Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1-19)
RT HON
GEOFFREY HOON,
MR MICHAEL
TATHAM AND
MR MARTIN
SHEARMAN
17 MAY 2007
Q1 Chairman Minister, thank you very much
indeed for coming to see us and for having suggested the idea
that we should have this session on Kosovo, which obviously is
of considerable topical importance. Perhaps you would like to
introduce your colleagues.
Mr Hoon: Yes. First of all, could I say how grateful
I am for this opportunity; I think it is a useful innovation that
you have made. Could I introduce Michael Tatham, who is officially
the Western Balkans Group Co-ordinator, but it is fair to say
he has probably forgotten more about Kosovo than I know, so he
is a very considerable expert on the subject, and Martin Shearman,
who specialises, in particular, on ESDP questions, so when I am
struggling on that I will ask him to assist.
Q2 Chairman: I wonder whether you
would like to start with your own description of the European
Union's general approach to the Kosovo question.
Mr Hoon: I think the first point is to say that
this is self-evidently a European issue, and I think it is right
that the EU has assumed a degree of responsibility for resolving
the situation there. The Balkans is very much part of the Continent
of Europe and it is right that we should try and deal with it.
I think it is important, given the recent history of Kosovo, that
we not only look to the way in which we have been able to help
militarily, in terms of providing an administration, as well as
now looking to the future in terms of status and rebuilding what
was a pretty difficult area in the immediate aftermath of the
entry of British and other soldiers. I think, financially, we
will be looking to the European Union to provide significant help,
and I think it is right that we accept that responsibility. Michael,
I do not know if you want to add anything to that?
Mr Tatham: I would say, first of all, in big
picture terms, the EU has a vision for the whole Western Balkan
region which sees all these countries moving closer down the road
towards European integration, and the vital part of achieving
that is clearing away the unresolved legacy issues from the conflicts
of the 1990s and so playing a leading role in taking the status
process forward in Kosovo is an essential accompaniment to that
vision. In terms of the EU's more specific posture, the EU has
been giving consistent and full support to the UN Special Envoy
Ahtisaari in his efforts to take this process forward and, as
the Minister said, the EU is bound to take a leading role in settlement
implementation and significant preparations are underway so that
when the moment comes the EU is ready to meet those responsibilities.
Q3 Lord Lea of Crondall: Can I ask
a supplementary to that, Lord Chairman? You mentioned European
integration. You did not mention membership, but progress down
the road towards movable integration and policy for the whole
of the Western Balkans. Belgrade may not take the same view about
independence. Do you think that trouble could be brewing again
with knock-on effects on other parts if your target is greater
European integration? Would there be differences around the Western
Balkans in precisely—
Mr Hoon: Clearly Kosovo and its status is a
significant issue, inevitably, in Serbian politics. It was an
issue in the election and it will continue to be an issue for
Serbian politicians, but progress on the European Union is not
an issue. I know the President of Serbia quite well, Boris Tadic".
He was the Defence Minister when I was the Defence Minister and
I keep in touch with him, and, by chance, I spoke to him yesterday
because, after many months of very difficult negotiations, they
have formed a government and it is the prospect of EU membership,
ultimately, that continues to drive the reform process, not only
in Serbia but in other parts of the Western Balkans. We see that,
obviously, in Croatia. The transformation in Macedonia is quite
remarkable. I think Paddy Ashdown has said that the only thing
holding Bosnia together is the prospect of European integration.
So, this is a significant driving force in the politics of the
area but, crucially, from our perspective, it drives reform and
change—legislative change. Bosnia is changing some of the
attitudes, we hope, towards policing and security, and in Serbia,
historically, Belgrade was the most European city in that part
of Europe and we want Serbia to make the changes that allow it
to reach a level that would permit practical steps towards membership
of the European Union. So, it is a huge issue and I would not
underestimate the significance of it for the politics in places
like—
Q4 Lord Lea of Crondall: I am sorry,
I totally and absolutely accept that, and I am sure everybody
does, but, Kosovan independence, could that throw a rock into
the pool in that connection?
Mr Hoon: It is an issue, and it is a sensitive
issue for all politicians in Belgrade. I do not believe, though,
that it is going to sidetrack the determination of democratic
politicians in Belgrade to make progress, not only in relation
to the status of Kosovo, but, crucially, in relation to their
own European ambitions. It is not either/or.
Q5 Chairman: Could I go back to the
initial question about the European Union? The views which you
have the expressed are certainly those that one has heard from
the Presidency. One has heard reports that at some meetings of
the Council there have been different accents expressed from different
places and some Member States who are less enthusiastic about
the approach which you have been outlining.
