there was no information
giving rise to Criteria concerns these goods should be approved.
Components for military communications equipment
were spares to be used for repair and maintenance in military
radios. The end user was not involved in policing the pro-democracy
protests that took place in Jordan and it was assessed that there
was no information giving rise to Criteria Concerns for these
goods.
The components for military helmets were for manufacture
of helmets for the police and armed forces. The nature of the
equipment and the identity of the end-users did not raise concerns
against the Criteria.
Kenya: Given that many
observers judge that there is a clear risk of renewed violence
in Kenya in the context of the 2012 national elections, why were
SIELs granted for, inter alia, combat shotguns, components for
all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, small arms
ammunition and weapon sights, an OIEL for components for military
support vehicles and an OITCL for assault rifles and small arms
ammunition, rather than refused under the terms of Criteria 2
of the Consolidated Criteria?
For all export licence applications for Kenya
we pay particular attention to Criterion Two following the post
election violence and internal security operations that took place
during 2007 and 2008.
The combat shotguns and ammunition relate to a
licence that was granted to a private security company undertaking
maritime security work in the defence of commercial vessels whilst
in international waters. The assessment was that this equipment
was not for end use by the Government of Kenya but for use by
commercial organisations undertaking legitimate anti-piracy work
who had further confirmed that the equipment would be held in
secure conditions whilst vessels were docked in Kenya. We therefore
judged there was not a clear risk that the weapons might be used
in contravention of Criterion 2 and the licence was approved.
The components for all-wheel drive vehicles with
ballistic protection relate to a licence that was granted to UN
Peace Keeping Forces operating under AMISOM. The assessment was
that this equipment was not for end use by the Government of Kenya
but for use by the UN in furtherance of an authorised and legitimate
peace-keeping mission. We therefore judged there was not a clear
risk that the equipment might be used in contravention of Criterion
2 and the licence was approved.
The small arms ammunition relates to a licence
for sporting cartridges, to be used by athletes in preparation
for the African Championship, Olympic Games and other World Cup
events. We assess the such an end use did not raise Criteria
concerns and the licence was therefore approved.
The open licence authorising the trading of goods
between one overseas country and another relates to a licence
for assault rifles, components for assault rifles, small arms
ammunition, sporting guns, and weapon cleaning equipment to a
private security company that is undertaking maritime security
work in the defence of commercial vessels whilst in international
waters. The assessment was that this equipment was not for
end use by the Government of Kenya but for use by commercial organisations
undertaking legitimate anti-piracy work. The security companies
had confirmed that the equipment would be held in secure conditions
whilst vessels were docked in Kenya; other provisos were also
placed on this licence to ensure the safe storage of the items
and the terms under which they can be used. We therefore judged
there was no clear risk that the weapons might be used in contravention
of Criterion 2 and the licence was approved.
The open licence for components for military support
vehicles relates to a licence granted to Government end users.
The application was approved as there was no evidence to link
the equipment with human rights violations in Kenya and we concluded
that there was no clear risk under Criterion 2.
Kuwait: Given
the unrest in the country prior to and during this period, the
Committees wish to have further information about why SIELs for
hand grenades and teargas/irritant ammunition and OIELs issued
for components for: military combat vehicles; and inter alia,
components for weapon night sights, rather than refused under
Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria.
The SIEL for hand grenades and teargas/irritant
ammunition relates to goods exported to an end user who was not
involved in the limited unrest which took place in Kuwait last
year. Therefore, there was no clear risk that these goods might
be used contrary to Criterion 2.
The OIEL for military combat vehicles was for
evaluation and demonstration purposes only. Therefore, there
was no clear risk of these goods being used contrary to Criterion
2.
The OIEL for weapon night sights is for goods
exported to an end user who was not involved in the limited unrest
which took place in Kuwait last year. Therefore, there was no
clear risk of these goods being used contrary to Criterion 2.
