Science and TechnologyWritten evidence submitted by Dr. Mike Richardson, CMG
BAS/NOC Proposed merger (and a Forthcoming Interesting Week in Antarctic Politics)
You may have seen the article on the proposed BAS/NOC merger in today’s on-line copy of the Independent of Sunday by Paul Bignell.1 In that there is mention of NERC coming forward with alternative options. This is interesting, for up to now there have only been two options on the table—the merger, or the status quo. And NERC Chairman, Chief Executive and Council have all made it abundantly clear that they are not prepared to countenance the latter.
My concern remains that NERC in putting forward an alternative(s) will seek to promote a plan that would still see the BAS polar ships merged into one fleet operated by NERC. Superficially, this might seem attractive. But there is no financial, operational or management justification for doing so (I have commented separately, see the attachment, on the ship-merger issue in the light of the draft report from the MSCC). The potential danger of going down any such course of action is that, I fear, within a relatively short time, NERC will then seek to reduce their fleet number to three ships by cutting one of the polar vessels. (As the MCSS Report rightly indicates, cutting a government research vessel is the only way to save significant costs). But, as the MCSS report also warns, such action would leave the UK unable to meet its existing commitments to science, and thus this option is dismissed by them. Importantly, in relation to the UK’s Antarctic programme and presence, any reduction in BAS’ vessel capacity would have a very significant impact on the UK’s polar science, safe operations, and footprint in Antarctica. It would almost certainly mean the closure of the newly opened Halley VI Research Station.
I would urge that the Select Committee asks to see the alternative options now being considered by NERC. I would further urge that the Select Committee instructs NERC to now go away, work up such alternative options in detail, with full justifications (including costings) and re-submit them for scrutiny by the science community and Select Committee before any decisions are taken on the future of BAS.
It would be most unfortunate if the issue was now to move forward based on an option, or options, that have been very hastily, and with no transparency, put together (in desperation) in Swindon in the face of the overwhelming opposition to the current proposal. That opposition has stemmed from hundreds of eminent and respected scientists, polar experts and politicians as well as the several thousand members of the public who have so far signed a petition against the proposed merger.
I believe that all along the main reasons behind the proposed merger have stemmed from power politics in Swindon rather than being underpinned by an objective and rational attempt at either enhancing the UK’s polar and marine science delivery, or saving significant costs to the tax payer.
Finally, I would make the point that one unfortunate by-product from this whole episode is that, even if the merger does not now proceed, the existing NERC—BAS relationship, if carried forward, is unlikely to work (or at least to work in harmony). A great deal of trust and respect has been squandered by the way that NERC has handled this whole affair.
In consequence, the Select Committee might wish to consider recommending to Government that it explores a new and better way to manage the UK’s prestigious polar research institute (BAS) before even greater damage is done to it.
NERC Proposed Merger of BAS and NOC
Further to my covering correspondence there are two other matters that I would wish to bring to your attention:
The benefits (or otherwise) of merging NERC ship operations; and
The intervention made by NERC Chairman Mr Ed Wallis in the Palace of Westminster on 23 October.
(i) Proposed ship-merger
In my submission to NERC on the proposed BAS/NOC merger, a copy of which is before the Select Committee, I made reference to the several previous reviews of NERC/BAS ship operations undertaken in the past decade. All such reviews had concluded that the status quo (ie non merger) was the most appropriate and cost-effective way forward.
NERC’s latest proposition on merging the BAS and NOC ship operations is apparently based on enhanced efficiency and cost- savings (though these assertions are not then based on any given facts, financial figures or a business case in NERC’s Consultation Document promoting the merger).
The rationale for vessel-merger needs to be set against the wider picture presented in the (as yet) draft report from the Marine Science Co-ordination Committee (MSCC) on “UK Marine Research Vessels—An assessment and proposals for improved co-ordination”
The MSCC (under Defra) examined the issue of research vessel operation in response to the House of Commons Science and Technology Select Committee’s recommendation (in its 2007 report Investigating the Oceans), of increased co-ordination of government research vessels.
It is pertinent to note that although BAS is responsible for the management of two of the UK’s seven large-scale ocean and global class of marine research vessels, they were not invited to participate in the MSCC group. Rather NOC, on behalf of NERC did so. The inference of this is that the proposed NERC merger of BAS and NOC is, at least regarding vessel management, already a reality.
