Memorandum by Fisheries Research Services
(FRS)
INTRODUCTION
1. Fisheries Research Services (FRS) is
an Agency of the Scottish Government providing scientific advice
on a range of marine resource and environmental issues. In relation
to fisheries FRS' main activities include monitoring and assessment
of stocks of key importance to Scotland. The agency's remit does
not include fisheries control and enforcement responsibilities
or development of structural policy. As a consequence, the evidence
provided here mainly focuses on conservation and management aspects.
In recent years, FRS has played an important part in initiatives
to increase stakeholder involvement (for example the North Sea
Commission Fisheries partnership and Regional Advisory Councils).
A few comments are also offered on governance issues.
GENERAL
2. The consultation mainly raises questions
framed against a background of existing European management experiences.
Much of this has evolved in response to developing circumstances
in fisheries. For thousands of years, there has been a basic assumption
of freedom to operate and innovate until a constraint is deemed
necessary. Frequently, the introduction of new management measures
and changing economics elicit a mitigating response from those
exploiting stocks so that subsequent management processes (including
enforcement and monitoring) are always involved in a process of
catching up. In some fishery models elsewhere in the world such
freedoms are constrained and new developments are only introduced
when they will i) not lead to increased mortality on the stocks
concerned ii) are accompanied by compensatory measures to constrain
mortality. While a completely restrictive process may be unattainable
in multifaceted European fisheries, it is perhaps nevertheless
time to give consideration to a process requiring constructive
and collective discussion in advance of introducing technological
advancements.
SPECIFIC ISSUES
Conservation/Management
3. The new methods for promoting conservation
(recovery plans, management plans and emergency measures) have
been introduced to varying degrees and their effect has been mixed
so far. It is helpful to make a distinction between emergency
measures and recovery plans on the one hand and management plans
on the other.
4. Evaluating the effects of emergency
plans, introduced for a few stocks in very poor condition,
is difficult. These have tended to be established quickly, are
often based on limited prior analysis and are sometimes disruptive
in the short term. The emergency measures for North Sea cod in
2001, including a large scale spawning closure, did not lead to
a detectable stock improvement. Furthermore, unintended consequences
arose from effort transfer onto juvenile haddock. On the other
hand one of the most dramatic emergency measures, the closure
of fishing for North Sea herring in the 1970's was followed by
stock recovery. This action also coincided with reasonably good
recruitment but there is little doubt that the resultant industry
restructuring and closer attention to controlling fishing mortality
rate (F) has been beneficial.
5. Recovery plans, again directed
at stocks outside safe biological limits and where reproductive
capacity is impaired, define a more structured approach and are
frequently underpinned by predictive modelling. One of their advantages
is that focus is maintained on a problem situation until this
resolved. There have been recent improvements in some European
stocks subject to recovery plans, notably Northern hake and Bay
of Biscay Nephrops. The biomass of cod in the North Sea
is also predicted to increase. In each case, recruitment to these
stocks has increased but the extent to which recovery plans have
contributed to this is not known. Encouragingly, fishing mortality
on North Sea cod has come down by about 20% since 1999. Unfortunately,
other stocks, for example Irish Sea cod, have not shown such improvement
despite this being subject to the longest standing recovery plan.
6. There are several general difficulties
with the current recovery plan approach. Firstly, the plans are
linked to biological reference points defined by ICES. The achievement
of some of the biomass targets set is often dependent on environmentally
driven processes (such as recruitment success) and an assumption
that the reference points are fixed through time. Secondly, attainment
of the reference point value (by no matter how small a margin)
relaxes the requirement for a recovery plan but unless the overall
population structure has improved and fishing mortality has dropped
to a more sustainable rate, the stock can quickly deteriorate.
This leads to an unsatisfactory `on/off' situation. Finally, the
annual December EU Council of Ministers can (and sometimes does)
establish TACs inconsistent with the analyses of what is required
to deliver recovery. This disrupts the expected recovery process.
7. Management plans ideally operate
under circumstances where a stock is not overexploited and does
not have impaired reproductive capacity. The general objective
is to establish a fishing regime and mortality rate which leads
to long term sustainability where the stock stays well away from
trigger points requiring more serious action. Management plans
are therefore more strategic, take a longer term view and are
generally based on more thorough analysis incorporating estimates
of risk associated with actions taken. In recent times, European
commitments to international agreements requiring stocks to be
fished at maximum sustainable yield (MSY) have influenced the
development of plans. A number of key stocks fished by Scottish
vessels are subject to management plans particularly stocks shared
with Norway. In these cases, ICES provides advice consistent with
the management plan and comparison of the agreed TAC with this
advice suggests that it is closer than for stocks not subject
to plans. The inclusion of annual TAC change constraint rules
(eg no more than +/- 15%) helps to stabilise year to year fluctuations.
