Annex 11: The Committees' questions and the
Government's answers to the Strategic Export Controls Annual Report
2010
The text of a letter from the Foreign Secretary to
the Chairman of the Committees dated 7 January 2012 relating the
Committees' questions and the Government's answers to the United
Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Report 2010 (HC1402) follows:
Thank you for your letters of 19 October and 16 December
2011 about the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls
Annual Report 2010. I apologise for the delay in responding which
was due to administrative error, and I regret any inconvenience
this has caused. I enclose a response which addresses the questions
asked in Annex A of your letter of 19 October.
The Government attaches great importance to the work
of the Committees, and values their role in scrutinising strategic
arms exports. We look forward to working closely and constructively
with the Committees to address their concerns in a transparent,
comprehensive and timely manner. I also look forward to giving
Oral Evidence before the Committees on 7 February and to receiving
the Committees' Annual Report for 2012 in due course.
Annex A: Questions relating to the Government's
Report - United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report
2010- HC1402
The paragraph numbers follow those in the Government's
report. In order to assist the Committees, we have provided internet
links to sources where available.
Ministerial Foreword 2nd paragraph
On what grounds does the Government consider that
its commitment to increasing arms exports on the one hand, and
promoting democracy and human rights abroad on the other, are
mutually reinforcing, rather than mutually conflicting, agendas?
Increasing defence and security exports does not
by definition mean ignoring the promotion of democracy and human
rights abroad. All countries have the right to an effective, secure
defence and the Government will use its export licensing powers
to ensure that the UK only permits responsible defence exports.
Ministerial Foreword 2nd paragraph
In what specific ways has the present Government
extended transparency on arms exports data compared with the previous
Government?
The Government makes available data on all export
licensing applications via the BIS Strategic Export Controls:
Reports & Statistics website (link below). The Government
now provides an unclassified, redacted version of its answers
to the Committees questions based on BIS Quarterly Reports. This
began with the response to questions covering the quarter January-March
2011.
Link: https://www.exportcontroldb.bis.gov.uk/eng/fox/sdb/SDBHOME
Section 1 Domestic Policy paragraph 1.1
Does the Government accept that the scale and content
of its revocation of extant arms export licences to countries
in North Africa and the Middle East as detailed in Annex 1 of
the Government's Response (Cm 8079) to the Committees on Arms
Export Controls Report published on 5 April 2011 represent a serious
failure by BIS, FCO, MOD, DFID, HMRC and UKBA to fulfil the first
Guiding Principle of the Export Licensing Community's Joint Mission
Statement namely: "We shall implement effectively the UK's
framework of strategic export controls so as to ensure that sensitive
goods and technology are kept out of the wrong hands?"
Revocations, on the contrary, show how seriously
we take this guiding principle. Given the significant changes
in the region, it would seem entirely right and reasonable that
risk assessments should be updated and, in some cases, lead to
a change in decision where the licence is no longer consistent
with the Consolidated Criteria. There is no suggestion that the
original decisions were flawed in the context of the prevailing
conditions at the time they were made.
Section 1 Domestic Policy paragraph 1.2
In respect of each of the extant arms export licences
to countries in North Africa and the Middle East which have now
been revoked, as detailed in Annex 1of Cm 8079, which were, and
which are not:
a) referred to the FCO overseas post concerned for
assessment against Criteria 2 and 3 before the licence was granted?
b) referred to FCO Ministers for a final recommendation,
and what was their recommendation in each case and the date of
their recommendation?
Risk assessments are made by the individual country
officer in the Arms Export Policy Team, consulting as necessary
with geographical desks and/or overseas Posts. The need to consult
may be driven by a lack of specific information in relation to
the equipment for export, or its intended use, or to obtain a
more general update should the situation in a country change.
A significant change in a country (e.g. because of upheaval) is
likely to lead to an increase in advice being sought from desks
and Posts because the situation on the ground is in a state of
flux, or a review of licences to that particular country. Ministers
are consulted about particularly difficult cases.
We do not go into detail about this process, particularly
in a document that is likely to be made public. The export licensing
system is based on risk assessment. Information about how risk
was assessed for individual countries could have a negative impact
on our bilateral relations and therefore regional stability.
Providing the level of detail requested could breach commercial
confidentiality in some instances and place the UK defence and
security industry at a disadvantage in a competitive market.
Section 1 Domestic Policy paragraph 1.2
a) Which strategic export licence applications,
and for what goods and to which countries, were referred to DFID
in 2010 for that Department's specific expertise and advice? Of
those applications, which were granted and which were refused,
and which were granted contrary to the advice of DFID?
DFID received 266 applications to review in 2010.
Please see Annex 1 for a breakdown of the countries, goods and
final licensing decision made for each of these applications.
DFID reviews all licences for exports to World Bank International
Development Assistance eligible countries. Although the attached
spreadsheet highlights multiple destinations for OIELs and OITCLs,
DFID comments only on those that fall within this criterion. This
is made clearer in the final column.
Of the applications seen by DFID, broken down
by country,178 were issued,196 issued with proviso, 25 rejected,
14 refused and 83 stopped, withdrawn or remain outstanding. There
were no instances of a licence being granted despite DFID recommending
it be declined.
b) Which of the arms export licence applications
to countries in North Africa and the Middle East which have now
been revoked, as detailed in Annex 1 of Cm 8079, were referred
to DFID for that Department's specific expertise and advice, and
what was DFID's advice in each case?
None of the revoked licences listed in Annex 1of
report CM8079 were circulated to DFID.
Section 1 Domestic Policy paragraph 1.3
What steps will the Government take to inform the
Committees on Arms Export Controls of any amendments to strategic
exports control legislation it has decided to make by way of secondary
legislation?
Amendments to strategic export control legislation
are laid before Parliament and we endeavour, as a matter of course,
to provide the Chair of the CAEC with advance written notice of
this.
Amendments are also published on the legislation.gov.uk
website, as well as being publicised directly to exporters via
a Notice to Exporters or Awareness Bulletin and on the export
control pages of both the BIS and Business Link websites:
Link: http://www.legislation.gov.uk
Link: http://www.bis.gov.uk/exportcontrol
Link: http://www.businesslink.gov.uk/exportcontrol
Section 1 Domestic Policy paragraph 1.3
Will the Government's relaxation of the UK's national
controls on explosives-related items to bring them into line with
EU controls increase the risk that such items exported from the
UK may be used for internal repression or against the Armed Forces
of the UK or those of other NATO and EU member countries?
No. The items in question still require an export
licence to be exported to any destination outside the EU or a
country other than Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway,
Switzerland or the USA. This change simply brought the controls
into line with EU-wide controls on equipment having a higher specification.
In doing so we corrected an anomaly whereby equipment of a lower
specification was subject to national controls which were more
restrictive than EU controls on equipment of a higher specification.
Section 1 Domestic Policy paragraph 1.3
a) Is the Order introducing a control on the export
to the USA of sodium thiopental used in some states in the USA
in the process of execution by lethal injection going to be extended
beyond the maximum of 12 months?
b) What has been the European Commission's response
to the British Government's request that sodium thiopental be
added to the items in the EU's so-called "torture Regulation"
for which export authorisation is required?
The European Commission have brought forward proposals
to add to Annex Ill of Regulation 1236/2005 (the so-called torture
Regulation) certain "short and intermediate acting barbiturates",
including sodium thiopental and pentobarbital. This means that
a licence would be required for export of any of these drugs from
the EU to any destination outside the EU. It is expected that
this measure will come into force in December 2011. When it does
we will revoke the existing UK controls on these drugs.
The Commission have also indicated that in 2012
they will begin a broader review of the torture Regulation, including
further revisions of the Annexes and consideration of the inclusion
of "end-use", brokering and transit controls. These
further measures will, however, require the approval of the Council
(acting by a qualified majority of the Member States) and European
Parliament and it is of course not possible to predict what the
outcome of this review will be.
Section 1 Domestic Policy paragraph 1.3
On 27 October 2010 a new EU Regulation imposing restrictive
measures against Iran came into force - Council Regulation (EU)
961/2010 of 25 October 2010. Will the UK Government be introducing
any new or amending any existing legislation in order to comply
with the Regulation?
The Export Control (Iran) Order 2011 (SI 2011/1297)
was laid in Parliament on 23 May and came into force on 13 June
this year. The Order set out the new offences and penalties in
relation to the elements falling within the remit of BIS of Council
Regulation (EU) No. 961/2010 on restrictive measures against Iran.
A copy of the Order is available to view at legislation.gov.uk.
Link: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2011/1297/
contents/made
Section 1 Domestic Policy paragraph 1.3
On 9 November 2010 Mark Prisk MP, Minister for Business,
announced to Parliament that the Government would only issue licences
for Annex IV items in the most exceptional circumstances. What
would those circumstances be?
It is hard to envisage many circumstances where
we would issue a licence for Annex IV goods to Iran. But it is
conceivable that, should some sort of humanitarian emergency (an
earthquake for example) develop in Iran, we may require the flexibility
to provide controlled goods to aid this humanitarian effort. To
date we had no occasion to issue a licence for Annex IV goods,
but the statement gives us the flexibility to do so should the
need arise.
Section 1 Domestic Policy paragraph 1.4
a) The Government has made the policy change that
from 1 July 2010 all applications for Standard Individual Export
Licences (SIELs) must contain a declaration from the end-user
that the goods will not be re-exported or otherwise re-sold or
transferred to a destination subject to UN, EU or OSCE embargo
where to do so would be a breach of the terms of that embargo.
Why did the policy change apply only to Standard Individual Export
Licence applications, and not all applications for strategic exports?
The policy change only applies to applications
for Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs) where an End User
Undertaking is currently required. Open General Licences either
already contain a specific no re-export condition or are otherwise
constructed around a particular scenario (e.g. export for exhibition
where the goods ultimately return to the UK) such that the question
of re-export does not arise. The documentary and record-keeping
requirements of each OGEL are set out clearly in the licence itself
and are not affected by this new requirement.
Open Individual Export licences (OIELs) are concessionary
licences and therefore already have a condition on the licence
prohibiting re-export to a destination not on the licence.
b) From 1 July 2010 all End-User Undertakings must
contain a declaration by the end-user that the goods will not
be re-exported or otherwise re-sold or transferred to a destination
subject to UN, EU or OSCE embargo. How is this monitored and enforced?
The risk of diversion to destinations subject
to UN, EU or OSCE embargoes is minimised by completing a thorough
risk assessment of each application received at the pre-licensing
stage and this process includes careful examination of information
about the proposed end-use and actual end user of the goods. The
risk of diversion is, of course, considered when assessing licensing
applications under Criterion 7.
The use of military equipment overseas in destinations
of concern is also monitored by UK diplomatic posts, reporting
on the equipment that has been supplied from the UK and how it
is being used in that destination.
We also take account of a variety of different
reporting on end-use which includes reports from NGOs, human rights
organisation reports, media reporting, and intelligence reports.
Posts overseas are instructed to report to the FCO any misuse
of UK-supplied equipment.
Section 1 Domestic Policy paragraph 1.6
Is the Department for Business intending to make
any further developments to the ECO website in order to aid exporters?
If so, what is envisaged?
The ECO's main method of communicating with
exporters is online and ECO is continually endeavouring to
further develop and improve its website presence. This is achieved
via a number of different websites rather than a single ECO website.
A summary of the planned developments of each web area is summarised
briefly below:
- www.businesslink.gov.uk - ECO's main practical
guidance material is published on this cross-government portal.
Businesslink are currently in the process of making some site-wide
improvements including the launch of a business mentoring portal,
a comprehensive resource for start up companies and a revamped
events database as well as a project to simplify content across
the site. ECO has input into the BL-wide content simplification
project, although there not envisaged to be any significant changes
to the export control pages. Recent improvements to the export
control pages have included the addition of new guides on 'Exporting
military goods to the United States'.
- ECO maintains a presence on the Department
for Business website. All ECO's Notices to Exporters and training
course information are published via this site. ECO is currently
planning to make some changes to the training pages to better
promote our courses and services.
- Checker tools database - www.ecochecker.co.uk
- the ECO maintains two tools (Goods Checker and OGEL Checker)
which are designed to help exporters to identify if their goods
are controlled and if they might be able to register for an appropriate
Open General Licence. In line with Cabinet Office web convergence
guidelines, ECO is planning some changes to the Checker Tools
homepage, to include clearer links and references to the ECO's
other web platforms.
- SPIRE - www.spire.bis.gov.uk - ECO is in the
process of testing a number of enhancements to its export licensing
database which will be made in System Release 2.14. This includes
the option for exporters to create templates from existing applications
and to share templates across organisations, which has been requested
by a number of stakeholders.
