House of Commons - Democracy and Development in Burma - International Development Committee

Democracy and Development in Burma - International Development Committee Contents

3 Governance

30. DFID has a major governance programme to assist Burma's movement towards democracy. It involves support for:

· addressing the long running ethnic conflicts in Burma through

— assisting the peace process

— supporting services in ethnic areas, and

— helping create a military for a democratic society

· reducing inter-communal violence between the Buddhists and Muslims;

· strengthening institutions and facilitating reforms in several key political areas:

— the constitution

— public financial management

— civil society

— the rule of law, and

— parliament

Addressing ethnic conflict

Peace process

31. Burma is made up of many different ethnic groups— 60% of the population are Burman, the other 40% are from diverse ethnic backgrounds[36] and tend to live in the mountainous areas which circle the Burman Buddhists who are mainly based in the central low lands (see map at Figure 3). The ethnic minorities often feel ignored by the international community. A Shan leader said when Burma's civilian Government was formed after the elections in 2010:

Figure 3 Map of minority ethnic groups in Burma

32. Burma has long been subject to serious ethnic conflicts. In World War II the ethnic groups tended to support the British, the Burmans the Japanese. Before independence in 1948 the Burman General Aung San (the father of Aung San Sui Kyi) achieved agreement with the ethnic groups to come together as one independent nation on the promise that they would be given "full autonomy in internal administration" known as the Panglong Agreement.[38] However the agreement was never fulfilled by the majority Burman Government and it was abandoned altogether by the military when it took power in 1962. The ethnic groups in response resorted to forming armies to fight for greater autonomy and in some cases to fight for independence.

33. Since President Thein Sien came to power in 2011 there has been a major effort to end the fighting and so far ceasefires have been signed with 11 out of 12 of the main ethnic groups with Kachin remaining in conflict. The Burmese Government has many incentives to establish peace. Benedict Rogers highlighted that all the ethnic states which are

34. Whilst in Burma we had discussions with the Burmese Ministers and leaders of the ethnic groups. The Burmese Government is looking for a nationwide ceasefire before entering further negotiations with the separate armed groups. The ethnic groups want negotiations to take place immediately; they fear that the Burmese military will use the ceasefire to regroup without making progress in negotiations.

35. Charles Petrie stressed that "ceasefires are not ends in themselves" but "create the space and opportunity for the resolution of historical difference through political dialogue."[40] The Women's League of Burma warned against assuming that because ceasefires were in place that the lives of communities had improved. It said that militarisation had extended in Karen under the 'cover of ceasefires' and that no soldiers had left, land confiscation and displacement was rife and selective business deals with former ethnic army leaders encouraged a corrupt system which was marginalising the wider community.[41] An organisation called Physicians for Human Rights which had documented abuses that occurred in Karen between January 2011 and January 2012 concluded:

36. DFID's main contribution to peace building has been in funding the mediation organisation Inter Mediate to advise all sides on negotiations and how to structure a peace process. DFID has funded visits by senior Burmese Government Ministers and officials as well as some leaders of the ethnic minority armed groups to the UK.[43] The Minister told us:

37. Lord Williams of Baglan, former United Nations Under Secretary General who had been closely involved with the United Nations initiative to open a dialogue with the military junta and Aung San Suu Kyi between 2005-07, believed that there should be more UK Government cross-departmental work on the peace process:

38. DFID, MoD and FCO should work closely together to put pressure on the Burmese Government for an effective outcome to the peace process. This should include pressure to push forward negotiations for a political settlement while continuing to seek and maintain a nationwide ceasefire. The UK should be prepared to increase its spending to support on the peace process.

SUPPORTING SERVICES IN THE ETHNIC REGIONS

39. Many of the conflict areas of the ethnic regions have had no Government presence so essential services such as health and education have been provided by the local ethnic groups themselves. An example of this is the Kachin Women's Association which funds and organises projects such as:

Due to the conflicts the ethnic areas are often the poorest in the country with high levels of malnutrition and disease. This creates a problem for donors in attempting to support and develop essential services in the ethnic regions. They are faced with the choice of either working with the armed groups on services that already partially exist or attempting to introduce new Government supported and funded services. However the Government services run the risk of being distrusted as a form of central control. As Dr Adam Burke highlighted education can be seen as enforced assimilation.[47] The Karen Women's Organisation demonstrated to us the reality of duplication in Karen where they had set up nearly 90 nursery schools throughout the state in partnership with local villages:

40. Charles Petrie highlighted the importance of the continued provision of basic services by the armed ethnic groups to help them survive the period of dialogue of the peace process. His concern was that the peace process was likely to take years, he suggested until 2020,[49] and that there would be frustrations among the ethnic population at the pace of change. If services in this time decreased there was the risk that, under pressure from their local population, the peace process would break down and the armed groups would return to conflict.

41. The Head of DFID Burma, Gavin McGillivray recognised the importance in delivering services in the ethnic regions but bringing them in line with Government provided healthcare and education. He told us:

In the ethnic regions, the ethnic authorities have been providing their own healthcare and schooling. As peace, we hope, sets in, meshing those two together is going to need some quite subtle negotiations and advisory work in different parts of the country.

