Science and TechnologyWritten evidence submitted by Dr John Richard Dudeney OBE

Summary Conclusions

1. The NERC has not made an adequate case that a proposed merger of the British Antarctic Survey (BAS) and the National Oceanographic Centre (NOC) would be in the best interests of UK science, allow the saving of substantial costs or maintain HMG’s foreign policy objectives in the South Atlantic and Antarctica. The merger should not proceed.

2. The UK would not be better served in the provision of marine research/logistic capability by bringing together the two BAS ships and the two ships operated on behalf of NOC under a single management and operational arrangement. Unless the overall number of ships is reduced there will be no cost savings, but there will be a significant loss of operational efficiency, especially for the Antarctic, but no increase in ship time availability for research.

3. A wider consultation should now be undertaken to determine whether the policy requirements of HMG would be better served by placing BAS, its funding and its assets, under a new management and oversight regime independent of the NERC.

Supporting Evidence for Conclusion 1

This evidence concerns the NERC Consultation Document.1 My detailed response to this consultation has already been provided to the Committee so I will not repeat that detail here.

The consultation process that NERC has undertaken for the proposed merger is confused and fundamentally flawed. It appears that a paper concerning the merger was first put to NERC Council by the Chief Executive in May 2012. Council seems to have agreed to consider the proposal further and to have asked the NERC executive to prepare a detailed scientific and business case for consideration at its December meeting. As part of this process, Council asked that the NERC executive consult staff and wider stakeholders on how best to implement the proposed changes. The first public announcement by NERC that it was considering a merger “of the scientific and logistics management of marine and polar science” delivered by NOC and BAS was via a NERC press release dated 7 June 2012. The Consultation document does not ask for views on whether the merger should take place.

The decision that the merger should proceed appears to have been taken without any proper analysis of other options and without any staff work having been carried to determine whether there is a sound scientific or business case. All that the consultation appears to have been seeking is a discussion of the modalities of the merger. In the process of forcing ahead with the merger, three key BAS senior staff—Director, Deputy Director and Head of Corporate Services—departed from BAS, leaving it effectively leaderless.

As regards the strategic scientific case, what is contained in the consultation document is just a list of motherhood assertions with no supporting justification, and those assertions are attempting to address a problem that does not, in my view, exist. Many of the areas of possible joint research for the new Centre are already being undertaken through normal science collaborations. It is telling that there seems to have been no consultation with BAS or NOC science leaders over the scientific advantages of the merger before this document was prepared. The UK science community is world beating, it does not need to be shepherded or coerced into cross-disciplinary, cross institute or international collaborations where there is good science to be done. It is not organisational boundaries in general that hinder such collaborative science, but the behaviour of grant funding bodies when confronted with multi-disciplinary grant applications.

There is no doubt that there is synergy between some aspects of marine science and some aspects of polar science. But this is not a reason to merge institutes—such synergy could just as well be argued for atmospheric science, geological science, (or even space science in the case of BAS) or a whole list of other science disciplines. So, given the existing diversity of BAS science, it could be argued that the merger is as likely to close down the breadth of collaborations by focussing on just two areas. It would be better to let the two independent organisations (BAS and NOC) follow their ideas to the best science across whatever disciplinary or institutional boundaries are the most appropriate.

It seems to me that had this consultation document been put to an NERC research grant committee or to a Parliamentary Committee as a Green Paper for evaluation it would have been laughed out of court.

The United Kingdom is currently pre-eminent amongst the international community in Antarctic science and political affairs. That this is so, and has been so for at least two decades, is very well demonstrated by Dudeney & Walton (2012) Leadership in politics and science within the Antarctic Treaty Polar Research 31 DOI: 10.3402/polar.v31iO.11075 (available as a background paper for the committee), and by Dastidar (2007) National and institutional productivity and collaboration in Antarctic science: an analysis of 25 years of journal publications (1980–2004) Polar Research 26(2); Dastidar, PG & Persson, O (2005) Mapping the global structure of Antarctic research. Current Science 89, 1552–1554; and Dastidar, PG & Ramachandran,S (2008) Intellectual structure of Antarctic science: a 25 year analysis. Scientometrics, DOI: 10.1007/s11192–007–1947-x. Given the Government’s recent reaffirmation of the importance it attaches to its policy aims for the South Atlantic and Antarctica, any proposal for a change in the status of BAS must be judged by whether it will maintain (and even enhance) this international success, and there must be measurable indicators of success that demonstrate this is the case. No indicators for success are suggested in the consultation paper. Talk of scientific synergies between polar and ocean science is misleading unless HMG’s requirements are met, because the imperative for British presence in Antarctica at the current scale is political and territorial (crucially the UK is a claimant Nation), and not scientific, even though the science is of outstanding international quality. This fundamental fact seems not to have been grasped by the NERC.

