Sixth Special Report
The International Development Committee published its Sixth Report of Session 2024–26, The FCDO’s Approach to Displaced People (HC 525), on 17 September 2025. The Government’s response was received on 17 November 2025 and is appended below.
Appendix: Government Response
Introduction
1. The UK Government is grateful to the International Development Committee for its report on The FCDO’s approach to displaced people, published on 17 September 2025.
2. The UK recognises the critical importance of addressing forced displacement and the scale of the global challenge. The Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) is responding to forced displacement through a comprehensive approach, focused on: reducing the drivers of displacement; protecting people once displaced; supporting refugee and host communities; and finding sustainable, long-term solutions. We are working closely with multilateral organisations, host countries and likeminded partners to strengthen the international system so it can respond effectively to the complexity of this issue.
3. We welcome the Committee’s focus on these important topics, and we have carefully considered the Committee’s recommendations. This response addresses the Committee’s conclusions and recommendations in the order in which they appear in the report.
The global displacement crisis
(Conclusion 1, Paragraph 15) There is a global displacement crisis. The UK cannot solve it alone, and nor should it be expected to. However, significant cuts to UK ODA and development programming indicate a United Kingdom that is stepping back from the world stage at a time when engagement and collaboration are most needed.
Government response
4. The UK is actively engaging with partners and the multilateral system to strengthen the international response to forced displacement.
5. This includes shaping the UN80 reform process, championing the Global Compact on Refugees, and working in partnership with refugee hosting countries to promote long-term solutions for displaced people.
6. Meanwhile, the UK continues to protect the most vulnerable displaced people through our ongoing humanitarian interventions in key geographies such as Ukraine, Gaza, and Sudan.
7. Development remains central to our global objectives and to the delivery of the government’s priorities. We continue to work with partners to strengthen and stabilise countries, tackle poverty, support growth, and enhance global safety.
8. The global challenges we face demand a modern approach to development to maximise impact and value for money. This includes transforming to a partnership-led approach: shifting from donor to investor, service delivery to system support, grants to expertise, and international intervention to local provision.
FCDO strategy
(Conclusion 2, Paragraph 29) Programming to reduce poverty, which drives displacement and exacerbates other drivers of displacement, has received a declining share of ODA in recent years.
Government response
9. The alleviation of poverty is the primary purpose of all FCDO Official Development Assistance (ODA) programmes.
10. In light of pressing security challenges, the government has made the necessary decision to reduce the ODA budget to the equivalent of 0.3% of Gross National Income (GNI) by 2027.
11. We intend to return to spending 0.7% of GNI on ODA when fiscal circumstances allow and will continue to monitor future forecasts closely.
12. We are working through detailed decisions on how the ODA budget will be used from 2026/27 to 2028/29, informed by internal and external consultation and an impact assessment. We plan to publish indicative allocations for the next three years in the coming months.
(Conclusion 3, Paragraph 40) The Department has failed to learn the lessons from previous cuts to stabilisation, peacebuilding and deconfliction programming, which likely contributed to the escalation of conflict in Sudan going unchallenged. We are concerned that the recent cuts to the Integrated Security Fund will lead to escalating conflict, with unpredictable ramifications for the UK both at home and abroad.
Government response
13. The UK government does not accept that changes in funding for peacebuilding in Sudan contributed to conflict escalating without challenge.
14. The UK uses a comprehensive strategy to address the root causes of conflict - combining diplomacy, development, and security, and working with our international partners. We are also driving reform of the multilateral system to better focus resources and strengthen effectiveness and supporting the efforts of regional mediators such as Qatar to bring violent conflict to an end.
15. The Integrated Security Fund (ISF) is one part of the UK’s broader peacebuilding efforts, prioritising overseas conflict work that both benefits UK national security and supports stability in partner countries. The Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) supported peacebuilding in Darfur until 2021. The Sudan Peace & Reconciliation Programme, funded bilaterally by the FCDO, continued many of the same activities including transitional justice, peace processes and conflict sensitivity, demonstrating the UK’s ongoing commitment to peace and stability in Sudan.
