Select Committee on European Union Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 300 - 318)

THURSDAY 29 MARCH 2007

HIS EXCELLENCY DR ODED ERAN AND MRS TALYA LADOR-FRESHER

  Q300  Lord Lea of Crondall: Question five opens up two distinct aspects. One is how does Israel see the European Union as an actor politically? Is it only seen as a member of the Quartet? Apart from the Quartet, other countries and the US have bilateral dealings. Secondly, do some European countries play their role more through bilateral procedures, Britain, France, Germany and so on?

  His Excellency Dr Eran: I hope that being candid will not harm my ability to perform in Brussels. Israeli/European relations have gone through different stages. The Jewish European experience is a very rich one on the one hand and also very difficult. In 2,000 years we have had a very interesting dialogue which is rich with cross-fertilization. We also had Pogroms and violence against the Jewish community in Europe culminating in the Holocaust of course but also in modern history Israel was deserted at two existential junctures in 1967 and 1973 by European countries. That left a scar on the minds of Israelis. However, in recent years I have seen a very important improvement in the bilateral relations between the EU and Israel and the growing confidence of Israel in the EU in the context of the peace process. You are now seeing Europeans in Rafah on the border with Gaza and Egypt. You now see Europeans, not as the EU, but as Europeans in Lebanon. There is a more intensive, more open dialogue between the Israeli political leadership and that of Europe. All sides to the conflict in the Middle East accept the leading role of the United States. This is also acceptable in Brussels to the extent that there is now a process. Everyone is involved but obviously one can see that the EU is taking a role. There are many reasons for it. The European political aspect started to develop long after 1967 and 1973 wars and even after 1978-9. This was when the peace with Egypt was reached in which the US took their leading role and the efforts to which I have alluded in 1999/2000. The Quartet is a very important mechanism in my view and it allows a greater coordination which is very important. It is very important not to send to the parties in the Middle East different messages and create different expectations. I would say that when there is a more comprehensive process than we see today, there will be a need for a clearer division of labour between Europe and the US. In a very crude way, I would say that there is the political side of the negotiations but there is also another aspect, which to a large extent was neglected in Camp David and continues to be neglected, and that is the non-political issue. Let us say that there is an agreed solution to the Palestinian refugees, and obviously no matter what the solution is, all of them with no exception will have to be absorbed somewhere.

  Q301  Lord Lea of Crondall: That particular characterisation, your Excellency, is exactly what some people, particularly in the community, are known to think is asymmetrical. They do not like the idea that America is there to run the politics and Europe is there to run something else. Given what they see as the asymmetry of the political process, therefore, that the Americans are taking the lead in the Quartet on the political process, they say why does the European Union not occasionally—Mr Solana, et cetera—go some inches ahead of the Americans, why not?

  His Excellency Dr Eran: Most of them go to Washington when they have a problem rather than to Brussels, that is the reality, we may not like it but this is the situation. I have to admit here, as an observer in Brussels, the fact that many of the foreign ministers wish to go separately to the Middle East does not help to create the perception of a unified European position. Recently I saw a very interesting development, and from my point of view very positive, when Solana went to Damascus and was speaking on behalf of the EU, and hopefully the 27 foreign ministers will allow Solana to continue the dialogue with Damascus rather than trying to do it themselves. We do have a situation in Jerusalem where you have in the morning one foreign minister, in the afternoon another foreign minister and then the following morning you have Mr Solana, so one can assume that it does not help the posture of the EU as a unified force. I hope I have been sufficiently diplomatic.

  Q302  Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Were you quite comfortable with Mr Solana volunteering to give back the Golan Heights which is largely considered part of Damascus?

