UK arms exports during 2016 Contents

3The licensing regime

Background to licensing

9.According to the Government, the UK is the second largest defence exporter in the world.9 ADS Group, which represents the UK’s Aerospace, Defence, Security and Space sectors, emphasised to us the “strategic importance” of “The UK’s world-class defence and security industry”:

Defence and security exports make a significant contribution to the UK economy and national prosperity. They help to sustain high-skill jobs and our industrial base, deliver UK capabilities for the UK Armed Forces, reduce unit costs of production and facilitate interoperability.

In 2016, the UK’s defence and security industry generated a turnover of over £30 billion and secured export business worth £12 billion. The industry directly sustains around 240,000 jobs, including some 7,100 apprentices and trainees […] The UK domestic market alone would not support this level of employment and activity. Boosting exports will continue to be an area of focus for the sector.10

10.The export of, and trade in, military items, and dual-use items (those with the potential for both non-military and military applications), does, though, raise major questions of ethics, national security and international law. Self-evidently, the potential consequences of such items falling into the wrong hands are extremely serious, including as they do the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction / effect, the instigation or exacerbation of conflicts, and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.

11.The Government consequently has a need to exercise significant control over military and dual-use items leaving the UK, as well as what might be arranged from the UK, and what UK citizens might do overseas, in relation to such items. This control takes the form of a significant and substantial body of licensing regulations, backed up by powers in relation to compliance and enforcement.

12.In its Strategic Export Controls Annual Report for 2016, the Government describes rigorous controls as “vital”, saying that they:

The Government has repeatedly stated that it “takes its export control responsibilities very seriously and operates one of the most robust export control regimes in the world.”12

13.Regulation of arms exports originally rested on emergency legislation that was introduced at the start of the Second World War in 1939 and only made permanent in 1990. The 1996 Report of the Inquiry into Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions (the Scott Report) led to the modernisation of export control in two ways: firstly, by the introduction of greater parliamentary oversight and control (of which CAEC forms part); and, secondly, by the creation of a new statutory framework.

14.In the aftermath of the Scott Report, the government that was elected in 1997 introduced new UK National Arms Export Licensing Criteria, incorporating commitments the previous government had made under the multilateral Wassenaar Arrangement in 1996.13 At the same time, the then government promoted the creation of a voluntary EU Code of Conduct on arms exports to non-EU countries. This followed attempts since 1991 to harmonise Member States’ export policies in respect of both military and dual-use items (which had already borne some fruit). The Code of Conduct (which included licensing criteria) was instituted in 1998. In 2000 a new European Dual-Use Regulation came into force. The UK subsequently, in 2001, made significant commitments under a further international agreement, the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.

15.A new UK statutory basis for the regulation of controlled exports was created under the Export Control Act 2002.14 The 2016 Annual Report explains that the 2002 Act confers on the Government powers to:15

16.In 2003 the legally-binding EU Common Position on Arms Brokering was adopted. This concerned regulation of “activities of persons and entities” involved in the “transfer of items [to which the Code of Conduct applies] from a third country [i.e. a country that is not an EU Member State] to any other third country”. Member States were required to regulate such activities on their own territory or where carried out by citizens of theirs in another jurisdiction. The objective of the Common Position was to control brokering so as to avoid circumvention of arms embargoes, “as well as of the Criteria set out in the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports”.16

17.In 2008 the EU Code of Conduct was replaced by the EU Common Position on Arms Exports, which was also legally binding on Member States.17 In 2009 a new Dual-Use Regulation came into force.18 Despite these new provisions, however, the actual mechanisms for export control remained an exclusively national prerogative.

18.Orders made by the responsible Secretary of State under the 2002 Act were consolidated into the Export Control Order 2008, which came into force in April 2009. As well as consolidating previous legislation, the 2008 Order also made certain changes following the Government’s 2007 post-implementation review of export-control legislation. Consequently, “[t]he 2008 Order is now the main piece of domestic export control legislation”.19

19.The context of UK export-control policy has since been shaped by a further important multilateral agreement, the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which came into effect in 2014 (see Chapter 7).

20.Those military and dual-use items whose export requires authorisation are specified in a set of Control Lists, referred to collectively as the Consolidated List.20 These Lists, and the legislation underpinning them, are set out in Table 1.