16. We are also a major donor to the UN Peacebuilding Fund, contributing over £7m last year to support peacebuilding in over 40 countries, including Sudan.
17. The UK government has gained valuable insights from its past involvement in stabilisation and peacebuilding efforts. These insights are now being applied across government departments through a new stabilisation toolkit. This toolkit provides practical guidance on making strategic decisions, including understanding trade-offs, navigating complex environments - especially in conflict zones - and building strong partnerships that ensure local communities have ownership of peacebuilding initiatives.
18. The toolkit draws on lessons and evidence from key areas such as security, justice, and cross-border threats. Although the toolkit is primarily intended for UK government staff, it has also attracted interest from international partners, including other governments, global organisations, and civil society groups. We plan to launch the toolkit across departments and publish it online by the end of the year.
(Conclusion 4, Paragraph 48) Climate change is a current and growing driver of displacement, and the Department must better integrate the modelling of climate threats into its planning for its displacement work.
Government response
19. We agree that climate change is a growing driver of forced displacement, exacerbating existing drivers of displacement such as conflict and poverty, and increasing the likelihood of extreme weather events which can cause displacement.
20. As the Committee notes in its report, the FCDO has a “strong track record” on investing in climate adaption. Through this work, we are strengthening the resilience of the most vulnerable, including refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and host communities, to the impacts of climate shocks.
21. To do this, the UK is engaging with international sources of climate finance to increase funding to the most fragile and vulnerable settings. For example, we are working with the Green Climate Fund (GCF) to increase its investments in places experiencing intersecting vulnerabilities and risks, including fragility and conflict. As Co-Chair the UK worked to support improved access to the GCF, helping secure Somalia’s first single-country project ($94.9m) and increasing work to reach other fragile and conflict affected states.
22. We also actively integrate climate threat modelling into displacement-specific programming. For example, at COP29 we launched the £5.56m “Jahez” programme, which will invest in the resilience of climate-vulnerable refugees and host communities in Jordan, one of the most climate vulnerable countries in the world.
(Recommendation 1, Paragraph 49) In its response to this report, the FCDO should set out the measures it is taking to increase the data available to policy teams when planning medium to long-term climate adaptation investments; and whether prevention of climate-induced displacement is one of the criteria that these teams must remain cognisant of.
Government response: Agree
23. The FCDO produces Seasonal Climate Outlooks that provide three-to-six-month climate predictions to inform our decision making. These are distributed widely to provide information on likely weather patterns.
24. We have also established a Natural Hazard Science Hub through the Science in Emergencies Centre of Expertise. This Hub will continue to produce and update the climate outlook products in addition to producing data and early warning products for other natural hazard events.
25. These products are available to help inform policy and programme teams across the FCDO, including those planning medium to long-term climate adaptation investments.
26. FCDO programming rules do not require all teams planning medium to long-term climate adaptation investments to consider prevention of climate induced displacement.
(Conclusion 5, Paragraph 56) The Government appears to have devised a strategy for influencing multilateral institutions, most notably the World Bank. This is a welcome effort to reinvigorate UK engagement at the multilateral level, given the significant cuts to other parts of the UK ODA budget.
Government response
27. We must modernise our approach, make choices and focus on greater impact – ensuring every pound delivers for the UK taxpayer and the people we support. That is why we are prioritising particular multilateral partners in the ODA budget, while driving reform of the multilateral system to strengthen its most important parts.
28. No nation can tackle global challenges alone, and the multilateral system offers legitimacy and has the expertise and innovative tools to deliver at scale. The UK will continue to push for improved system wide effectiveness and increased lending volume from the multilateral development bank system.
29. The UK remains a major donor to the International Development Association (IDA) and one of just six countries with a single country seat on its Board. We will continue to influence and shape the World Bank while also leveraging our extensive network of posts to ensure delivery of UK priorities
(Conclusion 6, Paragraph 57) Engagement with the World Bank’s fragility, conflict and violence strategy update is positive, but the Government should not assume that it can outsource to multilateral institutions the need to also formulate strategy on preventing and reducing displacement.
