2 DFID's work in Burma
8. DFID's ambition for Burma is to:
"help create a better governed, more peaceful
and prosperous Burma that uses its increased wealth to reduce
poverty."[9]
It does this mainly through its development programmes
on which it spends over £60 million per year. It also works
closely with other parts of the UK Government, especially the
Foreign Office, in a highly political context to encourage the
Burmese Government to reform. In addition, DFID has an important
role to play in attempting to coordinate the work of donors in
a country which is an increasingly fashionable location for donors.
DFID's Burma programme
DFID's strategy
9. When we last undertook an inquiry into Burma in
2007, DFID had a relatively small programme of £8.8 million
with only three staff in Rangoon; we recommended a quadrupling
of aid which the last Government initially rejected in its response,
but eventually implemented.[10]
Since then, DFID Burma's budget has significantly increased with
a doubling in 2013 from £32 million to £62 million and
the number of DFID staff in Rangoon from 12 to 26 people.[11]Figure
2: DFID Spend in Burma over its Operational Plan 2011/12-2014/15
Source DFID submission BUR0016
10. DFID describes its current programme in Burma
as "high cost, high risk but also high return".
· High cost—because of the many conflict-affected
and difficult-to-reach areas, the weak infrastructure and the
scale of the development challenges.
· High risk—due to the lack of capable
implementing partners, the often low capacity of Government, the
fragile peace, and inter-communal violence.
· High return—resulting from Burma's
resources, location, its dramatic reform trajectory, and the youth,
goodwill and commitment of its people which could mean it graduates
from development aid within a generation.[12]
11. DFID is taking this approach because it believes
it is possible for it to have a transformative impact in Burma
as a development agency as a result of:
· many aspects of Burma's parliamentary,
Government and legal systems reflecting UK systems;
· DFID's long experience of working with
civil society, ethnic leaders and key political players in Burma;
· the UK and DFID having recognised expertise
in financial sector reform and in strengthening laws and institutions
that foster private investment and enterprise;
· Burma looking to the UK as a centre of
excellence on education; and
· DFID leading donor health sector work
in Burma for several years and as a result having strong and established
health expertise there.[13]
12. The UK Government's approach is based on its
analysis of the political dynamics of the situation in Burma,
namely that there are a number of reformers close to the President,
including U Aung Min, Minister for the President's Office—who
is the lead Minister for the ceasefire negotiations and we met
on our visit—who need support. He is seen by many as a committed
reformer. Even some of the commentators and ethnic leaders who
are sceptical about the Government's commitment speak positively
about Aung Min's commitment and engagement in the peace process.
13. Not all organisations support the UK Government's
approach. Burma Campaign UK agreed that there had been "significant
and welcome changes in Burma" and that Burma was "going
through a period of transition" but criticised the UK as
taking a "rose tinted view" of the reforms:[14]
the approach of DFID and the British Government
as a whole is based on a false assumption that Burma is currently
in a period of transition away from dictatorship and towards democracy.[15]
It believed Burma was heading to an authoritarian
regime "along the lines of China or Russia" and that
the Burmese Government had made the minimal reforms required to
persuade the international community to drop sanctions.[16]
Burma Campaign UK warned that UK funds could therefore be "used
to assist what remains one of the worst human rights abusers in
the world to modernise its institutions, rather than democratise
them".[17]
14. Benedict Rogers of Christian Solidarity thought
"the beginning of the beginning may now have begun".
He warned of both "entrenched cynicism" and "premature
euphoria" as it was still unclear "what the intended
destination of the regime" was. He said:
That there is a transition is clear, but whether
it is a transition to a genuine democracy or whether it is a transition
to a more respectable kind of authoritarian regime is uncertain.
We should not assume that it is definitely a transition to a democracy,
at this stage. There is a lot that needs to happen for that to
be secured."[18]
15. Others such as Charles Petrie who had been UN
humanitarian co-ordinator and UN Development Programme resident
representative in Burma and Dr Adam Burke, an academic, took a
more optimistic view. Charles Petrie believed change was coming
from a new political will developed by reformists within the Government
who had witnessed the violence of the Saffron Revolution[19]
and the destruction resulting from Cyclon Nargis.[20]
Dr Adam Burke believed reform was, in addition, due to Government
concerns over the growing influence of China, and a desire to
benefit from growing regional economic opportunities.[21]
Dr Burke did however warn that the path to a western style liberal
democracy would not be smooth and instead would be "a complex
mix of elections and authoritarianism, with a diminished yet still
significant political role for the military, and considerable
power being wielded by well-connected individuals or networks
of aligned interests" with tensions between the state and
minority groups continuing.[22]
Charles Petrie thought it would be hard for a return to the past
levels of repression now that the people of Burma had experienced
"an easing of the constraints imposed on it."[23]
Tucker McCravy of Cord told us:
there are unprecedented opportunities right now
in Myanmar for building a peaceful and democratic society.[24]
