Select Committee on European Union Written Evidence


Memorandum by Greenpeace UK

1.  INTRODUCTION

1.1  Greenpeace

  Greenpeace UK is the autonomous regional office of Greenpeace, one of the world's leading environmental campaigning organizations. Greenpeace has regional offices in 40 countries, 2.8 million supporters worldwide and around 150,000 in the UK. It is independent of governments and businesses, being funded entirely by individual subscriptions.

  The World's oceans have reached a state of crisis. They are woefully unprotected, hugely overexploited, polluted, and face the uncertain impacts of global climate change. Supported by the weight of credible scientific findings, Greenpeace believes that a crucial part of achieving environmentally balanced and sustainable oceans is a representative network of large-scale Marine Reserves covering 40% of our oceans, with environmentally responsible fishing practiced in the other 60%

  1.2  The evidence of overexploitation of global fisheries is startling:

  (i)  Large predatory fish species such as cod, tuna, sharks and swordfish have declined by 90% in the past 50 years. 65% of all fisheries exploited since 1950 have collapsed. (Myers RA, Worm B (2003). Rapid worldwide depletion of predatory fish communities. Nature 423: 280-3)

  (ii)  The European Commission's latest advice states that 80% of European fish stocks are outside known safe biological limits

  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0295:FIN:EN:PDF

  (iii)  The UN FAO estimated that in 2003, 76% of the world's assessed fisheries stocks were either fully exploited, over exploited or depleted.

  http://www.fao.org/docrep/007/y5600e/y5600e00.htm

  1.3  Moreover, there is widespread and consistent criticism of the failure of Fisheries management and nowhere is this more acute than in European waters. In addition to the Court of Auditors Report, the recent report to the European Commission by Sissenwine and Symes is a damning critique of the failure of the CFP:

  http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/denmark/press/rapporter-og-dokumenter/reflections-on-the-common-fish.pdf

  1.4  Greenpeace believes that the solutions that are needed to address the crisis facing our oceans are well-known, supported by credible scientific evidence and enjoy popular support. Only by setting aside large areas off limits to all destructive activity, including fishing, as Marine Reserves, can we hope to rebuild the resilience our oceans and our ocean species need, so that we may exploit them sustainably outside these areas. We would welcome the opportunity to present evidence to this inquiry.

  2.  CONSERVATION/MANAGEMENT

Chapter II of Regulation 2371/2002 on the conservation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under the CFP introduced new methods of ensuring conservation and sustainability, including recovery plans, management plans, and emergency measures. To what extent have these been effective?

  2.1.1  The implementation and application of conservation measures under the CFP are extremely disappointing. Firstly, a significant number of stocks that are outside safe biological limits have no recovery plans, and management plans also remain underutilised. Secondly, many of the plans that have been adopted are both weak in content and restrictive in the conservation measures they outline. For instance, little use is being made of closed areas, fishing bans and specific gear restrictions.

  2.1.2  Most, if not all, plans fail to apply the precautionary principle. In the case of the cod recovery plan, for example, ICES has recently concluded that since it does not allow for a complete closure of the cod fishery, it is not consistent with the precautionary approach (ICES Advisory Committee on Fisheries Management, North Sea cod 2007).

  2.1.3  In particular, the rules aimed at maintaining relative stability in the annual fishing opportunity by limiting TAC changes to no more than 15% (up or down) between any two years, restrain the management of depleted stocks in unsustainable patterns of overfishing. Given that many stocks are in such a severe state of depletion that much more drastic cuts in fishing quotas would be necessary, the 15% rule seems just another misguided management ploy that favours the short-term interests of the fishing industry and politicians over the long-term benefits of stock recovery and sustainable management.

  2.1.4  Moreover, many management and recovery plans have only very recently been adopted and therefore have not been in place for long enough to show results. No stock has yet recovered as a result of an EU recovery plan. There is also considerable pressure both politically and from the fishing industry to increase levels of fishing at the earliest possible opportunities, meaning that any apparent recoveries in stocks are seemingly viewed as short-term bonuses with little long-term consideration.

  2.1.5  It makes no coherent sense for marine conservation to be the (sole) preserve of the CFP, when clearly protection should be given under Environmental auspices.

  2.1.6  Overall, we would respectfully adopt the following expert conclusions:

    "[T]he track record of fisheries management in Europe has been disastrous." Prof Callum Roberts, The Unnatural History of the Sea: The Past and Future of Humanity and Fishing, Octopus Publishing Group, London, 2007, p. 346-7

    "Over the past 25 years (1982-2007), EU institutions have presided over an unparalleled period of decline for Europe's fishing industries. In denial of the basic principle of Sustainable Development, they have apparently allowed the satisfaction of demands by the present generation to compromise the ability of future generations to meet their needs from the living resources of Europe's seas. : David Symes `Institutional Issues' in Michael Sissenwine and David Symes, Reflections on the Common Fisheries Policy, Report to the General Directorate for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs of the European Commission, July 2007 at http://www.fishsec.org/downloads/1193925814_63294.pdf

    "...EU national-level and European Commission fisheries advisory groups are often dominated by interests from the fishing industry through powerful lobbying and this has often led to scientific advice being ignored or compromised..." Turning the Tide—Addressing the impact of Fisheries on the Marine Environment, Twenty-fifth Report of the United Kingdom Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, December 2004 at http://www.rcep.org.uk/fishreport.htm