DFID is funding NGOs to try to harmonise the health services of the Government with those of ethnic health authorities.[50] The Minister referred to this as "the convergence agenda", marrying up the different systems into one.[51] The alignment of rules and standards would allow for free movement of human resources for health and education between ethnic authority controlled areas and Burmese Government areas, thereby giving greater chance of filling critical human resources gaps.

42. DFID should continue to engage with the armed ethnic groups converting them to civilian administrations that can help build up health and education in the ethnic regions and ensure service delivery during the peace process period.

RAPE AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND WOMEN'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE PEACE PROCESS

43. Women's League of Burma said:

It highlighted that Burma has refused to sign the United Nations 'Declaration of Commitment to end Sexual Violence in Conflict'. Women's League of Burma also reported that women's organisations and human rights groups had been documenting the high incidence of rape throughout the conflicts in Burma but because there had been no international verification the evidence had been sidelined. More worryingly its recent report Same Impunity, Same Patterns documents over one hundred cases of rape by the Tatmadaw with victims as young as eight since the civilian Government came to power in 2010. It believed the attacks to be systematic and structural in a pattern of sexual violence indicating its use as an instrument of war and oppression by the Tatmadaw in Kachin and Nothern Shan State since the military offensives started in 2011. Twenty eight of the women had been killed or died as a result of their injuries. It called upon DFID to ensure the abuses were brought to international attention and that the victims could access justice. Global Justice Centre said the Burmese Constitution blocked justice as it "contains a permanent amnesty for the Burmese military for any such crimes" contrary to international law.[53] The Women's League of Burma wants the Constitution changed so that the military is subject to an independent civilian judicial system and for there to be an appropriate complaint procedure for victims of violence. It believed that the Burmese National Human Rights Commission currently did not have the mandate, capacity or willingness to address such serious human rights abuses.[54]

44. The British Ambassador in Burma has recently launched a project funded by the UK as part of UK-led Prevention of Sexual Violence Initiative to address the culture of impunity in many countries by increasing the number of perpetrators brought to justice; and to strengthen efforts—both national and international— to prevent and respond to sexual violence. The project is targeting 40 villages in Kachin, Kayah, Rakhine, Meikthila, and Pyapon to help people understand that sexual violence is unacceptable and inform about legal rights and how to access services, including access to justice. Sixty women will receive training on basic legal skills with the hope that they will work in their communities to bring the issue of sexual violence to light as well as providing advice to survivors on how to access legal services and other support services. In addition the UK will fund paralegals and legal aid centres in the targeted conflict areas and a 'Legal Aid Resource Centre' in Rangoon to provide legal reference materials. Funding will be provided for community leaders and local government staff to participate in workshops and for psychosocial training to gain a better understanding of their influential role in preventing sexual violence in their communities.[55]

45. Women's League of Burma have also highlighted that in regard to the peace process:

While women have suffered the worst effects of Burma's ongoing conflicts they continue to be sidelined from the peace process. Negotiations have not included female representatives at any stage. The Government set up Myanmar Peace Centre is all male and there are few women involved in its negotiating partner, the United Nationalities Federation Council.

Christian Aid said that research it had carried out on the participation of women in the peace process had shown that despite being disproportionately affected by the armed conflict women were less likely to be consulted or invited to participate.[56] Oxfam said that "the exclusion of women from roles of economic leadership, decision making and political processes" threatened Burma's "progress on social, political and economic reform". It saw the forthcoming elections as the perfect opportunity to try to reverse this and called on DFID to encourage political parties to have a greater number of women in their ranks.[57]

46. The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)[58] announced a National Strategic Plan for the Advancement of Women but The Women's League of Burma said that it required close monitoring by DFID. It recommended support for:

47. Rape has been widespread in Burma as part of the conflict. UN resolution 1325 stresses the need for women's equal participation and full involvement in peace and security efforts. We call on the Government of Burma to develop a national action plan on 1325 to ensure that women are involved in the peace process. We also call on the Government of Burma to support the participation of women in reform, including increased representation in Parliament and in developing provincial and local government.

LINKS BETWEEN THE MOD AND THE TATMADAW

48. The UK Government has sought to establish links with the Tatmadaw (the Burmese army) in part to encourage the military to adopt an appropriate role in a democratic state. The Ministry of Defence has recently funded a course at the UK Defence Academy for around 40 members of the Tatmadaw.

49. This has not been popular amongst some commentators such as Burma Campaign UK which has referred to it as "Training War Criminals". One hundred and thirty three ethnic civil society organisations have written to the UK Government asking for key conditions to be met before any of the Tatmadaw receive British Armed Forces training.[60] It was widely believed amongst these groups that the course was called 'The Art and Science of War' as opposed to in reality 'Managing Defence in the Wider Security Context'.[61] Head of DFID Burma Gavin McGillivray who spoke at the conference explained that the training was to teach about how an army operates as the servant of the people including topics such as human rights, accountability and responsibilities of an armed force in a modern democracy.[62] The Foreign Office Minister Hugo Swire MP on a recent visit to Burma also tried to allay fears. In a speech in Rangoon he confirmed that the course "did not enhance the Tatmadaw's military capacity or capabilities"[63]. In addition to this course there has now been a military attaché at the British Embassy in Rangoon since 2013 to lead discussions with the Tatmadaw on the role of the military in a democracy for example on countering sexual violence, humanitarian access and not using child soldiers. The Minister was clear that the UK would not "shy away" from raising these "very real and continued concerns" with the Tatmadaw.[64]

50. We support the training given by the UK Armed Forces to the Tatmadaw to encourage a better understanding of human rights and better working with civilians. The MoD should work further on military to military advice about governance reform and democracy building as soldiers listen best to other soldiers.