  His Excellency Dr Eran: He did not formulate it exactly as you put it! I spoke to him and others who went earlier to Damascus, especially after the war in Lebanon last summer, and I said, "You cannot deliver and promise land". I think that Dr Solana does understand the difference between saying, "That is the right of Damascus", and saying, "I will make Israel deliver the Golan Heights". By the way, if I may, I want to add a sentence on the issue of the negotiations with the Syrians because there was a lot of commotion in the international press. Even if we assume that the Syrians are genuine in their wish to negotiate a settlement with Israel, and it is not a ploy to try and rehabilitate their stature or perceptions in the international community, I would still say that Israel should not negotiate right now with the Syrians and I put my finger at the present. I had long arguments with the then Prime Minister Barak on this issue when suddenly in November 1999, once the negotiations with the Palestinians had started, he turned to negotiate with the Syrians. I strongly argued with him on this issue and I maintain the same position now. Let us say if we start negotiations with Syria they will take, in my view, at least a year. Although the issues are different—there are no refugees, there is no Jerusalem, only the issue of territory and normalisation—it will take a year. Every prime minister since the late Prime Minister Rabin said that the results of these negotiations will go to a referendum, that is another year. Removing the settlers from the Golan Heights, given the not so positive experience with those from Gaza, will take another two years, so four years. The Israeli public opinion, Israeli body politic cannot sustain two sets of negotiations, one with Syria and one with the Palestinians. In my view, the heart of the Israeli-Arab conflict is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and we should direct all our efforts to solve this issue and then solve the issue with Syria and, therefore, we should delay for the time being the discussions or the negotiations with Syria.

  Q303  Lord Anderson of Swansea: Your Excellency, the focus of the Committee is at two levels, the macro-level, the role which the European Union can play on the major issues, and also, of course, those instruments which the EU can deploy effectively in hoping to bring the peace process forward. One point on the macro one, do you accept that there are downsides also to relying only or mainly on the US because it depends, therefore, on perceptions within the US? For example, there was a fall effectively in opposition to the Clinton pressure, the Bush Administration diverted its attention from that for four years or more and, as we move into the US presidential campaign, presumably the pressure will lessen. Now that Israel has a warmer link with the EU the days of the Venice Declaration are in the past. Does Israel see that the EU can play a larger role?

  His Excellency Dr Eran: As I said, there is a marked difference in the Israeli attitude to the EU and I also believe in the EU attitude towards Israel. There is now, what I called elsewhere, a civilised dialogue between the two, meaning the differences, which are major issues, are still there but they can be discussed. By the way, these differences may also appear with the United States once we go into meaningful, serious negotiations with the Palestinians. The answer in short: yes, I do see a more meaningful role for the EU. That will require obviously an internal improvement in the way the EU performs and, as we all know, there is still a long way to go on this issue. The failure of the constitution did not help, because one of the major issues in the constitution was the creation of a foreign minister in the EU. I am not going into the debate, by the way, I am just making an observation whether Europe should have a constitution or not. I want to submit to you, your Lordship, that you cannot have two drivers in this case, you need to have a clear division of labour. If the US, for whatever reason, abandons or wishes to abandon the traditional role we had this would create a different situation but this conflict is too delicate, too complicated. Therefore, I emphasise the importance of the Quartet because this is the mechanism whereby the two can co-ordinate and create an understanding of who does what at what point in time and therefore this is a very important mechanism. Beyond the Quartet meetings and deliberations I know there is more than that in the co-ordination between Solana and the Administration which I think is very useful and very important.

  Q304  Lord Anderson of Swansea: If there is a division of labour then what part is devolved to the EU?

  His Excellency Dr Eran: First of all, this would have to be decided, as I said, between the US and the EU. Secondly, we need to see how the process, once it is there, is evolving. Thirdly, there are various issues, as I said. I understand that the non-political issues are not as juicy or glamorous as the political issue, but I submit to you that they are no less important in the solution of this Israeli-Palestinian conflict, maybe more. From my experience as a negotiator, I can tell you that both sides will go to war over a well of water as if we were in the first century AD, not the 21st century AD and, therefore, the solution to this particular issue is no less important than deciding where exactly the border will pass.

  Q305  Lord Hamilton of Epsom: When he came to see us the Egyptian Ambassador described the EU as a chequebook in terms of we were financing what was going on there, and maybe we did not have much political influence.

  His Excellency Dr Eran: I beg to differ with him, I strongly differ with him. I think the EU as is now known, and I gave two great examples, has a presence on the border. The TIM mechanism, by the way, is almost purely European in its creation and the way it functions. The presence in Lebanon, which is a very important one, is not directly connected with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but it is a sign of the growing Israeli confidence in Europe, and once again I go back to the Quartet, so I beg to differ with the Egyptian Ambassador, with all due respect.

