Select Committee on European Union Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 280-299)

Dr Wolfgang von Pommer Esche

27 NOVEMBER 2006

  Q280  Chairman: The same is true of the Data Framework Directive and negotiation of SIS II?

  Dr von Pommer Esche: Yes.

  Q281  Chairman: Good. Thank you very much.

  Dr von Pommer Esche: We get papers and papers. It is only a question of the capacity to cope with all of these papers. In my unit there are only five of us.

  Chairman: I can understand the problem.

  Q282  Lord Avebury: Within your knowledge of the regimes of data protection in other Member States, do you consider that they all have sufficient resources to carry out the tasks that are expected of them under the current SIS rules and also under the SIS II legislation?

  Dr von Pommer Esche: I am not informed about the state of knowledge in other countries but I have got the impression via discussions with my colleagues in other countries that in most cases in Germany we are better informed than my colleagues in other countries, although the government is in Berlin and we are still in Bonn and that means we are 550 kilometres from the government. Maybe you have heard about the Prüm Treaty. I had the impression from some colleagues that they were not at all informed about the negotiations of such a far-reaching Treaty or far-reaching project like the Treaty of Prüm.

  Q283  Baroness Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury: Can I ask you about access to data. I believe that the Commission have proposed detailed new rules on access and the Austrian Presidency has proposed instead simply retaining the Schengen Convention. In your opinion, is the SIS II legislation sufficiently precise as regards which authorities can access data and for what purpose data can be used? Does the third pillar SIS II decision sufficiently limit the purpose for which data can be used?

  Dr von Pommer Esche: Thank you for that question. In principle I would say that the legislation or the proposals are clear enough with one exception: at the end of the negotiations in September/October there was a question as to whether the secret services shall have access to the SIS, not to all kinds of data but to certain alerts, and I found the wording of that clause in the proposals very tricky. It was very difficult to understand what was behind this wording. It has not been denied. It was approved by the Council but the Parliament was against the inclusion of the secret services to get access.

  Q284  Baroness Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury: Are you concerned about the possible access to data for asylum purposes?

  Dr von Pommer Esche: By which authorities?

  Q285  Baroness Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury: By any authorities. Are there sufficient safeguards, I suppose is what I am asking you.

  Dr von Pommer Esche: The access to the immigration data is regulated in Article 17 of the draft Regulation. As far as there is a reference to other EU or EC regulations, I do not find it very clear to define the competent authorities by reference to other regulations. On the other hand, I must say in the first draft, in the first version of the Regulation, it was still open as to whether other authorities will have access to this data and the police forces also. I think that these possibilities have been deleted.

  Q286  Earl of Caithness: Doctor, is the relationship between the general data protection rules in EU legislation, that is the 1995 Directive and the proposed Framework Decision, and the SIS II legislation sufficiently clear in your view?

  Dr von Pommer Esche: That was one of the key questions when we discussed these proposals in the different bodies. There are several regulations or several provisions to be taken into account. As basic regulations we have the Directive of 1995 for the first pillar, then we have the project of a Framework Decision on third pillar data protection, then we have the two SIS regulations and we have Regulation 45/2001. In Germany we have a data protection regime of general law and of specific law. We have a federal Data Protection Act with general regulations which is applicable unless there are specific rules. In Germany we do not have problems with this competition between different rules. As far as a matter is regulated, and exhaustively regulated, in a specific act this specific act prevails. The general act is only applicable insofar as there are no specific regulations. In the field of the EC and EU Law we feel that will have the same relationship with competition. There are some problems, for instance as regards the right of access and the right to information. So far in the draft Framework Decision on data protection there is a right of access and a right to information whereas, as far as I know, in the SIS II decision there is no right to information, so the question arises if there is no right to information in the specific legislation. Is the right to information in the general rule, that means in the Framework Decision or data protection third pillar, applicable or not? From my point of view I would say although there is no regulation on the right to information in SIS II, there is the intention of the legislator that there should not be a right to information in the field of Schengen. That means the general rule cannot replace the missing regulation in the SIS decision. That is my opinion.

  Q287  Earl of Caithness: Do you think your view is the majority view? Do you think that is how it will be interpreted?

  Dr von Pommer Esche: I have not had any discussions with other colleagues. I have read your questions and I have thought about the problems. We have discussed these problems in general and dealt with them in the opinions of the Article 29 Group and in the Schengen JSA but we did not go so far into the details.

  Q288  Lord Dubs: I think my question has largely been answered but if there is anything left to answer I will give you the opportunity. My question is this: how would you assess the current state of negotiations on the Framework Decision on data protection? To what extent would the Framework Decision, in the latest available text, affect the standard of data protection provided for in the SIS II decision, for example as regards a right to information? I think you have dealt with a lot of that.