Longer term, the ECO is mindful of ongoing developments
across government websites, including moves to create a single
site and work on the www.alpha.gov.uk prototype. Developments
in this area will necessarily impact on any changes to the ECO's
website presence, given that the push is for more centralised
rather than separate sites.
ECO will keep the CAEC updated on any changes
impacting on export control related content.
Section 1 Domestic Policy paragraph 1.7
The ratio of errors found during compliance visits
is relatively high. What steps are being taken to reduce the instances
of compliance misuses?
The majority of compliance visits are first visits.
The error rate on these visits is likely to be higher when a
company is in its first year of using open licences.
Although the number of misuses identified in each
year appears to be high, occurring in around one third of all
audits, it must be remembered that this includes all types of
misuse including minor administrative errors such as failing to
reference the licence on commercial documentation. The numbers
of more serious errors, such as an unlicensed shipment (i.e. a
shipment of items that was not permitted by the particular open
general licence that was used), are much lower and have actually
gone down by over 50% compared to 2009.
We take all cases of misuse seriously. Persistent
misuse of Open licences was the principal reason we introduced
the Warning Letter and suspension procedure. This appears to have
had the desired effect because, as noted above, the proportion
of serious errors has fallen. Following an audit, exporters are
always informed of the findings and of any remedial action required.
In the majority of cases when the company is re-audited the errors
have been corrected. This illustrates very well the effectiveness
of the compliance audit process and the overall robustness of
open licences.
We also encourage attendance at ECO's training
and awareness seminars, and are able to provide company-specific
on-site training. More generally we are looking at ways to
improve the usability of OGELs in order to reduce the number of
errors that occur through simple misunderstanding.
Section 1 Domestic Policy paragraph 1.9
a) In how many of the 134 cases of seizures in 2010
of strategic goods in breach of licensing requirements were prosecutions
for strategic export offences initiated?
No prosecutions have yet been initiated involving
seizures of military equipment, dual-use goods or goods subject
to sanctions where the goods were seized during the financial
year 2010- 2011. However, this is not unusual, as cases require
a thorough criminal investigation before they are referred to
the Crown Prosecution Service. It then takes time to bring a case
to a conclusion through the criminal justice system.
The Government's policy is not to prosecute every
offence, and each case is considered on an individual basis. The
majority of cases where goods are seized at the border are of
a less serious nature and are dealt with by way of a written warning
and, where appropriate, a restoration penalty.
However in more serious cases, criminal investigations
leading to prosecution are initiated as a result of a seizure
at the border. For example, two recent prosecutions involved cases
where unlicensed goods had been seized at the UK border (F14 fighter
jet parts destined for Iran and telescopic sights for sniper rifles,
also destined for Iran).
b) Why were only 5 prosecutions successful?
A total of five criminal prosecutions were concluded
during the financial year 2010 - 2011, and they all resulted in
guilty verdicts. Four of the cases resulted in custodial sentences
and one resulted in a suspended sentence. The cases involved a
range of military, paramilitary and dual-use goods. There were
no unsuccessful prosecutions. We expect that further prosecutions
will be concluded during the current financial year. This is not
an area where we ordinarily expect to see large numbers of prosecutions
in any given year. The Government's policy is not to prosecute
every offence, and the way we deal with a case needs to be proportionate
to the offence.
Since April 2010, HM Revenue and Customs has made
greater use of its ability to offer compound settlements in lieu
of prosecution for breaches of export licensing controls and trade
controls. Fourteen compound penalties have been paid since April
2010, including one for unlicensed goods detected at the border.
The compound penalties issued in these cases have ranged from
£1,000 up to £239,000. An offer of a compound penalty
is only made when the circumstances of the case justify an offer.
HM Revenue and Customs, the UK Border Agency and
the Crown Prosecution Service maintain an active intelligence-led
enforcement effort targeted against the most serious proliferation
threats including deliberately non-complaint businesses and
individuals. HMRC also works with BIS to deliver a joint compliance
and education programme that aims to prevent breaches of the controls
by providing advice and guidance to exporters and improving their
awareness of their legal obligations. This reduces the risk of
breaches and helps to facilitate legitimate trade.
Section 2 International Policy Table 2.3
Why is the Department for International Development
only consulted when assessing an arms export licence application
against Criteria 8, and not when assessments are made against
Criteria 2, 3 and 4?
The FCO, MOD and DFID act in a policy advisory
capacity and provides the ECO with advice and analysis on the
foreign, defence and international development policy aspects
relevant to consideration of export licence applications against
the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria.
As stated in Section 1of the Government's Annual
Report, DFID provide specific expertise and advice in considering
applications to those developing countries eligible for concessional
loans from the World Bank's International Development Association.
DFID considers export licence applications destined to all International
Development Association (IDA) eligible countries against Criterion
8 and specifically, whether the proposed export would seriously
undermine the recipient country's economy, and whether the export
would seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient
country. The FCO is the advisory department on Criteria 2, 3 and
4.
The Department for International Development is
currently considering its role in the UK's arms export control
system, including the most appropriate criteria on which to be
consulted.
Section 2 International Policy paragraph 2.4
The Government produced in its Report case studies
of export licence applications for:
1. body armour and night vision goggles that were
to be used by Private Security Companies in Afghanistan,
2. a single armoured personnel carrier for demonstration/evaluation
for the Nigerian Police Force, and
3. shields and body armour for use by the Ministry
of Internal Affairs in Kyrgyzstan.
Why has the Government selected as its Case Studies
relatively insubstantial export licence applications compared
with the previous Government which in its 2008 Report included
as a Case Study an application for an export licence for Armoured
Personnel Carriers and components for the Libyan Police?
Cases studies for the 2010 report were selected
to help illustrate the decision making process, and to represent
accurately some of the issues considered during the course of
the year, including areas of the world that threw up particular
export control challenges.
Afghanistan- The UK Government wants Afghanistan
to become a stable, secure state that is able to suppress terrorism
and violent extremism. Our troops and civilians are working with
the Afghan Government to help them combat terrorism and extremism,
including in support of our own national security. The long-term
future of Afghanistan depends upon the revival of its economy
and the UK is supporting this through increasing trade and investment.
There are sanctions in place for Afghanistan (arms embargo) which
apply to those individuals designated under UNSCR 1988 (the '1988
List'). We selected Afghanistan as a case study to provide more
background on why and what type of equipment is exported.
Nigeria - It is important that case studies reflect
the worldwide nature of our assessments, and we chose Nigeria
given that it is the UK's second largest market in sub-Saharan
Africa after South Africa. The value of exports has increased
steadily from £535 million in 2000 to £1.3 billion in
2009. The UK is actively involved in human rights issues and has
funded a number of human rights projects in Nigeria over the past
few years, including supporting work aimed at bringing an end
to torture and the death penalty. Human rights abuses often occur
in Nigeria as a result of communal conflict, often between communities
and security forces. In recent years, violence has claimed hundreds
of lives in the Niger Delta, Kaduna, Plateau, Borno and Kano
States. The export licence application was for a vehicle for
evaluation by the Nigerian Police.
Kyrgyzstan - Concern over civil liberties and
increases in electricity tariffs led to growing discontent in
Kyrgyzstan in 2010; President Bakiev was overthrown in April with
ensuing civilian unrest and demonstrations being reported in the
UK media. Ethnic unrest in June led to over 400 deaths, thousands
being displaced and the Kyrgyz government declaring a state of
emergency. The UK has a growing interest in a safe and stable
Kyrgyzstan {also bearing in mind its proximity to Afghanistan).
HMG has contributed almost £1 million since 2003 to support
conflict prevention, criminal justice reform, election monitoring
and human rights and democratisation in Kyrgyzstan and we signed
a Defence Co-operation MOU in January 2006 to provide a framework
for more effective support from the Kyrgyz for UK assistance in
defence matters. The British All-Party Parliamentary Group on
Central Asia visited Bishkek in March 2010 to sign a MOU on strengthening
co-operation. The Foreign Secretary subsequently announced {11
May 2011) that the UK would open a new Embassy in Bishkek.
Section 2 Arms Trade Treaty paragraph 2.5
When does the Government anticipate agreement to
the Arms Trade Treaty? What are the main issues still to be resolved
to enable a consensus to be reached?
The Diplomatic
Conference on an Arms Trade Treaty will take place at the UN in
New York from 2 to 27 July 2012. The UK believes it is important
for all UN Member States to work together at the Conference to
achieve agreement on a robust and effective, legally binding ATI,
and we will be striving for a successful conclusion to the Conference
to this end.
Much progress has been made at the Preparatory
Committee meetings, and the Chair's papers provide a solid basis
for the negotiations in July 2012. There are still a range of
views on what equipment should fall under the Treaty's scope;
including on the inclusion of ammunition and explosives. This
is true of the ATT's parameters, on issues such as human rights
and sustainable development. The Conference will also need to
decide what national requirements the Treaty will introduce for
particular activities and types of transfer.
Section 2 Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)
paragraph 2.6
Which states attended the Fourth Biennial Meeting
of States considering the implementation of the UN Programme of
Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small
Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects?
105 UN member states attended this meeting. Algeria,
Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Canada, China, Colombia,
Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Estonia,
Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya,
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali,
Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Moldova, Romania,
Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,
Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, FYR of Macedonia, Togo, Tunisia,
Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Tanzania, United
States, Uruguay, Yemen and Zambia.
link: http://www.poa-iss.org/BMS4/0utcome/BMS4-0utcome-E.pdf
Section 2 Cluster Munitions paragraph 2.7
Which countries have now ratified the Convention
on Cluster Munitions prohibiting the use, production, stockpiling
and transfer of cluster munitions?
Afghanistan, Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Austria,
Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso,
Burundi, Cape Verde, Chile, Comoros, Cook Islands, Costa Rica,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji,
FYR of Macedonia, France, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala,
Guinea-Bissau, Holy See, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lao PDR, Lebanon,
Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Moldova,
Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua,
Niger, Norway, Panama, Portugal, Saint Vincent and Grenadines,
Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovenia,
Spain, Swaziland, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, United Kingdom,
Uruguay and Zambia.
link: http:1/www.clusterconvention
.org/ratifications-and-signatures/
Section 2 Wassenaar Arrangement paragraph 2.8
a) Which states and international organisations
participate in the Wassenaar Arrangement dealing with the accumulation
and transfer of conventional weapons?
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Russian Federation, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
United Kingdom, United States, Argentina, Republic of Korea, Romania,
Bulgaria, Ukraine, Slovenia, Malta, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia,
Croatia and South Africa.
link: http://www.wassenaar.org/participants/index.html
b) The report states that "the UK plans to
play a full and leading role in the Assessment Year process"
for the Wassenaar Arrangement. What actions will be or have been
taken to fulfil this statement?
The UK has made a broad and multi faceted contribution
to the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) Assessment process throughout
2011, and a wide range of cross Government expertise has been
utilised to optimise impact and avoid duplication. The high quality
UK engagement with WA Participating States during this process
helped protect and promote UK interests across a number of key
activities of the WA, and guide the WA towards more effective
and modern practices. The UK contribution to the WA assessment
has, and will, ensure that the Organisation's long term goals
reflect HMG strategic objectives in the sphere of non proliferation.
The UK role in the WA assessment process was focussed
on contributing to discussions aimed at improving the efficiency
of the Control List reviews and consistent interpretation amongst
the Participants.
Section 2 UN Register of Conventional Arms paragraph
2.9
a) Which UN member states make reports to the UN
Register of Conventional Arms?
64 member states including the UK made reports
to the UN Register of Conventional Arms for the calendar year
2010. These member states were: Andorra, Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belize, Bhutan, Bosnia Herzegovina,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland,
Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guyana, Hungary, India, Ireland, Japan,
Latvia, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico,
Monaco, Mongolia, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Palau, Peru,
Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation,
Samoa, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, Suriname,
Switzerland, FYR of Macedonia, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay
and Vietnam.
Link: http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Register/
(Then select document
A/66/127- 12 July 2011).
b) What specific steps is the Government taking
to try to ensure that more UN member states do so, and on an up-to-date
annual and accurate basis, and also with the full details required
by the UN?
The UK encourages other UN member states by example,
i.e. submitting its complete return in a timely fashion on an
annual basis. The UK has co-sponsored UN General Assembly resolutions
supporting the Register, for example Resolution 64/54 in December
2009. The UK has one of the most rigorous and transparent arms
export control systems in the world and encourages other states
to adopt similar regimes, for example by taking a leading role
in negotiating an ATI that will be robust, effective and legally
binding.
Section 2 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) paragraph
2.10
a) Which are the members of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group seeking to reduce global nuclear proliferation by controlling
the export and re-transfer of materials that may be applicable
to nuclear weapons development, and promoting effective safeguards
and the protection of existing nuclear materials?
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia,
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United
Kingdom and United States.
Link: http://www.nuclearsuppliersgrouo.org/Leng/03-member.htm
b) The 2011Plenary of the Nuclear Suppliers Group
took place in Holland. What were the main outcomes from this session?