16. Burma presents a unique development opportunity.
After 60 years of conflict and decades of military dictatorship
the country has begun a process of reform. Although this is uncertain
and fragile there is a real opportunity to raise the country out
of poverty, develop the economy and build a society moving towards
democracy and accountability to the people. The progress is unpredictable
and likely to be bumpy but we believe backing the reforms and
working to deliver public services and develop livelihoods offers
unprecedented potential. We recommend that DFID Burma's budget
be increased from £60 million to £100 million. If the
reform process stalls, the budget can always be reduced.Box
2: The Accelerated Reform Programme
| The Accelerated Reform Programme
A innovative feature of DFID's work in Burma is the "The Accelerated Reform Programme" (see the appendix to this report which is a table of all of DFID's major projects currently in Burma). DFID Burma explained that this was a fund which was set up in September 2012 to enable quick responses to opportunities that arose to "catalyse, foster and deepen reform in Burma." It was established with a £5 million budget from September 2012 to April 2014 which was extended to £15 million up to December 2015. It includes £5 million specifically to support peace-building and to address inter-communal violence.
|
Source: DFID supplementary submission
BUDGET SUPPORT AND GOVERNMENT CAPACITY
17. The Burmese Government's capacity to provide
services is extremely weak and needs to improve. The UK was previously
bound by a European Union Council Decision that no development
assistance to Burma should be implemented through its Government.
In April 2013, this restriction was lifted in recognition of Burma's
progress on political reform.[25]
18. However, the Karen Women's Organisation said:
There are clearly forces for positive change
in the Government but there also are significant portions of the
Government and the military who continue to work against democracy,
for their own power and enrichment. DFID funding going directly
through the Government touches all those hands not just the hands
of those working for a better future.[26]
DFID stated in its written evidence to us:
Our policy has been that no UK aid is given as
budget support nor through central budget accounts. We provide
nearly all of our aid to Burma through UN organisations and trusted
international and local NGOs. [27]
19. ActionAid were concerned that without budget
and sector support parallel systems would grow up and the capacity
of Burmese Government systems would not improve.[28]
We asked the Minister ,Rt Hon Alan Duncan MP about this and how
the state's ability to provide essential services for its people
could be improved without development funds going through the
Burmese authorities. He told us that some of DFID's partners were
currently working alongside certain line ministries at the township[29]
level which was helping to build up its capacity. He also envisaged
that once the Burmese Government was able to administer money
more effectively in a "trustworthy manner" DFID could
deal directly with them.[30]
20. We support
DFID's current wary stance on budget and sector support to the
Burmese Government. However it is important that parallel systems
of delivering basic services are not created and that Government
capacity is enhanced. We are pleased that DFID's partners are
working alongside ministries at the local level to prevent this
from happening.
Donor co-ordination
21. Donor coordination is vital, all the more since
the dropping of EU sanctions on aid in 2013 which has led to a
proliferation of donors seeking to be involved with Burma. The
Minister told us that it had become "a very busy place for
donors" and that it was occupying a lot of Burmese ministerial
time meeting with these prospective development agencies. However
there were still no significant contributions coming forward other
than those from Japan, the UK and a few others.[31]
It is worthy of note that in the current financial year, Japan
is providing $500 million of loans and $400 million of grants.
Table 1 Bilateral DAC Countries' Overseas Development
Assistance to Burma in 2012
| Country
| 2012 spend (USD millions)
| Rank in size of spend
|
| Australia
| 57.73 |
2 |
| Austria
| 0.06 |
|
| Belgium
| 0.44 |
|
| Canada |
2.67 |
|
| Czech Republic
| 1.14 |
|
| EU Institutions*
| 46.41 |
4 |
| Denmark
| 19.37 |
8 |
| Finland
| 1.19 |
|
| France |
4.94 |
|
| Germany
| 12.52 |
9 |
| Ireland
| 1.67 |
|
| Italy |
1.54 |
|
| Japan |
92.78 | 1
|
| Korea |
6.04 |
|
| Luxembourg
| 0.01 |
|
| Netherlands
| 1.61 |
|
| New Zealand
| 1.79 |
|
| Norway |
22.83 | 6
|
| Poland |
0.43 |
|
| Slovak Republic
| 0.02 |
|
| Sweden |
19.61 | 7
|
| Switzerland
| 12.21 |
10 |
| United Kingdom
| 48.06 |
3 |
| United States
| 33.05 |
5 |
Source OECD DAC
*2012 are the latest available figures from OECD
OECD lists EU as a multilateral although EU considers
itself as a bilateral so we have listed here to help compare spends
22. In order for the Burmese ministers and officials
to be able to work on developing their economy and country their
time should not be taken up by meeting a plethora of small donors.
Multilateral funds have been developed to prevent this and bring
donors together. DFID plays an important role in seeking to coordinate
donors: it chairs the Development Partners Working Group and the
Head of DFID Burma plays an important role in the Myanmar Development
Cooperation Forum.[32]
23. However it seems that not all donors want to
co-ordinate. ActionAid told us:
most of the aid agencies, for some unknown reason,
do not like coordination. They want to go their own way. DFID
is probably the only organisation, along with Australia, that
appreciates or participates in coordination. China, Japan and
India are three donors that do not want to attend coordination
meetings at all.[33]
DFID has highlighted that the involvement of non-OECD
donors, NGOs and the private sector in donor coordination structures
has been limited. In addition the structures to coordinate development
assistance were not well integrated with those that coordinated
humanitarian assistance or peace-building.[34]
In addition, we heard of the proliferation of small donors who
have not agreed to spend significant sums of money, yet expect
an audience with overworked inisters.