  Q306  Lord Janner of Braunstone: First, thank you very much for inviting me to join the Committee. I have been heavily involved in these issues for a very long time. I would like to ask the Ambassador, first of all, whether there is any hope at all of any advance towards peace with Hamas as part of the Palestinian Government? I ask this with a very good friend of mine who is a leader of Fatah who is back into their government. You said you cannot have two drivers, which I am sure is correct, but there is a great Arab saying that with one hand we alone cannot clap and if you have got a government in Palestine where there are two lots of people who do not agree, one of whom will not even admit the existence of the State of Israel, do you see any hope of peace in the near future or even in the distance?

  His Excellency Dr Eran: Lord Janner, I do see hope. I am telling you from my own experience that if you look at the developments ever since 1967 and 1973, they are all leading me to the conclusion that peace will prevail in our region. It took Arafat 24 years; the PLO had been created in 1964, until in 1988 Arafat accepted Security Council Resolution 242, 24 years, but he did accept the resolution. It took another five years before we got to the Oslo agreements but we did reach mutual recognition.

  Q307  Lord Janner of Braunstone: Then what did you do?

  His Excellency Dr Eran: Then there was a serious decline, but the fact is that we are still speaking to the Palestinians. You can throw at me all the list of the bad things that happened from terror to violence to withholding taxes to settlements, everything, but we are speaking. I think the fact that you have the moderate Arab camp actively involved, which was not the case seven years ago, in Camp David, is a very positive element. The Israeli public opinion went through a tremendous change in attitudes toward the solution—what was totally unacceptable 10 years ago is now acceptable. I think that the changes will occur on the Palestinian side, they will not take 24 years to happen and, therefore, what we need to do is to keep the line that was applied, or the policy which was applied by the international community, which I think brought small, not sufficient, but some changes. In the platform that I cited there is a reference to previous agreements, I cannot deny that, it is not drafted in the way you and I would draft it, but it is there. There is a beginning of movement and eventually they will get there, we just need to continue to exert the pressure to do that without, I repeat, punishing innocent people. Therefore, I maintain that there will be peace in our time between us and the Palestinians, and normalisation with the Arab world. If you had told my late parents that I would be the second Israeli Ambassador to Jordan they would have sent you to a psychiatrist, but I was.

  Q308  Chairman: I think I can assume from that you would feel partial re-engagement with the Government, an element of which the European Union is now exploring, might be a useful way of encouraging moderation?

  His Excellency Dr Eran: The Israeli Government took a different position, as you know.

  Q309  Chairman: I am aware of that.

  His Excellency Dr Eran: Now I am being paid to make the Israeli position clear! I think that every avenue should be used in order to tell the Hamas part of the Government that they ought to accept what the Fatah Government part has already accepted in the past.

  Q310  Lord Crickhowell: Could I come back to what the EU should be doing, the EU instruments. When we were in Brussels last week I think there was total agreement with those we talked to in the various EU institutions about the lead role of the United States. It was felt that in the Quartet in the whole process of drafting and so on, perhaps there was a part the EU could play in shifting the position in the United States, but I do not think there is any disagreement that it is in the Quartet and that role is best played. I turn then to the other things that the EU might be doing. Clearly, the EU played a useful role in the election process by supervising it in Palestine. Is a focus on the reform of the Palestinian institutions and capacity-building of the Palestinian Administration enough to make a real difference in the prospects for peace? What do you think are the weaknesses of EU assistance in this area? What progress is there, for example, in the security sector? Having concentrated and said the real role of the EU is probably with the instruments, would you like to comment on what perhaps the EU might be doing more or better with the use of the instruments?

  His Excellency Dr Eran: Here is the dilemma: on the one hand, it is clear that every peace process and every agreement between us and the Palestinians and its implementation will depend to a large extent on the performance of the two governments. In this case, we speak about the Palestinian Government and, therefore, the building of healthy governance on the Palestinian side is important, but that clashes right now with the formation of this government. Therefore, what should the EU do? Reform only the ministries which are under the control of Fatah ministers and abandon the other ministries, because they are under the control of Hamas ministers? Therefore, I suggest that the efforts should be delayed. I think the ground should be laid for that in preparation for the day when there is a government which meets the benchmarks required by the international community. There could be a discussion with the presidency, those who will discuss things with Salam Fayyad, will discuss them with him, but I think that the whole question is, if you want to be credible you ought to maintain a very clear line on the issue of not dealing with Hamas people and you cannot have it both ways because otherwise this policy is going to fail very clearly. You cannot draw the line if tomorrow morning there is a Hamas minister coming and you say to him, "I will discuss only the reforms with you but, God forbid, I will not discuss any of the peace process issues with you", it will not work, in my view. It will totally erase any credibility from that position and, therefore, assuming we accept that only pressure will bring change in the attitude of the government, then we have to maintain it.