Within the framework of the NSG's mandate, concerns
were shared about the proliferation implications of the nuclear
programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
and Iran. The NSG reiterated its long-standing support for diplomatic
efforts for a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and for a
solution to the DPRK nuclear issue in a peaceful manner. The
NSG also: agreed to strengthen its guidelines on the transfer
of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies; emphasised
the importance of keeping its lists up to date with technological
developments and took stock of the work done for a fundamental
review of the trigger and dual use lists; continued to consider
all aspects of the implementation of the 2008 Statement on Civil
Nuclear Cooperation with India and discussed the NSG relationship
with India.
link: http:1/www.nuclearsuppIiersgroup.org/Leng/PRESS/2011-06-Public%20statement%202011%20NSG%20v7%20-%20final.pdf
Section 2 The Academic Technology Approval Scheme
(ATAS) paragraph 2.11
a) Which are the Institutes of Higher Education
(IHEs) in the UK participating in The Academic Technology Approval
Scheme seeking to protect certain sensitive technologies relating
to Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery from
possible misuse by proliferators?
The Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS)
is a Tier 4 student visa requirement enshrined within the UK Immigration
rules. It must therefore be adhered to by all UK Higher Education
Institutes, which offer courses to international students from
outside the European Economic Area (EEA) and Switzerland.
b) Which are the "sensitive subjects"
at each participating Institute of Higher Education for which
foreign students seeking to study them must first obtain an ATAS
certificate?
The scheme covers postgraduate study in a variety
of subject areas ranging from medical and biological science to
engineering and computer science. A full list of subjects which
apply to the scheme can be found on the ATAS website.
Link: http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/ what-we-do/services-we-deliver
Iatas/ who-atas/
c) Why does the Government consider that the need
to protect at UK Institutes of Higher Education certain sensitive
technologies relating to WMD and their means of delivery from
possible misuse by proliferators arises only in the case of foreign
students?
The ATAS scheme is designed to prevent those students
who pose the greatest risk from studying potential WMD proliferation
subjects. In order to give the broadest and most efficient coverage,
ATAS is built into the Tier 4 student visa requirement.
Section 2 Australia Group paragraph 2.12
Which are the current participants in the Australia
Group to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological
agents and dual-use manufacturing equipment?
There are 41 participants in the Australia Group
including the European Commission. These are:
Argentina, Republic of Korea, Australia, Latvia,
Austria, Lithuania, Belgium, Luxembourg, Bulgaria, Malta, Canada,
Netherlands, Croatia, New Zealand, Cyprus, Norway, Czech Republic,
Poland, Denmark, Portugal, Estonia, Romania, European Commission,
Slovak Republic, Finland, Slovenia, France, Spain, Germany, Sweden,
Greece, Switzerland, Hungary, Turkey, Iceland, Ukraine, Ireland,
United Kingdom, Italy, United States and Japan.
Link: http://www.australiagroup.net/en/participants.html
Section 2 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
paragraph 2.13
a) Which countries are Partners in the Missile Technology
Control Regime coordinating their export licensing efforts to
prevent the proliferation of WMD capable unmanned delivery systems?
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russian
Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.
Link: http://www.mtcr.info/english/partners.html
b) What was the outcome of the Plenary held in Buenos
Aires in April 2011?
MTCR partners discussed the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction as well as their means of delivery that constitute
a threat to international peace and security. Furthermore, partners
reaffirmed the importance of addressing these challenges and the
role the MTCR serves in this regard.
Partners conducted extensive discussions on missile
proliferation-related activities worldwide, including developments
in missile programmes and their proliferation; procurement activities
and techniques in support of such programmes; rapid technological
change; the role of intangible technology, brokering, and transshipment
in facilitating proliferation; and key technology trends in proliferation
missile programmes. These discussions showed that additional export
control efforts by MTCR countries could have an even greater impact.
They also underlined the importance of addressing transit and
transshipment issues and, in this context, the proliferation risk
posed by countries with weak export controls.
Partners exchanged information on concerns about
the ongoing missile programmes in the Middle East, Northeast Asia
and South Asia, including Iran and North Korea, which could contribute
to regional instability and supply missile proliferation activities
elsewhere. Partners noted the direct relevance of UN Security
Council Resolutions, inter alia, 1874 and 1929, to MTCR export
controls and expressed their determination to implement these
resolutions and to exercise vigilance and prevent the transfer
of any items, materials, goods and technology that could contribute
to WMD missile programmes of proliferation concern, in accordance
with their national legislation and consistent with international
law. Partners agreed to continue exchanging views on missile programme
developments.
Partners reaffirmed the critical importance of
the MTCR's ongoing technical work. They noted the rapid evolution
of relevant technologies and the related need to take forward
looking action to address these developments. They expressed their
appreciation for the work of the Licensing and Enforcement Expert
Meeting (LEEM), the Information Exchange Meeting (IEM) and the
Technical Expert Meeting (TEM) in particular the decision adopted
on amendments to the Equipment, Software and Technology Annex.
Over the past year, the outgoing MTCR Chair (Brazil)
conducted outreach with Belarus, China, India, Kazakhstan, and
Thailand. The incoming MTCR Chair (Argentina) intends to conduct
further outreach, including with additional countries, in order
to increase transparency about the Regime and promote its objectives.
Partners expressed their willingness to continue extensive outreach
by individual MTCR Partners to a wide range of countries. Non-Partners
activities in support of the objectives and purposes of the MTCR
would also be welcome.
Partners agreed to continue their individual and
collective efforts to assist interested countries in implementing
the missile-related export controls mandated under UN Security
Council Resolution 1540, and to work with the 1540 Committee.
Partners also reviewed a number of key aspects of the internal
functioning of the Regime, including issues related to future
membership. Partners exchanged views on their overall approaches,
inter alia membership evaluation. Individual applications for
membership also were thoroughly discussed, with no consensus being
reached on the admission of new members at this time. The membership
issue will continue to be discussed.
link: http://www.mtcr.info/english/Press%20Release%20April%202011.html
Section 2 Gifted Equipment paragraph 2.15 and
Table 2.4
a) Does the Government attach the same controls
and conditions to the equipment it gifts to overseas governments
as it attaches to arms export licences it grants to commercial
exporters?
The Government may agree to requests from other
governments to gift to them military equipment. All gifting proposals
made by Government sponsors are assessed against the Consolidated
EU and National Arms Export licensing Criteria by specialist licensing
advisers. The Government can give provisos to the recipient of
a gift where it is necessary.
b) Is the Government requiring from governments
to whom it is gifting equipment the same end-use declaration it
introduced from 1 July 2010 for commercial exports as described
in paragraph 1.4 of the Annual Report 2010?
The Government does not currently ask for an end-user
undertaking from a foreign Government recipient of gifted equipment.
As the provider of the equipment, the Government would expect
to have a relationship with countries to which we gift. .This
allows us to understand their need and the end-use to which the
equipment being gifted would be put. We would not agree to a
gifting proposal where we assessed that the recipient intended
to transfer the items to a destination subject to UN, EU or OSCE
embargo where to do so would be a breach of the terms of that
embargo.
However, we are content to consider whether there
would be benefit in requiring end-user undertakings from recipients
of gifts and will advise the Committee of our findings.
c) Does the Government retain the right to require
the return of equipment it gifts if the controls and conditions
attached to the gift are not complied with?
Once a gift has been delivered to the recipient
we regard title to the item as having transferred. Were there
to be evidence subsequently that the gifted equipment had been
misused the Government would consider what representations it
wished to make and the impact of the event on our future relationship.
d) What were the functions of the Laboratory Equipment
gifted to the Iraq Ministry of Interior in 2010?
The laboratory equipment gifted to the Iraq Ministry
of Interior was part of an ongoing Forensics and Criminal Justice
Project to re-establish Iraqi police forensic evidence capability
in Baghdad. The gift helped to re-equip the Karrada Laboratory
in Baghdad following a bomb attack in January 2010. The gifted
equipment restored the Iraq police capability to produce credible
physical and forensic evidence to be considered as part of the
criminal justice system.
e) What were the functions of the Law Enforcement
Equipment gifted to the Government of Yemen in 2010?
The non-lethal equipment gifted to Yemen was part
of a programme designed to reduce the use of lethal force in public
order situations and address a source of grievance amongst Yemeni
citizens by developing the capability to be able to deal with
public order situations in an accountable and professional manner
in accordance with human rights and law of armed conflict. The
equipment was used to train the security forces in UK procedures
and tactics so that in time the Yemenis would be able to continue
their own training with UK adopting a monitoring role. However,
this programme has been suspended as a result of the significant
deterioration of the security situation within Sana'a since March
2011.
Section 3 Background to export licence decisions
paragraph 3.1
a) Why is the provision of technical assistance
where the provider knows or has been made aware that the technical
assistance will be used for "WMD Purposes" only controlled
outside the EU, and not inside the EU also?
These controls implement the UK's obligations
under European Union Joint Action of 22 June 2000 concerning control
of technical assistance related to certain military end-uses (2000/401/CFSP).
The Joint Action only provides for such controls where the end-use
is in a destination outside the EU.
b) Why is the rating given to items that the exporter
has been told, knows or suspects are or may be intended for "WMD
Purposes" described as "End-Use" and not "WMD
End-Use"?
This is merely convention. The rating for items
where the exporter has been informed, knows or suspects that the
items may be used for a "military end-use" in a destination
subject to an arms embargo is "MEND". However the vast
majority of "end-use" cases are WMD end-use rather than
military end-use and so it is understood that "End Use"
refers to WMD End-Use.
c) Why is the transfer of technology by any means
where the person making the transfer knows or has been made aware
that the technology is for "WMD Purposes" only controlled
outside the EU, and not inside the EU also?
These controls implement the UK's obligations
under European Union Joint Action of 22 June 2000 concerning control
of technical assistance related to certain military end-uses (2000/401/CFSP).
The Joint Action only provides for such controls where the end-use
is in a destination outside the EU.
Section 3 General Note on Licensing Data paragraph
3.2
a) What are the "certain conditions" that
have to be met if controlled goods being transhipped through the
UK en route from one country to another pre-determined destination
are made exempt from control?
The conditions are set out in Article 17 of the
Export Control Order 2008. In general, a transhipment licence
is not required where:
(a) the goods in question remain on board a vessel
or aircraft for the entire period that they remain in the United
Kingdom or are goods on a through bill of lading or through air
waybill and in any event are exported before the end of the period
of 30 days beginning with the date of their importation;
(b) the destination of the goods in question following
exportation from the United Kingdom has been determined in the
country from which they were originally exported prior to their
original exportation in connection with the transaction which
has given rise to transit or transhipment and has not been changed
prior to their exportation from the United Kingdom, or the goods
are being returned to that country; and
(c) the goods
in question were exported from that country in accordance with
any laws or regulations relating to the exportation of goods applying
there at the time of exportation of the goods.
However, a transhipment licence will always be
required for:
(a) anti-personnel landmines and components specially
designed for them; (b) Category A goods;
(c) equipment, software or technology falling
within entry ML18, ML21or ML22 in Schedule 2, specifically related
to anti-personnel landmines or Category A goods;
(d) controlled goods being exported to a destination
specified in Part 1of Schedule 4;
(e) military goods being exported to any country
or destination specified in Part 2 or 3 of Schedule 4;
(f) Category B goods being exported to any country
or destination specified in Part 4 of Schedule 4.
(g) any goods where the exporter has been informed,
knows or suspects that the goods are or may be intended in their
entirety or in part for WMD purposes.
b) Why is there no Open Individual Transhipment
Licence?
There are very few transhipment licences issued
in any one year. There has therefore never been a business need
for an Open Individual Transhipment licence.
c) Why do Trade Controls not apply to software
and technology?
The powers to impose trade controls were introduced
in section 4 of the Export Control Act 2002 in order to address
specific concerns regarding the trafficking and brokering of military
goods between overseas destinations. There is a separate power
to impose controls on transfers of technology (including software)
in section 2 of the Export Control Act 2002.
Section 3 Information on SIELs. SITLs. OIELs.
SITCLs and OITCLs paragraph 3.3
Why are the exporters holding Open Individual Export
Licences (OIELs) not asked to provide details of the value of
goods that they propose to ship?
OIELs are concessionary licences that are specific
to an individual exporter and cover multiple shipments of specific
items to specific destinations. Depending on the type of OIEL
they can be valid for up to five years, have no quantity limits
and are not usually restricted to specific end users. OIELs are
usually only issued for low risk transactions and where the exporter
has demonstrated a specific business need, for example to fulfil
long-term maintenance contracts. Therefore it is not usually possible
for exporters to gauge in advance the value of ongoing multiple
shipments. If the Government had concerns about the quantity or
value of goods to be exported we would reject the OIEL application
and require SIELs instead.
