Examination of Witnesses (Questions 290
- 299)
THURSDAY 29 MARCH 2007
HIS EXCELLENCY DR ODED ERAN AND MRS TALYA LADOR-FRESHER
Q290 Chairman:
Your Excellency, we are very grateful to you for coming to meet
the Committee today and in particular for having come from Brussels.
We know of your very considerable experience both in dealing with
matters of the European Union and indeed in dealing with matters
in your own region. We would be very grateful if perhaps you would
introduce yourself for the record and, if you have an introductory
statement, you might like to make it now. Otherwise we will move
to our questions. The Committee which is carrying out this inquiry
on the European Union and the Middle East is very pleased that
we have been joined by one of our colleagues from the House, Lord
Janner, today, who is not a Member of the Committee but has, as
you know, a very considerable interest in these matters.
His Excellency Dr Eran: I would like to open
by expressing sympathy and understanding for the situation of
the hijacked sailors who are kept in Iran. We can very closely
associate ourselves with this situation. My name is Oded Eran.
I am the Israeli Ambassador to the EU covering NATO as well. For
the sake of this discussion, I have spent almost 20 years of my
life trying to bring peace to the Middle East. I have been the
Israeli Ambassador for Jordan. I have been dealing with economic
affairs concentrating on the regional cooperation in the Middle
East and when I retire I hope to continue to do this. I do not
have an introductory statement because I guess you wish to ask
me questions. I will reserve all I would have said in an introductory
statement for answers to your questions.
Q291 Chairman:
Thank you very much indeed, your Excellency. We are taking a note
of this meeting and we will be able to use it as part of the evidence
when we come to draw up our report but if at any stage you were
prepared to go off the record perhaps you could let us know and
we will proceed for a short period on that basis. That is an option
which you have available. Can I ask you about your own views of
the current situation regarding the Middle East Peace Process
and in particular the policy which you expect your government
to take to reinvigorate the process and help to facilitate the
economic situation for Palestine?
His Excellency Dr Eran: Obviously as we speak
there are efforts to revive the peace process. The Secretary of
State of the United States was there in the last few days. The
Arab League is meeting as we speak to discuss, among other issues,
what is known as the Arab League Initiative or the Saudi Initiative.
One of the results of the visit of the Secretary of State is the
biweekly meetings between the Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas,
and the Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert. In my view, it would
be very difficult at this juncture to revive the efforts to reach
a comprehensive peace process. The gaps in position are still
very wide and we find ourselves in a very peculiar situation whereby
there is a will but not necessarily the political power to do
this. Let me dwell for a second on the situation on the Palestinian
side. We have a peculiar situation whereby the President of the
Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, has committed himself to
the road map and to the two state solution. On the other hand,
when you look at the platform of the Palestinian government, you
would not find any reference to the basic concept on which any
peace process can be predicated and that is the two state solution.
Not only that but there are references and code words which indicate
that this particular government is not renouncing violence and
terror as a means of getting the national aspirations of the Palestinian
people. There are other issues that could be obstacles to the
attainment of the peace process. For example, the platform says
that every agreement that would be reached has to be submitted
to a referendum of Palestinians in and outside the Palestinian
territories, which is almost a guarantee that it will not get
the approval of the Palestinians. Therefore, it is a very strange
situation where, on the one hand, the President is willing to
discuss comprehensive peace on the two state solution basis while
his own government does not have it on the platform. If I may
add a personal note here, our situation on the Israeli side is
also politically quite difficult though the government enjoys
a wide majority and the bulk of the Israeli population has long
accepted the idea of the two state solution. Currently the government
is facing serious domestic problems which may affect its ability
to go into comprehensive, full scale negotiations. Therefore,
we should all be very careful not to create the illusion that
there is a possibility to jump start the comprehensive peace process
negotiations. We should concentrate on what is attainable, what
is feasible, and create the circumstance and the environment from
which then, once the political circumstances allow, we can then
turn to the attempt to find a comprehensive solution. This brings
me to the second part of your question: what can be done and what
can my government do? Currently, the socio-economic situation
on the Palestinian side has reached dangerous dimensions. In the
international community—in the international community I
also include the Arab states—and Israel, all of us have
to pay attention and to make a serious effort to alleviate the
economic situation there. We can increase the economic assistance
and especially the economic assistance directed to long term,
economic recovery through the mechanisms which exist and which
can be improved. As you all know, there is the Temporary International
Mechanism and there are discussions to try and improve and increase
its scope. We can work opposite the President, Mr Mahmoud Abbas,
and use the mechanism attached to the presidency to try and reach
an understanding of how to do it. As far as the Israeli government
is concerned, we can of course improve the situation in the passages,
both for people and goods. We can find a way to transfer more
of the tax money to the presidency, provided that the Palestinian
presidency can find a way to monitor the disbursement of the money
so that the money does not go to any terror infrastructure. We
can under certain circumstances increase the number of Palestinian
labourers inside Israel which is a very important factor. Almost
a third of the Palestinian GNP depends on labour in Israel. Currently,
the levels of unemployment are really reaching dangerous dimensions.