The reason that BAS is such a highly efficient, cost-effective, and above all very safe, organisation is because of the wholly integrated operation run under a single highly experienced management/leadership team in Cambridge. The culture of BAS is unique within the Research Councils with staff at all levels and all types of skill/trade (from space scientists to plumbers) coming together to deliver complex outcomes safely and effectively in a hostile, remote and objectively dangerous environment. One of the most important aspects of this “can-do” culture is high morale and motivation, and that morale comes from being proud to work for BAS. Creating high morale and effectively channelling that into consistently impressive performances takes years of high quality leadership but it can be lost overnight by inept management. NERC does not appear to grasp the realities of operating in such a hostile environment or the sort of inspirational leadership required to create and sustain a successful operation. It is noteworthy that the consultation document does not address the highly important issue of the damaging effect the merger will have on staff motivation and morale. The merger process has already led to the lowest morale that I have seen in BAS throughout my career there, and if spirit de corps is lost then those staff that can, will, opt to leave BAS. The merger will destroy the invaluable and widely admired integrated approach, reduce cost effectiveness, blur lines of command and control, and as a result put at serious risk the outstanding safety record of BAS.

The BAS should be maintained as a separate integrated polar research and logistics operation under the direction of a fulltime director and a strong internal management team. There is no case for moving away from this provided HMG wishes to maintain the current UK strategic presence in the South Atlantic and Antarctica.

Supporting Evidence for Conclusion 2

At a superficial level, there might appear to be a strong economic case for the BAS ships (RRS James Clark Ross and RRS Ernest Shackleton) and the NOC ships (RRS James Cook and RRS Discovery) to operate as a single integrated NERC fleet. Indeed, if the primary requirement is to make major infrastructure savings through a future reduction of the number of ships, then this would be easier to accomplish under unified management. It might also be argued that merger could release more ship time to meet research or operational needs. It is therefore not surprising that the possibility of an integrated fleet has been looked at by NERC on numerous occasions, with three NERC major ship reviews in the past decade and a further mini-review in 2011. However, no study has found that a merger made operational or financial sense.

The primary role of the two BAS vessels has to be the safe, effective and timely support of the Antarctic operation. This requires very capable vessels and a particular set of seafarer’s skills (such as ice navigation, small boat operations, unsupported cargo operations etc), married with considerable general polar expertise and a high degree of independent tactical decision making by ships’ Masters and senior officers that is not needed in the NOC operation, as well as close integration into the rest of the BAS Antarctic field programme. In general the BAS ships officers and crews stay with the organization as a career and build up enormous skill and experience, as well as maintaining a very high morale and a much admired can-do attitude (the latter is evident in the consistently high praise they receive from external science teams using the vessels), and an outstanding safety record. Because of the nature of the Antarctic operation BAS crew operate on a four month duty cycle, whereas for NOC the cycle is two months. Each crew changeover for the BAS fleet costs on average around £50,000. But the BAS ship operation is otherwise breathtakingly cost effective, with only 5 FTE shore-side staff involved in the management of the fleet. Full harmonization of the two fleets will require an expensive standardization of staff terms and conditions (BAS crews are on significantly poorer terms and conditions than are their contemporaries in the NOC fleet)—just the increase in the number of crew changeovers required per year for the BAS vessels would raise costs by as much as an extra £300,000 to £350,000. Hence it seems very unlikely that merging the current fleet would save any money whatever.

There is also a significant political issue that NERC has not addressed. The NOC vessels are registered on the UK shipping register, but the BAS vessels are registered in the Falkland Islands. It would be a very significant political signal to Argentina about the UK commitment to its policy in the South Atlantic for the ship registrations to be moved to the UK.

The BAS ships are, of course, also very highly successful platforms for science—particularly the RRS James Clark Ross, a world class research platform and the UK’s only fully ice-strengthened research vessel. However, it is unlikely that the merger would release any extra ship time for science. JCR already spends almost all of the year at sea—normally she spends around seven months on her Antarctic deployment and the northern summer on science cruises in the Arctic on behalf of the wider UK scientific community. The RRS Ernest Shackleton, on the other hand, is mostly used for Antarctic logistics support during the austral summer, though she also carries out some oceanographic research. But she also already spends most of the year at sea because during the boreal summer she earns BAS significant commercial revenue, mostly through carrying out an offshore oil support role in the North Sea but also increasingly for charter work around the Falkland Islands and South Georgia. Hence in neither case is there any spare ship time.