Table 1 Strategic Export Control Lists

Control List


UK Military List

Export Control Order 2008

UK Security and Human Rights List

UK Dual-Use Control List

EU Human Rights List

Council Regulation (EC) 1236/2005 (the Anti-Torture Regulation)

UK Radioactive Sources List

Export of Radioactive Sources (Control) Order 2006

EU Dual-Use List

Council Regulation (EC) 428/2009 (the Dual-Use Regulation)

Source: Department for International Trade, UK Strategic Export Control Lists: The consolidated list of strategic military and dual-use items that require export authorisation, March 2018

21.Since 2000 there has been an EU Common List of Military Equipment, describing initially those items to which the Code of Conduct was applicable and now those in respect of which the Common Position on Arms Exports applies (as well as the Common Position on Arms Brokering).21 The items on this list are all captured by the UK Military List (which also includes a few additional items).

22.In addition to the licensing system, there are so-called end-use “catch-all” provisions, whereby export of non-listed items can be prevented where there is a risk that the goods involved will be put to an illicit end-use in connection with Weapons of Mass Destruction or some other military purpose.22

23.In respect of intra-EU transfers of controlled items, particular arrangements apply, in accordance with the principles of the Single Market, whereby non-tariff barriers to trade within the EU are reduced or eliminated as far as possible. The movement of military items between Member States is governed by legally binding EU Directives which deal specifically with such transfers.23 Dual-use items can be moved between EU states mostly without restriction under the Dual-Use Regulation.24

Types of licence

24.The main types of licence that are available under the current export-control regime are summarised in Table 2. The range of licence types reflects the diversity of transactions relating to the sale of controlled items and of the circumstances in which they occur. Types of licence are defined in relation to two key distinctions: between standard licences and open licences; and between individual licences and general licences. In respect of the first distinction, the Government explains that:25

Generally, open licences can be used with fewer restrictions than standard licences. Standard licences tend to name a specific quantity of specific goods that can be exported to a specific destination whereas open licences may include a wider range of goods or destinations and generally do not limit the quantity of goods that can be exported.

25.Regarding the second distinction, it is stated that: “General licences are pre-published and can be used by all eligible exporters whereas individual licences are issued following a successful application and allow only those named on the application to export certain goods.”26 Standard licences only exist in the individual format; and, unlike open licences, those using them are not generally subject to compliance audits.

26.A number of licence types relate specifically to trafficking / brokering (the acquisition, disposal or movement of goods between third countries, or the facilitation of such activities) and these are known as Trade Control Licences (as distinct from Export Control Licences). Trade control relates only to Military List goods, meaning that it does not cover any dual-use items; or non-hardware military items, such as software or technology.

Table 2: Types of export-control licence

Standard (more restricted)

Open (less restricted; subject to compliance audit)

Individual (specific to an individual exporter)

Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs)

These allow one-off shipments of specified items to a specified consignee up to a specified quantity. Undertakings regarding the end-use of goods, or intentions to hold them in stock for future delivery or re-sale, must be supplied when applying for a SIEL. Subtypes are:

  • Permanent
  • Temporary
  • Incorporation
  • Transhipment, also called Standard Individual Transhipment Licences (SITLs)—where risk levels mean that licence exemptions for transhipment do not apply
  • Goods on the EU Human Rights List, under Council Regulation (EC) 1236/2005—relating to capital punishment, torture, etc.

    Licences for permanent exports are generally valid for two years, or until the trade has taken place. Licence-holders are liable to be subject to compliance audit if they hold SIELs for electronic transfers of software or technology.

Open Individual Export Licences (OIELS)

These allow multiple shipments of specified items to specified destinations. Names of consignees or end-users are not normally required at the time of application; but consignee undertakings (regarding the nature of the goods and their end-use) are required before goods are shipped. Generally, OIELs do not limit the quantity or value of goods that can be exported; and they are not usually restricted to specific end users. There are several subtypes, including:

  • Global Project Licences (GPLs)—to facilitate international collaborative defence projects
  • Dealer-to-dealer
  • Cryptographic
  • Media
  • Continental Shelf

    OIELs are concessionary licences, issued in certain circumstances, and can be refused or withdrawn. Licences for permanent exports are generally valid for up to five years. Where an OIEL is denied, a SIEL may still be granted.