Let me give you an illustration. Every year between 50,000 to
60,000 Palestinians are added to the labour market. I do not believe
that there are even 10% of new jobs created annually to absorb
some of these new labour workers. Obviously a lot can be done
and should be done in a concerted effort by the international
community, including Israel.
Q292 Lord Anderson of Swansea:
At the time of the last Israeli elections, the conventional wisdom
was that there would be further unilateral moves on the West Bank
as there have been in Lebanon in 2000 and Gaza in 2005. Has that
policy by Israel been totally abandoned now?
His Excellency Dr Eran: This is a very important
question because the idea of the unilateral disengagement came
at a juncture where there was very little hope to revive bilateral
talks with the Palestinians. The then Prime Minister, Sharon,
took this decision, almost personally, to go for a unilateral
disengagement from Gaza which was accomplished. There were many
in Israel who questioned the wisdom of the policy because the
argument was that it is much better to reach a bilateral agreement
with your adversary or the other side, which would have created
a better understanding and atmosphere, but the policy had been
carried out. However, two important things happened. The violence
and the terror continued from Gaza. There is daily shelling of
Israeli towns and rockets launched from the Gaza Strip. Gaza became
a powder keg. There is a lot of smuggling of weapons and explosives
from Egypt into Gaza. What is called the Philadelphia Axis, which
is the border between Gaza and Egypt, became very porous, more
than it was before. Before there were tunnels and now it is almost
wide open. Many in Israel challenged the premise of what is the
use of taking unilateral actions if this is the "reward"
for the return on the policy. Secondly, there was also quite a
wide criticism of the way the evacuated settlers were dealt with
by the Israeli government. Then Prime Minister Sharon became incapacitated
and the whole idea evaporated to a large extent. I cannot say
that it will never come back in one way or another but for the
time being the whole idea has been very much shelved. I do not
see that there will be in the foreseeable future a major repetition
of this exercise.
Q293 Lord Hannay of Chiswick:
Could I ask one question about the first part of your reply which
related to the Middle East Peace Process and one about the second
part which related to the operations within the Palestinian Authority?
On the Middle East Peace Process, I am sure you are familiar with
the phrase "political horizons" which seems to have
become rather fashionable in recent times and which is taken I
think by most of the people who use it as a shorthand way of describing
the final status issues, Jerusalem, borders, refugees et cetera.
Was I right in thinking that you were expressing the view that
even the discussion of these political horizons is premature and
impossible to undertake at this stage because, if so, there is
surely a rather sharp contrast in the views of the American Secretary
of State, the European Union, the Arab Quartet and a lot of other
people, who have all expressed a strong desire to bring within
the scope of any future discussions the "political horizons".
Perhaps you could take that a little further. I was not absolutely
sure whether what you were saying was that you did not think it
could be discussed with certain people or whether it could not
be discussed at all. Secondly, on what you said about the situation
in the Palestinian territories, which you described in very dramatic
terms, I thought quite correctly, you said there were certain
things that could be done to improve the situation. I am not sure
I picked up any reference to the retention of taxes and tariffs
which Israel holds and which basically belong to the Palestinians,
but which have not been released to them. Is that also part of
a feasible way forward to help them improve their economic situation?
His Excellency Dr Eran: Let me deal with the
last part of your question. We are not challenging the fact that
the money is Palestinian money. We never claimed the money to
be Israeli money. What we are saying is that we need to make sure
that the money goes to positive, constructive purposes. That was
not the case before. When the last Palestinian government after
the elections in January 2006 came to power, we stopped the flow
of taxes to the Palestinian government with the exception of the
$100 million and 30 million shekels which have been passed in
recent months to Mahmoud Abbas. Some of the $100 million apparently
found its way into purposes we did not wish to see the money going
to. In principle, the Israeli government would be willing to continue
the flow of the money to the Palestinian Authority provided that
they could create a clear cut mechanism monitoring where the money
goes. On the issue that you raise, first of all, we said and we
continue to say that we will talk to Mahmoud Abbas and any camp
on the Palestinian side which accepts the road map and the three
benchmarks created by the Quartet. That is obvious. Let me now
express my own views on the issue of the political horizons. You
are absolutely right. When one speaks about the political horizons,
one speaks about the three major issues which were and will be
the major subjects for negotiation and the creation of the two
state solution, two states as a comprehensive solution to the
Israeli Palestinian conflict. Each one of them as we all know—and
I know from my own experience as a participant in the Camp David
talks—is sufficient to derail the whole process. On each
one of them we have differences of opinion between us and any
moderate Palestinian counterpart, on Jerusalem, on refugees, on
borders. It is possible to discuss them and to try and narrow
the gaps which exist but my argument was that I am not so sure
where they lead. Let us say that we have these biweekly meetings.