Key findings of the MSCC report are that:
Significant cost savings (to the tune of £millions) are only possible by rationalising the existing fleet, ie by reducing it by one (or more) vessels. But the MSCC report then notes that doing so “would currently result in non-delivery of the existing programme, in an environment of increasing Government demands and so is not thought to be practical or desirable”.
The only other options that provide any savings (and they are very modest) is either:
(i)
(ii)
The MSCC have calculated that either of the above two options would only yield minimal savings (across the whole UK 7 vessel fleet) of £50,000 pa.
Since BAS already implements (i), there seems little or no virtue in adopting (ii). There would be no extra savings to be had. Furthermore, since the management of BAS’ ship operations, as demonstrated by previous NERC ship reviews, is considered to be more efficient, with better science delivery, than those of NOC then any merger (of the sort proposed by NERC) would be perverse and illogical.
(ii) NERC Chairman’s Intervention
At an Antarctic Reception in the Palace of Westminster on 23 October, hosted by Mr Neil Carmichael MP for supporters and stakeholders involved with the Antarctic Bill, Mr Ed Wallis (Chairman of NERC) , without invitation, made an impromptu speech.
Mr. Wallis’ presentation was variably misleading, disingenuous, erroneous and indeed “economical with the truth”. Some examples include:
Staff Redundancies
Mr Wallis emphatically denied that there were any plans to sack people at BAS, and that NERC was not ...”dusting off the P45s of a lot of other people “.... “None of this is true” he stated.
The day after he spoke around 40 staff in BAS were notified that they were at risk of being made redundant, with a minimum of 18 scientists and five support staff to leave Cambridge by March 2013. Some of those individuals are shortly to go to the Antarctic for the coming austral season.
The role of BAS
Mr Wallis indicated that:
“We also have a philosophical problem with BAS in that though we say it is great, NERC is there to support top quality science and yet so often when you get involved in BAS you see more of a logistics organisation or a mapping organisation. But it is not a mapping organisation. It doesn’t even do survey”
The Chairman of NERC appears to have a very poor grasp of what BAS actually does do, and how its functions are intimately inter-linked. BAS’ predominant and priority focus is unquestionably top quality polar science. But to deliver that in the hostile and remote conditions of Antarctica then good supporting operations and logistics are vital. Running polar research stations with modern scientific laboratories, plus ships and aircraft with state-of-the art scientific instrumentation does not come cheap. But they are vital. Accordingly a significant proportion of BAS’ budget has to be devoted to such logistics and large research infrastructure.
BAS does indeed do survey, and in doing so utilises sophisticated digital aerial mapping and satellite remote sensing techniques which have delivered very important results. (For example, BAS scientists have shown that glaciers on the Antarctic Peninsula are shrinking rapidly as a result of climate change. They have mapped 244 glaciers on the Peninsula and found that nearly 90% had retreated significantly in the past 50 years. The results were published in the prestigious journal “Science” in 2005).
Operating in Antarctica both on the science and logistics fronts without accurate surveying and mapping would be a nonsense. But BAS achieves this with an excellent, award-winning mapping unit which “punches well above its weight”.
A great strength of BAS, mirrored by very few other national Antarctic programmes, is that all of its operations in Cambridge are “under one roof”—science, engineering, logistics and administration. It is this aspect of BAS that is looked on with considerable admiration and envy by many other national Antarctic operators.
It would seem that this hang-up by NERC over the term “survey” is one of the principal drivers for a name change for BAS . And even on that aspect Mr. Wallis appears to indicate that the deal is done—not being proposed. He states “...and that is why we are changing the name....”
Commercial Opportunities
Mr Wallis drew a comparison between BAS and another NERC institute, the Centre for Ecology and Hydrology (CEH) inferring that BAS should adopt the same working model for raising finance through external commercial consultancy work. But whilst CEH has considerable opportunities for exploiting commercial opportunities with private companies in the UK, BAS in contrast has very limited options in the Antarctic or Arctic. At present, and through until 2048 all exploration/exploitation of minerals in Antarctica is prohibited whilst in the Arctic where the UK has very limited sovereign rights access to commercial opportunities is highly restricted. Mr Wallis’ contention that “This [ie the commercial application of science] is the way to go forward” is misguided as far as BAS’ sphere of operation is concerned.
Consultation Exercise
According to NERC a total of 370 submissions were sent in response to its Consultation Document on the proposed BAS/NOC merger. Some of those submissions were very detailed in their analysis of the issues. All submissions were, I understand, to be objectively evaluated by an independent reviewer (Professor Robert Allison, the Vice-Chancellor of Loughborough University) who would report his findings to NERC Council.