Section 3 paragraph 3.5 and Table 3.6 Reasons
for Refusals and Revocations of SIEL and SITCL applications
a) Will the Government state the number of revocations
in this table, and the case of each revocation the goods concerned,
the country of destination, and the Criterion (using the same
11 categories as in Table 3.6) under which the licence was revoked?
There were no revocations in 2010. Tables 3.1
and 3.4 give a clearer breakdown of how applications were considered
in 2010.
b) Will the Government state in the case of each
refusal in this table the goods concerned, the country of destination,
and the Criterion (using the same 11 categories as in Table 3.6)
under which the application was refused?
More detailed information on refusals and revocations
can be found within the Annual Report pivot report, under each
destination. However, please find attached at Annex 2 a list of
'refusals and the Criterion they were refused under (in brackets).
Link: https://www.exportcontroldb.berr.gov.uk/eng/retrieveByStoragelocation/5275
Stra tegic export con.pdf?thread id=B4hQU2R EmmBz2Pke&app
mnem=sdb&module=SDBHO ME&storagelocation=SDBPUBLISHED-DOC-Sl-BlOB&wsiCacheKey
c) Will the Government provide the same information
for refusals and revocations of OIELs and OITCLs, and in the same
format as that requested for SIELs and SITCLs in a) and b) immediately
above?
OIELs and OITCLs are concessionary licences and
are therefore usually "rejected" rather than "refused".
Rejection of an OIEL or OITCL does not mean that a Standard Individual
licence would be refused. In many cases we need to give the proposed
transaction greater scrutiny, and need information about end-users
and quantities/values to be exported as well as requiring an end-user
undertaking, before deciding whether or not to issue a licence.
This can only be done if the application is for a SIEL or SITCL
In these cases the reasons for refusing/revoking SIELs/SITCLs
are not applicable to decisions to reject OIELs/OITCLs.
Section 3 Open General Export Licences (OGELs)
paragraph 3.7 and Table 3.7
a) What are the shipments and destinations that
are eligible for OGELs and what are the "certain conditions"
that have to be met for an OGEL?
Each Open General Export licence has its own terms
and conditions, with a list of permitted destinations for the
goods described. The various OGELs available can be found on the
ECO website.
link: http://www.businesslink.gov.uk/OGELS
b) Why are there a small number of Open General
Transhipment Licences for which registration with BIS's Export
Control Organisation is not required and what are the details
of these licences?
The main purpose of registration is to identify
who is making use of the licence and to determine where records
are to be kept so that ECO may conduct compliance audits. In the
case of transhipment the goods simply pass through the UK en route
from Country A to Country B. The exporter, and usually the shipping
agent as well, will be established outside the UK. It is highly
unlikely that we would be able to conduct audits of overseas companies
and therefore registration serves no useful purpose in relation
to transhipment.
Section 3 Performance in processing licence applications
paragraph 3.8
a) The number of SIELs processed within 20 working
days fell significantly from the previous two years, resulting
in missing the target. What was the reason for this fall and what
steps have or are being taken to rectify the situation?
In 2010, 63% of SIELs were finalised within 20
working days against a target of 70% compared with 73% in 2009
and 2008. There were two reasons for this fall. Firstly, in 2010
SIEL volumes were up 32% on 2008, and 18% on 2009. Secondly, ECO
staff numbers reduced from 90 in 2008 to 79 in 2010 as a result
of BIS restructuring.
ECO has, therefore, had to adapt so that it can
deal with a rapidly growing workload with shrinking resources
but with growing customer expectations. Over recent years we have
worked up ambitious programmes of change to take forward measures
that can achieve major reductions in the overall administrative
burden on business of the export licensing process by making significant
improvements in ECO's own efficiency and risk management processes.
This will continue.
b) The target for the number of appeals to be completed
within 20 working days was also not met and was significantly
down from the previous two years. Why and what is being done to
ensure that the target is met in the future?
We recognise that performance on appeals was
lower in percentage terms than the previous year, but this should
be viewed in the context of a 25% increase in the total number
of appeals. Naturally, any fall in performance is regrettable
but as the Committees will appreciate appeals are particularly
difficult cases to deal with. That said we continue to look for
ways to improve efficiency across the board and are hopeful that
this fall {in percentage terms) 2010 was a temporary phenomenon.
The Committees will wish to be aware that in spite of the increase
in appeals {in numerical terms), the number of successful appeals
actually fell from 14.9% in 2009 to 3.4% in 2010. This statistic
is testament to the rigour of the initial decision.
Annex C Information Required for the UN Register
of Conventional Arms
Will the Government provide a revised copy of Annex
C with all the explanatory notes that are currently missing, or
unclear, included or clarified as necessary?
The explanatory notes referred to in Annex C of
the Annual Report are those notes attached to the standardised
forms that the UN sends out annually for completion by member
states. A copy of Annex C with the standardised form and its explanatory
notes added is attached as Annex 3.
Annex 1: Licences Processed by DFID Jan - Dec 2010
| | |
|
APPLICATION TYPE
| END USER COUNTRIES
| GOODS ANNUAL REPORT SUMMARY
| DFID RECOMMEND-ATION
| FINAL DECISION FOR IDA COUNTRIES
|
OIEL | Nigeria
| components for military improvised explosive device jamming equipment, components for test equipment for military improvised explosive device jamming equipment, military improvised explosive device jamming equipment, test equipment for military improvised explosive device jamming equipment, technology for the use of military improvised explosive device jamming equipment, technology for the use of test equipment for military improvised explosive device jamming equipment, software for the use of military improvised explosive device jamming equipment, software for the use of test equipment for military improvised explosive device jamming equipment
| Issue | Nigeria STOPPED
|
OIEL | Afghanistan
| military devices for initiating explosives, demolition devices, demolition charges, signal flares, illuminators, tear gas/irritant ammunition, CS hand grenades, tear gas/riot control agents, stun grenades, smoke ammunition, smoke generators, smoke hand grenades, signal hand grenades, smoke canisters, exploding simulation devices, fire simulation equipment for small arms ammunition, training anti-aircraft ammunition, thunderflashes, training hand grenades
| Proviso | Afghanistan Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | Abu Dhabi, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Botswana, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Dubai, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, South, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, United States
| shotguns, rifles, air guns, semi-automatic pistols, sporting pistols, weapon sights
| Reject | Sri Lanka Reject
|
OIEL | Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United States, Zambia
| shotguns, sporting rifles, air guns, pistols, semi-automatic pistols, sporting pistols, weapon sights
| Issue | Zambia Reject
|
OIEL | Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Switzerland, Turkey, United States, Zambia
| equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | Zambia Issue
|
OIEL | China, Hong Kong, India, Korea, South, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Province of China, Thailand
| components for military devices for initiating explosives, military devices for initiating explosives, components for military firing sets, military firing sets, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, accessories for explosive ordnance disposal equipment
| Issue | India Issue
|
OIEL | Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Algeria, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dubai, Egypt, France, Fujairah, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, Ras al Khaimah, Saudi Arabia, Sharjah, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, United States
| cryptographic software, equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, frequency synthesisers
| Issue | Bangladesh, India, Indonesia Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | China, Hong Kong, India, Korea, South, Singapore, Taiwan, Province of China
| general naval vessel components, technology for the use of general naval vessel components
| Issue | India Issue
|
OIEL | Algeria, Brazil, Chile, Dubai, Gibraltar, India, Korea, South, Malaysia, Mexico, Oman, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela
| cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | India , Pakistan Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | Andorra, Brazil, Brunei, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, China, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Gambia, Guatemala, Guinea, Republic of, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, South, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mayotte, Niger, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Taiwan, Province of China, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Vietnam
| technology for the development of aero-engine assemblies, technology for the production of aero-engine assemblies, software for the development of technology for the development of aero-engine assemblies, software for the production of aero-engine assemblies
| Issue | Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros, Congo, Dominican, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, India ,Indonesia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Togo, Vietnam - Issue
|
OIEL | India
| accessories for training equipment for biological agent detection equipment, accessories for training equipment for chemical agent detection equipment, accessories for training equipment for nuclear radiation detection equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for training equipment for biological agent detection equipment, components for training equipment for chemical agent detection equipment, components for training equipment for nuclear radiation detection equipment, software for the use of training equipment for biological agent detection equipment, software for the use of training equipment for chemical agent detection equipment, software for the use of training equipment for nuclear radiation detection equipment, technology for the use of training equipment for biological agent detection equipment, technology for the use of training equipment for chemical agent detection equipment, technology for the use of training equipment for nuclear radiation detection equipment, training equipment for biological agent detection equipment, training equipment for chemical agent detection equipment, training equipment for nuclear radiation detection equipment, training equipment for military improvised explosive device detection equipment, military electronic equipment
| Issue | India Issue
|
OIEL | Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Province of China, Thailand, United States
| components for combat helicopters, equipment for the use of combat helicopters, technology for the production of combat aircraft, technology for the use of combat aircraft
| Issue | India Stopped
|
OIEL | India
| components for military aero-engines, components for military transport aircraft, general military aircraft components
| Issue | India Issue Proviso
|
OIEL | Australia, Canada, Denmark, India, Italy, Norway, Qatar, United States
| body armour, bomb suits, civil body armour, military helmets, components for body armour, constructions for ballistic protection of military systems, ballistic shields
| Issue | India Stopped
|
OIEL | Abu Dhabi, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Brunei, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Falkland Islands, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Gibraltar, Greece, Guernsey, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United States
| components for military surveillance aircraft, technology for the development of military surveillance aircraft, technology for the production of military surveillance aircraft, technology for the use of military surveillance aircraft
| Issue | Ghana Refused
|
OIEL | Brazil, India
| bomb suits, civil body armour, improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military helmets, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, demolition devices, military firing sets, non-military firing sets, mine detection equipment, components for bomb suits, components for civil body armour, military devices for initiating explosives
| Issue | India Issue
|
OIEL | Afghanistan, Belarus, Cambodia, Colombia, Laos, Lebanon, Occupied Palestinian Territories, Sri Lanka, Vietnam
| components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | Afghanistan Reject, Cambodia Issue, Laos, Sri Lanka, Vietnam Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | Abu Dhabi, Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Central African Republic, China, Croatia, Dubai, Egypt, Eritrea, Georgia, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kosovo, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Macedonia, Malaysia, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Zambia
| general naval vessel components, equipment for the use of general naval vessel components, technology for the use of equipment for the use of general naval vessel components, technology for the use of general naval vessel components
| Issue | India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Uzbekistan Issue - Afghanistan, Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia Herzegovina, Central African Republic, Eritrea, Georgia, Ivory Coast, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lesotho, Montenegro, Serbia, Tajikistan, Zambia Stopped
|
OIEL | Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, France, India, Korea, South, Malaysia, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand
| components for combat aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for military transport aircraft, components for military utility helicopters, general military aircraft components, technology for the use of combat aircraft, technology for the use of general military aircraft components, technology for the use of military training aircraft, technology for the use of military transport aircraft, technology for the use of military utility helicopters
| Issue | Bangladesh, India, Pakistan Issue
|
OIEL | India
| shaped charges, demolition charges, devices for initiating explosives, detonating cord, explosives
| Issue | India Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | Abu Dhabi, Azerbaijan, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Qatar, Spain, Thailand
| command communications control and intelligence software, technology for the development of command communications control and intelligence software, technology for the use of command communications control and intelligence software
| Issue | Azerbaijan, Indonesia Reject
|
OIEL | United States
| test equipment for aircraft missile protection systems, software for the use of test equipment for aircraft missile protection systems
| Issue | Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | Abu Dhabi, Brazil, Egypt, India, Israel, Jordan, Korea, South, Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Turkey
| technology for the production of military airborne cargo handling equipment, components for military airborne cargo handling equipment, military airborne cargo handling equipment, unfinished products for military airborne cargo handling equipment
| Issue | India Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | Sri Lanka
| technology for the development of nuclear reactors, technology for the production of nuclear reactors, technology for the use of nuclear reactors, technology for the development of nuclear reactor fuel element fabrication equipment, technology for the production of nuclear reactor fuel element fabrication equipment, technology for the use of nuclear reactor fuel element fabrication equipment, technology for the development of nuclear fuel reprocessing equipment, technology for the production of nuclear fuel reprocessing equipment, technology for the use of nuclear fuel reprocessing equipment
| Issue | Sri Lanka Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | Austria, France, Italy, Kenya, Slovakia, United States
| components for military helmets, military helmets, components for body armour, body armour
| Issue | Issue
|
OIEL | Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of, Cyprus, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Republic of, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Kosovo, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Malaysia, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sharjah, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Zimbabwe
| non-military firing sets
| Issue | Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of, Ethiopia, Guinea, Republic of, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Laos, Liberia, Nepal, Pakistan, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Timor Leste, Zimbabwe STOPPED -
|
OIEL | Angola, Cambodia
| cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | Angola, Cambodia Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | Angola, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Macao, Nigeria
| components for submersible equipment, submersible equipment, metal alloy cylindrical forms, metal alloy tubes, high energy capacitors, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, components for submersible vehicles
| Issue, Reject
