53.The vulnerability of aid and healthcare workers to violence and abduction in conflict-affected countries represents: direct and immediate human suffering; damage to efforts to provide relief to those most in need and to prevent the spread of pandemic disease; and grave violations of international humanitarian law.
54.Because of the Department for International Development’s (DFID’s) international standing as a leader in providing humanitarian aid, and the commitment to spend at least 50% of its aid budget in fragile states, the UK has both the opportunity and the responsibility, to provide global leadership on the safeguarding of humanitarian space through its actions via the international aid donor community and the UN Security Council.
55.We assume that DFID, in concert with the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) and other departments, are already: strenuously promoting policies and practices that strengthen adherence to international norms and humanitarian laws; acting to broaden and deepen the understanding of such norms and laws amongst the international community at every opportunity; and arguing and pressing for humanitarian access to currently closed areas around the world. We recommend that the Humanitarian Summit of 2016 be now followed up by the UK hosting an international humanitarian worker safety and security summit. This summit should be aimed at raising the profile of this topic for a global audience and establishing a consensus around best practice and pathways forward–perhaps back–to an understanding of, and respect for, humanitarian relief as a protected activity.
56.Our interim recommendations—on which we welcome feedback—are as follows.
57.The UK should:
58.Gaining acceptance among hard-to-reach communities and populations is a critical—and probably most effective—component of aid agencies’ risk management strategies. DFID should focus resources on developing and supporting a suite of effective approaches to relationship-building and trust-establishment with local host communities to try and avoid and/or break the cycle of suspicion, threat and counter-measure that appears guaranteed to lead to hostility and confirm any negative narratives coming from opposition forces.
59.Data on sexual violence and violence based on diversity characteristics such as ethnicity, disability and sexual orientation are weak. As a consequence, strategies to counter threats to workers with diverse profiles can be based on assumptions that are not evidence-based. Special efforts are needed in this area and the Department should support research to understand better the extent of violence against workers with diverse profiles.
60.DFID should explore the case for a longer-term strategic investment to support specialist aid worker security organisations, such as the European Interagency Security Forum (EISF) and the International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO), that provide risk analysis, and safety and security advice to aid agencies. The current reliance of these bodies on a combination of membership fees and periodic contributions from donors does not seem appropriate in the light of the potential contribution they have to make in this area.
61.Measures by aid agencies to secure the safety and security of their staff can result in the transfer of risk to local delivery organisations. When screening bids for aid funded programmes and projects, DFID should take fuller account of the duty of care owed to agency personnel, as well as downstream delivery partners, to prevent the transfer of high levels of risk for the sake of lower costs.
62.Any revised systems or guidance developed by DFID in this area should be made available to other government departments, or cross-government funds, with ODA-funded programmes to ensure consistent use of best practice when awarding grants and contracts to maximise the safety and security of development operations in fragile and conflict-affected states.
Published: 6 August 2019