Science & Technology CommitteeWritten evidence submitted by the Royal Society of Chemistry (Risk 03)

The Royal Society of Chemistry (RSC) welcomes the opportunity to make the following submission to Science and Technology Committee. The RSC’s Royal Charter obliges it to serve the public interest by acting in an independent advisory capacity and we are happy for this submission to be put into the public domain.

This submission has been prepared under the aegis of the Environment, Health and Safety Committee (EHSC) of the Royal Society of Chemistry. Members of the EHSC serve the RSC as individual experts and not as representatives of their employers.

The Royal Society of Chemistry only wishes to respond to those questions which fall within its area of its experience.

1. What are the key factors influencing public risk perception and tolerability of energy infrastructure facilities and projects?

1. The key factors influencing public risk perception of energy infrastructure facilities and projects, are fear and dread.1, 2

2. Public perception is often skewed by a fundamental lack of understanding of the difference between hazard and risk which are often used interchangeably when communicating about potentially adverse effects.

3. An examination of a number of incidents (including Chernobyl) found that:

(a)There are often psychological issues associated with disturbance and risk of future illness, and the potential for idiopathic environmental illness and mass hysteria is often significant.3, 4

(b)Keeping public perception in line with scientific opinion is very difficult - the information is not easily assimilated and often not believed. Existing scientific knowledge may be limited in some cases or be ambiguous and subject to a high degree of uncertainty. Campaigning Organisations are often perceived to be more trustworthy than Government because they often disseminate simplistic explanations that are conceptually easy to understand but which may not meet rigorous scientific evidentiary criteria. This is often confounded by so-called “Experts” who do not have relevant expertise being interviewed by the media. Communicating Science relies on existing knowledge rather than speculation.

(c)Generally, in the absence of information people go for the “worst case” scenario (and often exaggerate the likely outcomes) especially at the early stages of incidents.

(d)It requires luck for the precautionary principle to work when the diagnosis is incorrect and the precaution is applied to the treatment of the wrong claimed cause.

Notes

The RSC is the UK Professional Body for chemical scientists and an international Learned Society for advancing the chemical sciences. Supported by a network of over 47,000 members worldwide and an internationally acclaimed publishing business, our activities span education and training, conferences and science policy, and the promotion of the chemical sciences to the public.

The RSC’s Royal Charter obliges it to serve the public interest by acting in an independent advisory capacity, and we would therefore be happy for this submission to be put into the public domain.

We hope the above comments are of assistance. Please do not hesitate to contact us should you wish us to expand on any of these points.

References

1 Illing, H P A (2009). Toxicology and disasters. In “General and Applied Toxicology”, 3 Ed, (editors Ballantyne, B, Marrs, T C, Syversen, T) Chichester; John Wiley. Pp 3043–3076.

2 Clay, J, Illing, P and Perret, J (2007). The applicability of traditional health risk analysis and ill health models in the investigation of medically unexplained physical symptoms. Toxicol Env Health A70, 1664–1669, and the work of R Bartholomew and S Wessley on mass hysteria incidents.

3 Lowermoor: Lowermoor incident health advisory group (1989). Water pollution at Lowermoor, North Cornwall. Truro: Cornwall and Isles of Scilly Health Authority. Lowermoor Incident advisory group (1991). Water pollution at Lowermoor, North Cornwall. Second report. London: HMSO Committee on Toxicology (2005). Sub group report on the Lowermoor Water Pollution Incident. Consultative report, January 2005.
http://cot.food.gov.uk/pdfs/lowermoorreport05.pdf

4 Melbourne airport: Bartholomew, R E (2005). “Mystery illness” at Melborne airport; Toxic poisoning or mass hysteria? Med J Australia 183, 564–566.

7 December 2011

Prepared 6th July 2012