It was therefore extraordinary that ahead of that review the Chairman of NERC should publicly indicate in the way that he did that “....alot. of the 2 1/4 inches of consultation documents are hype—hot air”
For those who had taken considerable time and effort to contribute in good faith to the NERC Consultation exercise, including many staff members of both BAS and NOC, such a comment was disingenuous in the extreme.
With NERC having brought its critical Council meeting to decide on the merger forward by over a month, it is not clear whether the Allison review is complete, and if so, whether its findings will be available to the Select Committee or the Council meetings this week.
Financing
Mr Wallis also made reference to discussions between NERC and the FCO regarding possible dual funding lines for BAS in the future. Given that I understand that the exchanges between the two parties on this issue have to date been shrouded in secrecy, it is indeed surprising to hear the Chairman of NERC expounding on this issue to a public audience. There are those in Government I suspect who might wish that he had not done so.
Staff relationships
Lastly Mr Wallis ended his speech by saying ..... “and the thing that encourages me a great deal is that when you go out and talk to the staff, the staff are very close to what we want to do”
Mr Wallis’ last visit to Antarctica was in January 2008. He has not visited BAS, Cambridge for more than a year.
His comment demonstrates a total lack of understanding and appreciation of staff attitudes towards the proposed merger. BAS staff en masse made it abundantly clear to NERC Council Members Professors Andy Watson and Mike Lockwood, and to the BAS interim Director, Professor Ed Hill at a staff meeting on 4 October that they were very strongly opposed to the proposed merger with NOC.
October 2012
APPENDIX 1
RESPONSE TO THE NERC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT
Dr. Mike Richardson , CMG (former Head of the FCO’s Polar Regions Unit (1992–2007) with involvement in successive NERC-related polar committees, viz: Review Panel on the Antarctic Funding Initiative (AFI), Science and Management Strategy Review of BAS, the BAS Review Group, and the NERC Polar Sciences Committee.
Summary
The argumentation set out in the Consultation Document is inherently flawed:
It is very apparent from the whole tenor of the document and the leading nature of the headings of the template for responses that a decision in principle on a merger between BAS and NOC has already been taken by NERC Council. In consequence, what is being addressed in the Consultation Document is little more than the implementation mechanisms of a merger rather than addressing the wider question as to whether a merger should take place, or not;
It presupposes that BAS’ status is comparable to that of any of the other (ie UK-based) institutions for which NERC is responsible. By doing so it misjudges the geopolitical implications of the proposed merger and especially the name-change, and the perception of the merger by the wider international community and other sovereign States (notably Argentina);
It fails to provide any financial evidence of cost-savings from the merger. Where is the Business Plan? Indeed, the denial of any financial details to recipients of this “consultation” is little short of breathtaking arrogance;
There are numerous assertions throughout the document that are not backed up by fact. (For a national scientific organisation that ought to have its decision-making based on logic, facts and data, the absence of quantitative evidence to justify the various assertions is unacceptable);
The case for the merger leading to enhanced science output is poorly articulated—and again based on assertion, not evidence. BAS’ science delivery, in terms of peer-reviewed papers per £, has for many years been the most productive of any national Antarctic programme. There is no evidential justification provided in the paper that a merger would further strengthen this position. Indeed, one could equally well argue the opposite case eg that certain elements of BAS’ current world-class science such as Upper Atmospheric Physics would be cast adrift, and thus weakened under the merger plans.
As requested comments on the various sections have been set out below.
However, before dealing with detail, I believe it pertinent to address a series of much wider issues surrounding the governance of BAS; in particular whether a decision on the proposed merger ought to be taken wholly by NERC. I believe that it should not.
Rather, given the political nature of BAS’ role, I would contend that Government (eg at the level of Cabinet Office, or above) should now step in and take responsibility for this exercise. Accordingly, and given that any responses to NERC are effectively to a body that appears less than objective on this issue, I have copied my submission, with covering correspondence, more widely within Government and Parliament (eg to relevant Select Committees), and elsewhere
Political and Governance Background
BAS, as with any organisation, must be subject to periodic review to determine and enhance its efficacy. However, the notion that NERC alone (as is suggested by paras 9, 27 and 44) should be the sole arbiter of decisions, the implications of which go well beyond its remit as a Research Council, is fundamentally flawed. NERC has no expertise (nor should it have) on the complex geopolitics of the polar regions (particularly those relating to the Antarctic).
