Annex 12: National Counter Proliferation
Strategy 2012-2015
The text of a letter and the attachment from the
FCO Minister Alistair Burt to the Chairman of the Committees'
dated 21 March 2012 relating to the National Counter Proliferation
Strategy for 2012-2015 follows:
I write to inform you that the Government has agreed
a National Counter Proliferation Strategy for 2012-2015. It flows
from key risks identified in the National Security Strategy and
formulates three overarching objectives:
- To deny access to chemical, biological, radiological
and nuclear (CBRN) materials and expertise to terrorists;
- To prevent acquisition by states of capabilities
and their means of delivery (whether conventional or CBRN) which
would threaten stability and UK vital interests, including our
armed forces overseas; and
- To support, strengthen and extend the rules-based
international system of counter proliferation treaties, regimes
and organizations that underpins global security and prosperity.
It describes the actors on whom we focus our activities,
the tools and resources we deploy, and our internal governance
arrangements under the National Security Council. I attach to
this letter the public version of the strategy, which will be
released in the next few days.
We are already using it to drive forward more coherent
and focused work across government departments and with our international
partners. In the last few months, we have:
- continued work alongside the United States in
Libya to locate and secure stockpiles of advanced conventional
weapons, including MANPADs;
- played a key role in the final preparatory conference
on an Arms Trade Treaty held in February, which achieved consensus
on the process for the negotiations in July, and the adoption
of the Chairman's paper as a basis for these negotiations;
- as part of implementation of the 2010 Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty review Conference outcomes, and along
with the US and Russia, supported closely the Finnish facilitator
for the Middle East WMD Free Zone, as he prepares his strategy
for a conference;
- kept up the pressure on Iran over its nuclear
programme by securing a strong EU sanctions package at January's
Foreign Affairs Council, and a good E3+3 statement at the March
meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors.
The next key event will be the Nuclear Security Summit
in Seoul on 26-27 March, at which the deputy prime Minister will
be leading the UK delegation. President Obama convened the first
such summit in Washington in 2010, as part of his drive to secure
vulnerable fissile material around the world within four years.
The second summit will assemble 53 countries, and the UN, the
EU, the IAEA and Interpol, to assess progress and reinvigorate
commitment.
The Deputy Prime Minister will be able to report
significant achievements against our commitments from Washington,
including helping to secure nuclear materials in the former Soviet
Union (not least, 775 bombs' worth in Kazakhstan); hosting a successful
IAEA security advisory mission to Sellafield and Barrow; and leading
efforts to secure last year's renewal of the G8-based Global partnership
against the spread of WMD.
I expect him to make new commitments for the two
years up to the next summit in 2014, including further close partnership
with the IAEA, the US, the EU and others on risk reduction programmes
overseas; further development of plans for the future management
of our inventory of separated civil plutonium; and implementation
of the new UK/France framework for cooperation on civil nuclear
security and emergency response.
Our key contribution, and the summit's most innovative
element, will be our ground-breaking work on the security of nuclear
information. Over the past year we have built consensus on the
need for greater focus on protecting not just nuclear material
but also the information that a terrorist would need to obtain
the material, build it in to an improvised explosive device, and
mount an attack. Such information ranges from maps of nuclear
installations, to how to construct a bomb, to how to beat border
security and emergency response plans. At the summit, I expect
our work to be reflected in a dedicated paragraph in the communiqué,
and an additional UK-led statement, in which at least 20 countries
will join us, committing to specific national actions to improve
the practice of information security.
I look forward to engaging with you and your committee
further on these and other matters in due course.
NATIONAL COUNTER PROLIFERATION STRATEGY 2012-2015
WHY DO WE NEED A NATIONAL COUNTER PROLIFERATION
STRATEGY?
1. The proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological
and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and their delivery systems is a huge
challenge which poses several serious risks to the UK's national
security. These include a CBRN attack on the UK by terrorists
or a threatening state, or an international military crisis. Conventional
weapon systems also present the clearest threat to the UK's Armed
Forces deployed on operations. Reducing these risks requires a
comprehensive approach to counter proliferation.
2. The National Counter Proliferation Strategy sets
the framework for this activity. Much of our approach is internationally
focussed; in priority countries, with partners, or through the
rules-based international system. Ensuring that we have the right
controls and security in place domestically is also a key element.
A risk-based approach
3. The National Security Strategy takes a risk-based
approach to prioritise the Government's national security response.
Counter proliferation work is critical to reducing several of
the most serious national security risks identified:
RISK 1: A terrorist chemical, biological, radiological
or nuclear (CBRN) attack on the UK or its interests, including
UK Armed Forces.
4. Al Qaeda has a long-held desire to obtain and
use CBRN devices. Without continued global efforts to reduce vulnerabilities
in the security of material and information, there is a significant
likelihood that terrorists will at some point acquire CBRN capability.
RISK 2: An international military crisis
5. The proliferation of CBRN and conventional military
technologies to countries, and the enhancement by countries of
their existing capabilities, have the potential to increase instability
and precipitate an international military crisis, or exacerbate
the consequences of such a crisis, including for UK deployed forces.
RISK 3: A state (or proxy) CBRN attack on the
UK or its overseas territories
6. While there is currently a low threat of CBRN
attack on the UK, it is still important that we retain our ability
to monitor - and where possible prevent - CBRN weapons
advancements by other countries, maintain our defences
against attack, and lead global efforts to strengthen the rules-based
international system that has helped to limit the number of CBRN
possessor states thus far.