Lebanon: The Committees
note that, inter alia, the following SIEL was granted during this
period: sniper rifles. We wish to know whether this licence application
was approved on the grounds that it was authorised by the Government
of Lebanon and so not covered by the prevailing arms embargo.
If not, why was the SIEL issued.
No SIEL was issued for sniper rifles. The
Government's Quarterly Report shows an OITCL for the provision
of insurance related to a
list of military
equipment (as an act calculated to promote the supply or delivery
of that
equipment) as
well as the supply of sniper rifles.
Sniper rifles were not part of the original application
and an error in entering a later amendment to the licence led
to the Quarterly Report entry reading "sniper rifles"
instead of "promoting the supply of sniper rifles".
An amendment to the Quarterly Report will issue shortly.
Oman: Given that unrest
in Oman continued until May 2011 the Committees wish to have information
about why: SIELs for assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns,
components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components
for rifles, components for sniper rifles, gun silencers, pistols,
rifles, small arms ammunition, weapon sight mounts and weapon
sights were granted; why an OIEL for components for military combat
vehicles and military combat vehicles was granted; and OITCLs
for assault rifles, components for assault rifles and small arms
ammunition issued?
Criterion 2 concerns have emerged for Oman following
the anti-government protests. The reports of clashes between
security forces and protesters in Sohar have included allegations
of the use of tear gas and rubber bullets. On the 2nd March 2011,
in light of the protests, HMG reviewed export licences for Oman
and in light of the information that subsequent protests were
handled in a proportionate and reasonable manner by the security
forces no revocations were made.
The cases above relate to a variety of equipment
and all were risk assessed individually.
The SIEL for components for sniper rifles and
weapon sight mounts is for goods exported for resale for hunting
and target shooting purposes. Since they were not intended for
military end use it was assessed that there was no clear risk
against the Criteria.
The SIEL for weapon sight mounts and weapon sights
is for goods for use by an end user in Oman who was not involved
in the unrest of last year. Therefore, it was assessed that there
was no clear risk against the Criteria.
The OIEL for military combat vehicles was for
goods for use by an end user in Oman who was judges to have acted
with restraint during the unrest of last year. Therefore, it
was assessed that there was no clear risk against the Criteria.
Other licences were granted for a range of equipment
including weapons and ammunition which were to be used by private
security companies who are undertaking maritime security work
on behalf of commercial shipping companies in the Horn of Africa/Gulf
of Aden. The assessment was that this equipment was not for end
use by the Government of Oman but for use by commercial organisations
undertaking legitimate anti-piracy work. The security companies
had confirmed that the equipment would be held in secure conditions
whilst vessels were docked in Oman.
We therefore judged there was not a clear risk
that such weapons would be used in contravention of Criterion
2 as they were not for use by the armed forces or internal security
forces of Oman.
The OITCLs were approved for the named maritime
and private security companies undertaking this anti-piracy work
on the basis that the equipment was being moved between destination
countries and would be held in secure conditions at each port
after docking before being embarked onto vessels for their next
destination. Criterion 2 concerns have emerged for Oman following
the anti-government protests. The reports of clashes between
security forces and protesters in Sohar have included allegations
of the use of tear gas and rubber bullets. On the 2nd March 2011,
in light of the protests, HMG reviewed export licences for Oman
and in light of the information that subsequent protests were
handled in a proportionate and reasonable manner by the security
forces no revocations were made.
The cases above (which post-dated the protests
and the review of licences) relate to a variety of equipment and
all were risk assessed individually.
The SIEL for components for sniper rifles and
weapon sight mounts is for goods exported for resale for hunting
and target shooting purposes. Since they were not intended for
military end use it was assessed that there was no clear risk
against the Criteria.
The SIEL for weapon sight mounts and weapon sights
is for goods for use by an end user in Oman who was not involved
in the unrest of last year. Therefore, it was assessed that there
was no clear risk against the Criteria.