Inter-communal violence

51. We heard from many witnesses that the inter-communal conflict was the major challenge facing Burma.[65] Tucker McCravy of NGO Cord likened it to "a thread" that could "unravel the entire ball of yarn" of the democratic reform process.[66]

52. The main focus of the violence has been in Rakhine (historically known as Arakan) state bordering Bangladesh where there have been clashes between the Buddhist Rakhine and the Muslim population known as Rohingya but referred to as Bengalis by many Buddhists, who find the term Rohingya offensive. The UN has described the Rohingya as one of the most persecuted minorities in the world. Successive Burmese Governments have claimed that the Rohingya were actually Bengalis who had recently immigrated from Bangladesh and have refused to recognize them as citizens although there is historic evidence that Rohingya have inhabited the region for hundreds of years. Part of the problem may be that many retreated into British India during World War II before returning.

53. The 1982 Citizenship Law did not list the Rohingya as one of the 135 "national races" and so they were declared "non-national" or "foreign residents" by the Government. They remain stateless unrecognised by either Burma or Bangladesh. The Toronto based Sentinel Project recently went as far as describing Burma as "a textbook case" of a nation on the brink of genocide due to the violence against the Rohingya.[67] Human Rights Watch reported that around 140,000 Rohingya are confined to 40 internally displaced persons camps in northern Rakhine[68] and others are in heavily-policed settlements. Ben Rodgers of Christian Solidarity asked DFID to put pressure on the Burmese regime to open up access to the camps and to protect aid workers so that humanitarian aid could get through to those in immediate need.[69] Burma Campaign UK were critical of DFID for not supporting the Rohingya refugees who have gone to Bangladesh and for not using its influence on the Bangladesh Government to challenge restrictions on aid to Rohingya refugees there.[70]

54. The Minister said that DFID was "on a diplomatic level, at a development level, on the ground with UN agencies, humanitarian aid"[71] trying to address the rights of the Rohingya. He highlighted the joint statement between the EU and American Embassies in Rangoon condemning the violence in Myebon in Northern Rakhine where humanitarian aid to the camps had been blocked by local community members. .[72] DFID is providing £4.4 million of humanitarian funding in Rakhine which will help 50,000 internally-displaced persons. In other areas the Head of DFID Burma said it had:

55. The violence against Muslims unfortunately spread last year to central Burma with attacks in Meiktila where 44 people were killed, 1,400 business and houses destroyed and 12,000 people were displaced. Further violence against Muslims was reported in Pegu and Okkan north of Rangoon, Lashino in Shan State and against the Kaman Muslims in the southern part of Rakhine.[74] While violence against Muslims goes back centuries, following years of 'cultural nation building' by the military leadership Muslims are now perceived as a threat to the Burmese nation not just among hardliners but also among the general public, Buddhist monks and National League for Democracy[75] (NLD) politicians.[76] Many Burmese Buddhists are of the belief that Burma and the majority Buddhist faith is being overrun by Muslims.[77] Burman-Buddhist nationalism is becoming more extreme with the formation of groups such as "969" led by Ashin Wirathu, a Buddhist monk from Mandalay. Last year he featured on the front cover of Time Magazine under the title "The Face of Buddhist Terror". [78]

56. There are those who believe DFID should be doing more. Benedict Rogers told us that DFID should be:

His organisation Christian Solidarity Worldwide recommended that DFID should increase financial support to empower civil society among the ethnic groups and for initiatives to enhance communication between the different sections of society. It also would like to see funding for rehabilitating the victims of conflict.[80]

57. Lord Williams believed that there were lessons to be learnt from elsewhere as these problems were "not new in Southeast Asia. Over 5,000 Muslims have been killed in southern Thailand in the last decade. In Indonesia, it has been a recurrent theme over the decades". He said there was a need for the Burmese Government to "get to grips with the problems" and "to try to address them and defuse the tensions." He concluded:

58. There is fear that the situation in Burma could worsen and spread. Benedict Rogers told us that there was a risk:

that what has been happening to Muslims in Burma has the potential to attract the attention of radical Islamists outside Burma and for them to use this as a recruiting issue. We have seen, particularly in Indonesia, a number of calls for Jihad against Burma.