Mr Hoon: As of today there is unanimity and
clear, strong unanimity, even in countries where the political
debate perhaps has influenced those kinds of comments in the past.
What has been really significant is, even where countries have
had those kinds of issues—and I do not think our Spanish
counterparts would mind if I mentioned Spain—independence
in parts of Spain is a hugely sensitive political issue, they
certainly have worried about it, but what has been remarkable
about this is that actually overriding those domestic concerns
only in one or two countries has been an absolute determination
for the European Union to be united, and that has come through
in a number of comments, particularly in New York where delegations
from the European Union have made clear that this is the absolute
agreed position of the European Union and, whatever the domestic
politics, that is not going to get in the way of a consistent
approach by Europe, which is very encouraging actually.
Q6 Lord Tomlinson: But the 190 million
euro that has been allocated for Kosovo for pre-accession assistance
over the years 2007 to 2009 is meant to be a signal of assistance
to their European ambitions. It is called pre-accession assistance,
as I understand it. Do you think it is significantly different
to that which they would have got from the European neighbourhood
policy in any case?
Mr Hoon: I cannot really answer that question,
because it is highly speculative, but I accept—and I first
went to Kosovo in July 1999, and I have been there fairly regularly
since in various different capacities—there is a remarkable
change. Priština is a bustling city with lots of activity.
I accept, if I can answer the question as best I can, that we
would have had some continuing financial commitment to Kosovo
given the events that had occurred before July 1999. We simply
accept this, as I said right at the outset, as part of the European
Continent and we have obligations as a result.
Q7 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Minister,
could you just give us a very brief view of the differences between
the Ahtisaari plan and what is currently being considered by the
Security Council? What changes have been, or are likely to be,
made in the process of the negotiations there, or is it essentially
the same plan? Could you comment a bit on the fairly complex institutional
position of the civilian representative otherwise known as the
EU Special Representative double-hatted, both in respect of the
accountability of that person to the Kosovars, their Parliament,
their elected President, and so on, and also the line of command
between the EU Council and this person, who is, if one understands
it properly, responsible to a wider audience and to you as well
as to the EU?
Mr Hoon: I will deal with the more political
questions that you ask at the outset and leave Michael to deal
with the more technical ones on responsibilities. As far as the
report is concerned, we broadly believe that it will be supported
in New York in its entirety. We do not see any need for there
to be a series of amendments or changes. On the other hand, we
have always made clear, particularly (if I can say this) to Belgrade,
that if there are aspects of the detail perhaps concerned with
the position of Serb minorities, local government arrangements
in particular areas, then we are not inflexible. We would look
at those kinds of changes if it made it easier to accept the plan.
So, broadly, we expect that this will remain. After all, it is
a UN proposal, it is a UN sponsored document and we expect it
to be debated by the UN in those terms.
Q8 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: And approved?
Mr Hoon: We hope so, yes.
Q9 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: And the
Russian attitude is mysterious!
Mr Hoon: I have had regular conversations with
Russian foreign ministers, as have a number of government ministers.
Others are also engaging with Russia. No doubt the Russians have
some reservations, but I think we are making progress with them.
His Lordship will know even better than I that the Russian negotiating
style is not one with which we might use the words flexibility
and emollience, but they negotiate hard, and we are having those
kinds of discussions with them.
Q10 Chairman: Will it be discussed
tomorrow in Samara?
Mr Hoon: Yes. Michael, I will give you the difficult
question rather than the easy one!
Mr Tatham: I will try and answer the technical
aspects, but let me know if you feel there are areas that I have
not covered. The International Community Representative (the ICR
as a shorthand) is also going to be the EU Special Representative,
so it is a rather complicated arrangement. In his ICR capacity—I
would slightly turn round the premise of your question—his
accountability is not so much to the people or the Parliament
or Government of Kosovo, in actual fact he is overseeing the conduct
of those institutions, so it will be a bit weird for him to be
accountable to them. He will be accountable to an international
steering group which would be established underneath the Ahtisaari
proposals, which would consist of essentially those countries
and institutions which are currently members of the Contact Group—the
US, Russia, France, Germany, the UK, Italy, the EU and NATO. In
his capacity as EUSR he would be reporting to the General Affairs
Council.
Q11 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Could
I follow that up a little bit. What will his relationship be to
the Commission Delegation in Priština, which will be, presumably,
disbursing very substantial sums, 190 million, or whatever it
is, and to what extent does he have overall co-ordinating authority
over them? As you know, this Committee in an earlier manifestation
suggested that the double-hatting that took place in Macedonia
had been a great success and that one should be prepared to consider
it elsewhere, because it is really important to avoid a situation
where you have turf fighting and disagreement about that. Secondly,
you did a little bit brush aside the problem of accountability
to the Kosovar institutions. It is, surely, rather different from
Bosnia, where at the time of the establishment of the International
Representative there were not any really properly functioning
national institutions in Kosovo. You have got a Parliament and
a President. Do you really not think that saying that this guy
or this lady has absolutely no accountability to these institutions
is a recipe for some considerable friction further down the line?