| Azerbaijan Reject - Angola, Iraq, Nigeria Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | Abu Dhabi, Brazil, Cameroon, Cape Verde, China, Egypt, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, Vietnam
| components for military electronic equipment, components for naval navigation equipment, components for naval radars, general naval vessel components, military electronic equipment, naval navigation equipment, naval radars
| Issue | Nigeria, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Vietnam Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Oman, Pakistan, Singapore
| general military aircraft components, general naval vessel components, general military vehicle components, equipment for the use of general military vehicle components
| Issue | Bangladesh, India, Pakistan Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | Australia, Denmark, France, Germany, India, Italy, Norway, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, United States
| cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | India Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | Angola, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Macao, Nigeria
| components for gun laying equipment, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights, gun laying equipment, technology for the use of gun laying equipment, technology for the use of weapon night sights, technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, weapon sights, components for military image intensifier equipment, military image intensifier equipment, technology for the use of military image intensifier equipment, technology for the use of weapon sight mounts, weapon sight mounts, equipment for the use of weapon sights, technology for the use of equipment for the use of weapon sights
| Issue | Angola, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Nigeria Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | Abu Dhabi, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dubai, Falkland Islands, Finland, France, Germany, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, South, Kuwait, Libya, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand
| components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military communications equipment, test equipment for military communications equipment
| Issue | Indonesia, Malawi Reject
|
OIEL | Albania, Angola, Bulgaria, Latvia, Romania, Turkey
| components for military aero-engines, technology for the use of military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment
| Issue | Albania, Angola Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | Pakistan
| general naval vessel components
| Issue | Pakistan Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, Greece, India, Pakistan
| equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, radio jamming equipment
| Issue | Bangladesh, India, Pakistan Issue
|
OIEL | Australia, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Province of China, Thailand, Vietnam
| components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military training aircraft, components for military utility helicopters, components for tanks, technology for the use of combat helicopters, technology for the use of military utility helicopters, components for military containers, military containers, technology for the use of military containers
| Issue | Vietnam Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | India
| goods specified by Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Export Control Order 2008 excluding: [1] Goods specified by PL5001; [2] Landmines specified by ML4 and all goods related to landmines; [3] Man Portable Air Defence Systems MANPADS and test equipment/production equipment/software/technology therefor [4] RDX or HMX explosive material or explosive material containing RDX or HMX; [5] Chemicals specified in Schedule 1 of the Chemical Weapons Convention and specified by ML7a or ML7b and associated technology; [6] Complete rocket systems including Ballistic Missile Systems/Space Launch Vehicles/Sounding Rockets and Unmanned Airborne Vehicle systems including Cruise Missile Systems/Remote Piloted Vehicles/Target Drones/Reconnaissance Drones capable of at least a 300km range; [7] Complete subsystems designed or modified for the rocket systems specified in 6 above as follows: [i] individual rocket stages; [ii] re-entry vehicles and equipment designed or modified therefor and electronics equipment specially designed for re-entry vehicles; [iii] solid or liquid propellant rocket engines having a total impulse capacity of 1.1MNs; [iv] guidance sets capable of achieving system accuracy of 3.33% or less of the range; [v] thrust vectors control systems; [vi] weapon or warhead safing/arming/fuzing/firing mechanisms; [8] Specially designed production facilities or production equipment for the goods specified in 6/7 above; [9] Software specially designed of modified for the use of goods specified in 6/7/8 above
| Issue | India Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | Afghanistan, Bahrain, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Umm al Qaiwain, United States, Uzbekistan
| equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | Afghanistan, Pakistan Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | Abu Dhabi, Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cameroon, Congo, Dubai, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Macedonia, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia
| technology for the development of unmanned air vehicles
| Issue | Afghanistan, Iraq REJECT - Benin, Bosnia Herzegovina, Cameroon, Congo, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia, Tanzania, Zambia ISSUE
|
OIEL | Nigeria
| technology for the development of civil unmanned air vehicle engines, technology for the development of civil unmanned air vehicles, technology for the development of control equipment for unmanned air vehicles, technology for the development of guidance equipment for unmanned air vehicles, technology for the development of remote control equipment for unmanned air vehicles
| Proviso |
Nigeria Issue with Proviso |
OIEL | India, Saudi Arabia, Singapore
| general naval vessel components
| Issue | India Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | Brazil, Chile, India, Korea, South, Malaysia, Mexico, Oman, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey
| equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | India Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, China, Dubai, Egypt, Fujairah, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Ivory Coast, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Macao, Macedonia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Northern Mariana Islands, Pakistan, Ras al Khaimah, Sharjah, Taiwan, Province of China, Umm al Qaiwain, Vietnam, Yemen
| equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | Angola, Azerbaijan, India, Ivory Coast, Kazakhstan, Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan Vietnam, Yemen STOPPED
|
OIEL | Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Dubai, Egypt, Fujairah, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Ivory Coast, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Macao, Macedonia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Northern Mariana Islands, Pakistan, Ras al Khaimah, Sharjah, Taiwan, Province of China, Umm al Qaiwain, Vietnam, Yemen
| inertial equipment |
Issue | Angola, Azerbaijan, India, Ivory Coast, Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan Vietnam, Yemen ISSUE
|
OIEL | Dubai, Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia
| components for military training aircraft, equipment for the production of military training aircraft, test equipment for military training aircraft, technology for the production of military training aircraft, technology for the use of military training aircraft
| Issue | Issue
|
OIEL | Brazil, Burkina, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, United States
| components for military aero-engines
| Issue | Burkina Refuse Dominican Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | Australia, Belgium, Egypt, Germany, India, Norway, Pakistan, Qatar, Sweden, United Kingdom
| inertial equipment |
Issue | India, Pakistan Issue
|
OIEL | Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Gambia, India, Israel, Jamaica, Kenya, Maldives, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukraine, Venezuela
| components for military training aircraft, general military aircraft components, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military training aircraft
| Issue | Bangladesh, Dominica, Gambia, India, Kenya, Maldives Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | India
| non-military detonators
| Issue | India Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Denmark, Faroe Islands, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mauritania, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United States
| heading sensors for hydrophone arrays
| Issue | Albania, Azerbaijan, Senegal Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Republic of, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Namibia, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo
| heading sensors for hydrophone arrays
| Issue | Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Republic of, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Namibia, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | Algeria, Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Morocco, Mozambique, Senegal, Somalia, Tunisia
| components for military transport aircraft
| Issue | Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Senegal, Somalia Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | South Africa, United States - Afghanistan, Uguanda
| components for biotechnology equipment, biotechnology equipment
| Issue | Afghanistan Reject Uganda Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | India, Israel
| heading sensors for hydrophone arrays
| Issue | India Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | Brazil, Dubai, Greenland, Iceland, Jamaica, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Singapore, Trinidad and Tobago, Vietnam
| heading sensors for hydrophone arrays
| Issue | Nicaragua, Vietnam Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | Bahrain, Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, China, Haiti, Korea, South, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Ukraine
| equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | Burma, Cambodia, Haiti Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | Congo, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Libya, Zambia
| equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | Congo, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Zambia Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | Angola
| technology for the development of corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for the production of corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for the use of corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment
| Issue | Angola Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | India, Israel, Korea, South, South Africa
| weapon sights, technology for the use of weapon sights
| Issue | India Reject
|
OIEL | Abu Dhabi, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Botswana, Brunei, Canada, Denmark, Dubai, Falkland Islands, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Malawi, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland
| general naval vessel components, technology for general naval vessel components
| Issue | Malawi Reject
|
OIEL | Australia, Bangladesh, Barbados, Brazil, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, South, Kuwait, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Peru, Portugal, Qatar, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United States
| heading sensors for hydrophone arrays
| Issue | Bangladesh, India - Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | Azerbaijan, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Israel, Ivory Coast, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Pakistan, Russia, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan
| components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment
| Issue | Application is outstanding
|
OIEL | Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, China, Croatia, Dubai, Egypt, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Israel, Kazakhstan, Korea, South, Kuwait, Malaysia, Montenegro, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, South Africa, Taiwan, Province of China, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zimbabwe
| components for aircraft cannons, software for aircraft cannons, technology for aircraft cannons, equipment for the use of aircraft cannons
| Issue, Reject
| Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Indonesia, Montenegro, Nigeria, Serbia, Vietnam, ISSUE with Proviso Azerbaijan, India, Kazakhstan, Yemen, Zimbabwe REJECT
|
OIEL | Abu Dhabi, Australia, Bahrain, Dubai, Finland, India, Kenya, Kuwait, Malaysia, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, United States
| fibrous/filamentary materials
| Issue | India, Kenya Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | Abu Dhabi, Azerbaijan, Dubai, Egypt, India, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Oman, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sharjah, Singapore, Thailand, Tunisia
| components for combat aircraft, components for military helicopters, components for military training aircraft, components for military support aircraft
| Issue | Azerbaijan, India Issue Proviso
|
OIEL | Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Dubai, Finland, France, Fujairah, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Kenya, Korea, South, Kuwait, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Ras al Khaimah, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sharjah, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Umm al Qaiwain, United States
| components for small arms ammunition, small arms ammunition
| Issue | Application is outstanding
|
OIEL | Abu Dhabi, Alderney, Australia, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Gibraltar, Guatemala, Guernsey, Hong Kong, Iceland, India, Japan, Jersey, Korea, South, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mauritius, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Qatar, Romania, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, Taiwan, Province of China, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, United States
| equipment for the use of general military aircraft components, equipment for the use of general military vehicle components, equipment for the use of general naval vessel components, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, general military aircraft components, general military vehicle components, general naval vessel components, military electronic equipment, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for general military vehicle components, technology for general naval vessel components, technology for military electronic equipment
| Issue | India Issue with Proviso
|
OIEL | Abu Dhabi, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dubai, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Korea, South, Kuwait, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States
| hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays
| Issue | Application is outstanding
|
OIEL | Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Eritrea, French Guiana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Venezuela
| equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | Application is outstanding
|
OIEL | Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Chile, Croatia, Egypt, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, South, Malaysia, Moldova, Oman, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Serbia, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, Province of China, Turkey, Ukraine, Vietnam
| components for equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for software for equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | India, Indonesia, Moldova, Serbia, Vietnam Issue with Provision
|
OIEL | Azerbaijan, China, Nigeria, Tanzania
| promoting the supply of Category B goods, promoting the supply of military goods, promoting the supply of pepper sprays for self protection, promoting the supply of portable anti-riot devices, promoting the supply of tear gas for self protection, promoting the supply of tear gas/riot-control agents
| Issue | Azerbaijan, Nigeria, Tanzania Issue with Proviso
|
OITCL | Armenia, Lebanon, Sudan
| promoting the supply of military goods
| Issue | Armenia, Sudan Issue with Proviso
|
OITCL | Iraq, Lebanon
| bomb suits, military helmets
| Issue | Iraq Issue with Proviso
|
OITCL | Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Macao, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam
| all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
| Issue | Bangladesh, India, Indonesia ,Vietnam - ISSUE - Pakistan, Sri Lanka REJECT
|
OITCL | Afghanistan, Chad, Congo, Congo, Democratic Republic of, Dubai, Haiti, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan
| fragmentation hand grenades, rifle grenades
| Issue | Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan REJECT - Chad, Congo, Congo, Democratic Republic of, Haiti ISSUE with Proviso - Ivory Coast, Somalia, Sudan REFUSE
|
OITCL | Congo, Democratic Republic of, Guinea, Republic of, Ivory Coast, Lebanon, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan
| components for armoured fighting vehicles
| Issue | Congo, Democratic Republic of, , Ivory Coast, Lebanon, Liberia, Sudan ISSUE with Proviso- Guinea, Republic of, Sierra Leone REJECT
|
SIEL | Togo
| bomb suits, components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, components for military firing sets, mine detection equipment, military helmets, military devices for initiating explosives
| Issue | Togo REFUSE
|
SIEL | Afghanistan
| radio controlled improvised explosive device jamming equipment
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Iraq
| technology for the use of unmanned air vehicles
| Issue | Iraq Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Afghanistan