Government response
30. While we have been engaging with the World Bank’s Fragility Conflict and Violence strategy refresh, we do not assume that we can outsource the need to formulate strategy on preventing and reducing displacement.
31. The FCDO has developed a cross-cutting strategic approach aimed at addressing forced displacement, more details of which are set out in the Government’s answer to Conclusion 7 below.
(Conclusion 7, Paragraph 58) The Department lacks a holistic view of the drivers of and solutions to displacement, and therefore lacks an overarching strategy to establish solutions and prevention mechanisms. This means that UK impact in this area is constrained, reducing value for money of relevant spending and resulting in a wasted opportunity to assist displaced people.
Government response
32. The FCDO’s strategic approach to support forced displacement draws on a wide range of interventions, which combine to: reduce the drivers of displacement; protect people once they are displaced; support host communities; find long-term solutions; and create conditions that allow displaced people to return home.
33. Conflict and fragility are major causes of forced displacement which the UK is tackling through a strategic approach combining diplomacy, development and security, and working with our institutional partners. Through work to prepare vulnerable populations for the impacts of climate change, we are addressing another contributing factor to displacement and directly protecting displaced people who are more likely to live in climate vulnerable countries.
34. When people are displaced, the FCDO provides humanitarian assistance in key geographies, with specialised support for the most at-risk groups, particularly women and girls.
35. Alongside prevention and humanitarian response, the FCDO is championing long-term solutions to forced displacement. This includes working with host governments to ensure that displaced people have access to essential services, education and economic opportunities, as well as supporting communities hosting displaced people. Where possible, we support peacebuilding and stabilisation in the countries from which people have been displaced, laying the groundwork for people to return.
36. Responding to these issues is not something the UK can do alone, so we are working closely with our partners to devise solutions and drive the international response. The Global Compacts on Refugees and Migration continue to be important tools for catalysing collective action on migration and displacement. The UN reform process is also important to ensuring ongoing protection for displaced people. We are closely engaged with this process and will ensure that displaced people receive the protection they need.
37. The FCDO will continue to work through the multilateral system to increase development financing in situations of forced displacement, an important enabler of our work to find long-term, sustainable solutions for displaced people.
(Recommendation 2, Paragraph 59) The FCDO should commission a holistic review of the drivers of and solutions to displacement, reporting its findings to the Committee within one year of the publication of this report.
Government response: Agree
38. In light of the volume of existing analysis on forced displacement, the FCDO will commission a literature review of the current evidence, to include drivers and solutions, which we will share with the Committee.
(Recommendation 3, Paragraph 60) The Department should appoint a new Special Envoy for Displacement who can oversee the discrete policy teams that work on mitigating the drivers of displacement, facilitating policy co-ordination between teams and ensuring consistency of outputs.
Government response: Disagree
39. The FCDO has no current plans to appoint a Special Envoy for Displacement. The department has a dedicated Forced Displacement Team which works closely with thematic teams and the FCDO’s overseas network to coordinate implementation of the FCDO’s approach to forced displacement.
Displaced women and girls
(Conclusion 8, Paragraph 77) Funding cuts to gender-specific programming will be devastating for women and girls, starving them of vital support and services. The Government has not learned lessons from the previous Government about the severe impacts of funding cuts to programming for women and girls.
Government response
40. At every stage in the decision-making process to set 2025/26 ODA programme allocations, we considered the equalities impacts of allocations, including on women and girls. Our approach was informed by lessons learned from previous rounds of reductions.
41. As confirmed by the Equalities Impact Assessment (EIA) we have published, we have avoided disproportionate negative impacts on women and girls in our 2025/26 ODA allocations.
42. We continue to strengthen actions to help mitigate the negative impacts on equalities, including by putting women and girls at the centre of our international efforts. For example, the Foreign Secretary made a commitment at UNGA 80 for the UK to spearhead international work to eliminate violence against women and girls.