Mr Hoon: If I deal with that political point
and Michael can deal with the double-hatting point. Clearly, we
would ideally like the ICR not to have ever to exercise his or
her powers, on the basis that the administration, the Government,
in Kosovo implements the Ahtisaari proposals, and there is no
difficulty; but in a sense the issue is not accountability as
far as Kosovars are concerned, it is really to provide a long-stop,
a degree of security for all of the people of Kosovo, in particular
the Serbian minority, that the complex balance that Ahtisaari
has set out is maintained in practice as well as in theory. I
think that the role will be important in allowing people to recognise
that there is somewhere else to go if the Government of Kosovo
does not, in practice, fulfil the arrangements set out by Ahtisaari;
so it is the other way round in a sense.
Q12 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: I think
the word "accountability" was wrong. I am sorry. I can
understand why your feeling is not positive towards that?
Mr Hoon: These jobs really work on the basis
of personal style and personal relationships, and I think it is
important (and I think it is recognised in Ahtisaari's proposals)
that there is a real recognition of the sensitivity of the importance
of the Serbs believing that they have a role and a place in Kosovan
society. My experience whenever I have I visited is, by and large,
British troops have been co-located with Serbian communities,
because they still remain, I am sure, to this day somewhat nervous
about their future situation. In a sense we are now trying to
move away from that military guarantee, although it still will
be there (there will still be large numbers of soldiers in Kosovo)
to something that is more constitutional. I think the aftermath
will be fulfilling that role, at least in the transitional period.
Michael, do you want to do the double-hatting?
Mr Tatham: Yes. Can I just add to what the Minister
said. You referred to the high rep in Bosnia, and I think there
is an awareness that this is a different role and that it is very
much a sort of backseat role in respect of day-to-day government.
The expectation would be that that would be taken forward by the
Kosovo Government with the ICR having no role. His responsibility
would purely be for settlement and implementation, and even there,
if the Kosovo Government was carrying forward all its commitments
under the Ahtsisaari proposals, he would be taking a back seat.
His powers to remedy breaches would only be used in extremis,
where necessary, to uphold the settlement. You asked about the
Commission Office and the relationship between the ICR, EUSR and
the Commission Office. At the minute it is envisaged that the
Commission Office will be a separate office with a separate head.
I think the thinking there is that, if you were, in effect, to
triple-hat this position so that it was both ICR, EUSR and a Commission
head, that would be risking a degree of overload in addition to
the big responsibilities for overseeing settlement implementation.
You would be having significant responsibilities in respect of
the 200 million Euros which Lord Tomlinson referred to earlier;
so I think the feeling is that it makes sense to keep the two
roles separate for now. However, the point you are making about
co-ordination is recognised and the ICR, EUSR is clearly designated
in the Ahtisaari proposals as the co-ordinator of all the international
presences in Kosovo—the Commission, the OSCE, NATO—and
a committee is foreseen in the proposals, which the ICR would
head, which would allow that co-ordination to take place in a
systematic way.
Mr Shearman: I just wanted to add on double-hatting
that I think Lord Hannay is quite right, the arrangements in Macedonia
have worked very well, but the circumstances are quite different
in that you have the bulk of the responsibility for implementation
of EU policy taken on by the Commission. There was still a residual
security concern, which meant it made sense to maintain an EU
special rep, but also to bring them together on the grounds that
that residual foreign security policy concern was probably not
great enough to justify the continued employment of a dedicated
special representative. In the case of Kosovo, in addition to
the co-ordinating committee on the ground that Michael has talked
about, you will also have the co-ordination of Brussels that would
be ensured by Solana, to whom the special representative will
report, and by Ollie Rehn, to whom the Head of the Commission
Delegation will report. So those arrangements—we will see
how they work—should be quite robust and should ensure the
co-ordination between the community and the CFSP activity that
we need to see on the ground.
Q13 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Perhaps
we could just express a note of scepticism about your confidence
on that. Of course, presumably this is a purely transitional arrangement,
if one assumes that some kind of institutional changes in the
foreign policy sector are going to come about in the next two
or three years, in which case they will almost certainly bring
about the triple-hatting and the unification of the Brussels machinery.
That is what is likely to be proposed.
Mr Hoon: I would not get too far down that particular
road, if I were you. I know what you are referring to!
Q14 Chairman: Lord Hannay, that is
outside the scope of today's meeting which is discussing Kosovo
as it is.