Standard Individual Trade Control Licences (SITCLs)

These are similar to SIELs, but relate specifically to the acquisition, disposal or movement of military goods between non-EU countries (or facilitation of such activities)—sometimes called “trafficking” or “brokering”. SITCLs are normally valid for two years.

Open Individual Trade Control Licences (OITCLs)

These allow a range of activities, such as the trading of specific military goods between any number of specified countries, specifically in relation to trafficking / brokering. They require specific information regarding country of origin and destination and / or specified consignor, consignee and end-user. OITCLs are generally valid for two years. Where an OITCL is denied, a SITCL may still be granted.

General (pre-published and available to any qualifying exporter; subject to compliance audit)

Open General Export Licences (OGELs)

These give general permission for the export of certain types of goods to certain specified destinations. In most cases, exporters must register to use an OGEL, but once registered they do not need to submit further applications to trade under the licence concerned. OGELs remain in force until they are revoked; their provisions can be varied while they are in force.

Open General Transhipment Licences (OGTLs)

The main OGTL gives general permission, subject to certain conditions, for any goods to be imported for transhipment and subsequently exported within 30 days of entering the UK. There are also three subtypes of OGTL, relating to:

  • Dual-use goods bound for Hong Kong
  • Postal packets
  • Sporting guns

    Use of OGTLs does not require registration.

Open General Trade Control Licences (OGTCLs)

These give general permission for the transfer to and from certain specified destinations of most goods on the UK Military List, specifically in relation to trafficking / brokering. Exporters must register to use them in the first instance. There are currently four OGTCLs, covering:

  • “Category C” goods (which are only subject to Trade Controls in respect of brokering conducted from the UK)
  • Small arms and light weapons
  • Insurance or re-insurance
  • Maritime anti-piracy

EU General Export Authorisations (EU GEAs)

These are the EU equivalent of UK OGELs. They give general permission, subject to certain conditions, for the export of dual-use items to certain specified destinations.

Shift from standard to open licences

27.In 2013, the then government stated, in response to a CAEC report, that it was “striving to reduce bureaucracy and ensure that UK companies do not experience unnecessary disadvantages in relation to international competitors” by “develop[ing] a strategy to encourage exporters to shift from [standard] individual to open licences.”27 The following year, the then government responded to CAEC that it was committed to encouraging exporters to switch from SIELs to OIELs where possible:

Experience and analysis shows that a large number of SIELs annually relate to exports for which OIELs would be suitable, i.e. less sensitive goods to less sensitive destinations, with exporters using SIELs for repeat business—same goods, same end user, same group of destinations.

It contended that the exports concerned did not raise significant concerns in terms of licensing criteria; and, in any case, those using open licences were subject to compliance audits.28 As we were told in evidence, it remains government policy to encourage a shift from standard to open licences in the interests of reducing the workload of the licensing authorities and “other relevant agencies”.29

28.We heard evidence about the limited use of open licences in other jurisdictions,30 which can be seen as reinforcing the point that their use by UK exporters could confer something of a competitive advantage. ADS Group was supportive of a shift towards open individual licences, referring to “the role that they can play in trying to assist the British Government to try to keep the numbers of licensing applications down to much more manageable proportions.”31 The industry body did, though, have criticisms of the way that the processing of OIELs works in practice; these are discussed in Chapter 4.

29.Ian Stewart, of King’s College, London, agreed that shifting to open licences did serve to “expedite the licensing process” and reduce the burden on officials. However, he also saw it as “transferring risk from Government to companies—outsourcing risk a bit—in part because it becomes the company, as opposed to the Government, who determines whether or not the rating of the item is correct.”32

30.Oliver Feeley-Sprague, Programme Director for Military, Security and Police at Amnesty International UK, urged caution in respect of allowing small arms and light weapons to be exported under the “more permissive” open licences, “given the high risk around those particular items”. He also raised the lack of reporting on open licences. (Reporting in relation to open licences is dealt with further in Chapter 6.) The Minister responsible for licensing, Mr Stuart, said open licences “provide for situations in which what is needed is a more tailored and flexible licence”, with OIELs being “granted to support more complex business activities” than those covered by SIELs. The Minister emphasised that “OIELs are not a simple or quick option for exporters and the application process can take several months. Terms and conditions for use will vary depending on the goods and export destinations.” Mr Stuart also emphasised to us that “Holders of OIELs are subject to audit by DIT compliance inspectors”.33