He said that Muslims in Burma have tended to be very moderate and not involved in extremist activity, but there was the potential for them to be radicalised.[82]

59. The Minister acknowledged that the religious violence was the 'biggest threat'[83] to the reform process in Burma but he did not recognise its potential to lead to extremism. He told us:

60. Since we took evidence for this inquiry the situation sadly seems to have deteriorated in the Rakhine. In January the UN reported that 48 Rohingya were killed in Northern Rakhine and asked for a "full, prompt and impartial investigation". The Burmese authorities rejected the claims as groundless.[85] At the end of February Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) was ordered by the Burmese Government to cease all activities in the country. MSF was one of the biggest providers of healthcare in Rakhine. It provided emergency assistance to Rohingya people displaced by the violence. It also administered HIV and anti-malaria programmes both in Rakhine and across the rest of Burma. Since 2004 it has treated over 1,240,000 malaria patients in Rakhine state alone.[86] A presidential spokesman alleged that MSF was biased in favour of the Rohingya minority and had prioritised the treatment of the Rohingya community over local Buddhists. It was thought this may have been trigged by MSF confirming that its medics had treated 22 patients near the site of the alleged attack in January contradicting the narrative of the Burmese officials.[87]

61. In addition to this a report was published in February by the human rights group Fortify Rights which had analysed 12 Government documents from 1993 to 2013, and found that Government policies imposed "extensive restrictions on the basic freedoms of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar's Rakhine state". It said the policies restricted Rohingya "movement, marriage, childbirth, home repairs and construction of houses of worship". Rohingya were also prohibited from travelling between townships, or out of Rakhine, without permission.[88]

62. The violence in Rakhine, in particular the plight of the Muslims there, and the extension of violence to the rest of Burma is very worrying and could cause the reform movement to unravel. The UK Government must acknowledge the concerns of the majority of the population with a large Muslim country to its west and the world-wide threat posed by jihadists. However, while we acknowledge that the situation is highly charged, delicate and complicated, we urge the UK Government to maintain its pressure on the Burmese Government to improve the situation of the Rohingya and allow humanitarian access to the internally displaced people camps.

63. It is worrying that violence has spread beyond Rakhine state, but from our visit it seemed that resolution of the conflict may be easier in central Burma. There may not be ready solutions to end the violence both in Rakhine and the rest of Burma, but DFID can help facilitate dialogue between the different faith groups, with the use of experts to help meditate and bring communities together—to encourage interfaith understanding and to help build cohesive and peaceful communities. The UK Government can also advise on integration for example in supporting Muslims to become members of the police force.

64. Without progress in dealing with the inter-communal violence, we have concerns that it could spread further. There is potential for the violence against Muslims in Burma to radicalise Muslims there, who have traditionally been moderate, and attract Islamic extremists to the country. Historical accounts reveal that Muslim communities have lived in the country for centuries.

THE 2014 NATIONAL CENSUS

65. DFID has committed £10 million to co-fund a nationwide census in Burma this year, the first in 30 years. It hopes that this will "help correct the poor data coverage and quality that undermines the capacity of Government and donors to assess priorities and target funding and service delivery."[89] However DFID has faced criticism for its support with a recent article in The Independent saying:

66. There is concern that because of the 1982 Citizenship Law the census will not list Rohingya as an ethnic group. We questioned the Minister on this and he explained that the census would allow people to 'self-identify' their ethnicity and would hopefully provide a sound statistical base for estimating their numbers.[91] The census operators were being given two and a half months intensive training to sensitively deal with the issues.[92]

67. A recent 'crisis alert' from International Crisis Group has warned that the census could unintentionally support the Buddhist Burman narrative that Muslims are 'overrunning' Burma. Currently, it is widely believed that Burma's population is 4% Muslim, a figure reported in the last census in 1983. However, International Crisis Group said there were strong indications that the real figure collected then was over 10%, but that a political decision was taken to publish a more 'acceptable' figure. The results of the 2014 census could therefore incorrectly be used as evidence of a three-fold increase in the Muslim population in the country over the last 30 years by extremist movements such as 969. This will have particular consequences in the Rakhine where International Crisis Group warned that Rakhine political actors fear the census will establish a baseline Rohingya population that would make it more difficult to keep up the narrative of recent migration in the future. Rakhine politicians are already claiming that additional populations of Bengali Muslims are now infiltrating Rakhine State in order to be included in the census count. These politicians are demanding that they be allowed to form an armed Rakhine militia to prevent such a migration.[93]

68. We support DFID's commitment to the nationwide population census as it is needed for future planning in Burma. It is important to get an accurate measure of the ethnic and religious diversity of the country but DFID, with the Government of Burma, should consider how ethnic and religious classification contribute to future planning without inflaming tensions or whether simpler data on just sex and age would be sufficient.

Strengthening institutions

Constitution

69. The current constitution of Burma was adopted in May 2008 following a national referendum and came into effect following the elections of 2010. Andrew McLeod, a lecturer in Constitutional Law at Oxford University who has been advising on the subject of constitutions in Burma told us that its adoption marked the conclusion of a "very long process" that could be traced back to July 1990 when a national convention was established to draft a new constitution. He told us that over the past 12 months, constitutional reform had become the focus of almost all political discussion with the debate centring around four main issues: regional and state autonomy; military representation in Parliament; the constitutional amendment procedure and the eligibility for presidency clause.[94]

Regional and state autonomy

70. Following the ceasefire agreements and as part of the ongoing dialogue on a peace process the ethnic nationalities are seeking greater political and economic autonomy along the lines of the Panglong Agreement principally through increased powers for regional and state governments. Under the constitution, the president appoints chief ministers for each region and state from among the members of the regional and state legislatures. The constitution also grants authority over most economically valuable matters—such as the ethnic area's rich natural resources— to the national legislature. The ethnic groups as part of their bid for greater autonomy would like powers to raise revenue within their territories.

71. We noticed on our visit that Burmese Ministers were referring to 'federalism' and were willing to explore a federal future which as Ben Rodgers told us was once totally taboo.