  Q311  Lord Crickhowell: You interestingly addressed an issue which I probed quite hard about in Brussels. Having served in an administration that believed in collective responsibility, it is quite difficult to envisage a situation where you agree to talk to one lot of ministers but will not have anything to do with another lot of ministers. There are those probably in the Commission, particularly, who think that is the line which should be taken; there are others we detected in Brussels who think one should begin at least to move to talk to the administration as a whole. You are arguing, I think, that, no, the pressure has got to be maintained by being absolutely firm, you cannot talk to them as if they are a collective administration, you are not prepared to have anything to do with the Hamas group which will not acknowledge the three principles, that is where you stand.

  His Excellency Dr Eran: I maintain that, I repeat myself, once you have holes in the policy, the policy will collapse eventually and you will not get the desired result. This is the position the Israeli Government took but I realise when, for example, Salam Fayyad, the minister of finance, comes to town he will be met. We also drew the line ourselves because the Israeli Government will meet those who met the Fatah ministers in Ramallah but will not meet those who met the Prime Minister who is from Hamas. We also drew a certain line between Hamas and non-Hamas members of the Government, but it is not the meetings that I am referring to, I am speaking about the policy and how do you deal with the question you raised, which is an important issue, the reforms in the Palestinian Government and how do you deal with the security issue, which brings me to another mission of the EU, the EU COPPS. The EU COPPS was created when there was a Fatah Government and we went along with it. There was a need for us to go because we needed to grant the immunities and to allow duty-free entry of the vehicles in the service of the EU COPPS, so we went along with this but now the question is, what exactly is the mission or with whom is it implemented? Is the EU going to co-operate and work with security forces which belong to Hamas? I think it is inconceivable.

  Q312  Lord Crickhowell: You say, "We believe in democracy", but as soon as the vote goes against the way you would like it to go, you are not going to have any real ongoing discussions to make democracy work.

  His Excellency Dr Eran: Because democracy is not the only value you are looking for when you are dealing with the peace process, democracy is not sufficient, as we see elsewhere. You need to meet other criteria and if you do not meet them it will be very difficult for the international community to co-operate.

  Q313  Chairman: Perhaps I could raise the question with you, your Excellency, on the question of the Euro-Med partnership and how that has been helpful, in particular whether Israel's engagement with the European Union through the association agreement and the European Neighbourhood Policy has proved of value and how far has it affected the approaches to the Middle East peace process. You have alluded to this already, but is there anything else that you feel it would be useful to say?

  His Excellency Dr Eran: I would like to dwell on this issue, with your permission, because I think it is very important and related to the role of the EU in the peace process. The Barcelona Process was born in 1995 as part of the euphoria we all went through in the post-Oslo era and it was a very useful mechanism or initiative. To this very day some of this significance is still there. That is the only forum of which I can think that Israeli ministers and officials sit around the same table with those from Syria and Lebanon, with whom we certainly do not have any diplomatic relations. Therefore, even if that is the only purpose it serves, it serves a very important purpose. It went even further than that in trying to create some sort of economic relations between all of the Mediterranean countries, which is a process still going on and this is very important. However, I have two important reservations. First, it became too politicised and it has been very difficult to leave aside the politics and concentrate only on the co-operation issues. Secondly, a policy which treats such a large group of countries on the same basis is bound not to fail, but to be less attractive to those involved in it. Therefore, in Israel we found the ENP, the European Neighbourhood Policy, a very important addition and especially the willingness of the EU to adopt the principle of differentiality, which we think is a very important element. It allows the EU and Morocco, for example, to develop their bilateral relations in a way which befits the wishes and capabilities of Morocco which have very little to do with those of Lebanon, or Egypt for that matter. It allows for more than one speed in the way the EU handles its relations with its neighbours. It is not a substitute for Barcelona, it is a complementary addition. Israel looks at the Barcelona Process as a very important vehicle and a very important policy. In my view, it has to be invigorated, and it can be, and there should be an attempt to eliminate some of the politicising of the mechanism. Therefore, in my view, both the Barcelona Process and the ENP are very important tools of the EU to strengthen the relations. Indirectly, the fact that we do meet together does help to increase the idea of normalisation and the acceptance of every side of the conflict and, therefore, I repeat, these are very important instruments.