31.The Minister explained that “when there is a repeated need for licences OIELs can create a system that is equally thorough but allows less bureaucracy at either end of the process.”34 We did, though, receive evidence that exporters often find the process of renewing or replacing OIELs to be onerously long-winded and bureaucratic (this is discussed in Chapter 4).

Compliance audits

32.The UK, like other jurisdictions that operate open licences,35 subjects their users to compliance auditing. The 2016 Annual Report states that:36

the Export Control Organisation’s (ECO) Compliance Team continued to inspect companies and individuals holding Open Individual and Open General Licences for both exports and trade activities. The primary purpose of these inspections is to establish whether the terms and conditions of licences are being adhered to, but they also serve to raise awareness of export controls.

These inspections take four forms:

33.When we asked Mr Stuart about the number of such audits carried out in 2016 in respect of overseas-based companies, he told us: “We do not audit overseas.”37


34.HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) is responsible for enforcement in respect of export control and trade control. Customs officers work with Border Force and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) in undertaking a wide range of enforcement activity regarding controlled items. The 2016 Annual Report states:38

HMRC has a team that develops and manages strategic export controls, trade controls and sanctions enforcement policy, as well as liaising with the wider cross-Government counter-proliferation community. HMRC also has two specialist operational teams carrying out criminal investigations and intelligence management in this area.

The two specialist operational teams are apparently known as “Customs A/B”.39

35.The Annual Report further explains:40

HMRC assesses all alleged breaches of arms export controls and sanctions. Where serious or deliberate breaches are identified, or where there are aggravating features, cases may proceed to a full criminal investigation. If appropriate, they may be referred to the CPS, who will determine whether there is sufficient evidence to prosecute and whether prosecution is in the public interest.

36.HMRC takes into account a range of factors in deciding whether to conduct a criminal investigation. These include: “the seriousness of the offence, the likely impact and outcome of a criminal investigation compared to other forms of enforcement action, and the need to prioritise investigations in line with wider Government policies and strategies.”41 This was reiterated by Mr Stuart in evidence to us.42

37.The following data are given in the 2016 Annual Report regarding numbers of prosecutions over the previous decade:43

38.However, the title of the table and the right-hand column heading do not correspond. Mr Bell, the Head of the ECJU, admitted to us that the figures given in this table relate not to prosecutions but only to seizures of goods—which “overwhelmingly” did not result in prosecutions, since “It is quite possible for someone to unknowingly find themselves in the act of breaching and have their goods seized at the border.”44

39.When a Member of the International Development Committee attempted earlier this year, by means of a Written Question, to obtain data on the staff numbers and budget for Customs A/B he was referred to HMRC’s Annual Report and Accounts. However, these do not contain the information that had been requested.45 When we asked Mr Stuart for this information, he told us: “More detailed issues about the way that HMRC goes about its business are for HMRC to address, and I cannot comment on that.”46

End-use monitoring

40.In response to several recent Written Questions on the use of UK-supplied military equipment by the Israeli Defence Force, the Government has stated that “We do not collect data on the use of equipment after sale.”47

41.Such end-use monitoring is not common in export-control regimes. Dr Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, Research Fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, told us that Switzerland and Germany undertook it on a limited basis:

In Switzerland, on-site inspections between 2014 and 2016 were between 3 and 9 per year. In 2017 Germany conducted two visits, one in India and one in the [United Arab Emirates]. Swiss controls so far have focused on small and light weapons […] In Germany also the focus is on small arms and light weapons.