Management of North Sea haddock, herring and also mackerel has
benefited from tailored plans although the existence of a management
plan does not of itself guarantee the stock will remain in good
condition. At present, declines in herring associated with poor
recruitment are causing concern. Significantly, the management
plan provides for these circumstances and defines fishing mortality
rates to try to reduce the risk to the stock. It remains to be
seen how successful this is.
Management tools
8. Total Allowable Catches—TACs—From
the point of view of establishing a basis for the share-out of
resources between member states, TACs have arguably been successful
in the European context. As a tool to control fishing mortality
they have generally had low success rates, particularly in mixed
species fisheries. This scientific view has remained for a number
of years. In fact, the term `total allowable catch' is something
of a misnomer—`total allowable landings' is a more accurate
description. If it was possible to limit catches the tool might
perform rather better. Unfortunately, in a mixed fishery the exhaustion
of a TAC for one species does not automatically lead to the stopping
of its capture and it continues to be taken as bycatch in the
pursuit of other species. Furthermore, there is frequently an
assumption that the scientific predictions underpinning a TAC
are made with high precision. In practice, the precision of forecasts
is generally too low to support small reductions in fishing mortality
sought by managers. The uncertainties in the predictions and changes
in fishing pattern and behaviour from one year to the next can
lead to an imbalance between the TAC and the out-take. Political
decisions out of line with advice further disrupt the process.
Evidence for continuing difficulties with TACs as currently implemented
can be seen in the continued high discard rates of marketable
sized fish in some fisheries.
9. Effort limitations—Considering
first the controls on fishing vessel time at sea, there have been
two main initiatives. Some Member States including UK and in particular
Scotland, undertook significant decommissioning in recent years.
The removal of a large number of fishing units led to a major
reduction in effort that could be deployed and this is most evident
in the haddock stocks where serious over-fishing has been reduced
to levels close to maximum sustainable yield. This played an important
part in sustaining the fishery through a period of low recruitment.
Days at sea limits set out to control the activity of active vessels.
Assessments by the EU Scientific Technical and Economic Committee
on Fisheries (STECF) suggest there has been some reduction of
effort arising from days at sea although not enough to reduce
cod mortality sufficiently (cod remaining a key driver for this
action) and not as much as implied by the percentage reductions
in days legislated for. This is in part because many vessels have
rarely fished up to their maximum capacity. Fishing mortality
on cod in the North Sea has reduced recently, nevertheless. It
is tempting to assume that further effort cuts will deliver bigger
mortality reductions but the relationship is unclear and at a
point where reductions in effort become especially restrictive,
a likely response from fishermen is to use their available time
to target areas delivering greatest economic return. These could
well contain cod and so mortality may not reduce further.
10. Conservation Credits. Scotland
(and possibly other parts of the UK) has now taken advantage of
a Council provision which allows the allocation of a total KWdays
effort package to the Member States to manage how it chooses.
This has been linked to a `Conservation Credits' scheme intended
to deliver further reductions in cod mortality and reduce discards.
11. Marine conservation areas come
in many shapes and forms. As a tool for conserving particularly
vulnerable habitats, features or critical life stages they are
potentially very useful—especially when policed with the
assistance of satellite vessel monitoring or observers. As a more
general tool in the management of fish stocks, their effectiveness
is less clear. Most analysis suggests that large areas need to
be closed to have any effect and that without accompanying reductions
in effort, the transfer of activity into other, unprotected, areas
can have undesirable and unpredictable effects. A common experience
with closed areas is that once established they are difficult
to remove, even if no benefit to the feature or stock being protected
is demonstrable.
12. Real time closures (RTCs) offer
a more reactive approach which responds to variations in local
abundance and therefore triggers closures when they are needed.
The approach has been used in Norway for many years for the avoidance
of young fish. Within the EU legislative framework, such short
term tools have not hitherto been possible. Under national schemes
however, the required responsiveness is available and Scotland
has recently been trialling a scheme. Its effectiveness is as
yet unknown but it seems likely that to deliver significant direct
benefit to the stock in avoiding cod (or other species requiring
protection) numerous closures would be required to make a difference.
The value of RTCs is probably increased by focussing them at times
and areas associated with fish aggregating to spawn. Like permanent
closures their value is determined by the impact of displaced
effort in other areas. They are often weakened by compromises
leading to inappropriately high thresholds for closure etc. Taking
a broader view, as much value may be attached to the changes in
behaviour prompted by RTCs encouraging fishermen to move away
from areas of abundance. RTC effectiveness will be monitored under
the Conservation Credits scheme.