  Dr von Pommer Esche: As for the state of discussion on the Framework Decision, I find it disappointing. The Member States in the MDG have brought themselves to a negotiation situation where it is difficult to find a way out.

  Q289  Chairman: Are you talking about the Council or the—

  Dr von Pommer Esche: The Framework Decision on data protection is discussed in the Council and in the Parliament.

  Q290  Lord Avebury: Do you have access to any of the working papers of the MDG? How do you know what is going on there?

  Dr von Pommer Esche: I do not have all the papers which are tabled in the MDG but for each meeting the Federal Government prepares a joint position for further discussions in the MDG and in other Council working groups. As far as data protection legislation or questions are concerned, we are involved in most cases. I do not have any comments on that because I am outside the Federal Government.

  Q291  Baroness Henig: Do you believe that the United Kingdom should have access to immigration data, at least for some purposes, such as asylum, or at least to come categories of that data, such as persons who are listed because they have committed criminal offences or are believed to have committed, or to be intending to commit, such offences?

  Dr von Pommer Esche: I do not know whether you want to hear this or not, but my opinion is that the United Kingdom Government should not get access to the immigration data because the file with immigration data is a collection that for me is a compensatory mechanism for the abolition of the border controls. As the United Kingdom is insisting on the border controls I would find it out of proportion if the United Kingdom got access to this data for whatever purpose.

  Q292  Baroness Henig: So is this quite a principled response from you?

  Dr von Pommer Esche: Yes, for me it is a principled question.

  Q293  Baroness Henig: So you would not take a pragmatic view that—

  Dr von Pommer Esche: In that case I would say that this is not an official opinion of the Data Protection Committee, it is my opinion.

  Q294  Baroness Henig: Can I just ask how widely shared is your opinion, do you think?

  Dr von Pommer Esche: How wide is it?

  Q295  Baroness Henig: Yes. If we talked to a cross-section of people who hold important positions such as you, would that be a general view do you think?

  Dr von Pommer Esche: I have not had an exchange of views with the Federal Government, so it is not in discussion.

  Q296  Baroness Henig: I meant people within the EU, people who are perhaps holding positions as you are, not necessarily German but other nationalities. I just wondered whether there were many of you who had discussed this and come to that view.

  Dr von Pommer Esche: We discussed the access of the United Kingdom to the Schengen data files but that was years ago. I do not remember the details.

  Q297  Lord Dubs: I understand, of course, that if the United Kingdom is not prepared to join Schengen then we should not get the benefits of Schengen membership. I think that is clear and I would not argue with that. However, it seems to me that some of the immigration data, because of the fact that international criminals and terrorists frequently cross borders, is important in dealing with criminal activity. Is there not a loss of information to the Schengen countries through not having the UK's information and similarly there is a loss of information for the UK in not having the Schengen countries' information as part of the build-up of dealing with criminal activity?

  Dr von Pommer Esche: I am aware that the United Kingdom is one of the favourite targets of asylum seekers and refugees from third countries and it is clear that international criminality and cross-border terrorism is without frontiers, it is a worldwide danger, but how will you limit or restrain the access of the United Kingdom for what purposes or for which criminal acts and so on? You must find a definition of "international terrorism".

  Q298  Chairman: Of course, it is not for us to defend the British Government's decisions in this matter. To some extent the position of the United Kingdom, and indeed the position of Ireland, is a factor of our geography, would you not agree? We do not have either the benefits, or perhaps the disbenefits, of Germany. I cannot remember how many borders you have but you have got a very large number. I think you have more than any other member of the EU, do you not?

  Dr von Pommer Esche: Yes, I think so.

  Q299  Earl of Listowel: Doctor, does the SIS II legislation provide sufficient safeguards in respect of the biometric data and, if not, what should those safeguards be?

  Dr von Pommer Esche: In the course of the negotiations the regulations have been improved. For a long time it has been crucial whether the biometric data should or should not be used in the SIS but now it has been decided that the biometric data, that means photographs and fingerprints, shall be used as features in the SIS. For me it is understandable that biometric data are used for a better identification and for reliable and fast identification on the borders. The use of these biometric data and their involvement is now regulated in Article 14a(c) of the regulation of both proposals. At the moment the purpose of their use is to make one-to-one searches. From my point of view, I do not have great objections to that method but if you look at Article 14a(c), paragraph three, there is an opening clause that in the long run these biometric data should also be used for one-to-many searches. That means in that case if the Schengen Information System was not used for control purposes only, it would change its character to a kind of investigative tool or method. That would be a new quality and in the long run if Member States insist on that possibility, which I cannot exclude, then we must reconsider additional safeguards. The use of biometrics is combined with some risks, it is not 100 per cent sure, and if you test the different methods of biometric features you have high false rejection rates. That means at the moment the methods are not reliable enough but the technique is going on and the methods will be better and better in the future.


 
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