Sweden was also planning end-use monitoring in respect only of “small arms and light weapons and ammunition, manufactured and exported from Sweden”.48

42.There does, though, exist one comprehensive such arrangement, namely the “Blue Lantern” End-Use Monitoring Program, inaugurated in 1990 and operated by the US State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC). This entails end-use checks being made by US embassy personnel in cooperation with host governments (and the relevant country’s own personnel, such as HMRC in the UK) across up to 100 countries each year.49 The previous Committees were impressed by the Blue Lantern scheme. When the then government stated in 2004 that it already carried out “the vast majority of the work in the Blue Lantern programme as part of our current licensing procedures”, the previous Committees noted that there was, though, no provision for systematic end-use monitoring.50 When, in 2006, the previous Committees advocated such an arrangement for the UK, and indeed the whole EU,51 the then government responded that there was “no substitute for a rigorous assessment of any proposed export at the time of application”.52 Following the government’s 2011 Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, a commitment was given that the FCO would “undertake end-use monitoring of controlled military goods, bearing in mind both the practical and resource limitations”.53 However, no overall end-use monitoring system was forthcoming.

43.When we asked Mr Stuart about end-use monitoring, he told us: “It would require the permission of the country where we would be doing it and it would make no-notice inspections very difficult.” He emphasised the rigour with which licence applications are processed: “We feel that the most effective, proportionate methodology is to analyse and decide before you issue the licence, rather than hope that any form of verification afterwards could be a suitable methodology.”54 Regarding the new German end-use monitoring regime, he said: “The Germans have recently brought in an approach for small arms. I think they have done a total of two inspections so far, and say that there will be at most five a year.” The Government was open-minded and would “seek to learn from the German experience, but to date, we are not convinced that it offers a superior alternative to what we currently do”.55

44.Mr Bell, the Head of the ECJU, further reflected, regarding a possible “sort of system of extraterritorial checks post-licensing”, that:56

a team of lawyers would be tied up for a long time working out the ins and outs of how we would do it, leaving aside the whole issue of how you would resource it and how you would carry it out in-country. I know the Germans have struggled with their two inspections.

Licensing cryptographic items

45.Cryptographic items are used to encrypt or decrypt information. In accordance with the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Dual-Use Regulation, such items fall within the scope of the Dual-Use List. In the 2016 Annual Report, the Government describes the cryptographic subtype of OIEL as authorising:57

the export of specified cryptography hardware or software and the transfer of specified cryptography technology to the destinations specified in the licence. These OIELs do not cover hardware, software or technology which includes certain types of cryptanalytic functions.

46.Figures regarding applications for OIELs in respect of cryptographic items cited in Annual Reports since 2009 are shown in Table 3.

Table 3: Cryptographic OIEL applications





































Source: Strategic Export Controls Annual Reports, 2009–16

47.There also exists an OGEL which “allows, subject to certain conditions and destinations, the export of certain types of cryptographic (protecting information by transforming it into an unreadable format) development software and technology.”58 Mr Stuart told us that this licence permitted: “the export of low-risk information security equipment, such as computer servers and routers”. Deliberately excluded were “all high-risk capabilities, including mobile telecommunications interception equipment, cyber-surveillance tools and items designed to defeat or bypass information security, because those items will remain subject to individual licence applications”.59

48.ADS Group told us that they advocate the introduction of a new OGEL to cover “non-contentious cryptographic goods”:

Most other nations (and especially the US) have seemingly adopted a much more flexible and permissive attitude to these commercial activities than the UK’s own Government has done. As a direct result, sales (and related jobs) are being lost to the UK; often the supply chains related to these sales are being placed overseas by multinational firms. At present, the UK is widely perceived to be at a competitive disadvantage in this increasingly important area of commercial activity in comparison.60

49.The Chief Executive of ADS Group, Mr Everitt, explained what might be considered a “non-contentious cryptographic good”:61

Because of concerns about cyber-crime, hacking and the like, normal businesses increasingly want to make their standard commercial business activities more secure. The sorts of areas that we are thinking of are, indeed, satellite communication or satellite service delivery and/or how you go about securing financial transactions that might be done either online or through mobile telecommunications.

50.He emphasised that:62

We are not looking at trying to provide equipment that might be used to monitor people; we are looking at supplying commercial-grade equipment and software that would be used to secure mobile telephony and other things for things like commercial transactions. Again, a mix of end-user scrutiny would be sufficient to determine whether it is going to the right type of business.

