Science & Technology CommitteeWritten evidence submitted by the National Physical Laboratory (Risk 02)
1. Summary of Our Key Points
1.1 The National Physical Laboratory (NPL) is the UK’s National Measurement Institute and our comments relate to the measurement of radionuclides in the environment and of food samples.
1.2 Measurements of radionuclides in the UK are underpinned by standards and reference materials provided by NPL, and assured through Proficiency Testing Exercises and national accreditation. These provide confidence in the data provided to the public.
1.3 However, at times of crisis the public are hungry for measurement data and the measurement infrastructure that assures the quality of data will inevitably become stretched. This can sometimes lead to data being put in the public domain that is in conflict, which risks undermining public confidence. There is an opportunity to learn from the Fukushima crisis to improve the quality of data provided to the public at a time of crisis.
2. About NPL
2.1 The National Physical Laboratory (NPL) is a leading UK research establishment with an annual turnover of £70 million and a staff of 600. It is the largest science asset directly owned by BIS and occupies a unique position as the UK’s national measurement institute (NMI) sitting at the intersection between scientific discovery and real world application. Although sponsored by BIS, NPL also undertakes work for other government departments, notably Defra, DECC, MoD and DH. Its expertise and original research underpin quality of life, innovation and competitiveness for UK citizens and business:
NPL provides companies with access to world-leading technical expertise and scientific facilities, assuring the confidence required to realise competitive advantage from the use of new materials, techniques and technologies.
NPL expertise and services are crucial in a wide range of social applications—helping to save lives, protect the environment and enable citizens to feel safe and secure. Support in areas such as the development of advanced medical treatments and environmental monitoring helps secure a better quality of life for all.
NPL develops and maintains the nation’s top-level measurement standards, supporting an infrastructure of traceable measurement throughout the UK and the world, to ensure accuracy and consistency.
2.2 NPL has a world-class reputation for the quality of its science and an unparalleled record in demonstrating innovation and industrial relevance (the value of its measurement work to UK GDP has been estimated at £2 billion per annum).
2.3 Specifically NPL has capabilities in:
Materials development and characterisation.
Radiochemical analysis and reference standards for the nuclear industry.
Structural Health/Condition monitoring for plant life cycle management.
Instrumentation validation and optimisation.
2.4 NPL is managed by Serco on behalf of BIS through a government-owned, contractor-operated contract. This contract provides significant reachback to broader nuclear capabilities within Serco, notably its in-house capabilities within Serco Energy, as well as strong links with the National Nuclear Laboratory (managed on behalf of DECC in partnership with Battelle and the University of Manchester) and the Atomic Weapons Establishment (managed on behalf of MoD in partnership with Lockheed Martin and Jacobs Engineering).
3. What are the key factors influencing public risk perception and tolerability of energy infrastructure facilities and projects and to what extent can public perceptions be changed by improving risk communication?
3.1 One of the key factors influencing public risk perception and tolerability of nuclear energy infrastructure facilities is the degree of public confidence in the measurement of radionuclides in environmental and food samples during a crisis situation such as Fukushima. These types of radionuclide measurements vary from relatively fast, non-destructive techniques such as gamma spectrometry for I-131, Cs-134 and Cs-137 to labour-intensive and time-consuming radiochemical techniques for strontium and plutonium isotopes with all these techniques requiring specialist knowledge and facilities.
3.2 The National Physical Laboratory (NPL), which is the UK's National Measurement Institute, provides radionuclide standards and reference materials and organises laboratory proficiency testing exercises (PTEs) needed to support the measurements of radionuclides in environmental and food samples. Measurement laboratories in the UK and overseas make use of these standards, reference materials and proficiency testing exercises to:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
3.3 The use of traceable radionuclide standards, participation in proficiency test exercises and the use of certified reference materials are required to comply with the requirements of the international ISO 17025 standard and to obtain and/or maintain United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS) accreditation. UKAS is the sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspection and calibration services. Japan has similar arrangements in place for routine radionuclide measurements.
3.4 In response to the Fukushima crisis, the Japanese ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) and the Japanese ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare and the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), the company who runs the Fukushima nuclear power plants, have been publishing numerous reports with measurement results of radionuclides in samples as diverse as seafood, rice, milk, fish, meat, tea leaves, mushrooms, tap water, seawater, soil, air, vegetation and many other matrices on their respective websites. In addition, several other initiatives including Japanese nuclear industry associations, international organisations, universities, concerned citizen groups and activist organisations have been publishing additional measurement data as well.
3.5 The amount of measurement data published by the Japanese government and TEPCO is very extensive, but it has not always resulted in its intended purpose of openness and improved risk communication. This is partly unavoidable, since a small but vocal minority of the general public, rightly or wrongly, is likely to question any official data and instead may believe in conspiracy theories and/or alleged cover-ups. Another issue is that it is practically unavoidable that in a crisis situation at times contradictory or incorrect information will be published, due to time pressure, the exceptional circumstances and uncharted territory. There have been a few instances where radionuclide data previously published by TEPCO was corrected or withdrawn. As a result, alternative hypotheses on what was/is happening during the on-going Fukushima crisis were postulated by the public and the media. Some of these hypotheses can best be described as eccentric, but others have a certain degree of credibility while deviating from the official position.
3.6 However, on the whole, the attempts by the Japanese government and TEPCO to inform the public by effective use of the Internet, considering the inherent difficulties this entails and the scale of the nuclear crisis and the destructive tsunami, are unprecedented and may serve as a blueprint for future risk communication.
Dr Arvic Harms
Environmental Radioactivity Principal Research Scientist
National Physical Laboratory
30 November 2011