Our objectives
7. We are working to reduce proliferation risks by:
1. Denying access to CBRN materials and expertise
by terrorists;
2. Preventing acquisition by states of capabilities
and their means of delivery (whether
conventional or CBRN) which would threaten stability
and UK vital interests, including our armed forces overseas; and
3. Supporting, strengthening and extending the rules-based
international system of
counter proliferation treaties, regimes and organisations
that underpins global
security and prosperity.
WHERE WE SEEK TO FOCUS
8. We are focusing activity on four broad groups
of actors:
- states which may have vulnerabilities in
the security of their CBRN information and materials;
- states which may have the capability or intent
to develop CBRN or advanced conventional weapons;
- states which may actively or inadvertently supply
or transit CBRN weapons, delivery systems and conventional
weapons, or related technologies, to actors of concern; and
- partners and multilateral organisations with
whom we can effect change, including the UN, G8, NATO and
the EU.
States with CBRN security vulnerabilities
9. Many countries possess significant quantities
of CBRN material or expertise, or have a significant CBRN technological
base; some countries have CBRN weapons. In several of these we
assess that security weaknesses could make such capabilities easier
for non-state groups to acquire or exploit for malicious purposes.
States with the capability or intent to develop
CBRN or advanced conventional weapons
10. A number of states have active CBRN and advanced
conventional weapons and delivery system programmes - either to
acquire a new capability or to improve an existing one. The existence
of either can be destabilising for a region and can lead to an
arms race or a military response by a regional or global power.
This would increase the risk of a state threat to the UK and its
overseas interests.
11. Despite Iran's claims that its nuclear programme
is peaceful, serious concerns about a military dimension remain
as a result of Iran's actions over recent years. We continue to
follow the dual track strategy of engagement and sanctions. We
also have continuing concerns about North Korea's proliferation
activities. We continue to urge North Korea to refrain from further
provocative actions and to re-engage in dialogue with the international
community.
12. Alongside our commitment to prevent the spread
of such weapons, we are promoting the peaceful use of nuclear
energy, the right to which is enshrined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty.
States which may supply or transit material and
technologies which threaten security
13. Where states admit to, or are judged to, have
a nuclear weapons capability, or
chemical or biological technologies and materials,
controls are essential to prevent more states from acquiring CBRN
weapons. We want all states with these dual use technologies to
have the will and ability to prevent leakage.
14. Globalisation has increased the flow of trade
and knowledge making it harder to
identify cargoes and technologies destined for weapons
programmes of concern. We cannot stop this trade on our own, so
we need to work with trading hubs to improve policing.
Partners and multilateral organisations with whom
we can effect change
15. We are working with our closest international
partners and in the multilateral
environment, including in the UN, G8, NATO and the
EU, to effect change in both specific countries and the rules-based
international system.
WHAT WE SEEK TO CHANGE
16. The rules-based international system is a network
of organisations, ad hoc groups,
treaties and regimes that has been built up over
the last 80 years and has over that period successfully limited,
and even helped to reduce, the number of states with - or looking
to acquire - WMD or their delivery systems, or advanced conventional
capabilities. In developing the rules-based international system,
we seek to:
- Strengthen international commitments to non-proliferation
treaties such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention;
- Lead in groups such as the Nuclear Security Summit
or G8 Global Partnership which are delivering CBRN security improvements
on the ground;
- Provide financial, technical and diplomatic support
to the international bodies that monitor and verify compliance
against these commitments, such as the International Atomic Energy
Agency and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons;
- Strengthen enforcement of existing obligations
and export control regimes, and adoption of non-obligatory guidelines,
while developing and implementing new ones such as the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty, an Arms Trade Treaty, and a Fissile Materials
Cut-off Treaty;
- Lead by example internationally in terms of our
own domestic security practices and export controls;
- Identify, and seek consensus to mitigate, any
gaps in the international architecture.
17. To complement this, we are:
- Working to encourage states to improve nuclear
and biological security, and ensure that sensitive science
is not misused for hostile intent;
- Aiming to disrupt proliferation networks,
through helping others to enforce sanctions and export regimes
more rigorously;
- Supporting the international community in tackling
proliferation finance by working with banks to identify front
companies and freeze assets;
- Tackling the supply of delivery systems;
- Promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
HOW WE ARE EFFECTING CHANGE
18. We are using the diplomatic network to
increase our understanding of and influence on the drivers of
policy in priority countries including government, industry and
civil society.
Our missions to international institutions and organisations
- especially in Vienna, New
York, Geneva and the Hague - are playing a crucial
role in developing, strengthening and upholding the rules-based
international system.
19. Our export controls and enforcement capability
enable us to reduce the risks of material getting into the
wrong hands. We are acting to maintain a robust and effective
national export control regime, and to improve international export
controls. We are at the forefront of efforts to gather international
support for a legally binding Arms Trade Treaty to regulate the
global trade in conventional weapons.
20. We have prioritised our objectives to ensure
that we make best use of available
resources. We are providing technical and financial
support to deliver concrete
improvements in the security of materials and know-how
in partner countries; facilitating debate and delivering training
to help build partners' engagement and capacities; and
maintaining our own technical and scientific expertise
in counter proliferation, arms control
and CBRN security.
21. The National Security Council, chaired by the
Prime Minister, ultimately oversees
implementation of this strategy. We will measure,
evaluate and report progress on its delivery at regular intervals,
including through reports to Parliament on implementation of the
Strategic Defence and Security Review.[357]
357 "National Counter Proliferation Strategy 2012-2015",
FCO website, http://www.fco.gov.uk/ Back
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