51.Mr Feeley-Sprague, of Amnesty International, was sceptical about ADS Group’s proposal but did say:63

there is a recognition among the exporting community […] that the area of cyber-controls, or controls on equipment to monitor and carry out surveillance of the internet, for example, has struggled to cope with the technology advances that have happened. With a list-based system, these items tend to be things that the list struggles to cope with, because technology advances much faster than the list can.

52.He also suggested that moves were afoot:64

within both theWassenaararrangement and the EU [i.e. the proposed recast of the EU Dual-Use Regulation—see Chapter 8], to strengthen our controls in this area of goods because of the human rights concerns that can occur when they are misused. At a time when others are looking to ensure that our controls are as strong as they possibly can be, relaxing them may not be the right thing to do at the moment.

53.When we asked Mr Stuart about the proposal for a new OGEL in respect of non-contentious cryptographic goods, he emphasised that cryptographic items were controlled under the Wassenaar Arrangement. He told us:65

We have international obligations and, as with all our international obligations, we aim to be top of the field in implementing them. Encryption has a role in enabling human rights defenders, for instance, to communicate securely, but equally the use of strong encryption by terrorists or others represents a threat to the security of the UK and its allies.

Conclusions and recommendations

54.We note that the Government has in recent years encouraged industry to apply for open rather than standard licences, in order to reduce the workload associated with the processing of uncontentious licences. We accept that it is legitimate for the Government to seek to make the best use of limited resources in this way—provided there is evidence to show that open licences do represent a more cost-effective approach without compromising necessary standards. The Government needs to supply evidence to that effect, either in response to this report or in correspondence.

55.At the same time, there is a need for greater clarity and transparency regarding the circumstances in which open licences are deemed appropriate rather than standard licences. This is particularly the case given the concerns raised with us about reporting in respect of open licences. The Government must explain how it is going to bring greater clarity and transparency in this regard, which would be of practical benefit to industry, as well as being good policy.

56.In addition, the Government must demonstrate that companies using open licences are subjected to proportionately rigorous and frequent compliance audits.

57.We are most dissatisfied at the Government’s admission that no such audits are ever carried out in respect of UK companies’ operations overseas. The compliance-audit regime must be extended as soon as practically possible to cover such companies in relation to Trade Control Licences (and Export Control Licences in any relevant circumstances). The Government must say how it will achieve this, either in response to this report or in correspondence.

58.The resources provided to HM Revenue & Customs for export-control enforcement must be commensurate with the scale and complexity of the task. We are not convinced that this is currently the case. The Government should review the allocation of resources, setting out to us in its response to this report what the current level of resourcing is and how it relates to current demands. It should also provide data on the staff numbers and budget for Customs A/B for each year since 2008.

59.The Government should provide raw / base statistical data on numbers of investigations, reports for prosecution, prosecutions, convictions, fines, seizures, compound penalties and warnings—both successful and unsuccessful—in the last ten years. It must not, as it did in the 2016 Annual Report, confuse data on prosecutions with data on seizures. We are extremely disappointed at what we see as a misrepresentation of data in this area, as we believe it leads to public distrust of the licensing process and casts doubt on the data that the Government provides.

60.The Government should set out in the response to this report what the arrangements are for the exchange of information between the Export Control Joint Unit and HM Revenue & Customs, and show that these are adequate for the successful discharge by both bodies of their responsibilities in this regard.

61.The Government should consider whether to begin end-use monitoring, and how that would be done, taking account of resource implications, and set out the reasoning behind its conclusions in the response to this report. We believe that some end-use monitoring is advisable, and that it would assist the Government in making better, more informed, export licensing decisions, as well as in addressing questions around compliance and enforcement.

62.The case has been put to us for the introduction of an Open General Export Licence to cover “non-contentious” cryptographic goods. This merits serious attention and the Government should accordingly give it formal consideration (taking fully into account the oppressive uses to which such items can be put). It should then set out clearly, in its response to this report or in correspondence, the reasoning behind the conclusion that it reaches, being explicit about how it defines “non-contentious goods” in this context.

9 Department for International Trade, UK defence and security export figures 2016, July 2017. This statement refers to data compiled using a ten-year rolling average.

