Select Committee on European Union Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 360-379)

Senior District Judge Timothy Workman

23 MAY 2007

  Q360  Chairman: I see. Is this a reported case now?

  District Judge Workman: Yes, it is.

  Q361  Chairman: I think that probably deals with the consultation area of questioning, but looking at recognition and enforcement, first recognition, have there been equivalent problems in the European Arrest Warrant area with recognition to those that are envisaged here?

  District Judge Workman: There have been cases where the warrant itself has been challenged and it has been said that it is not a warrant under Part 1. There has been a number of cases where that has arisen. There are certain defects in the completion of the form, basically, and that is regarded as mandatory and therefore a failure to do that correctly means that the process fails, but I think that is the limit of it.

  Q362  Chairman: Are there the sorts of equivalent grounds for non-recognition? I cannot remember, and I ought to, what is the European Arrest Warrant regulation.

  District Judge Workman: It comes under the Extradition Act.

  Q363  Chairman: That is right, of course it does. Has it got this ne bis in idem provision and all the rest of it?

  District Judge Workman: Yes, it does. The basic principle is we look first of all to see whether the warrant is valid, then whether it is an extradition offence, and then we move to the bars which are actually in the Act, which are rather wider than the framework decision, and from the bars you move to human rights and then health, mental and physical condition.

  Q364  Chairman: Yes, but this is rather narrower, is it not?

  District Judge Workman: Oh, yes.

  Q365  Chairman: There is the double jeopardy rule.

  District Judge Workman: Double jeopardy, yes.

  Q366  Chairman: Then there is a discretion to refuse. One ground of giving a discretion is age. If you are asked, for example, to execute a warrant in respect of somebody who is younger than your own minimum criminal age of responsibility you have got a discretion to say no, but of course the consequence of exercising that discretion to say no is that this luckless young person will in fact therefore remain in custody in the other state, which recognises a lower age of criminal responsibility. So on the face of it, it is not a very good idea, but on the other hand there are, as I understand it, considerations of principle. You do not want to lend yourself to a process which prosecutes people whom you regard as under age?

  District Judge Workman: Yes. There is a similar provision in the Extradition Act, but of course that works to the advantage of the child.

  Q367  Chairman: Exactly. That is the great contrast to be made.

  District Judge Workman: Yes, and I think that is an important distinction.

  Q368  Chairman: Absolutely. The other discretionary grounds for non-recognition are, I daresay, ones you would not expect to find very often. Immunity or privilege under the law, what is that? I suppose things like diplomatic privilege?

  District Judge Workman: I suppose so, yes.

  Lord Lucas: Whoever the Member is for France at the time.

  Q369  Chairman: The head of state, quite, and diplomatic. Well, we had better pass quickly on from there. Amnesty—I suppose we do have amnesties, do we, from time to time?

  District Judge Workman: I am not sure that we ever had a statutory amnesty. We have a police decision that they will not prosecute cases where you hand your knife in, and that sort of thing, but it is not really an amnesty.

  Chairman: With an assurance you will not be arrested for doing it.

  Lord Burnett: There is supposed to be a tax amnesty, which has been very widely advertised, which is going to run out very shortly, if that is of any help to Members of the Committee!

  Chairman: Quite!

  Lord Burnett: Overseas bank accounts.

  Q370  Chairman: Can we pass then to enforcement, because a number of our witnesses, I think, have envisaged that there may be problems there. How do you see that?

  District Judge Workman: Yes. Could I rather rudely just interrupt in relation to the bars? I am concerned about sending somebody back who may be seriously ill and I think it would be useful to have some provision to give discretion to the court if somebody needs to be returned under the supervision order where they are seriously ill. A power to defer, or something of that sort, would be sufficient, but I think it would be quite difficult at times, if somebody was seriously ill, to have to make the journey.

  Q371  Chairman: On the face of it, there is nothing to deal with that at all. There it is, you have got this person under supervision and he has been loyally abiding by the various requirements put upon him, and then suddenly the issuing state says, "Right, we want to try him next week."

  District Judge Workman: Yes, and he is in hospital.

  Q372  Chairman: In the ordinary way you would simply say, "Right, off you go." I am not sure how it does work actually. What happens in that situation ordinarily in the scheme?

  District Judge Workman: I do not know quite how it does work, actually. It is not really clear from the framework decision, but I think you could envisage the situation where there is a breach of condition and he comes back before the court and is then going to be transferred back. If at that point somebody is admitted to hospital with a heart attack, or something of that sort, you would not want to start making an immediate order, you would want to defer it until he was well enough to go.

  Q373  Chairman: That might happen either because he has breached a condition and therefore, as you say, it is during the course, or it might happen at the end when he is simply summoned?

  District Judge Workman: Yes.

  Q374  Lord Lester of Herne Hill: In the asylum jurisdiction, an asylum judge would obviously look at the Human Rights Act and decide that someone suffering from AIDS, for example, facing a return to a country where he could not get treatment even if he was a failed asylum seeker might not be returned to that country because it would breach the Human Rights Convention. Presumably in an extreme case that kind of consideration would inform your own jurisdiction, would it not, because it would be inhuman to deprive someone of medical attention where he needed it here and could not get it there and the effect of the order would be to kill him or to subject him to some absolutely gross inhumanity?

  District Judge Workman: Yes. I think the extreme cases would be covered by the Human Rights Act, but I think in the less extreme cases, somebody who is temporarily ill but it is not life-threatening and who could probably receive treatment in the country he was going to anyway, the situation is slightly different and I think most courts would like to have the discretion to be able to say, "We will defer the decision for a week or two until you are well enough to travel," but that is just a personal view.

  Q375  Chairman: It may be that that would just be expected to be worked out between two civilised nations, but certainly there is nothing in the framework decision which appears to address it. Beyond that, there seems to us to be a number of problems, not least the question of how one decides the issue as to whether or not there has been a breach of the obligations. Articles 16 and 17 appear to have been drafted upon the supposition that that will be self-evident, either there will have been a breach or there will not, but there may be a possibility of a breach, an alleged breach, but a disputed breach as to whether somebody has gone within a prohibited area or whether he has failed to attend the police where he has some perfectly good excuse, and all the rest of it?

  District Judge Workman: Yes.

  Q376  Chairman: How do you envisage those alleged breaches being dealt with?

  District Judge Workman: I am afraid I would, I think, apply the principles we use now, which is that if someone is arrested for a breach of the conditions he is brought before the court—and he has to be brought before the court within 24 hours, to the minute—and if he denies the breach of condition then evidence, representations, are heard and a decision made.

  Q377  Chairman: Within 24 hours of what?

  District Judge Workman: Of arrest. That is the way it operates at the moment. I am bound to say that, on my reading of Article 16, I do not think it is workable because, taking a rather absurd example, if a defendant in England, having been bailed by the French court, is seen to be getting on a plane to South America, it would be no use us reporting the matter to the French Court because by then he will have gone.

  Q378  Chairman: You do not read this framework decision as allowing the executing state any power, so to speak, to arrest preparatory to gaining the instruction of the issuing state?

  District Judge Workman: It does not appear on the face of it, no.

  Chairman: I follow. I think Lord Bowness has a question on this.

  Lord Bowness: I think the question has just been asked and answered, thank you.

  Q379  Chairman: So you do not actually think that there is any power at the moment to do anything to prevent an apprehended breach of condition?

  District Judge Workman: It is not contained in the wording which I have. Obviously at some point if this framework decision is ratified and then embodied into our law, it may well be that our law would contain a provision.


 
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