SIXTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF BIOLOGICAL
AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION (BTWC) 2006
Letter from the Chairman to Rt Hon Douglas
Alexander MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Thank you for the Explanatory Memorandum dated
8 February 2006 which Sub-Committee C considered at its meeting
on 16 February. The Sub-Committee agreed to clear the document
from scrutiny.
In our Report on the EU Strategy against the
proliferation of WMD (European Union Committee, 13th Report of
Session 2004-2005, HL Paper 96) we recommended that the EU "should
vigorously study and support ways of strengthening the BTWC, whether
by verification arrangements, security assurances, improved standards
of material safeguarding, or otherwise." (paragraph 51).
We commend the EU for proposing to agree a Common
Position on the Sixth Review Conference, but believe that further
concrete proposals to be taken forward at the Conference should
be adopted, in particular on verification mechanisms. Will the
EU adopt any such proposals prior to the Conference?
Further to this, we would like you to set out
the Government's objectives for the Conference in terms of verification
mechanisms, and state how you propose to gain the agreement of
EU Member States and other States Parties to the Convention, especially
the United States, to such mechanisms.
16 February 2006
Letter from Rt Hon Douglas Alexander MP
to the Chairman
Thank you for your letter of 16 February concerning
the Explanatory Memorandum dated 8 February 2006 on the Common
Position adopted by partners on the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention (BTWC). I am pleased that Sub-Committee C cleared the
document on 16 February 2006.
I am aware of the recommendations in relation
to the adoption of a verification mechanism for the BTWC made
in the Select Committee's report on the EU Strategy against the
proliferation of WMD. I would like to assure you that both the
UK and EU remain ready to support a verification mechanism for
the BTWC. However, we have not seen any indications to date that
the international climate has changed enough to permit agreement
on verification, given the need for the Review Conference to operate
by consensus.
It is our belief that to be effective, any verification
mechanism would have to be universally adopted. We could not support
the adoption of a verification mechanism where States could opt
out as we believe that this would weaken the BTWC. Furthermore,
a verification mechanism that is not adopted by all States Party
would be likely to put UK/EU industry at a disadvantage with no
concomitant security gain.
Our approach to the Review Conference therefore
is based on the identification and formulation of specific, practical,
and feasible ways to take the Convention forward, which have a
good prospect of securing consensus. We believe it is vital to
maintain the relevance of the Convention in the period 2006 through
to 2011 (Seventh Review Conference). As befits the UK role as
a Co-Depositary of the Convention, one of its leading supporters,
and our commitment to international law, the UK will seek to lead
other States Party to agree an outcome with practical effect.
In doing so, we will of course consult closely with the EU, the
United States and other key States Party.
7 March 2006
Letter from the Chairman to Rt Hon Douglas
Alexander MP
Thank you for your letter dated 7 March 2006
which Sub-Committee C considered at its meeting on 16 March.
In your letter you state that "It is our
belief that to be effective, any verification mechanism would
have to be universally adopted. We could not support the adoption
of a verification mechanism where States could opt out as we believe
that this would weaken the BTWC." We do not agree with this
statement. As demonstrated by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
there is value to be found in verification mechanisms even though
significant states are not parties to that Treaty. Furthermore,
the UK and EU ought to be pressing more strongly for a verification
regime in order to demonstrate a commitment to the process, and
to encourage those states which do not agree to reconsider their
position.
20 March 2006
Letter from Rt Hon Douglas Alexander MP
to the Chairman
Thank you for your letter of 20 March concerning
my letter dated 7 March on the Common Position adopted by partners
on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).
HMG's views on a verification regime for the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention are well known. While
we continue to attach importance to a verification mechanism in
the long term, we believe that it is better to concentrate at
this year's Review Conference on measures that are achievable
and will allow States Party to strengthen national implementation
of the Convention.
Review Conferences of the BTWC operate on a
consensus basis. There are no signs that the positions of States
Party have changed enough to permit consensus to be reached on
pursuing a verification protocol at the forthcoming Review Conference.
Although the intersessional programme between 2003 and 2005 was
adopted as a fallback, it is our belief that the programme has
been a success, due in part to significant engagement by a large
number of States Party.
The Sixth Review Conference in 2006 will consider
the work of the intersessional meetings and decide upon any further
action to strengthen the Convention. This is why our approach
to the Review Conference this year is based upon the identification
and formulation of specific, practical and feasible ways to take
the Convention forward which have a good prospect of securing
consensus. We believe that building on the intersessional work
programme will provide the best opportunity for a positive outcome
at the Review Conference.
6 April 2006
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