BAS has never been in the mould of a “standard” UK-based research institute. The Survey’s predecessor (the Falklands Islands Dependencies’ Survey—FIDS) was born in the 1940s out of a political imperative—to achieve a critical UK presence in the Antarctic Peninsula area. Subsequently, despite the fact that science output from BAS has achieved global acclaim, the political element of its remit is as important as ever because the UK’s territorial claim to the British Antarctic Territory remains extant.
BAS/FIDS has never found an ideal home within the UK governmental establishment. Rather, it has oscillated between political oversight (provided by the former Colonial Office up to 1967), and science oversight (through NERC) since. Neither mechanism has proved effective in taking account of the dual roles of BAS to provide: (a) scientific excellence in polar science, and (b) ensure the UK’s presence within the Antarctic/sub-Antarctic is adequately maintained. This is why the BAS Review Group was instigated in the 1980s after the Falklands’ conflict, through the Cabinet Office, by the then Prime Minister. Its role was in part to mediate on such matters at high level as well as to provide objective Government oversight of BAS finances. But over the past year meetings of the Group have, it would appear, been cancelled by BIS, and the Group has not met at all during 2012.
Changes that affect BAS’ status (such as the proposed merger, and the loss of the Survey’s dedicated Director), or which remove or downgrade BAS’ world-famous name and brand (ie the proposed name-change) will undoubtedly have significant reverberations across the international polar community. Concerns are already rife within that community of a perceived weakening of the UK Government’s commitment to Antarctica that would be brought about by the NERC proposals (and here crucially, perception lies in the eye of the beholder, not with the drafters of a NERC document).
Whilst the UK has sought to separate out its interests and territories in the SW Atlantic and the Antarctic through the creation of legally and constitutionally discrete Overseas Territories (the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, and the British Antarctic Territory) this is not so for Argentina. Its view has always been that such territories constitute an integral part of greater metropolitan Argentina. A weakening (or perceived weakening) by the UK in any one aspect of its presence in the region will almost certainly be construed in Buenos Aires as a lessening of HMG’s commitment in the region more generally, and may well encourage Argentina to increase in influence in the region.
That is a dangerous slope on which the UK ought not to proceed.
Recommendations
If the review of the proposed merger between BAS and NOC (with all its adverse implications) is to continue (and it is a very big if), then I recommend that:
The process be transferred from the direct responsibility of NERC to a wider independent authority in Government (the obvious candidate being the Cabinet Office), and that due weight is given in any decision-making to other relevant Government Departments (most notably the FCO, but also the MoD, DECC as well as BIS/NERC).
Furthermore that:
In the medium to longer- term, the BAS Review Group must be reconvened to provide the proper oversight of BAS and the Group should be chaired by Cabinet Office (rather than as has been the case previously by the parent department of NERC ie BIS), and
The funding and management model for BAS should be critically reassessed to ensure that appropriate weight is given both to the geopolitical element (providing the UK’s major and year-round presence in the Antarctic/sub-Antarctic), as well as to a world-class polar science programme.
Such an arrangement might well suggest that the logical “home” for BAS is not necessarily embedded within NERC.
The issue that the Consultation Document addresses is of considerable importance. It deals with the future of two well established and internationally respected national research institutes and their many hundreds of staff. That the consultation paper is deficient in many key areas, and lacks quantitative evidence undermines its credibility. It raises serious questions as to (a) why this process has reached the stage that it has, and (b) the judgement of senior officials within NERC and its Council.
In essence, I believe that the Consultation Process, as currently constituted, should be terminated.
Detailed Comments
Section 1. Vision and Mission of the Centre (paras. 10–13)
The inference of para. 10 appears to be that the oceans and polar regions will become a focus for resources’ exploitation (see also my comments in Section 3).
The whole thrust of this section is of a done deal/a fait accompli on the merger. No effort has been made by NERC to determine whether there is any wider support for the concept of a merger. In consequence the whole document addresses little more than implementation of a process rather than providing an argued case on the principle.
The last bullet point of para. 13 does not require a merger for its delivery. BAS has for many years been providing very effectively the very leadership and participation that is needed by the UK in the Antarctic Treaty System. What is apparent is that with a watered-down senior executive team in what would remain of BAS ,and no dedicated institute Director (as set out in Section 5), the UK’s leadership in bodies such as SCAR (the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research), IASC (the International Arctic Science Committee) and COMNAP (the Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programmes (as well as the annual meetings of the Antarctic Treaty Parties and the Antarctic Fisheries Commission (CCAMLR) ) will be diminished significantly.