By the way, the agreement now is to discuss current issues between
Mahmoud Abbas and Olmert in these meetings rather than long term
issues. You can create an understanding on each one of them but
they are meaningless in the sense that they do not create an agreement.
Certainly they do not create any legal understanding or a binding
document. I come back to the issue which I raised in my opening
answer. Let us say that tomorrow morning the two sides in the
discussions about the political horizons reach some sort of an
understanding. I do not believe that Mahmoud Abbas can deliver
on that because there is a situation where one camp on the Palestinian
side believes that the solution is the two state solution, of
course solving the three major issues, and there is one camp which
does not believe that this is the solution. This camp happens
to be the majority, at least as far as the results of the elections
in 2006 indicate. There is even some danger in creating the illusion
that they can bring a solution. Under the current circumstances,
I believe the continuation of the international pressure can create
a situation where the government, not the party—we all know
that parties do not change ideologies overnight—can change
ideologies. Therefore, I am not interested in what is the ideology
of Hamas; I am interested in what the platform of the government
is. I say that the Palestinian government may change its position
on this particular issue under the pressure of the international
community and the Arab League. I believe that pressure is exerted
by all these bodies on the Palestinian government to modify the
terms. This will be the moment when they do change and they do
accept the basic notion of the two state solution. If they accepted
the road map, in my view, that would be sufficient to go into
the next stage of discussing final issues. A possible discussion
on the political horizons may serve a positive purpose but, on
the other hand, it could create illusions which I believe right
now are quite dangerous, given the fact that even if you reach
an understanding on them you cannot translate it into a politically
legal binding document in my view.
Q294 Lord Lea of Crondall:
Surely the Arab Quartet et cetera and Hamas are partly what all
this is about, are they not, to make sure that the credibility
of the whole of the Palestinian government can become more of
a negotiating partner?
His Excellency Dr Eran: What happens on the
Arab side is very important and interesting. The Arab League initiative
from 2003 is a step in the right direction but a step. When you
look at the document from our point of view, it has the one important
element which is the recognition of the state of Israel and the
willingness, assuming solution of the three major issues, to end
the conflict, something, by the way which Arafat failed all along
the negotiations to say—that if these issues are solved
that will be the end of the conflict. I never heard him say that.
Therefore, these two elements in the Arab initiative are very
important. However, there are at least three major issues in which
there is a wide gap between what the Arabs are agreeing and what
the Israelis, if I can generalise, are willing to offer. On the
issue of refugees, for example, it says that the solution should
be based on UN resolution 194. I do not know any Israeli government
of any colour which will accept that. The Arab initiative speaks
about the full return to the 1967 line and I do not know of any
other Israeli government which will accept it. I would submit,
as a side remark, just think about it. If Israel decided tomorrow
morning to go back to the 1967 lines, this would be detrimental
to the Palestinian state because in 1967 there was no connection
between the West Bank and Gaza. Gaza was Egypt; the West Bank
was Jordan. If we go back to the 1967 line, this state would be
divided. There was no connection between these two territories
before 1967. To give you another example, everyone speaks about
a port in Gaza which to my mind is ludicrous, economically speaking.
Gaza is a small territory the size of a handkerchief with the
highest density of population in the world or probably very close
to the highest. They do not have the space to have a serious port
which would be the solution and my personal view, having dealt
with this issue for years, is to ask Israel to have a semi or
fully autonomous dock in the nearby Ashdod port with a direct
12 kilometres of railway to Gaza and let the Palestinians run
it from A to Z. That is not 1967. That is the second issue. It
is true that the then Prime Minister, Barack, was willing to discuss
the dividing of Jerusalem. The Arab League says the eastern side
of Jerusalem should be the capital. This is another bone of contention.