Military representation and constitutional amendment

72. The constitution guarantees that at least 25% of all seats in both houses of the national legislature and 25% of all seats in regional and state legislatures are nominated by the Commander in Chief of the Tatmadaw. This gives the military a voting bloc which is particularly relevant as all Bills setting out proposals to amend the constitution must have the support of at least 20% of the members of the Union Parliament, a joint sitting of both houses of the legislature. With their allocation of seats the military has an effective veto over any changes to the constitution. In addition to the need for a Bill to change the constitution some sections also require a national referendum.

73. The Bingham Centre of Law which had been working in Burma on a project to encourage citizens to become involved in the debate on reform to the constitution said that the key aspect of the constitution that garnered near universal support for reform was the provision for 25% of the Parliament to be reserved for members of the military.[95]

The Presidency

74. Under the current constitution, the president is not directly elected. Once national elections are held and Members of Parliament take their seats, a presidential electoral college convenes. The college comprises three groups: Members of the House of Nationalities; Members of the House of the People; and the 25% of Members of both Houses who are from the Tatmadaw. In the first stage each group elects a vice-presidential candidate. This person need not be a member of either house of the legislature but must be eligible to become president or vice-president. In the second stage of the procedure, the Speakers and Deputy Speakers of both houses scrutinise whether the three candidates nominated are in fact eligible. In the final stage, the Union Parliament, comprising members of both houses, votes to elect one of the three candidates as president. The other two candidates assume the two vice-presidencies.

75. To qualify as a candidate for the presidency or one of the vice-presidencies, a person must satisfy the requirements set out in section 59 of the constitution. The main debate about these requirements has centred on section 59(f), which prohibits

Andrew McLeod explained that although some within the military and the USDP publicly deny it, most believe that this provision was included to prevent Aung San Suu Kyi from ever becoming President because both of her sons are entitled to British citizenship. He also highlighted two other potentially controversial sub-sections: one required the president and vice-presidents to be 'well-acquainted with the affairs of the Union, such as political, administrative, economic and military'. He said the constitution offered no explanation of the meaning of 'well-acquainted' but that many within the NLD believed this provision to be intended to prevent any person who had not served in the military from becoming president or vice-president. Another subsection required the president and vice-presidents to have resided continuously in Burma for at least 20 years. This prevented any person who left Burma during the unrest of the late 1980s and early 1990s and most ethnic nationalities politicians who had lived in border regions from becoming president or vice-president.

76. Aung San Suu Kyi in protest at being barred by the constitution from standing for President has been touring Burma and Europe to gain support for constitutional reform ahead of the elections. The UK Government has come out strongly in favour of a change to the constitution with the Prime Minister David Cameron publicly demanding Aung San Suu Kyi be able to stand.[97] The Minister, Rt Hon Alan Duncan MP said of the constitution:

Andrew McLeod, warned that this approach risked overlooking "the complexity of the challenge", reinforcing "the historical narrative that concerns of the ethnic nationalities are of secondary importance" and shifting "the focus of the debate onto a single outcome rather than enabling an inclusive process of constitutional renewal."[99] He said that although it was "repugnant" a constitutional provision may have been drafted with a single person in mind "it would be just as repugnant for the provision to be removed to benefit a single individual." Speaker John Bercow said:

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77. On 31 January the Burmese Constitution Review Joint Committee which was set up in July 2013 to address concerns about the constitution reported to Parliament. The committee made two clear recommendations: the Parliament should focus on changes to the constitution that do not require a national referendum; and the concerns of ethnic groups should be prioritised. The provisions that Aung San Sui Kyi and the NLD most wish to change— the presidential qualifications and the constitutional amendment procedure—both require a referendum. Therefore for the Implementation Committee for Amendment of the Constitution—the body that has been set up to implement these recommendations—addressing the clauses that reflect ethnic concerns will take priority over the presidency clauses. Andrew McLeod concluded that as a result if Aung San Sui Kyi:

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78. We asked the Minister about the UK position on the devolution of power to the ethnic groups and he said "we are neutral on federalism".[102] The Women's League of Burma however highlighted that "Burma is a complex nation of diverse ethnic communities; yet politics continues to be elite Burman driven" and asked for DFID not to exacerbate this.[103] The Bingham Centre of law said that devolution was an issue to be addressed.[104]

79. We urge the UK Government to support reforms to the constitution that ensure ethnic groups are treated fairly and equally. It should also press for a reduction and eventual elimination of the role of the military in Parliament and Government.

80. We support the UK Government's view that the presidential eligibility clause 59f should be removed not just because of Aung San Sui Kyi but because there should not be a qualification targeted at one individual or group.

81. Most leading politicians, including Aung San Suu Kyi, are associated with the Burman Buddhist majority. It is essential to build a state that gives equal rights to all citizens and ensure that ethnic minorities have a say in federal and especially provincial government.

PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

82. Burma Campaign UK believed that Burma should be spending more of its own money on poverty reduction and development. It highlighted that Burma spent $1.15 billion in the year 2013-14 on the military which it estimated to be between 16-21% of Government spending, one of the highest percentages in the world. It said that the Burmese military had recently spent the equivalent of the whole of DFID Burma's budget on new ships.[105] Burma Campaign UK argued that unless the international community put pressure on Burma to move spending away from military to poverty alleviation ODA only served to alleviate domestic pressure on the Government to provide services, thereby unintentionally facilitating continued high levels of military spending.[106]

83. DFID said it wanted to help the Burmese Government's capacity "to collect, allocate and spend public funds." Head of DFID Burma, Gavin McGillivray told us that DFID would be supporting a World Bank programme which aimed at improving tax take in Burma from being one of the lowest in the world at 3-4% of GDP to being nearer 10%. It was hoped this would result in an extra £2 billion a year to become available to spend on services such as health care and education.[107] DFID would be providing £12 million towards this programme alongside £19 million from the World Bank.[108] In addition to improving revenue collection the World Bank programme would be aimed at improving the allocation of public resources and ensuring they were well used and spent where intended. This would be done by establishing a Public Financial Management academy for Government employees, by training parliamentarians on how to hold the Government to account on budgets and by supporting civil society to scrutinise Government spending.[109]

84. The UK should put more pressure on the Burmese Government to divert spending away from the military to the provision of basic services such as health and education for its population.

CIVIL SOCIETY

85. Many of the submissions to our inquiry highlighted the importance of civil society to the democratic reform process.[110] Christian Aid said that civil society organisations ensured that "citizens' voices shape the agenda" as they could: influence authorities in policymaking; hold policymakers to account on their obligations and educate citizens about their rights.[111] DFID has in place two specific civil society strengthening programmes: Pyoe Pin and Amatae. Both are also funded by the Swedish Development Agency SIDA.

86. Pyoe Pin, meaning 'green shoots' in Burmese, is a DFID funded civil society strengthening programme managed by the British Council. Its aim is to get civil society organisations which focus on rule of law, environment, health, education, and the economy together as coalitions to lobby Government and hold it to account as unified stronger voices. The British Council believed that the programme has had a significant impact in increasing civil society's role in decision making on: access to justice and legal services; land and forestry; HIV; non-state education policy and training; rice production; and fisheries. Amatae, meaning "core" or "essence", the other DFID funded civil society strengthening programme provides funding to a number of civil society organisations to help them meet core costs and to improve their governance, human resource systems, financial management, and ability to manage projects. This is seen by DFID as much needed in Burma where most funding for civil society organisations is for specific projects and does not necessarily help them grow as institutions, or manage funds effectively. Amatae also encourages the civil society organisations it supports to share good practice amongst the more mature and less experienced groups.

87. Burma Campaign UK criticised DFID for moving funding from 'underground networks'— which had previously operated out of neighbouring countries to Burma and had provided services such as health and education— to Rangoon-based NGOs which did not have the same level of grassroots community networks. Human Rights Watch also highlighted the importance of DFID not becoming too "Rangoon-centric" but engaging with civil society groups which had extensive networks in the outlying areas.[112] The Women's League of Burma warned that:

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Christian Aid was concerned that the smaller local civil society organisations were unable to access DFID funds due to a lack of confidence by DFID in their capacities and capabilities.[114] Burma Campaign UK was also critical of DFID for— as it saw it— not supporting the civil society organisations which promoted human rights and democracy.[115]

88. DFID should continue its support for civil society in Burma, but it needs to ensure that small, local organisations, based outside Rangoon also have access to funds.

RULE OF LAW

89. When we met with Aung San Suu Kyi, she talked about the importance of the rule of law and the necessity to train judges, lawyers and civil servants, for certifications and to remove corruption at what she called "rule of law centres". She told us the UNDP was conducting a feasibility study of such centres which would take a couple of months and then would be starting pilot projects. She asked us for funding for the pilots and then to help roll them out all over the country. One witness described it as 'her mantra' that she repeated alongside her desire to reform the constitution. Lord Williams highlighted the need for improvements to the rule of law

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Benedict Rogers said:

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90. Andrew McLeod however warned of potential duplication He said there was currently another large UNDP project working with Bridges Across Borders Southeast Asia Community Legal Education Initiative, partnering Burmese university law departments to teach clinical legal education[118] to students and lawyers. In addition USAid had recently allocated $8 million over three years to develop a programme promoting the rule of law in Burma. He said that a key part of the USAid project was

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91. The Minister told us the rule of law centres as proposed by Aung San Sui Kyi were a candidate for DFID support[120] although he also recognised that there were similar programmes being supported by other organisations.[121]

92. DFID should consider supporting Aung San Sui Kyi's rule of law centres only following a full assessment of the pilot projects and alternative options.

PARLIAMENT

93. During decades of military dictatorship, Parliament did not sit for many years. However a new Parliament was established in 2011 with a powerful figure, Shwe Mann as Speaker. The Parliament has begun to scrutinise the Executive, especially since the by-elections in April 2012 which brought in NLD and other non-government Members. Nevertheless, Parliament faces many challenges. MPs have little or no support to scrutinise draft laws, provide active oversight or engage with parliamentary staff, civil society and Ministries. All this needs strengthening. The Parliament has also not yet developed a plan or strategy to help prioritise and guide its reform or the assistance it requires from donors. On the other hand, we found the Burmese MPs we met engaged and keen to learn.