24. The UK, working with multilaterals which it
can influence, in particular the World Bank, should seek to prevent
a proliferation of donors who do not intend to spend significant
sums of money taking up Burmese Ministers' time. DFID should encourage
smaller development agencies to contribute through multi-donor
funds and encourage these funds and the Burmese Government only
to engage with donors if they contribute a minimum amount.
25. DFID should continue to seek to encourage
official development agencies such as Japan's and India's as well
as NGO and private donors to coordinate with each other and the
multilateral organisations to prevent duplication.
DFID coordination with the Foreign
Office
26. DFID told us that it worked closely with the
Foreign Office in Burma particularly on governance, the peace
process and responsible investment to the country. DFID is located
within the Embassy alongside UKTI, the Ministry of Defence and
the British Council. There are weekly cross-embassy meetings in
country and weekly video-conferences between the Foreign Office
and DFID staff in Rangoon with those located in London. DFID said
that it was participating in a Foreign Office led review of UK
policy and engagement with Burma and they had been looking at
ways they could both collaborate further.
27. The Conflict Pool is a shared fund between the
Foreign Office and DFID. Unfortunately it does not cover South
East Asia so the teams in Burma do not have access to these funds
for their conflict and peace building work. We welcome the
close cooperation between DFID and the Foreign Office. We recommend
that the Foreign Office and DFID be able to access Conflict Pool
funds for their conflict related programmes in Burma.
Availability of DFID programme
information
28. A couple of witnesses, as part of their submissions
to us, have been critical of the information available on what
DFID is doing in Burma. Lord Williams of Baglan, former UN Deputy
General said:
I have to say I find it quite difficult to get
details of the DFID programme. I do not find the DFID website
or, indeed, the UK embassy website in Yangon terribly helpful
about this. It seems to be completely lacking in specificity.[35]
Equally the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law said:
information about DFID's programming is not easily
available. The DFID website mentions five main strands of work:
[...]However, it is not readily apparent which of the 30 listed
projects relate to each of these five strands, or indeed what
each of the 30 projects entails, project information being available
in varying degrees for each one. For example, the only information
available in relation to UK Support for the 2014 Burma Census
is a logical framework; there is no Business Case or other documentation
available to illuminate to whom and how support is being provided.
29. We appreciated the clear presentation of DFID
Burma's health programme in ICAI's recent report where a simple
table outlined all of DFID's health projects' titles, allocations,
dates, funding channels and aims in an easy to read document (see
Appendix 2). We do not believe these criticisms apply specifically
to DFID Burma, but are perhaps a general observation of the way
DFID presents its country programme information. We recommend
that DFID consider having a simple table on each country programme
page on its website to present the basic country projects' data
such as duration, allocation of funds, funding channels such as
the non-government organisation or multilateral it is going through
and a short summary of its intended outcomes. In addition it would
be useful if the projects linked with the operational plan expected
results for the country.
9 DFID Burma Operational Plan 2011-15 updated June
2013 Back
10
Eleventh Special Report, DFID Assistance to Burmese Internally
Displaced People and Refugees on the Thai- Burma Border: Responses to the Committee's Tenth Report of Session 2006-07,
HC 1070 and HC Deb, 6 December 2007, col 321WH [Westminster Hall] Back
11
Department for International Development (BUR 0016) Back
12
Department for International Development (BUR 0016) Back
13
Department for International Development (BUR 0016) Back
14
Burma Campaign UK (BUR 0018) Back
15
Burma Campaign UK (BUR 0018) Back
16
Burma Campaign UK (BUR 0018), para 14 Back
17
Burma Campaign UK (BUR 0018), para 18 Back
18
Q81 Back
19
The Saffron Revolution was a protest against the military regime
by Buddhist monks in 2007 - saffron being the colour of monks'
robes. Back
20
In 2008, Cyclone Nargis struck the Irrawaddy Delta and Rangoon
causing a humanitarian catastrophe. In excess of 2.4 million people
were affected with 130,000 directly related deaths. Back
21
Dr Adam Burke (BUR 0005), para 9 Back
22
Dr Adam Burke (BUR 0005), para 10 Back
23
Charles Petrie (BUR 0043) Back
24
Q2 Back
25
Council of the EU Press Release 22 April 2013 Back
26
Karen Women's Organisation (BUR 0010) Back
27
Department for International Development (BUR 0016) Back
28
Actionaid (BUR 0034) Back
29
Townships are the administrative sub divisions of Districts -
they are the third level administrative divisions of Burma below
State/ Region and below District. Back
30
Q113 Back
31
Q171 Back
32
Q115 Back
33
Q7 Back
34
Department for International Development Annex F (BUR 0044) Back
35
Q84 Back
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