Section. 2. Aims and Objectives of the Merger
Para. 14 appears to be the nub of NERC’s aspiration for the merged institute. But the statement here presupposes that the international scientific competitiveness of the UK in marine and polar science is:
(a)
(b)
Neither case is substantiated by this document.
I cannot comment on the competitiveness of NOC. BAS, on the other hand, has repeatedly emerged as the most cost-effective of all national Antarctic operators in terms of science output per cost. Just how that competitiveness could be enhanced further through a merger is not addressed in the Consultation Document.
There are a number of comments made relating to cost- savings. The need for science delivery in the most cost-effective way is one of the three key rationales for this proposed merger between BAS and NOC (para. 1)
Furthermore, a principal objective of the proposed merger of the two institutes (para. 15) is given as “securing efficiency savings” (presumably meaning ultimately financial savings). Against this background it is inconceivable that NERC believes it credible to circulate a Consultation Document that fails to provide stakeholders (including presumably those within Government) of any scale of those savings—or indeed whether any at all would emerge from this proposed merger exercise. Paras 51–53 (the section on financial implications) says nothing meaningful, whilst para. 5 in a document of this nature is little more than a travesty.
NERC is acting way beyond its remit in indicating, as it does, in the chapeau to para. 15 that the objectives of merging BAS and NOC are being taken from “ a UK perspective “. Such a perspective can surely only be taken by HMG itself. This is particularly the case when it comes to the more politicised implications that would inevitably stem from the proposed merger ie issues affecting the UK’s presence in the SW Atlantic and Antarctic.
Section 3 Scientific, Economic and Societal Impact Opportunities (Whatever Those Last Three Words Mean) (Paras 16- 21)
The proposition that the scientific community will work more effectively together (para.17) ie produce more, and higher quality science simply by being shoe-horned into a restructured institute is an unfounded assertion. Where is the evidence to back this up? Synergy and co-operation across institutes and between scientists are commonplace. They will continue to be so, irrespective as to whether this merger proceeds or not.
Clearly, there are elements of BAS/NOC science that have commonality; these are largely related to marine biology and oceanography. But there is also a substantive mismatch between the breadth of the current science agendas of the two institutes.
An approximate estimate would suggest that a significant proportion of BAS’ science programme, perhaps as much as 2/3rds, lies outwith that commonality—and is thus not mirrored by NOC. This raises the question, unanswered by the Consultation Document, as to whether, and if so how, the majority of BAS science will be even catered for (never mind enhanced) under the merger scenario.
It could be counter- construed that most BAS science will be side-lined and ultimately discontinued under a unified institute. Indeed, there is more than a hint of this in the Consultation Document’s Fig. 1 (Pg. 7). This schematically sets out the “Science” foreseen of the integrated institute. This listing fails to include whole swathes of science* actively undertaken at present by BAS, but not by NOC. Whether this omission is accidental or deliberate is not clear. If the former, it reinforces a view about the competence of the Consultation Document; if the latter it suggests that indeed BAS’ science programme will be cut. This would inevitably have a knock- on effect on the level of the UK’s presence in the Antarctic/sub-Antarctic.
*Upper atmospheric and space physics/ionospherics
Terrestrial ecology.
Evolutionary biology.
Sustainable fisheries.
Space weather.
The inference of para. 18 is that there will be opportunities for science linked to “increasing economic activity in the oceans and polar regions (particularly the Arctic) in the coming decades”. This may be true of the deep ocean in relation to eg precious and semi-precious metals (eg manganese), and bioprospecting. The Arctic in contrast, insofar as its lands and maritime spaces fall almost exclusively within the sovereign jurisdictions of the Arctic States, will probably provide very limited access and opportunities. Within the Antarctic Treaty Area (south of 60oS) mineral resource activities (note not just extraction, as stated) are prohibited. This means that even research that has a commercial connotation is prohibited, and will remain so until 2048 unless there is a consensus amongst Antarctic Treaty Parties to lift the ban, or a 3/4s majority of Parties after that date.
It could be perceived that the ice-strengthened vessels of NERC, with Dynamic Positioning Systems (DPS) are particularly well suited to exploit commercial charter opportunities in eg the Arctic as is currently the case for the RRS Ernest Shackleton in the North Sea. However, the economic attraction of such charters would be offset by the fact that they would divert NERC vessels away from their primary task of providing specialised platforms for scientific research.
Most research related to economic activity associated with eg oil and gas exploration and exploitation tends to remain within the preserve of commercial companies (a) because the costs of technologies involved are considerable and thus often way above the budgets of academic institutes, or (b) due to commercial sensitivities.