94. In the summer of 2013 the Speaker, the Rt Hon John Bercow MP, visited Burma with a cross party group of UK MPs including our Committee Chair, Sir Malcolm Bruce MP, and a fellow Committee member, Fiona Bruce MP. The delegation held many high level meetings and the visit led to a number of UK-Burma parliamentary schemes in partnership with DFID including:

· funding the UK visit of the Burmese Parliament's Bills Committee to learn from their counterparts in Westminster;

· a legislative drafting expert attached to the Burmese Parliament to train MPs;

· Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) training of the Burmese Parliament's Public Accounts Committee including a UK visit, and a visit of WFD and National Audit Office trainers to the Burmese Parliament in Naypyitaw;

· the visit of a senior clerk from the House of Commons with a delegation from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU); and

· the secondment of a research expert from the House of Commons to the Burmese Parliament.

95. The Bingham Law Centre recommended that DFID should also consider providing training to parliamentarians on their responsibilities, including in relation to being transparent, being held accountable and upholding the rule of law. It also suggested that DFID consider working with regional governments with the added benefit of potentially helping to resolve ethnic tensions.[122]

96. DFID has subsequently informed us that it was considering a new £20 million four year programme to scale up its parliamentary work in Burma, helping Parliament be more effective, strengthening the electoral process and enhancing civil society engagement. The Minister told us the funding

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97. A number of other development agencies are providing funding and advice to the Parliament, particularly UNDP which has been working with the Inter Parliamentary Union. The US-funded National Democratic Institute (NDI) has set up a resource centre near to MPs' lodgings to provide them with access to the internet and resource materials. There is a danger that the Burmese Parliament will suffer from a profusion of donors' uncoordinated initiatives. DFID and other donors have recognised this and are encouraging the Parliament to bring forward an overall development or reform plan to set out strategically how it intends to develop.

98. We welcome the current projects which the UK Parliament and UK Government are undertaking to support the Parliament of Burma, but we believe that a more sustained programme is required over a long period, especially as the Burmese Parliament is likely to lose many of the newly trained MPs in the elections in 2015. We urge DFID and other donors to continue to encourage the Burmese Parliament to establish a strategic reform plan to coordinate the work of donors. We also recommend support to existing women MPs as well as encouraging more women to become involved in politics and at all levels of Government.

PARLIAMENTARY STRENGTHENING IN GENERAL

99. During our visit our interest in the role of the Burmese Parliament and how DFID might help strengthen it, led to discussions about parliamentary strengthening in general and UK capacity to provide it. We received memoranda from Global Partners Governance and Commonwealth Parliament Association UK (CPA UK)which reflected in more general terms on parliamentary strengthening. On our return from Burma we heard that two reviews were taking place of Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD). One is the DFID-funded mid-tem evaluation, the other is the Foreign Office required Triennial Review. The teams are working together and the DFID evaluation is designed to provide the evidence for Ministers to make decisions about the purpose and structure of the organisation which the Triennial Review is considering. As the Triennial Review will publish a draft report in April 2014 we have decided to look briefly at DFID's general approach to parliamentary strengthening in this inquiry before the Review is published. Much of what we have to conclude is based on informal discussions held during our visits. We plan to undertake a fuller inquiry later in the year before the Foreign Office's full report is published.

100. It seems to us that the key issues are:

· Is there need for parliamentary strengthening; should DFID do more?

· How is parliamentary strengthening best done?

· Should there be improved UK capacity to provide parliamentary strengthening?

· If there should be improved capacity, what form should it take?

101. The Prime Minister has set out the case for building powerful democratic institutions in his speeches about the golden thread:

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102. Parliaments are central to the establishment of a democracy and can stimulate development. Parliamentary committees can also play a role in overseeing the sectors where DFID has major programmes just as civil society is commonly funded by DFID for this purpose. For example, support could be given to the parliamentary health committee, as well as to civil society groups, to ensure money is well spent in the health sector

103. Some DFID officials see the value of parliamentary strengthening, as we saw on our visit, and a draft DFID/Foreign Office 'How to Note' on parliamentary and political party assistance indicates that in theory DFID realises the importance of this work. However, there is room for improvement in practice. Greg Power told us that historically DFID and other development agencies had preferred to work through civil society organisations rather than parliaments.[125] The CPA UK was critical of DFID's approach:

126

Mr Duncan told us:

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104. Despite the criticisms of DFID's work, its 'How to note' has given considerable thought to how best to do strengthening work and how not to. It is critical of traditional approaches such as programmes, which improve organisational infrastructure and technical capacity and which provide procedural support

105. The 'How to note' recommends an approach which appreciates that parliamentary assistance projects are unlikely to achieve meaningful results, unless there is understanding of what motivates MPs and how parliament works. The aim should be to support change in the behaviour of the MPs and officials within it. Particular attention should be given to women's political participation, which should be the norm not the exception. It also argues for engaging the parliament through 'real' issues and outcomes, not processes. Global Partners take the same line as DFID

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106. We believe that DFID and the FCO should make more use of UK capacity as opposed to large foreign organisations such as the UNDP and NDI. There is little doubt that there is a strong demand for the UK's expertise. The Minister agreed that "we can brand something as UK democratic and use that direct line of influence".[129] CPA UK informed us

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Moreover, spending UK taxpayers money on US organisations can encourage a process by which parliaments with a Westminster system move to a US-style system.