  Q314  Lord Lea of Crondall: Your Excellency, you have said that people ought to be careful to keep their eye on the ball of the central issue in the Middle East peace process, which is Israel-Palestine. However, we have taken evidence from a wide range of people now, we are halfway through our inquiry, and more and more people are finding inescapable that wider issues in the Middle East impinge in various ways on this, the new Arab Quartet includes the Gulf Co-Operation Council, for example, and the geography of the Gulf and the perceptions from there will be influenced by a number of other considerations. Would you, your Excellency, perhaps comment on the different ways in which the wider geography and the wider perceptions from different geographical backgrounds are going to affect how the EU sees what it might call the Middle East peace process?

  His Excellency Dr Eran: I was in Qatar last week and my distinct impression was that the number one issue on their agenda is the threats by Iran. You sense it in the air, you read it in the newspapers, you listen to the conversation and obviously this is a number one issue. It brought them also to be more active in the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians This they do in order to create a unified camp in an attempt to remove the one issue which is creates a domestic problem for them in the absence of a solution, so I think this is a very important factor. Beyond that, you have now a situation where some—I am not so sure I accept their view—are maintaining that a nuclear Iran would have a devastating effect on the prospects of a successful peace process because the argument is that Iran will prevent any agreement just by threat. Already now you have the long arm of Iran in the form of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the indirect support they give to Hamas and they obviously are involved elsewhere in the region. The negative influence of Iran and other fundamentalist forces in the region are having a serious impact. There is one issue which is you do have then increasing economic gaps, increasing poverty and increasing unemployment as serious issues which have an effect on the stability of regimes in the region. These issues are not lost on the minds of those who are dealing with them in Brussels. The EU, more than any other international factor, because of geography, is paying attention to these issues, certainly more than the United States.

  Q315  Lord Lea of Crondall: Is the lesson that a lot of people will be drawing—and the one you have implied but not stated because it is a paradox—that you think the Gulf people, for example, will put more pressure on Israel as well as other friends to get a solution to Israel-Palestine in order that Iran can be isolated, but it will mean that the Gulf, for example, will put more pressure on Israel? Is that not an inference?

  His Excellency Dr Eran: It is and, therefore, we were very careful not to respond totally negatively to the initiative. If you read the speeches made by the Israeli Prime Minister, he made a very important speech at the memorial for Ben-Gurion and then there was a government resolution on this issue, trying not to totally reject the Arab initiative, which in its origin was a Saudi initiative, and to point to some of the positive elements in it because we understand the sensitive situation in the Middle East. We cannot, on the other hand, close our eyes to the serious differences we have with some of the elements, but we wanted to encourage indirect dialogue between us and the moderate Gulf countries. It is a very difficult operation. I know that there is talk about meeting with the Arab Quartet and the international Quartet but it has to be crafted very carefully so both sides do not get disappointed. We need, once again, to orchestrate it and structure it in such a way which will not be counter-productive and damaging. Obviously there is a very interesting process going on and we do realise the stakes in the region. Once again, in this respect as well, the EU can be very helpful. I was a witness to a conversation where our Prime Minister asked Dr Solana to try and bring the meeting, which we are now talking about, so things are obviously moving and one has to encourage them on the one hand, but make sure that they do not fail on the other hand.

  Q316  Lord Anderson of Swansea: Your Excellency, you have said that the Israel-Palestine dimension is the key matter and we should focus almost exclusively on that. There are others who look more broadly and say there is a sufficient nexus between the different parts of the area, that there should, at least, be some recognition of that in terms of seeking tradeoffs on a more comprehensive basis bringing in Iraq and Iran. Do you reject that entirely?