(Conclusion 9, Paragraph 78) The policy of gender mainstreaming refers to a strategic approach to achieving gender equality through integrating women’s experiences and concerns in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes. However, while gender mainstreaming is part of the correct goal, the Government does not have the appropriate infrastructure in place to make it work. This gender mainstreaming will therefore reduce the impact of UK programming, as the problems faced by women and girls require gender-specific interventions. It is uncertain whether the Government will be able to mitigate the impacts of aid cuts to women and girls as it intends.
Government response
43. We are taking steps to strengthen the integration of gender and other equality issues across the Department’s work. This will ensure we maximise the impacts for women, girls, and marginalised groups across all our spend and through our diplomatic levers.
44. Our strengthened approach to mainstreaming gender equality will be underpinned by a strong capability offer, alongside measures to ensure clear expectations and robust monitoring and accountability systems.
45. When done well, integrating gender equality can have transformative impacts for women and girls. For example, since 2016, the Transforming Energy Access programme has supported training and work placements for women in the clean energy sector. As a result, it has improved clean energy access for over 15 million women and created more than 30,000 green jobs for women.
(Recommendation 4, Paragraph 79) It is astonishing that the Government has made cuts to gender-specific programming without seemingly understanding the impacts on women and girls. The Government must publish impact assessments, as promised by the Minister, as soon as possible and no later than the response to this report.
Government response: Partially agree
46. We strongly disagree with the premise that the Government made cuts to gender-specific programming without understanding the impacts on women and girls. An Equalities Impact Assessment (EIA) – which considers impacts on women and girls and wider equalities – was an essential part of how the FCDO made these decisions.
47. We agree with the specific recommendation to publish impact assessments. The Government published the EIA on GOV.UK on 22/07/2025 alongside final 2025/26 ODA programme allocations.
48. We are working through detailed decisions on how the ODA budget will be used from 2026/27 to 2028/29, informed by internal and external consultation and an equality impact assessment. We plan to publish indicative allocations for the next three years in the coming months.
(Recommendation 5, Paragraph 80) In the light of these impact assessments, the Government must reconsider the cuts to women and girls-specific programming announced by the Minister and should consider ringfencing funding for this programming.
Government response: Disagree
49. Decisions on the FCDO’s 2025/26 ODA programme allocations have been made. As confirmed by the Equalities Impact Assessment (EIA), the allocations process for 2025/26 has protected against disproportionate impacts on women and girls and people living with disabilities.
50. Inevitably, reducing our ODA spend means that for some themes, there will be less to spend, but less money does not necessarily mean less action. We will use our convening power and diplomacy to maximise our impact in these areas, increase the use of expertise to provide technical assistance to partner governments, and – in the case of gender equality objectives in particular – embed this work across our international action.
51. We are working through detailed decisions on how the ODA budget will be used from 2026/27 to 2028/29, informed by internal and external consultation and an equality impact assessment, ahead of publishing indicative allocations for the next three years in the coming months. EIAs are an essential part of how we make decisions on ODA programme allocations.
(Recommendation 6, Paragraph 81) The Government must develop a robust strategy and a consistent, data-led methodology for mainstreaming and integration, to ensure that its efforts to mainstream and integrate gender take place in tandem with stand-alone programming.
Government response: Agree
52. We agree that we must develop a robust strategy and a consistent, data-led methodology for mainstreaming and integration,
53. We are currently refreshing our approach and taking steps to strengthen the integration of gender and other equalities issues across the Department’s work. This will ensure we maximise the impacts for women, girls, and marginalised groups across all our spend and through our diplomatic levers.
54. Our new approach to embedding gender equality will consider the most effective measures for driving impactful mainstreaming across the Department’s business, including harnessing the use of data and metrics.
Working with the private sector
(Conclusion 10, Paragraph 87) The private sector can play a pivotal role in stimulating the economies of fragile and conflict-affected states. British International Investment has a strong track record of investing in difficult environments, particularly within fragile and conflict-affected states, helping to mitigate the drivers of displacement.