The case for merging the shipping fleet does not stand up to close scrutiny.

HMG has recently specified the size of the footprint that it wishes to see maintained within the Antarctic and South Atlantic (primarily South Georgia in the case of BAS). This footprint cannot safely be maintained with only one ship. Hence the real issue for HMG is the affordability of ships. The NOC fleet is modern (with the imminent replacement of Discovery by a new blue water research vessel next year). The JCR however is now 22 years old whilst the ES 17 years old. To maintain the footprint these vessels will need refit/replacement soon. Neither of the NOC ships could safely operate in the Weddell, Bellingshausen, or Amundsen Seas or the high Arctic, as they are not sufficiently ice-strengthened, and neither do they have any capability for the delivery of fuel, supplies or equipment to the Antarctic bases. So they could not provide back-up to the BAS fleet. The real question that HMG should be addressing is not the irrelevance of a NERC fleet merger, but rather how to ensure that the UK has two capable ships to safely and cost-effectively fulfill policy requirements in the South Atlantic and Antarctica while still providing the UK with world class marine research platforms for work in both polar regions.

Supporting Evidence for Conclusion 3

The predecessor of the British Antarctic Survey was born through a secret Cabinet decision taken on 28 January 1943 to establish a permanent presence by Britain in Antarctica to preserve our territorial claim in the face of Argentine territorial ambitions (see Dudeney & Walton, 2011, From Scotia to “Operation Tabarin”: developing British policy for Antarctica , Polar Record, CJO doi:10.1017/S00322474110005). From the outset the primary day to day activity of the field teams was to conduct an integrated programme of scientific research and survey. This approach has set the scene for the UK’s approach to Antarctica which continues until today—a dual mission of presence and expert advice for policy reasons, and science using the opportunity for access to carry out a first rate programme of science crucial to the wellbeing of humankind. From the outset in 1943 until 1967 the UK Antarctic programme was under the auspices of the Colonial Office. In the 1960s, with the signing of the Antarctic Treaty, some in Government felt that the territorial imperative would naturally wither away, leaving science as the prime driver. The Colonial Office was looking for a new home for the BAS and finally it was transferred with a dowry of £1 million to the fledgling NERC in 1967. As the passage of time has revealed, the political imperative, far from fading away, remains an overriding issue. As a consequence, neither NERC nor BAS have felt comfortable in each other’s company. It is not really appropriate for a Research Council to be involved in making decisions that significantly impact on HMG’s foreign policy objectives in the South Atlantic and Antarctica, and it is not appropriate for there to be conflict or confusion over what is and what is not “Science Vote” money, or what science programmes BAS pursues. For BAS, (and here I speak from long and difficult experience), it is not acceptable to be dealing day to day with one master who is not at all comfortable with the dual mission of BAS, especially when there is another master waiting in the wings who can (and has in the past) stepped in to require action in ways that make the NERC/BAS relationship more difficult. Add to this unfortunate state of affairs the fact that NERC has never grasped the true nature and requirements for safely operating in Antarctica (as evidenced by the consultation), and the question must be raised as to whether NERC remains the most appropriate home for the BAS.

Given that NERC has embarked on this consultation on the future of BAS, why not do the job properly by considering all options, from the “do-nothing” option, to placement of BAS, its funding and assets outside NERC, (perhaps, either as an agency linked to an appropriate government department, or hived off as a free-standing research institute linked to Cambridge University, but with a clear objective to deliver the dual mission). I recommend that a fundamental review should now be carried out to look at all options for the future of BAS. It would not be proper for this to be conducted by the NERC and therefore the appropriate lead organisation would probably be the Cabinet Office.

Selected Relevant Experience

Career as research scientist, base commander, research leader, division head within the British Antarctic Survey spanning 1966 to 1998, including two Antarctic winters and more than 20 summer seasons in Antarctica.

Deputy Director of British Antarctic Survey (1998 to 2006)

UK delegate to the Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programmes (COMNAP) (1998–2005)

Member of UK delegation to the Antarctic Treaty (1999—2005)

Chief Rapporteur to the XXIX Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, Edinburgh, June 2006

UK Delegate to the Forum of Arctic Research Operators (FARO) (1999–2005)

Chief Officer of the Solar Terrestrial & Astronomy Research Working Group of SCAR (1992–1994)

Chair of the International Review Panel for the Finnish Antarctic Programme 2006

Past Chair of the IAGA Joint Working Group on Antarctic Research

Past Member Royal Society UK National Antarctic Committee

A Director and member of the management board of Antarctic Science Ltd

October 2012