Mr Hoon: I think Lord Hannay is planning for
a career in journalism!
Q15 Chairman: While we are on this
group of questions, may I ask one thing. There has been a certain
amount of discussion of the possible name of the ICR, and a senior
Netherlands diplomat has been referred to. Is that yet public?
Mr Hoon: I do not think it is public, but it
is certainly well discussed.
Mr Tatham: I think, again, I am going to resort
to technicalities here. Under the terms of the Ahtisaari proposals
it is the International Steering Group which appoints the ICR.
So, until the settlement implementation begins, you cannot start
that procedure. The Ahtisaari proposals also say that the International
Steering Group will make this appointment after consultation with
the EU, and, you are absolutely right, there has been a certain
amount of discussion within the EU and I think there is broad
measure of consensus around an individual who is a Netherlands
diplomat, as you said, but you cannot really go much further than
that because of the stage we are at in this process.
Q16 Chairman: How similar to the
PIC will this new structure be, this international group of countries?
Will it have the same composition?
Mr Tatham: No. I think it will be quite similar
in its role, but it will be much smaller. Like I said, Ahtisaari's
recommendation is that it should be restricted to broadly what
is now the membership of the Contact Group, which would mean that
it is a tighter body.
Chairman: Thank you very much.
Q17 Lord Lea of Crondall: This is
question five, in case you do not know where we are. What worries
some of us, Minister, is that there could be repercussions. We
do not quite know whether there would be repercussions around
Serbia, or even Republika Srpska, possibly on the
edge of Macedonia, with people still murmuring about greater Albania.
How do you think that community relations could be assisted in
some way? This is not a question of accountability, it is a question
of the role in hearts and minds a" la Northern Ireland,
or wherever, and here you have two ways of looking at it, I suppose.
One is that some people think it is a bit Albanian and other people
think that it cauterises the Albanian dimension. Could you comment
on that and the spill over into the sensitivities, if not paranoia,
in some parts of Serbia that here we have been told that the federal
system in Bosnia is being strengthened following Dayton, you have
got independence for Montenegro and, bit by bit, you are creating
some discontent that it could have political consequences?
Mr Hoon: I accept that this process is an exercise
of the international community's judgment about the best way forward
for what has been a very difficult part of Europe in the very
recent past, but there are necessarily implications for that course
of action, I accept. I must say, stating the obvious, there are
necessarily implications in not taking action and, in trying to
weigh the balance, we are trying to move in a direction that avoids
the kinds of awful conflicts that we have seen very recently in
that part of the world, conflicts, incidentally, in my own experience,
of course, that have spilled over beyond the borders of Kosovo.
I have recently been again to Macedonia. My previous visit to
Macedonia was with British groups engaged in ensuring the trouble
there did not get out of hand. So, there are necessarily consequences
of what we do. I believe that perhaps the key to this, and it
is at the heart of Marti Ahtisaari's proposals, is a real guarantee
for the Serbian minority in Kosovo that politically, constitutionally
and legally they will be treated in an entirely even-handed way,
albeit by an administration inevitably dominated by Kosovar Albanians.
I think that is a part of it, and if we can get that right, then
I think that this is the right way forward.
Q18 Lord Lea of Crondall: You do
not think that the politics will be purely ethnic politics in
the new country?
Mr Hoon: I think so soon after the kind of violence
that we sadly saw there, there is going to be a degree of ethnically
determined politics—that is true, incidentally, next door
in Macedonia—but in establishing a degree of political stability,
that allows the opportunity for the development perhaps of ideologically-based
parties rather than ethnically-based parties, and I am reasonably
confident that that will happen. Your Lordship mentioned Northern
Ireland. What we have achieved in Northern Ireland is not a solution,
what we have achieved in Northern Ireland is a process, but in
that process young people have grown up in Northern Ireland no
longer subject to the kinds of traditions that affected their
previous generations and they have been able to get on with their
lives in the way that young people in other parts of the United
Kingdom have got on with their lives.
Q19 Lord Lea of Crondall: Will we
be promoting integrated education, something like that?
Mr Hoon: I think we need to find ways of allowing
actually the population in Kosovo to do that for themselves, and
the whole point of this is to go from very recent conflict to
a situation where we stabilise the situation in security terms
and then start to allow the institutions to develop, I would hope,
on a non-ethnic basis. It will take time. It will take time for
mutual self-confidence to develop. Certainly on my visits there,
there is still a degree of concern, anxiety and suspicion, particularly
amongst the Serbian minority, but do not assume that the Serbian
minority is consistent in its view. There are people who realise
that they have a future in Kosovo and want to work very closely
with Kosovan dominated administration.
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