| naval gun mountings, naval light guns, weapon sights, optical target acquisition equipment, inertial equipment, components for optical target acquisition equipment, fire control equipment, components for naval light guns, components for naval gun installations, laser rangefinders, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, equipment for the use of naval gun mountings, equipment for the use of naval light guns, technology for the use of naval gun mountings, test equipment for naval gun installations, equipment for the use of naval gun installations, software for the use of naval gun installations, software for the use of test equipment for fire control equipment, test equipment for fire control equipment, components for test equipment for fire control equipment, test equipment for naval light guns, inert ammunition, components for small calibre artillery ammunition, components for fire control equipment
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | United States, Iraq
| civil explosive detection/identification equipment
| Issue | Iraq Issue
|
SIEL | Yemen
| simulators for fire control equipment
| Issue | Yemen Issue
|
SIEL | United States, Iraq
| equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | Iraq Issue
|
SIEL | Iraq
| equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | Iraq Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Iraq
| military helmets, body armour
| Issue | Iraq Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Afghanistan
| components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue
|
SIEL | Nepal
| test equipment for attack alerting/warning equipment
| Issue | Nepal Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Iraq
| components for military training aircraft
| Issue | Iraq Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | United States, Iraq
| equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | Iraq Issue
|
SIEL | Iraq
| components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
| Issue | Iraq Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Afghanistan
| all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue
|
SIEL | Ghana
| chemicals used for chemical/materials production
| Issue | Ghana Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Ethiopia
| components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
| Issue | Ethiopia Issue
|
SIEL | Somalia
| components for aircraft missile protection systems
| Issue | Somalia Issue
|
SIEL | Iraq
| naval gun mountings, weapon sights, optical target acquisition equipment, inertial equipment, components for optical target acquisition equipment, fire control equipment, components for naval light guns, weapon control systems, laser rangefinders, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, equipment for the use of naval gun mountings, equipment for the use of naval light guns, technology for the use of naval light guns, equipment for the use of naval gun installations, naval light guns, components for fire control equipment
| Issue | Iraq Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | United States, Iraq
| components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, equipment for the use of military improvised explosive device disposal equipment
| Issue | Iraq Issue
|
SIEL | Nepal
| radio controlled improvised explosive device jamming equipment, components for radio controlled improvised explosive device jamming equipment
| Issue | Nepal Issue
|
SIEL | Iraq
| general purpose machine guns (38), gun mountings, heavy machine guns (20), launching equipment for anti-armour rockets, weapon sights, assault rifles (133)
| Issue | Iraq Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Liberia
| military cargo vehicles
| Issue | Liberia Issue
|
SIEL | Central African Republic
| components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
| Issue | Central African Republic Issue
|
SIEL | Kuwait
| explosive ordnance disposal equipment, non-military firing sets, equipment for the use of explosive ordnance disposal equipment, military improvised explosive device disposal equipment
| Issue | Issue
|
SIEL | Nepal
| equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | Nepal REFUSE
|
SIEL | Sudan
| cloth treated for signature suppression for military use
| Issue | Sudan Issue
|
SIEL | Sri Lanka
| components for simulators for small calibre artillery
| Issue | Sri Lanka Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Ethiopia
| gyroscopes, technology for the use of gyroscopes
| Issue | Ethiopia Issue
|
SIEL | Chad
| optical target acquisition equipment
| Issue | Chad Issue
|
SIEL | Netherlands, Afghanistan
| radio controlled improvised explosive device jamming equipment
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue
|
SIEL | Iraq
| all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
| Issue | Iraq Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Somalia
| components for NBC respirators
| Issue | Somalia Issue
|
SIEL | Denmark, Afghanistan
| technology for the use of military training aircraft
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue
|
SIEL | Iraq
| civil explosive detection/identification equipment
| Issue | Iraq Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Yemen
| equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | Yemen Issue
|
SIEL | Sudan
| components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
| Issue | Sudan WITHDRAWN
|
SIEL | Afghanistan
| equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue
|
SIEL | Dubai, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen
| body armour, components for body armour
| Issue | Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen Issue
|
SIEL | Iraq
| military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment
| Issue | Iraq STOPPED
|
SIEL | Korea, South, Afghanistan
| components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue
|
SIEL | Afghanistan
| components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue
|
SIEL | Netherlands, Ghana
| equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | Ghana Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Ethiopia
| equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | Ethiopia Issue
|
SIEL | Ethiopia
| equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | Ethiopia Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Zimbabwe
| equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | Zimbabwe Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Ethiopia
| cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | Ethiopia Issue
|
SIEL | Ethiopia
| military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military firing sets
| Issue | Ethiopia Issue
|
SIEL | Yemen
| bomb suits, components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military improvised explosive device disposal equipment
| Issue | Yemen Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Iraq
| equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | Iraq Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Dubai, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen
| components for military training aircraft
| Issue | Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | United States, Iraq
| equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | Iraq Issue
|
SIEL | Ethiopia
| body armour, components for body armour, military helmets
| Issue | Ethiopia Issue
|
SIEL | Afghanistan
| equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Somalia
| equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | Somalia Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Iraq
| general military vehicle components
| Issue | Iraq Issue
|
SIEL | Afghanistan
| components for body armour
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue
|
SIEL | Iraq
| components for military utility helicopters
| Issue | Iraq Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Sri Lanka
| military utility vehicles
| Issue | Sri Lanka Issue
|
SIEL | Pakistan
| weapon sights, weapon sight mounts
| Issue | Pakistan Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Afghanistan
| body armour, components for body armour
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Iraq
| civil explosive detection/identification equipment
| Issue | Iraq Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Yemen
| components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
| Issue | Yemen Issue
|
SIEL | Congo, Democratic Republic of
| assault rifles (31), components for assault rifles, technology for the use of assault rifles, weapon cleaning equipment
| Issue | Congo, Democratic Republic of Issue
|
SIEL | Afghanistan
| assault rifles (10), weapon cleaning equipment
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue
|
SIEL | Iraq
| command communications control and intelligence equipment, military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, command communications control and intelligence software, components for military navigation equipment, military navigation equipment, components for command communications control and intelligence equipment
| Issue | Iraq Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Iraq
| military aircraft ground equipment, equipment for the use of military airfield vehicles
| Issue | Iraq Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Afghanistan
| naval auxiliary vessels
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue
|
SIEL | Bangladesh
| equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software
| Issue | Bangladesh Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Dubai, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen
| components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
| Issue | Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen Issue
|
SIEL | Iraq
| chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes
| Issue | Iraq Issue
|
SIEL | Ethiopia
| components for combat aircraft
| Issue | Ethiopia Issue
|
SIEL | United States, Afghanistan
| components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue
|
SIEL | Afghanistan
| veterinary/tranquillising rifles, weapon sights, components for veterinary/tranquillising rifles, components for veterinary/tranquillising ammunition
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue
|
SIEL | Sri Lanka
| bomb suits, military communications equipment, military helmets
| Issue | Sri Lanka Issue
|
SIEL | Somalia
| military helmets | Issue
| Somalia Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Iraq
| non-military firing sets
| Issue | Iraq Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Somalia
| equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software
| Issue | Somalia Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Somalia
| cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | Somalia Issue
|
SIEL | Azerbaijan
| equipment employing cryptography
| Proviso |
Azerbaijan Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | China
| assault rifles (330), components for assault rifles, weapon cleaning equipment, components for general purpose machine guns, general purpose machine guns (20), assault rifles (100), components for semi-automatic pistols, semi-automatic pistols (100), assault rifles (20), general purpose machine guns (15), small arms ammunition
| Issue | Issue
|
SIEL | Iraq
| military cargo vehicles
| Issue | Iraq Issue
|
SIEL | Zimbabwe
| equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | Zimbabwe REFUSE
|
SIEL | Iraq
| mechanical measurement equipment, electronic measurement equipment
| Issue | Iraq Issue
|
SIEL | Burma
| cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | Burma Issue
|
SIEL | Congo, Democratic Republic of
| civil NBC detection systems, civil explosive detection/identification equipment
| Proviso |
Congo, Democratic Republic of Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Yemen
| decoy flares | Issue
| Yemen Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Iraq
| all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
| Issue | Iraq Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Iraq
| rifles (120), small arms ammunition, components for rifles, weapon cleaning equipment
| Issue | Iraq Issue
|
SIEL | Afghanistan
| cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue
|
SIEL | Nigeria
| equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software
| Issue | Nigeria Issue
|
SIEL | Dubai, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen
| cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen Issue
|
SIEL | Zimbabwe
| military cargo vehicles
| Issue | Zimbabwe Issue
|
SIEL | Liberia
| test equipment for attack alerting/warning equipment
| Issue | Liberia Issue
|
SIEL | Iraq
| military cargo vehicles, military containers
| Issue | Iraq Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Afghanistan
| components for military training aircraft
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue
|
SIEL | United States, Iraq
| body armour, components for body armour
| Issue | Iraq WITHDRAWN
|
SIEL | Afghanistan
| direct view imaging equipment, technology for the use of direct view imaging equipment
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Sudan
| body armour, components for body armour, military helmets
| Issue | Sudan REFUSE
|
SIEL | Afghanistan
| equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Dubai, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen
| body armour, components for body armour
| Issue | Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen Issue
|
SIEL | Somalia
| body armour, components for body armour, military helmets
| Issue | Somalia STOPPED
|
SIEL | Afghanistan
| small arms ammunition, stun grenades
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Ghana
| body armour, components for body armour, military helmets
| Issue | Ghana Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Nepal
| body armour, military helmets
| Issue | Nepal Issue
|
SIEL | Congo, Democratic Republic of
| surface coating equipment, pumps
| Issue | Congo, Democratic Republic of Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Iraq
| civil body armour, body armour, military helmets
| Issue | Iraq Withdrawn
|
SIEL | Afghanistan
| equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Iraq
| ground vehicle military communications equipment
| Issue | Iraq Issue
|
SIEL | Afghanistan
| body armour, components for body armour
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue
|
SIEL | Afghanistan
| body armour, components for body armour, military helmets, NBC respirators
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue
|
SIEL | Iraq
| equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | Iraq Withdrawn
|
SIEL | Dubai, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen
| components for radio controlled improvised explosive device jamming equipment
| Issue | Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen Issue
|
SIEL | Afghanistan
| military helmets, components for body armour, body armour
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue
|
SIEL | Afghanistan
| sporting guns (1), small arms ammunition
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Nepal
| chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes
| Issue | Nepal Issue
|
SIEL | Sri Lanka
| inertial equipment |
Issue | Sri Lanka Issue
|
SIEL | Singapore, Sri Lanka
| all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
| Issue | Sri Lanka Issue
|
SIEL | Afghanistan
| components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue
|
SIEL | Afghanistan
| anti-armour ammunition, exploding grenade ammunition, grenade launchers, machine guns (50), small arms ammunition, assault rifles (2500), weapon cleaning equipment, components for machine guns, machine guns, components for pistols, pistols (200)
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue
|
SIEL | Sierra Leone
| weapon night sights, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, imaging cameras, weapon sight mounts
| Refuse | Sierra Leone REFUSE
|
SIEL | Georgia
| military equipment for initiating explosives, components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment
| Issue | Application is outstanding
|
SIEL | Nepal
| inertial equipment |
Issue | Nepal REFUSE
|
SIEL | Sri Lanka
| military aircrew protective equipment
| Issue | Sri Lanka Issue
|
SIEL | Germany, Iraq
| chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production
| Issue | Iraq, Issue
|
SIEL | Sri Lanka
| components for sniper rifles
| Issue | Sri Lanka Issue
|
SIEL | Sri Lanka
| equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | Sri Lanka REFUSE
|
SIEL | Sudan
| inertial equipment |
Issue | Sudan issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Finland, Sri Lanka
| components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
| Issue | Sri Lanka Issue
|
SIEL | Ras al Khaimah, Iraq
| components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
| Issue | Iraq Issue
|
SIEL | Ras al Khaimah, Iraq
| technology for body armour
| Issue | Iraq Issue
|
SIEL | Iraq
| body armour, components for body armour, military helmets, components for military helmets
| Issue | Iraq Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Iraq
| equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | Iraq Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Iraq
| imaging cameras | Issue
| Iraq Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Afghanistan
| general naval vessel components
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue
|
SIEL | Sri Lanka
| components for military training aircraft
| Issue | Sri Lanka REFUSE
|
SIEL | United States, Iraq
| small arms ammunition |
Issue | Iraq Issue
|
SIEL | Afghanistan
| components for military support aircraft
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | United States, Iraq
| civil explosive detection/identification equipment
| Issue | Iraq STOPPED
|
SIEL | Somalia
| military helmets | Issue
| Somalia Issue |
SIEL | Iraq
| military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment
| Issue | Iraq Issue
|
SIEL | Iraq
| triggered spark gaps |
Issue | Iraq Issue
|
SIEL | India
| anti-riot/ballistic shields
| Issue | India Issue
|
SIEL | Yemen
| chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production
| Issue | Yemen REFUSE
|
SIEL | Sri Lanka
| inertial equipment |
Issue | Sri Lanka Issue
|
SIEL | Mozambique
| components for military training aircraft