Again, this significantly constrains the opportunities which para. 18 infers.
Section 4. Name of the new Centre (paras. 22–27)
Since I see no merit in the proposed merger, the issue of a name- change is somewhat academic.
Both BAS and NOC already have considerable international recognition in their own right. The notion that such recognition would in any way be enhanced by a name- change is no more than conjecture. The reverse, particularly in relation to BAS, is almost certainly the case.
BAS’ name is, as stated in para. 26, “internationally recognised” (and highly respected). It should not be lost or watered-down by some generic, less than eye-catching, but probably very expensive, rebranding, ie “The NERC Centre for Marine and Polar Science”—a title that has all the hallmarks of nomenclature invented by Committee. The international polar community (at diplomatic and governmental level) has never even heard of NERC; nor has it any appreciation of the Council’s functions. NERC, as an entity, simply has no brand appeal.
The proposition (para. 26) that under any merger the “physical infrastructure” of BAS might retain the BAS branding, but not the organisation itself, is little more than a fudge if other proposed changes such as the loss of a dedicated BAS Director are implemented. Any loss or diminution of the BAS branding is more than merely a presentational matter. It is a matter of substance when it comes to the perception (as it surely will in Buenos Aires) that the UK’s commitment to the Antarctic and sub-Antarctic is weakening.
Section 5. Governance and Management. (paras. 28—53)
It is telling that in a document that fails to set out evidence-based reasoning for this proposed merger 26 of the 59 paras. of this paper are devoted to little more than process. Even then parts of this Section are stating no more than the obvious (paras 28 and 29).
More worrying is that one gets the impression that elements of this section are deliberately opaque, or even devious. For example:
para. 36 provides the figures for the current operating budgets of BAS and NOC, but not what the budget would be under a unified structure; and
In a similar, though converse manner, figures are provided of the staff complement after merger, but not what the existing complements of BAS and NOC are. (NB if this interpretation is not correct, then para. 36 and its table infer that there will be no staff redundancies—and therefore no cost- savings from this element of the merger).
Therefore, whichever way one looks at these figures they verge on the useless, since no comparisons pre and post merger can be made.
Section 6. Large Research Infrastructure (paras. 54–59)
There may be merit in amalgamating NERC vessel management into a single unit (and fleet). If so, any benefit of doing so is not set out in the Consultation Document. A cost-benefit and management analysis should have been provided (if necessary as an annex to the document) to back-up the case.
Numerous reviews of the efficiency of NERC and/or BAS ship operations have been conducted over recent years. These have included reviews conducted externally eg the King Review of 1999–2000 or internally by eg senior NERC officials (the Read Review of 2003). Further reviews were undertaken by NERC in 2008
harmonisation of activities, staffing levels, costs, possible savings etc. etc.
Whilst successive NERC ship reviews have recommended closer working arrangements amongst the NERC fleet vessels (to the extent possible), each has also concluded that because of the highly integrated nature of the overall BAS operation in Antarctica the most effective (and cost-effective) way of managing the RRS James Clarke Ross and RRS Ernest Shackleton was directly through BAS. Indeed, the 2003 review even concluded that the Director BAS should take on the role of NERC “Director of Research Ships”.
Against this backdrop of a series of in-depth vessel reviews, all of which came to a similar conclusion, it is curious that the Consultation Document should now arrive at a diametrically opposite position -but one based, it would seem, on no detailed assessment. Or, if such an assessment has been undertaken then the results of it are not being relayed transparently to the audience of the Consultation Document. It would be interesting to know what parameters have altered in the intervening time to overturn the previous prevailing views.
On the political front there is a potential pit-fall in bringing all NERC vessels into one fleet, under one new institute name. At present, two of NERC’s vessels are flagged to the UK-register; two to the Falklands Islands’ register. The ships on the latter are prohibited from access to Latin America ports (with the exception of limited access to Chile) as a gesture of solidarity with Argentina.
It is not implausible that this denial of access could be extended to any vessel which is perceived by those Latin American States as having a linkage, however tenuous, to the Falklands. If this were to happen to the RRS Discovery and RRS James Cook because they were seen now as also being “polar” in nature and by implication associated with the Falklands, then it would significantly curtail NERC ship operations in the South Atlantic, and their access to South American ports.
Presumably that possibility (and risk) has been fully explored, and factored in?
1 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/british-antarctic-survey-saved-as-merger-plan-is-scuppered-8229461.html