  His Excellency Dr Eran: Not at all. I think that, in principle, there is no reason to exclude Iran and Iraq. The problem we have with Iran is that the current policies are irreconcilable with what we want to achieve. Iran is a very important element in regional stability and in regional development but, once again, how can you co-operate with a government which adopts policies that are totally destructive to what we want to achieve. Here is, by the way, another example: from the beginning Israel supported the efforts of the EU 3 and the diplomatic efforts to reach a solution to the crisis on the nuclear programme of Iran, we continue to do that and we believe that what you see now is the beginning of the impact of the sanctions. I submit to you that we have not exhausted even 50% of potential sanctions so obviously that is the way to continue.

  Q317  Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Surely, at the end of the day Iraq is key to whether Iran behaves in a more responsible way because that is where they have a clear vested interest as to whether they want complete chaos in their neighbouring country or not? You have described the negative forces and I imagine that includes Iran and Syria. I would suggest to you that the ability of Iran and Syria to be negative is far greater than the ability of—I do not know—the Gulf Co-Operation Council in Jordan to be positive, which presupposes there is such a thing as Arab unity which I have never observed anywhere and neither have you. I strongly disagree with your chronology, I do not think that the first thing which is likely to happen or should happen is an agreement between Israel and Palestine, I think you have to square the negative operators, who are Iran and Syria because, let us face it, part of that deal of squaring them would be to do something about Hezbollah in Lebanon which is a serious threat to Israel today. If you could get them to lead on a Palestinian Government then I suspect they would be much more effective than these so-called Arab unity people who come from the Gulf and with whom most of them have nothing in common whatsoever.

  His Excellency Dr Eran: It is a very interesting debate. First of all, I would not lump the negative potential of Syria with that of Iran because I think that Syria does create a serious problem by hosting all the Palestinian rejectionist factions in Damascus by aiding and assisting Hezbollah and Hamas, but it is easier to change the policy of Damascus than that of Iran. After all, Syria is an Arab and a Sunni state, not that religion is so strong in Syria but it is a Sunni state. It is susceptible to Arab pressures and to international pressures, and I think that they are in a totally different situation from Iran and they can be won over, but that would not change the nuclear programme of Iran. Even if tomorrow morning you somehow separated Syria from Iran it would not affect Iranian determination to pursue the nuclear option. Therefore, I am not against the efforts to separate Syria from Iran and I think that they should continue, provided we do it in a sophisticated way, and it can be done. Also I do not think the solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has anything to do with Iraq, or with Iran for that matter. They will not have any impact on the situation in Iraq. The situation in Iraq has a bearing on—

  Q318  Lord Hamilton of Epsom: But Iraq is bringing them together?

  His Excellency Dr Eran: Yes, Iraq does, I am not so sure to what extent. All of the Arab countries, one after the other, are concerned about the consequences of Iraq for several reasons, and several good reasons, because if it continues to be destabilised, as it is, it will obviously turn into a source of troubles elsewhere in the region. Secondly, the territorial integrity of Iraq is also very important in its impact on future development in the region. Therefore, the maintenance of Iraq as one political unit is of paramount importance to stability in the region, no matter how difficult it would be to maintain that. In my view, if it does not happen it will open a big Pandora's box not a small one, a big one. So there is an indirect influence of what happens in Iraq on other developments in the immediate region, I do not think it matters in North Africa, for example, but it does matter in the immediate vicinity. The failure to maintain one Iraq may unleash forces which really will throw the region into serious turmoil in the Gulf and elsewhere. Iran is a serious threat of a different nature, of course, and there is a big debate whether the policies that all of us are pursuing are aimed at the end of the nuclear programme or are we also looking at regime change in Iran, and are the two necessarily connected and linked? This is a very important issue. Obviously there are two timetables involved because if we do not know when the regime change is going to occur we cannot wait for that because the nuclear clock is ticking, and ticking very quickly, and so these are issues that we need to grapple with and are very important.

  Chairman: Your Excellency, thank you very much indeed. You really have given us a great deal this morning and we feel we have kept you here longer than we normally would because we have benefited so much from your wisdom and experience. Certainly, what we have learnt this morning and taken as evidence will be of great value to us in preparing our report and I hope you feel it has been worthwhile to have come over from Brussels for this meeting. We are also grateful to Mrs Lador-Fresher for all the work she did to make this morning possible, but we are particularly grateful to you, your Excellency, for having come and spoken to us in this way.







 
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