| Issue | Mozambique Issue
|
SIEL | United States, Iraq
| body armour, components for body armour, military helmets
| Issue | Iraq Issue
|
SIEL | Afghanistan
| components for military equipment for initiating explosives
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Iraq
| components for military communications equipment
| Issue | Iraq STOPPED
|
SIEL | Iraq
| all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
| Issue | Iraq Issue
|
SIEL | Iraq
| all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
| Issue | Iraq WITHDRAWN
|
SIEL | Iraq
| body armour, components for body armour, military helmets
| Issue | Iraq STOPPED
|
SIEL | Afghanistan
| equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Dubai, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen
| body armour, military helmets
| Issue | Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen Issue
|
SIEL | Afghanistan
| components for military combat vehicles
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue with Proviso
|
SIEL | Afghanistan
| all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue
|
SITCL | Sri Lanka
| body armour | Issue
| Sri Lanka Issue with Proviso
|
SITCL | Sri Lanka
| small arms ammunition, anti-structure rockets
| Issue | Sri Lanka Issue with Proviso
|
SITCL | Iraq
| anti-armour rockets, small arms ammunition
| Issue | Iraq STOPPED
|
SITCL | Iraq
| small arms ammunition, equipment for the use of aircraft cannons, components for small arms ammunition, components for heavy machine guns, heavy machine guns (81), sniper rifles (260), large calibre artillery ammunition, air-to-surface rockets
| Issue | Iraq STOPPED
|
SITCL | Afghanistan
| weapon sights | Issue
| Afghanistan Issue |
SITCL | Afghanistan
| armoured personnel carriers
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue
|
SITCL | Ghana
| all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
| Issue | Ghana Issue
|
SITCL | Iraq
| launching equipment for anti-armour rockets, weapon sights
| Issue | Iraq Issue
|
SITCL | Afghanistan
| armoured personnel carriers
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue
|
SITCL | Congo, Democratic Republic of
| body armour | Issue
| Congo, Democratic Republic of Issue with Proviso
|
SITCL | Sri Lanka
| components for body armour, body armour
| Issue | Sri Lanka STOPPED
|
SITCL | Iraq
| fragmentation rockets, anti-armour rockets, anti-armour ammunition, small calibre artillery ammunition, large calibre artillery ammunition, artillery rockets
| Issue | Iraq Issue with Proviso
|
SITCL | Iraq
| military transport aircraft
| Issue | Iraq STOPPED
|
SITCL | Iraq
| artillery rockets, large calibre artillery ammunition, fragmentation rockets, anti-armour rockets, anti-armour ammunition, small calibre artillery ammunition
| Issue | Iraq Issue with Proviso
|
SITCL | Iraq
| military communications equipment
| Issue | Iraq Issue with Proviso
|
SITCL | Iraq
| components for air-to-surface rockets, bombs, small calibre artillery ammunition, training small calibre artillery ammunition
| Issue | Iraq Issue with Proviso
|
SITCL | Kenya
| body armour, military helmets, components for body armour
| Issue | Kenya Issue
|
SITCL | Uganda
| optical target tracking equipment, ground based radars
| Issue | Uganda Issue with Proviso
|
SITCL | Pakistan
| military parachutes |
Issue | Pakistan WITHDRAWN
|
SITCL | Mauritania
| all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
| Issue | Mauritania Issue
|
SITCL | Afghanistan
| weapon night sights |
Issue | Afghanistan Issue
|
SITCL | Afghanistan
| body armour, components for body armour, military helmets
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue
|
SITCL | Afghanistan
| all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue with Proviso
|
SITCL | Afghanistan
| components for mortars, equipment for the use of mortars, mortars, weapon cleaning equipment
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue
|
SITCL | Afghanistan
| military helmets | Issue
| Afghanistan Issue |
SITCL | Iraq
| military helmets | Issue
| Iraq Issue |
SITCL | Afghanistan
| military helmets, body armour, components for body armour
| Issue | Afghanistan Issue
|
SITCL | Iraq
| small arms ammunition |
Issue | Iraq Issue with Proviso
|
SITCL | Iraq
| small arms ammunition |
Issue | Iraq STOPPED
|
SITCL | Iraq
| military combat vehicles, military support vehicles, components for military combat vehicles, military mobile repair shops and related equipment, military training equipment
| Issue | Iraq STOPPED
|
SITCL | Iraq
| components for military combat vehicles, military combat vehicles, military mobile repair shops and related equipment, military support vehicles, military training equipment
| Issue | Iraq Issue
|
|
| | Annex 2: Refusals 2010 with Criterion
| |
End Use Countries
| Application Type
| Reason for Refusal
| Goods | Rating
|
Argentina | SIEL (Permanent)
| 5 | components for military electronic equipment
| ML11 |
Azerbaijan | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7 | global positioning satellite receivers
| 7A105 |
Azerbaijan | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for military utility helicopters
| ML10, ML11 |
Azerbaijan | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | capacitors
| END |
Azerbaijan | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | test equipment for attack alerting/warning equipment
| ML11 |
Bangladesh | SIEL (Permanent)
| 2 | cryptographic software, radio jamming equipment
| 5A001, 5D002 |
Bangladesh | SIEL (Permanent)
| 2 | cryptographic software, radio jamming equipment
| 5A001, 5D002 |
Belarus | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7 | vibration test equipment
| 2B116 |
Belarus | SIEL (Permanent)
| 2 | gun silencers, sniper rifles (12)
| ML1 |
Burma | SIEL (Permanent)
| MEND (7) | telecommunications equipment
| MEND |
Burma | SIEL (Permanent)
| MEND (7) | components for radio equipment, radio equipment, technology for the use of radio equipment
| MEND |
Cameroon | SITCL
| 2 | promoting the supply of small arms ammunition
| ML3 |
China | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7 | focal plane arrays
| 6A002 |
China | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7 | imaging cameras
| 6A003 |
China | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7 | imaging cameras
| 6A003 |
China | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7 | imaging cameras
| 6A003 |
China | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7 | components for civil NBC detection systems
| 1A004 |
China | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7 | instrumentation cameras
| 6A203 |
China | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7 | components for instrumentation cameras
| 6A203 |
China | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | welding equipment
| END |
China | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7 | semiconductor process equipment
| 3B001 |
China | SIEL (Permanent)
| 5, 7 | semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers
| 3C001 |
China | SIEL (Permanent)
| 5 | imaging cameras
| 6A003 |
China | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7 | imaging cameras
| 6A003 |
China | SIEL (Permanent)
| 5, 7 | semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers
| 3C001 |
China | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7 | technology for the production of machine tools
| 2E002 |
China | SIEL (Permanent)
| 5, 7 | semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers
| 3C001 |
China | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7 | controlled atmosphere furnaces, equipment for the use of controlled atmosphere furnaces
| 2B226 |
China | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7 | semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers
| 3C001 |
China | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7 | computer analogue to digital equipment, software for the use of computer analogue to digital equipment
| 4A003, 4D001 |
China | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7 | computer analogue to digital equipment
| 4A003 |
China | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | electronic measurement equipment
| END |
China | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7 | focal plane arrays
| 6A002 |
China | SIEL (Permanent)
| 5c, 7 | focal plane arrays
| 6A002 |
China | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7 | semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers
| 3C001 |
China | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7 | imaging cameras
| 6A003 |
Equatorial Guinea | SIEL (Permanent)
| 2 | components for general purpose machine guns, equipment for the use of general purpose machine guns, general purpose machine guns (5), small arms ammunition, technology for the use of general purpose machine guns, weapon sights
| ML1, ML1, ML22, ML3, PL5017
|
Georgia | SIEL (Permanent)
| 2, 3 | anti-armour ammunition, small arms ammunition
| ML3 |
Germany | SIEL (Permanent)
| BM (1) | microwave components
| END |
Guyana | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7 | military helmets
| ML13 |
Hong Kong | SIEL (Temporary)
| 1 | imaging cameras
| 6A003 |
India | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7, WMD (1) | ballistic test equipment, equipment for the use of optical equipment, instrumentation cameras, optical equipment
| 6A003, END |
India | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7 | imaging cameras
| 6A003 |
India | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | general laboratory equipment
| END |
India | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | ferrous alloys
| END |
India | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7 | instrumentation cameras
| 6A003 |
India | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | general purpose integrated circuits
| END |
India | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7 | imaging cameras
| 6A003 |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | gaskets
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1, WMD | chemicals, fibre prepregs
| END, IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7, WMD (1) | machine tools
| 2B001, END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | controlled atmosphere furnaces
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7 | marine vessels
| PL9008 |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7 | corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment
| 2B350 |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | ferrous metals
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| BM (1) | components for valves, gaskets, seals
| END, IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | components for environmental test equipment, environmental test equipment, sealing compounds, software for the use of environmental test equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| BM (1) | components for valves, gaskets, valves
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7 | biotechnology equipment
| 2B352 |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | machine tools
| 2B001 |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | gaskets, seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | frequency generators
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | components for gas detection equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | gaskets, seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | components for materials testing equipment, materials testing equipment, software for the use of materials testing equipment, technology for the use of materials testing equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| BM (1) | components for pumps
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | accessories for materials testing equipment, materials testing equipment, pumps
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | accessories for materials analysis equipment, materials analysis equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | valves
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | materials analysis equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | polymer materials
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | fasteners/fixings
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | accessories for inspection equipment, inspection equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | shock mounts
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| BM (1) | sealing compounds
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | environmental test equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| BM (1) | liquids processing equipment, seals
| END, IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | corrosion resistant piping
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | accessories for machine tools
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| BM (1) | components for pressure monitoring equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | industrial handling equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| BM (1) | components for gas detection equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment
| 2B350 |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| BM (1) | valves
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment
| 2B350 |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment
| 2B350 |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | accessories for inspection equipment, inspection equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment
| 2B350 |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | components for valves, gaskets, seals
| END, IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | accessories for valves, seals
| END, IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | accessories for inspection equipment, components for inspection equipment, electronic components, inspection equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | non-ferrous alloys
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | gaskets
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | materials processing equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment
| 2B350 |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | components for process control equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | components for process control equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | components for pumps
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | accessories for inspection equipment, components for inspection equipment, inspection equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| MEND (7) | non-ferrous alloys
| MEND |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | components for pneumatic systems, components for valves, gaskets, seals, valves
| END, IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | components for digital computers, digital computers
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | electronic components
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | electronic components
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | materials analysis equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | electrical installation items
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | components for petrochemical plant
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | frequency changers, power supplies, process control equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | chromatographs
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | electrical switching equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment
| 2B350 |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | vibration test equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | gaskets
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment
| 2B350 |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | process control equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | electronic components
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | pumps
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | non-ferrous alloys
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | ferrous metals
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment
| 2B350 |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | electronic components
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | components for nuclear radiation detection equipment, nuclear radiation detection equipment
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | accessories for materials testing equipment, components for materials testing equipment, materials testing equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | materials testing equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | process control equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | accessories for materials analysis equipment, materials analysis equipment, technology for the use of materials analysis equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | sealing compounds/materials
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment
| 2B350 |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | liquids processing equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment
| 2B350 |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | components for civil vehicles, electronic components
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | components for industrial gas turbines
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | components for pumps
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment
| 2B350 |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | accessories for valves
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | components for steam systems
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | components for process control equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | components for steam systems
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | components for petrochemical plant
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | technology for the use of gas processing equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7 | imaging cameras
| 6A003 |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 5, 7 | components for marine vessel equipment