13. Rights based management—It
is difficult to comment from first hand experience but rights
based management appears to have some benefits where it operates
(Western Australia etc). Where rights are conferred and players
consider they have a `fair-share', this seems to engender greater
stewardship to look after the resource for the long term. From
a biological point of view, if this translates to lower, sustainable
fishing mortality, this is good for stocks and potentially the
wider environment. This contrasts with the condition of `tragedy
of the commons' prevailing for many years throughout many European
fisheries. Under these circumstances the `better fish it now before
someone else does' approach leads to higher fishing mortality
rates. It is probably fair to say that economics tends to drive
rights based management systems towards smaller, efficient fleets
with rather few highly committed operators. This may not match
social policy for vulnerable rural communities.
14. Technical Conservation Measures- These
have great potential to contribute but a long history of industry
response which appears to lead to mitigation of the effectiveness
of the original measure. For example, benefits from mesh increases
in the early 1990's designed to reduce discards and lower mortality
on young fish were offset by the development of multi-twine gears
(double-twine etc) which tend to restrict the lumen of the net.
Out turn fishing mortality showed no improvement. Given the ease
with which `adjustments nullify the effectiveness, fishermen have
to want the measures to work in order for them to do so. Developments
in the area of square mesh panels, grids and separators offer
potential for the release of, particularly, juvenile fish. Under
the latest Scottish initiative (Conservation credits scheme),
incentives for implementing more selective gears or ones reducing
cod and discards are being considered. Considerable research continues
in this area and it is likely that in circumstances of more sophisticated
consumer demand and better pricing, the role of technical measures
will increase.
Discards
15. Management measures in place over several
decades have contributed to the discard problem (see TACs above)
and in general, the most recent measures have not increased the
problem. In some fisheries where mesh has increased substantially
or square mesh panels are effectively used, discards have reduced.
The issue is complex and there were numerous contributory factors—
a reducing TAC at the time of stock increase did not help matters.
16. It is worth noting that discarding is
often blamed on TAC regulation implying that catch restrictions
create the problem. In fact most discarding in mixed demersal
fisheries is symptom of over-exploitation where the average size
of fish in the stock has reduced to close to the minimum landing
size because fish never live long enough to grow large. In trying
to catch fish of marketable size, vessels take a large bycatch
of undersized fish.
17. There is no single, simple solution
to the problem and a range of measures tailored to the characteristics
of different fleets is required. Avoidance plans (RTCs etc) to
avoid aggregations of unwanted fish coupled with relevant technical
measures will continue to play a major role. The pressure for
fisheries to be accredited and `clean' is also likely to be a
key driver as well as a focus on quality rather than quantity.
Climate change
18. Fisheries management policies need to
reflect fish productivity in the marine system. During periods
of altered stock productivity as a result of environmental forcing,
the expectations for the fishery need to be adjusted downwards
(or upwards) accordingly. The precise linkage between the population
dynamics and environment is complex but environmental drivers
do play a significant part. At present it is clear that the distributions
of many fish stocks have changed in response to changing climate
and will continue to do so. These changes can be related to wider
changes to the ecosystem in terms of oceanographic conditions
and plankton communities. Climate change is currently probably
one of the greatest sources of uncertainty in evaluating the sustainability
of fish stocks and hence the management regimes that should be
applied.
Structural policy
19. Recent UK policy on the reduction of
the mixed whitefish fleets has been successful in reducing fishing
on haddock to close to maximum sustainable yield and has contributed
to a reduction in the exploitation rate on some cod stocks.
Governance
20. RACs—These have had successes
in some areas and their extended funding from the Commission ensures
their persistence for some years. The forums are encouraging better
engagement between EU managers and other stakeholders and better
cooperation between stakeholders. The nature of each RAC is rather
different and some such at the North Sea RAC are more advanced
than others. This is reflected in the kinds of submission and
comment offered to the Commission with some RACs more willing
to make difficult decisions than others.
21. For the scientific community, the emergence
of RACs places additional demands on a limited pool of expertise.
Experts that assist the RACs are very often the same experts that
contribute to ICES and the STECF. This can lead to duplication
of effort in analysing the same problem. Consideration needs to
be given to rationalising the advisory landscape into a more integrated
system so that the scientific resource can be made better use
of and advice to managers can be made more coherent. At present
the Commission receives advice from ICES, STECF and RACs, often
on the same issues using the same scientists, yet the advice is
uncoordinated and as a result can provide mangers with a potentially
confusing array of information. This is not desirable for good
decision making.
February 2008
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