The OIEL for military combat vehicles was for
goods for use by an end user in Oman who was judged to have acted
with restraint during the unrest of last year. Therefore, it
was assessed that there was no clear risk against the Criteria.
Other licences were granted for a range of equipment
including weapons and ammunition which were to be used by private
security companies undertaking maritime security work on behalf
of commercial shipping companies in the Horn of Africa/Gulf of
Aden. The assessment was that this equipment was not for end
use by the Government of Oman but for use by commercial organisations
undertaking legitimate anti-piracy work. The security companies
had confirmed that the equipment would be held in secure conditions
whilst vessels were docked in Oman.
We therefore judged there was not a clear risk
that such weapons would be used in contravention of Criterion
2 as they were not for use by the armed forces or internal security
forces of Oman.
The OITCLs were approved for the named maritime
and private security companies undertaking this anti-piracy work
on the basis that the equipment was being moved between destination
countries and would be held in secure conditions at each port
after docking before being embarked onto vessels for their next
destination.
Sri Lanka: Given that
Sri Lanka is listed as a "country of concern", as listed
in the FCO's 2010 Human Rights and Democracy Report, the Committees
wish to have more information on why SIELs for all-wheel drive
vehicles with ballistic protection and military support vehicles
were granted and why SITCLs for assault rifles, components for
assault rifles and small arms ammunition were approved.
All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
and military support vehicles were approved on the basis that
the equipment was to be used by a well known international NGO
whilst carrying out a humanitarian mine clearance programme.
SITCLS for assault rifles were approved for the
named maritime and private security companies undertaking anti-piracy
work on the basis that the equipment was being moved between destination
countries and would be held in secure conditions at each port
after docking before being embarked onto vessels for their next
destination.
Sudan: Given the current
tension on the border between Sudan and South Sudan and the sanctions
imposed by the EU Common Positions 1994/165/CFSP and 2005/411/CFSP,
why was a SIEL for sniper rifles issued rather than refused under
Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria?
No SIEL was issued for sniper rifles.
The Government's Quarterly Report
shows an OITCL for the provision of insurance related
to a
list of military
equipment (as an act calculated to promote the supply or delivery
of that
equipment) as
well as the supply of sniper rifles.
Sniper rifles were not part of the original application
and an error in entering a later amendment to the licence led
to the Quarterly Report entry reading "sniper rifles"
instead of "promoting the supply of sniper rifles".
An amendment to the Quarterly Report will issue shortly.
South Sudan: Given the
current tension on the border between Sudan and South Sudan and
the sanctions imposed by the EU Common Positions 1994/165/CFSP
and 2005/411/CFSP and the Council Decision 2011/423/CFSP which
extended the arms embargo to South Sudan, why was a SITCL for
military combat vehicles granted rather than refused under Criteria
2 of the Consolidated Criteria?
In line with our international obligations, all
licence applications for South Sudan are processed in line with
EU Council Decision 2011/423/CFSP. Under the terms of the arms
embargo there is an exemption for "the sale, supply, transfer
or export of de-mining equipment and material for use in de-mining
operations".
The military combat vehicles were intended for
a humanitarian organisation for use in mine clearance operations.
The licence is therefore consistent with the terms of the embargo
and did not raise any concerns against the Criteria.
Syria: Given the current
unrest and human rights violations by the security forces in Syria
the Committees wish to know why SIELs for cryptographic software
and equipment employing cryptographic software were issued.
Criteria 2 and 3 concerns have emerged for Syria.
Protests began to spread in Syria during March 2011 after security
forces used excessive force to suppress peaceful protests. The
goods on this application for cryptographic software and equipment
employing cryptographic software are dual-use and intended for
civil end-use by a commercial (non-governmental) end-user. There
are no concerns relating to internal repression or aggravation
of existing tensions linked to these goods and this end use. On
this basis it was assessed that the risk threshold under Criteria
2 and 3 had not been met.
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