| PL9008 |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1, IRAN | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| BM, WMD | materials testing equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 5, 7 | marine vessel equipment, technology for the use of marine vessel equipment
| PL9008 |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | electronic components
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | chemical mixtures
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | materials testing equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | components for pumps
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | materials analysis equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | components for steam systems
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Temporary)
| 1, IRAN | personal protective equipment
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1, WMD | corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, valves
| 2B350, END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | nuclear radiation detection equipment
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | machine tools
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | components for industrial generators
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | fibrous/filamentary materials
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | materials testing equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | components for general industrial production equipment
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | fluid flow analysis software
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment
| 2B350 |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | chemicals, materials testing equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | materials testing equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | accessories for materials testing equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | fluid flow analysis software
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | imaging cameras
| 6A003 |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | components for petrochemical plant
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | components for inspection equipment, inspection equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | accessories for corrosion resistant piping
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | imaging cameras
| 6A003 |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | non-ferrous alloys
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | components for filtration equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1, IRAN | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Temporary)
| WMD (1) | inspection equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | general laboratory equipment
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | pumps
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | gaskets, seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | components for general industrial production equipment, general industrial production equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | components for environmental test equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | levelling devices
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1, IRAN | lasers
| 6A005 |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | inspection equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1, IRAN | seals
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | pumps
| IRN |
Iran | SIEL (Temporary)
| WMD (1) | inspection equipment
| END |
Iran | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | inspection equipment
| END |
Israel | SIEL (Permanent)
| 2, 3 | components for helmet mounted display equipment
| ML11 |
Israel | SIEL (Permanent)
| 2, 3 | components for helmet mounted display equipment
| ML11 |
Israel | SIEL (Permanent)
| 2, 3 | components for ground vehicle military communications equipment
| ML6 |
Israel | SIEL (Transhipment)
| 2, 3 | explosives
| ML8 |
Israel | SIEL (Permanent)
| 2 | components for naval radars
| ML5 |
Israel | SIEL (Permanent)
| 2, 3 | components for optical target acquisition equipment
| ML5 |
Israel | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7 | semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers
| 3C001 |
Ivory Coast | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | military cargo vehicles, military containers, military engineer vehicles, tank transporters
| ML17, ML6 |
Kenya | SIEL (Permanent)
| 2 | air guns (2), air guns (3), components for semi-automatic pistols, semi-automatic pistols (5), weapon sights
| ML1 |
Kenya | SIEL (Permanent)
| 2 | components for semi-automatic pistols, semi-automatic pistols (2), technology for the use of semi-automatic pistols
| ML1, ML22 |
Malaysia | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | components for pumps
| END |
Malaysia | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7 | network analysers
| 3A002 |
Nepal | SIEL (Permanent)
| 2, 3 | machine tools
| 2B001 |
Nepal | SIEL (Permanent)
| 2 | military firing sets
| ML4 |
Nepal | SIEL (Permanent)
| 5 | equipment for the use of explosive ordnance disposal equipment, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, non-military firing sets
| 1A007, ML4, ML4, PL5017
|
Nepal | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7 | components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military equipment for initiating explosives
| ML4b1, ML4b2 |
Nigeria | SIEL (Permanent)
| 2 | armoured personnel carriers
| ML6 |
Nigeria | SITCL
| 2 | all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
| ML6 |
Pakistan | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | components for general laboratory equipment
| END |
Pakistan | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment
| 2B350 |
Pakistan | SIEL (Permanent)
| BM (1) | accessories for dimensional measuring equipment, dimensional measuring equipment, software for the use of dimensional measuring equipment
| END |
Pakistan | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | electronic measurement equipment
| END |
Pakistan | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | gas detection equipment
| END |
Pakistan | SIEL (Permanent)
| BM (1) | components for gas detection equipment
| END |
Pakistan | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | components for petrochemical plant
| END |
Pakistan | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | components for petrochemical plant
| END |
Pakistan | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | accessories for temperature measurement equipment, temperature measurement equipment
| END |
Pakistan | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | components for liquids processing equipment
| END |
Pakistan | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | accessories for temperature measurement equipment, temperature measurement equipment
| END |
Pakistan | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7 | corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment
| 2B350 |
Pakistan | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7, WMD (1) | accessories for corrosion resistant piping, components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, corrosion resistant piping
| 2B350, END |
Pakistan | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | components for materials processing equipment
| END |
Pakistan | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | machine tools
| END |
Pakistan | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | electronic measurement equipment
| END |
Pakistan | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | electronic measurement equipment, imaging cameras
| END |
Pakistan | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | components for materials processing equipment
| END |
Paraguay | SITCL
| 7 | small arms ammunition
| ML3 |
Russia | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7 | focal plane arrays
| 6A002 |
Sierra Leone | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | military ambulances
| ML6 |
Sierra Leone | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | military cargo vehicles
| ML6 |
Sierra Leone | SIEL (Permanent)
| 2, 3, 7, 8 | anti-armour ammunition, assault rifles (2500), components for machine guns, components for pistols, exploding grenade ammunition, grenade launchers, machine guns, machine guns (50), pistols (200), small arms ammunition, weapon cleaning equipment
| ML1, ML2, ML3, PL5017 |
Sri Lanka | SIEL (Permanent)
| 3, 6 | components for sniper rifles
| ML1 |
Sudan | SIEL (Permanent)
| MEND (7) | components for telecommunications equipment, power supplies, telecommunications equipment
| MEND |
Sudan | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7 | direct view imaging equipment, technology for the use of direct view imaging equipment
| 6A002, 6E101 |
Swaziland | SIEL (Permanent)
| 2 | components for general purpose machine guns, general purpose machine guns (20), small arms ammunition, technology for the use of general purpose machine guns, weapon cleaning equipment
| ML1, ML22, ML3, PL5017 |
Swaziland | SIEL (Permanent)
| 5d | components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment
| ML4 |
Syria | SIEL (Permanent)
| BM (1) | components for TV cameras and control equipment
| END |
Syria | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | general laboratory equipment
| END |
Syria | SIEL (Permanent)
| N (1) | frequency changers
| END |
Syria | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | materials processing equipment
| END |
Syria | SIEL (Permanent)
| B (1) | accessories for general laboratory equipment, general laboratory equipment
| END |
Syria | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | general laboratory equipment
| END |
Syria | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | biotechnology equipment
| END |
Syria | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | components for hydraulic systems, hydraulic systems, workshop tools
| END |
Syria | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | accessories for materials analysis equipment, materials analysis equipment, technology for the use of materials analysis equipment
| END |
Syria | SIEL (Permanent)
| N (1) | frequency changers
| END |
Syria | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | general laboratory equipment
| END |
Syria | SIEL (Permanent)
| WMD (1) | digital computers
| END |
Turkey | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7 | pressure transducers
| 2B230 |
Turkey | SIEL (Permanent)
| 7 | machine tools
| 2B001 |
United States | SIEL (Permanent)
| 2, 3 | components for combat helicopters
| ML10 |
United States | SIEL (Permanent)
| 2, 3 | components for combat helicopters
| ML10 |
United States | SIEL (Permanent)
| 2, 3 | software enabling equipment to function as periscopes
| ML21 |
Vietnam | SIEL (Permanent)
| 2 | sniper rifles (83), weapon sights
| ML1 |
Yemen | SIEL (Permanent)
| 2, 3 | components for combat aircraft
| ML10 |
Yemen | SITCL
| 2, 3 | armoured personnel carriers
| ML6 |
Zimbabwe | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | equipment employing cryptography
| 5A002 |
Zimbabwe | SIEL (Permanent)
| 1 | military cargo vehicles
| ML6 |
Annex C
Standardized
form for reporting international transfers of conventional arms
(exports)a
EXPORTS
Report of international conventional
arms transfers
(according to United Nations
General Assembly resolutions 46/36 L and 58/54)
Reporting country:
National point of contact:
(Organization,
Division/Section, telephone, fax, e-mail) (FOR GOVERNMENTAL USE
ONLY)
Calendar year: __________________________________________________
A
| B
| C
| Db
| Eb
| REMARKSc
|
Category (I-VII)
| Final importer
State(s)
| Number
of items
| State of origin (if not exporter)
| Intermediate location (if any)
| Description
of item
| Comments on the transfer
|
I.
| Battle tanks
|
| |
| | | |
II.
| Armoured combat vehicles
| | | |
| | |
III.
| Large-calibre artillery systems
| | | |
| | |
IV.
| Combat aircraft
|
| |
| | | |
V.
| Attack helicopters
| | | |
| | |
VI.
| Warships
|
| |
| | | |
VII.
| Missiles and missile launchersd
| a)
| | | |
| | |
| | b)
| | | |
| | |
National criteria on transfers:
a
b c d See explanatory notes.
The nature of information
provided should be indicated in accordance with explanatory notes
e and f.
Standardized
form for reporting international transfers of conventional arms
(imports)a
IMPORTS
Report of international conventional
arms transfers
(according to United Nations
General Assembly resolutions 46/36 L and 58/54)
Reporting country:
National point of contact:
(Organization,
Division/Section, telephone, fax, e-mail) (FOR GOVERNMENTAL USE
ONLY)
Calendar year: __________________________________________________
A
| B
| C
| Db
| Eb
| REMARKSc
|
Category (I-VII)
| Exporter State(s)
| Number
of items
| State of origin (if not exporter)
| Intermediate location (if any)
| Description
of item
| Comments on the transfer
|
I.
| Battle tanks
|
| |
| | |
|
II.
| Armoured combat vehicles
| | | |
| |
|
III.
| Large-calibre artillery systems
| | | |
| |
|
IV.
| Combat aircraft
|
| |
| | |
|
V.
| Attack helicopters
| | | |
| |
|
VI.
| Warships
|
| |
| | |
|
VII.
| Missiles and missile launchersd
| a)
| | | |
| |
|
| | b)
| | | |
| |
|
National criteria on transfers:
a
b c d See explanatory notes.
The nature of information
provided should be indicated in accordance with explanatory notes
e and f.
a)
Explanatory
Notes
(a) Member States that
do not have anything to report should file a "nil report"
clearly stating that no exports or imports have taken place in
any of the categories during the reporting period.
(b) International arms
transfers involve, in addition to the physical movement of equipment
into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and
control over the equipment. Member States are invited to provide
with their return a concise explanation of national criteria used
to determine when an arms transfer becomes effective. (See paragraph
42 of the annex to document A/49/316.)
(c) In the "Remarks"
column Member States may wish to describe the item transferred
by entering the designation, type, model or any other information
considered relevant. Member States may also wish to use the "Remarks"
column to explain or clarify aspects relevant to the transfer.
(d) Multiple-launch rocket
systems are covered by the definition of category III. Rockets
qualifying for registration are covered under category VII. MANPADS
should be reported if the MANPAD system is supplied as a complete
unit, i.e. the missile and launcher/Grip Stock form an integral
unit. In addition, individual launching mechanisms or grip-stocks
should also be reported. Individual missiles, not supplied with
a launching mechanism or grip stock need not be reported.
(e) Check any of the following
provided as part of your submission: Check
(i) Annual report
on exports of arms __
(ii) Annual
report on imports of arms __
(iii) Available
background information on military holdings __
(iv) Available
background information on procurement
through national
production __
(v) Available
background information on relevant policies
and/or national
legislation __
(vi) Other (please
describe) __
(f) When reporting transfers,
which of the following criteria,
drawn from paragraph 42 of
the annex to document A/49/316, were used:
(i) Departure
of equipment from the exporter's territory __
(ii) Arrival
of equipment in the importer's territory __
(iii) Transfer
of title __
(iv) Transfer
of control __
(v) Others (please
provide brief description below) __
Categories
of equipment and their definitions
I. Battle tanks
Tracked or wheeled self-propelled
armoured fighting vehicles with high cross-country mobility and
a high-level of self-protection, weighing at least 16.5 metric
tons unladen weight, with a high muzzle velocity direct fire main
gun of at least 75 millimetres calibre.
II. Armoured combat
vehicles
Tracked, semi-tracked
or wheeled self-propelled vehicles, with armoured protection and
cross-country capability, either: (a) designed and equipped to
transport a squad of four or more infantrymen, or (b) armed with
an integral or organic weapon of at least 12.5 millimetres calibre
or a missile launcher.
III. Large-calibre
artillery systems
Guns, howitzers, artillery
pieces, combining the characteristics of a gun or a howitzer,
mortars or multiple-launch rocket systems, capable of engaging
surface targets by delivering primarily indirect fire, with a
calibre of 75 millimetres and above.
IV. Combat aircraft
Fixed-wing or variable-geometry
wing aircraft designed, equipped or modified to engage targets
by employing guided missiles, unguided rockets, bombs, guns, cannons
or other weapons of destruction, including versions of these aircraft
which perform specialized electronic warfare, suppression of air
defence or reconnaissance missions. The term "combat aircraft"
does not include primary trainer aircraft, unless designed, equipped
or modified as described above.
V. Attack helicopters
Rotary-wing aircraft
designed, equipped or modified to engage targets by employing
guided or unguided anti-armour, air-to-surface, air-to-subsurface,
or air-to-air weapons and equipped with an integrated fire control
and aiming system for these weapons, including versions of these
aircraft which perform specialized reconnaissance or electronic
warfare missions.
VI. Warships
Vessels or submarines
armed and equipped for military use with a standard displacement
of 500 metric tons or above, and those with a standard displacement
of less than 500 metric tons, equipped for launching missiles
with a range of at least 25 kilometres or torpedoes with similar
range.
VII. Missiles
and missile launchers
(a) Guided or unguided
rockets, ballistic or cruise missiles capable of delivering a
warhead or weapon of destruction to a range of at least 25 kilometres,
and means designed or modified specifically for launching such
missiles or rockets, if not covered by categories I through VI.
For the purpose of the Register, this sub-category includes remotely
piloted vehicles with the characteristics for missiles as defined
above but does not include ground-to-air missiles.
(b) Man-Portable
Air-Defence Systems (MANPADS).
|