Government response
55. We recognise the importance of strengthening the private sector in fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS) and we welcome the Committee’s recognition of the role British International Investment (BII) in these contexts.
56. BII has a strong and improving track record of investing in challenging markets, with the largest FCAS portfolio of any European bilateral Development Finance Institution (DFI). In 2024, 62% of BII’s new commitments were in Africa and 36% in Asia.
57. BII’s investments support economic resilience, job creation, and access to essential services—indirectly contributing to the conditions that help mitigate displacement pressures.
58. BII’s flexible capital and risk appetite allow it to invest in the riskiest markets and parts of the capital structure, supporting systemic change and catalysing private investment where others cannot.
(Recommendation 7, Paragraph 88) The FCDO should work alongside British International Investment ahead of its 2026 strategy refresh, including on how BII can place more emphasis on, and better target investment at, mitigating the drivers of displacement across fragile and conflict-affected states.
Government response: Agree
59. We agree that the FCDO should work alongside BII ahead of its 2026 strategy refresh. We will work closely with them to explore a wide range of priorities. This will include consideration of BII’s ambitions in frontier and fragile markets, in line with its overall strategy and mandate to strengthen the private sector.
60. BII is already a leader in investing in fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS), with the largest FCAS portfolio of any European bilateral DFI.
61. BII’s leadership in establishing the now multi-donor funded Africa Resilience Investment Accelerator (ARIA) platform helps to unlock investable opportunities that would otherwise not exist in frontier markets.
62. BII investments support wider drivers of displacement through job creation, access to services and economic resilience. As detailed in our wider response, the FCDO will also continue to utilise other means to combat displacement directly.
Localisation
(Conclusion 11, Paragraph 96) Despite long-standing commitments, the Government is not making sufficient progress in meeting its commitments to localisation in humanitarian programming. The steps taken by the UNHCR on improving localisation in its partnerships should serve as a blueprint for how the Government can make progress in this regard.
Government response
63. We are working hard to direct our humanitarian funding to support localisation, such as in Myanmar where over 65% of UK funding has gone to local organisations.
64. In 2022, the FCDO assisted with establishing the Aid Fund for Syria (AFS), contributing £40m to date. One of the fund’s primary focus areas is funding local Syrian organisations (SNGOs). The AFS involves civil society in decision-making, with six of the nine seats on the steering board being held by Syrian civil society organisations.
65. The FCDO, together with Switzerland and Denmark, convened donors, humanitarian funds and a range of local actors throughout 2024 to identify levers to accelerate support to local and national actors through humanitarian pooled funds. The FCDO continue to advocate and mobilise other donors to increase funding to local actors through pooled funds, as part of the broader humanitarian reset.
66. We are also engaging closely with UNHCR and other UN agencies on their approach to localisation, which has included round table discussions and annual reporting.
(Recommendation 8, Paragraph 97) In response to this report, the Department must explain its reasoning for not signing up to the Global Compact on Refugees’ multi-stakeholder pledge on advancing localisation in displacement and statelessness responses.
Government response: Agree
67. We have noted the committee’s recommendation and will review our position on the multistakeholder pledge on advancing localisation in displacement and statelessness responses.
(Recommendation 9, Paragraph 98) In response to this report, the Department must set out how it will make rapid progress in meeting commitments made, principally via the Grand Bargain and Global Compact on Refugees, to increase its engagement with and utilisation of local and national actors in humanitarian and development settings.
Government response: Agree
68. FCDO is leading global donor efforts to transform humanitarian funding and drive locally led delivery in alignment with the humanitarian reset. This includes increasing contributions to humanitarian pooled funds and scaling up funding through them to local organizations including women led and refugee led organisations. We have also increased the ability of locally led actors to access UK ODA through due diligence passporting.1
69. Moving from international intervention to local leadership is currently one of the four shifts of the FCDO’s new modern partnerships. We are looking across our policies, systems, capabilities and culture to see how we can deliver this shift in a way that is meaningful and effective.