We need to see this and declare that there are positive elements
in the Arab League initiative but that elements in it are not
the most desired solution, as far as we see it. What is more important
is that it is obvious that the moderate camp in the Arab world
is now trying to convince the Hamas government to go further.
The head of Hamas, Mashal, has visited Riyadh several times in
the recent few weeks obviously for more than just drinking tea.
We should allow time and allow these efforts to bear fruit. I
think Hamas begins to understand the need to face these issues.
There is a lot of criticism inside the Palestinian territories
against the performance of the Hamas government ever since January
2006. Therefore, in this case, the pressure may bear fruit but
we should give it time. Israel should contribute its part by actively
participating in the international effort to rehabilitate the
Palestinian economy. There is a lot to be done even if you cannot
reach an agreement on the comprehensive solution issues.
Q295 Lord Crickhowell:
Can I move to the third question which is the opportunities and
risks posed by the formation of the Palestinian National Unity
Government? You have addressed a good many of the issues already
there. The Israeli government has rejected the National Unity
Government's guidelines as falling short of a full acceptance.
You have indicated that even now there has been some movement
and you have pointed out that governments can develop and change
their position even if the political parties behind them do not
do so. What in concrete terms would provide a sufficient guarantee
to the Israeli government to lift its boycott of the administration?
His Excellency Dr Eran: Like the international
Quartet, we accept what they asked for as benchmarks. I do not
want to call them conditions because I am not sure that the Quartet
itself would call them conditions. Therefore I would use the word
"benchmarks" although I would very much like to see
them as conditions for the continuation of the international aid
directed to the government. They speak about the three conditions:
renunciation of terror and violence, the recognition of Israel's
right to exist and acceptance of previous agreements signed by
the PLO. What the Palestinian government has to do is to say very
simply, "We accept the road map" because the road map
ipso facto contains all these three conditions. If you
accept the two state solution which is the motto of the road map,
you accept Israel's right to exist. When you go through the first
phase of the road map you accept the renunciation of terror and
violence. If you accept the road map you accept all other agreements.
The three conditions in my view are what the government has to
say they accept. Then we can continue to cooperate with this government
and the international community can continue to cooperate with
this government. I wish to see the change in the Hamas doctrine
but what matters is what the government says, not what one leader
of a party or another says.
Q296 Lord Crickhowell:
Jumping from the previous position to the clear cut position that
you want may be difficult for them. Prime Minister Olmert has
welcomed the probability of joint meetings between the Quartet
and the Arab grouping and has I believe said that he would be
happy to attend. Is it not quite likely that what will happen
is that the form of words will be found in such a joint meeting
to which the Hamas government would find it easy or possible to
adhere, pressed by their Arab neighbours particularly, which may
not go the whole way but which will at least move the process
forward? It may be difficult for them to jump the whole thing
in the way that Israel and the Quartet want them to. Is it not
at least a hopeful possibility that we will be getting on to a
track of changing the Hamas government's position that will take
us forward?
His Excellency Dr Eran: You put your finger
on a very important issue because many people in Europe are saying
the very fact that there is a mixed government—it is not
black and white any more; it is sort of grey—should bring
us Europeans to start a dialogue with the aim of convincing the
government and Hamas to accept what is required from them by the
international community and Israel. Against that there is the
argument that the pressures which were exerted by the international
community, Israel and in a different way the Arab league are a
better way and eventually it will bring the desired change. (There
followed a discussion off the record) If you remove the pressure,
what incentive does Hamas have to change the policy? The money
will flow now. The discussions will be held. Why would they change
their ideology, practices, doctrines and what have you? I believe
that what we need to do is to be careful not to punish the Palestinian
people when we apply this policy. We have to make sure that, as
best we can—it is not very easy—that the pressure
is applied on the government and mostly on the Hamas part of it,
to channel all our efforts, activities and money to the improvement
of the situation of the Palestinian people. It is a very sophisticated
line of action. In societies like the Palestinian society, most
of the activities are not carried out by the private sector; they
are carried out by the government and this is why, when the team
was created, Israel was informally consulted and we said, "Yes,
pass the money to the health and education sectors", although
the money went through the government.
Q297 Lord Chidgey:
The question Lord Crickhowell asked, if I have this right, is
what would provide a sufficient guarantee to the Israeli government.
Am I right in assuming that the answer from the Israeli government
is and is only acceptance of the road map because if that is the
case, with all the other bits going round the corners, we are
asking the Palestinians to capitulate before negotiations start.
It does not happen. We only have to look at Northern Ireland and
how long that has taken to get the two sides to come to an agreement
because of the sensitivities, because of their positions, because
of their need to get security on all sides. That is the real world.