10 ADS Group (UAE0003), paras 1–3

11 United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2016, HC (2017–19) 287, p 1

12 See for example: Answer to Written Question HL3497, 7 December 2017; Written Statement HCWS799, 27 June 2018.

13 Following the end of the Cold War, the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), which the western powers had formed, ceased to function. In 1996 both former COCOM members and former Communist countries concluded the Wassenaar Arrangement. Unlike COCOM, the Arrangement does not rest on a treaty and so lacks any legal force. Participating states are expected to seek through their respective national export-control policies to ensure that transfers of conventional arms and dual-use items are regulated in accordance with the terms of the Arrangement.

14 Quadripartite Committee, First Joint Report of Session 2001–02, Strategic Export Controls: Annual Report for 2000, Licensing Policy and Prior Parliamentary Scrutiny, HC 718, paras 32–40

15 HC (2017–19) 287, p 28

16 Council Common Position 2003/468/CFSP on the control of arms brokering, 23 June 2003

17 Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment, 8 December 2008

18 Council Regulation (EC) 428/2009 on setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items, 5 May 2009

19 HC (2017–19) 287, p 28

21 Council Declaration on the occasion of the adoption of the common list of military equipment covered by the European Union code of conduct on arms export (2000/C 191/01), 13 June 2000

22 HC (2017–19) 287, pp 22, 30

23 Council Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons, 18 June 1991 (the Weapons Directive / Firearms Directive); European Parliament and Council Directive 2009/43/EC on the transfers of defence-related products within the Community, 6 May 2009 (the Intra-Community Transfers Directive)

24 Annex IV, Council Regulation (EC) 428/2009 on setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items, 5 May 2009

27 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, Reports from the Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees: Session 2013–14: Strategic Export Controls: Her Majesty’s Government’s Annual Report for 2011, Quarterly Reports for 2011 and 2012, and the Government’s policies on arms exports and international arms control issues: Response of the Secretaries of State for Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, International Development and Business, Innovation and Skills, Cm 8707, October 2013, p 10

28 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, Reports from the Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees: Session 2014–15: Strategic Export Controls: Her Majesty’s Government’s Annual Report for 2012, Quarterly Reports for 2012 and 2013, and the Government’s policies on arms exports and international arms control issues: Response of the Secretaries of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and International Development, Cm 8935, October 2014, p 15. These points were reiterated to CAEC in 2015 – Cm 9089, July 2015, p 48

29 Control Arms UK (UAE0007), para 84

30 Q192; Dr Lucie Béraud Sudreau (UAE0014), pp 1–2

31 ADS Group (UAE0003), para 15

35 Dr Lucie Béraud Sudreau (UAE0014), pp 2–3

36 HC (2017–19) 287, p 21

38 HC (2017–19) 287, p 34

39 HM Revenue & Customs, HMRC internal manual: Strategic Goods and Services: Assessment of risk and offence action, April 2017, SGSAROA11000 and SGSAROA5040

40 HC (2017–19) 287, p 22

41 HC (2017–19) 287, p 22

43 HC (2017–19) 287, p 22

45 Answer to Written Question 125321, 1 February 2018

47 Answer to Written Question 133735, 29 March 2018; Answer to Written Question 139365, 3 May 2018; Answer to Written Question 139368, 3 May 2018

48 Dr Lucie Béraud Sudreau (UAE0014), p 4

50 Quadripartite Committee, First Joint Report of Session 2003–04, Strategic Export Controls Annual Report for 2002, Licensing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny, HC 390, para 101

51 Quadripartite Committee, First Joint Report of Session 2005–06, Strategic Export Controls: Annual Report for 2004, Quarterly Reports for 2005, Licensing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny, HC 873, paras 91, 93

52 Department for International Development, Department of Trade and Industry, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, Reports from the Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development and Trade and Industry Committees: Session 2005–06: Strategic Export Controls: HMG’s Annual Report for 2004, Quarterly Reports for 2005, Licensing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny Response of the Secretaries of State for Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, International Development and Trade and Industry, Cm 6954, October 2006, p 15

53 H C Deb, 13 October 2011, col 42WS

57 HC (2017–19) 287, p 15

58 Export Control Joint Unit, Open general export licence (cryptographic development), April 2018

60 ADS Group (UAE0003), para 14

63 Q5

64 Q5

Published: 18 July 2018