70. The UK is committed to channelling humanitarian funding as directly as possible to local and national aid organisations as agreed in the Grand Bargain, and working with local partners to ensure our response to humanitarian crises better reflects the needs of affected populations.
71. For example, the Sahel Regional Fund (SRF) is a pooled funding mechanism created by the UK with over 30% of its funding transferred to local actors. National NGOs play a key role in the fund’s governance through their representation at the SRF board.
72. The UK has also supported the Start Network since its inception in 2014. The Start Network is made up of over 130 members of which over 70% are local and national NGOs. The Start Fund adopts a collaborative, decentralised model and uses a tiered due diligence system, which helps strengthen local capacity.
73. We are also partnering with the refugee-led Asia Pacific Network of Refugees (APNOR) to advance refugee leadership and representation in global policymaking and are working with UNHCR to support over one hundred refugee delegates to attend the Global Refugee Forum Progress Review Meeting in December.
74. The UK has not set a target for the proportion of bilateral humanitarian aid to be delivered through local partners, as this depends on the need and context.
FCDO’s use of data on displacement
(Conclusion 12, Paragraph 102) The FCDO may be limited in its ability to accurately target displacement-related humanitarian and development spending owing to its sub-optimal data collection.
Government response
75. The UK made a pledge on the statistical inclusion of forcibly displaced people at the Global Refugee Forum in 2023 and is supporting a wide range of projects to improve displacement-related data collection.
76. The UK contributes to the UN’s Complex Risk Analytics Fund (CRAF’d), which is investing in new forms of data and analysis to help predict and prevent crises. The fund is supporting a range of organisations to improve the quality and availability of displacement-related data.
77. The UK is supporting the UN Expert Group on Refugee, IDP and Statelessness Statistics (EGRISS), which is strengthening the capacity of national statistical systems to include displaced populations in their data.
78. The Office for National Statistics (ONS) is also contributing to improved displacement-related data collection. It has developed tools to automate the detection of IDP shelters in Somalia to support improved collection of population data, including preparations for a potential population and housing census in Somalia - the first in 50 years. This data has already been used to support the GAVI Zero Dose vaccination programme, with potential for wider application.
79. ONS have also encouraged publication of a report on refugees based on Population and Housing Census data in Rwanda and will support the implementation of the 2025 Jordan Census Questionnaire to ensure IDP/refugee/stateless persons inclusion.
(Recommendation 10, Paragraph 103) To help determine a baseline and future targets, the FCDO should start systematically tracking and publishing official data on how much it spends on supporting refugees and internally displaced people overseas.
Government response: Agree
80. The FCDO systematically tracks and reports data on how much it spends on supporting refugees to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which publishes this data online.2 The UK and other OECD member countries have also now extended this to include spending on IDPs. We would be happy to share a summary of this data with the IDC.
(Recommendation 11, Paragraph 104) The FCDO should ensure that the UK and partners disaggregate monitoring and programme data by age, gender, ability and displacement status at a minimum; do so systematically; and make this data available publicly.
Government response: Agree
81. The FCDO carries out evaluations to assess the impact of its programmes on vulnerable populations including refugees and IDPs. The FCDO and partner organisations do currently record data disaggregated by age, gender and ability.
82. While the FCDO does not currently record data disaggregated by displacement status, we will explore whether this can be implemented in a future iteration of our programme management system.
Footnotes
1 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/fcdo-programme-operating-framework/applying-for-fcdo-grant-funding-simplified-application-process-with-humanitarian-quality-assurance-initiative-verification-february-2025
2 https://data-explorer.oecd.org/vis?fs[0]=Topic%2C1%7CDevelopment%23DEV%23%7COfficial%20Development%20Assistance%20%28ODA%29%23DEV_ODA%23&pg=0&fc=Topic&bp=true&snb=27&df[ds]=dsDisseminateFinalCloud&df[id]=DSD_CRS%40DF_CRS&df[ag]=OECD.DCD.FSD&df[vs]=1.4&dq=DAC..1000.100._T._T.D.Q._T..&lom=LASTNPERIODS&lo=5&to[TIME_PERIOD]=false