I would not want to think that Israel's position was: accept the
road map and that is it. There must be more. There must be a process.
His Excellency Dr Eran: Why should there be
more? We are not asking for more. It was done by the President
of the Palestinian Authority. He accepts the road map. He does
not say, "I do not negotiate on any other basis." We
are not asking for any capitulation and nor does the international
community. What they are saying is when you, Israel and the Palestinians,
go to the negotiating table you need a basic agreement on where
you want to get. Where we and the international community and
the Arab League want to get to is the two state solution. It so
happens that when you look at the platform of the current Palestinian
government there is no reference to it. On the contrary, everything
points to them not accepting it. Let us say that tomorrow morning
we start the negotiations. Israel forgets about the road map and
the three conditions. The Palestinian side says, "We have
to start from the point of view whether you can exist in the solution"
long before we get into the issue of where is the Palestinian
capital or where exactly are the borders. Who says there will
be borders?
Q298 Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:
I am a little perplexed about this too because of course there
was a Palestinian government that did accept the road map. Neither
the Palestinian government nor the Israeli government fulfilled
phase one of the road map. The Israeli government went on building
the settlements and the outposts. The security wall went up and
the Palestinians continued to send Qassam rockets into Israel.
Both sides failed on the road map. When you now say that all we
need is the road map, the evidence is that when you had that it
did not work and there was stalemate. I find it rather hard to
understand why the road map is now your only way through because
you had it and nobody acted on it.
His Excellency Dr Eran: It is true that the
first phase was very lacking in implementation. I am not so sure
that I would apportion the blame equally on the lack of implementation
of the first stage of the road map. There are several issues which
are not necessarily pertaining to the road map. On the issue of
the illegal settlements, the Israeli government did take responsibility
for removing them and I can only express the hope that the government
will implement its decisions on this issue. Secondly, the fence
has if anything helped the chances for negotiations with the Palestinians
on any issue. The fence has reduced dramatically the number of
casualties on the Israeli side which enables us to look at the
possibility of negotiations with the Palestinians removed from
the pressures from the results of acts of terror. The fence is
not a political statement. It is not an attempt to fix the final
border at any particular point. There are many instances where
the fence corresponds to the 1967 line. Therefore, the issue of
the fence has very little to do with the road map. In spite of
your remark on the implementation of the road map, there is no
other common basis between us and the Palestinians and indeed
accepted by the international community on which we can negotiate.
This is the outline. It is not a solution. I do not want to create
any illusion. It is not. It does not say what should be the solution
over Jerusalem or refugees. It just outlines how to get there.
Regardless of the flaws in implementation in the first phase,
it remains the only acceptable basis on which one can negotiate
with the other side.
Q299 Lord Hannay of Chiswick:
Your answer about the wall takes us on to the area which seems
to me to be rather important—I would like to hear your comment
on this—which is the need to have a process, whether it
is to talk about the short term issues in the first and second
phase of the road map or about the political horizons, which cannot
be derailed or overthrown by acts of violence by people who are
outside the process, because it is perfectly clear that, even
if the coalition between the Palestinian Authority with Hamas
members accepted the three criteria or conditions, whatever one
wants to call them, or benchmarks, there will still be people
outside the process who will wish to use violence to prevent the
process proceeding. Is it now accepted or could it be accepted
on the Israeli side that a situation where these talks are going
ahead needs to be sustained as, for example, we in this country
sustained the process in Northern Ireland, even if people outside
it try to use violence to prevent the process?
His Excellency Dr Eran: It was the late Prime
Minister Rabin who coined the phrase, "We will negotiate
if there is no terror and we will deal with terrorists if there
are no negotiations." This is a statement which will guide
all future governments in dealing with the issue of negotiations.
What we always asked the other side to do—that is to say,
the Palestinian government, the Palestinian power—was to
make an effort to stop the terror. We realise that every government
may not get 100% success but at least it invests 100% in trying
to stop the violence and terror. This is what we expected and
we continue to expect from any Palestinian with whom we negotiate.
I fully accept the premise in your question that one has to negotiate
assuming that the political circumstances are right for this discussion.
I want to add a personal statement. As someone who participated
in the failed attempt (in Camp David, 2000), I am not so sure
that we can afford another failed attempt. The consequences of
another failed attempt are different and could be much more horrendous
than the consequences of the first failed attempt in 2000. Therefore,
I would like to see a very well detailed, structured attempt in
which we know almost to the last detail what will be the outcome
before we plunge into it.
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