107. Currently, a number of organisations provide support for parliamentary strengthening, including public bodies, including the Overseas offices of the Houses of Commons and Lords, the CPA UK, British Group IPU, WFD and private organisations such as Global Partners.

108. Some of these organisations consider they could increase the amount of work they do. The CPA UK informed the Committee

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109. In response to our question about the need for some limited funding for airfares and accommodation to support parliamentary strengthening work, we were informed by the Minister that a small fund for this purpose might be effective.[132]

110. However, while extra work could be done in this way, there is currently no UK rival on a scale to match UNDP or NDI. WFD is much smaller and in informal conversations we have held in the UK and overseas is seen as in need of considerable reform. There is concern about its governance structure with a dual remit of funding political parties and parliamentary strengthening as well as the lack of permanent staff who have worked in a parliament. Moreover, any increase in UK capacity would probably need to draw on more specialists than the pool of serving and retired MPs and parliamentary officials.

111. A further problem is that DFID has just one senior governance adviser based in the UK specialising in parliamentary strengthening work even though DFID does 'parliamentary and party work', in at least 21 countries as well as supporting parliamentary projects through the WFD and the Arab Partnership Fund, managed by the Foreign Office.[133]

112. We recommend that DFID and the Foreign Office give more emphasis to, and provide more funding for parliamentary strengthening. We further recommend that as part of sector programmes, for example in health and education, DFID country teams routinely fund work to improve the effectiveness of the relevant parliamentary committees.

113. Unfortunately, too often parliamentary strengthening work has not been well done. We are pleased that DFID recognises this and has published a draft 'How to Note', which points to the need to understand political sensitivities, the motivation of politicians, to establish regular contact with parliaments over several years and to respond flexibly to a changing environment.

114. The 'Westminster brand' is strong and there is considerable demand for Westminster expertise. However, DFID commonly uses non-UK bodies. We recommend that DFID make more use of Westminster-based organisations. We recommend that the UK Government establish an organisation with the attributes listed below. It could be a reformed Westminster Foundation for Democracy and could expand its work if it proved to be effective:

· a permanent staff, including a significant number of people with extensive parliamentary expertise, for example who have worked, or served, in Parliament and have experience of politics; the organisation should consider seeking to secure secondments from the House of Commons, the Foreign Office and DFID; and

· the establishment of a larger group of people with a knowledge of Parliament to draw on to work overseas; this might include people who have experience of parliaments outside Westminster.

If this organisation is to be a reformed Westminster Foundation for Democracy, there will need to be improved governance arrangements in relation to political party and parliamentary strengthening work.

115. The organisation described above, whether or not a reformed Westminster Foundation for Democracy, will need time to settle in. Moreover, it does not make sense to create a monopoly supplier. We recommend that DFID facilitate greater use of smaller organisations, which should be able to bid directly for parliamentary strengthening contracts from DFID. We further recommend that DFID establish a small central fund to support travel and accommodation costs where its country offices believe there is a need for a speedy intervention.

116. Finally, we recommend that DFID improve its capacity in its UK offices; it should:

· Increase from one to two the number of governance advisers working on parliamentary strengthening and ensure that these advisers remain in post for longer periods;

· Ensure that governance advisers make parliamentary strengthening a focus of their annual meeting in the near future work; and

· Establish a parliamentary advisory panel in DFID, which should include serving and former MPs and parliamentary officials.

The importance of politics in Burma

117. To undertake parliamentary strengthening work and the tasks described in this chapter properly requires greater sensitivity to the political situation. Lord Williams told us:

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118. Andrew McLeod highlighted that the UNDP had decided that the current environment in Burma meant that the constitutional reform process was "too political to engage with" and that the period after elections in 2015 would afford a more conducive opportunity to assist.[135] As a result the constitutional reform process had received very limited assistance to date other than small, ad-hoc forms of assistance consisting of short visits or workshops conducted by constitutional lawyers to Burma. Bingham Centre of Law however believed that the new constitution would form the framework for all future decision-making and accountability in Burma and therefore ought to be regarded as a priority.[136]

119. Sue Unsworth, former Chief Governance Adviser at DFID questioned whether DFID had the staff resources to run a governance programme in Burma which required "a really deep, on-going understanding of the rapidly shifting political and economic dynamics at work."[137] She said that DFID needed staff who "understand the country context" and have "sufficient time and operational flexibility to invest in building knowledge and relationships", and were not under pressure to meet "ambitious spending targets."[138]

120. Effective work on governance depends on understanding political context and making contacts. We recommend that DFID stress the importance of its staff engaging in the politics of Burma and continue to work closely with the UK Embassy staff.

36 Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust (BUR 0023), para 2 Back

37 Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust (BUR 0023), Back

38 The Economist Special Report Myanmar: The F-word, Ethnic Strife June 2013 Back

39 Q103 Back

40 Charles Petrie (BUR 0043), para 1 Back

41 Women's League of Burma (BUR 0007), para 9 Back

42 Karen Women's Organisation (BUR 0010), line 67 Back

43 Department for International Development (BUR 0016), para 46 Back

44 Q122 Back

45 Q86 Back

46 Women's League of Burma (BUR 0007), para 5 Back

47 Dr Adam Burke (BUR 0005), para 20 Back