    "In summary, the overall performance of the CFP has been poor. In terms of conservation of fish stocks, it is doing worse than the US and the rest of the world." Michael Sissenwine, "Challenges, Peformance and the Future" in Michael Sissenwine and David Symes, Reflections on the Common Fisheries Policy, Report to the General Directorate for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs of the European Commission, July 2007 at http://www.fishsec.org/downloads/1193925814_63294.pdf

  A wide range of management tools are available to fisheries managers. What are your views on the following tools:

Total Allowable Catches

  2.2.1  Setting a TAC for an individual stock is meant to help keep catch levels at or below sustainable levels. However, as the European Commission itself reports (COM(2007)295), the Council of Fisheries Ministers has consistently set EU TACs 50% above the scientifically recommended catch levels. This renders them useless as a tool for sustainable fisheries management, is entirely unprecautionary, and instead makes them part of the problem rather than a solution to overfishing. To the contrary, the US has passed fisheries legislation that stipulates that TAC must be set at, or below scientifically recommended levels.

  2.2.2  TACs also lose their value when i) they are set for individual species, which are then caught in a mixed fishery, and/or ii) fishermen get away with high-grading their catch by throwing small or undersized fish overboard, so as to replace them by larger, more valuable, fish.

  2.2.3  Clearly TACs must be set at, or below, scientifically recommended levels, and not simply at levels that are the result of political bargaining. If there are socio-economic repercussions associated with setting a recommended low level of TAC, they should be addressed accordingly, but bending or ignoring the science to cause as little socio-economic disruption as possible ultimately helps no one.

Effort limitation, including "days at sea", marine conservation areas and real-time closures

  2.3.1  Days at sea limitations only work if there is i) consideration taken of the effect that the advancement of technological improvements have in increasing catching ability (eg through sonar fish finders), and ii) steps taken that less time doesn't mean increased effort in a shorter period, but actually results in a reduction in fishing effort.

  2.3.2  Closed areas are a huge part of the solution, crucially the provision of a network of large-scale Marine Reserves that crucially prohibit fishing and allow stocks to recover, thrive, and offer resilience. The current attitude by the fishing industry is that protected areas should be as small and unrestricted as possible—and that long term protected areas are only acceptable in areas they don't want to fish in. The science says that for any real gain an area must be closed to all fishing—resulting in bigger animals, bigger stocks, and greater biodiversity; the essential bedrock of a long-term future for a sustainable fishing industry.

Technical Conservation Measures

  2.4.1  Technical Conservation Measures must accompany measures aimed at effort and capacity reduction, better enforcement, and measures aimed to protect particularly sensitive habitats and species (such as the creation of fully-protected Marine Reserves), including fish. Fisheries must move towards selective, non-destructive and sustainable methods of catching fish. The most destructive methods, such as beam trawling, should be stopped as soon as possible, and more progressive and selective measures should be encouraged and promoted.

  2.4.2  However, there have been numerous examples where the conservation objectives of technical measures have not been achieved (for example acoustic "pingers" on static nets to deter porpoises, mesh sizes etc.). In such instances it is imperative that the original conservation objective is addressed—and if no "technological fix" is forthcoming, action should be taken in other ways to halt the detrimental impact of these fisheries, up to and including stopping the fishery.

To what extent have current management tools increased the levels of discards and bycatch?

  2.5.1 Greenpeace has seen first hand the discarding of perfectly marketable but `non target' fish as part of the North Sea whitefish fleet, the wholesale destruction ravaged by bottom-trawling vessels in the North East Atlantic, and the bycatch of threatened species in the Mediterranean. Similarly the UK's coasts are still littered with the corpses of dolphins and porpoises that die in fishing nets in our waters.

  2.5.2 Recent debates on the problem of discarding appear to have spectacularly missed the point in terms of addressing the main cause of high discarding and bycatch rates: ie destructive and indiscriminate fishing practices. The solution to discarding and high by-catch rates is thus neither in the lowering of conservation standards, nor in the raising of fishing quotas.

  2.5.3 Greenpeace agrees that certain policies—in particular provisions that prohibit the landing of undersized and over-quota fish but fail to prevent their capture—have aggravated the problem of fish being wasted as a result of discarding.

What is your view on how these problems can be best tackled?

  2.6.1  Greenpeace supports a discard ban, so long as it is used to complement other management and conservation measures, in particular those that lead to more selective and sustainable fishing practices. A discard ban would move the focus of management measures from landings to catches and from fish production to fish mortality. In conformity with the precautionary approach, by regarding "no discards" as the norm, any discarding then requires adequate justification (eg high survival potential). Experience shows that discard bans may be effective where control of shore-based infrastructure is efficient, and where other complementary measures, such as introduction of selective gears and real-time closures, reduce discards to a minimum.

  2.6.2  The following considerations should be noted:

    —  Any policy on bycatch and discards must be complementary to, and not replace, other necessary management measures, such as capacity and effort reduction, technical conservation measures and area closures, including the establishment of a network of fully protected large-scale marine reserves that allow species, stocks, and ecosystems to recover and thrive. Overall, present stock levels dictate that we need to fish less.

    —  The key issue is to avoid unwanted catches in the first place, by prohibiting the most destructive and indiscriminate forms of fishing and by requiring, for example, the best available technology for all other gears, as well as by introducing real-time closures etc.

    —  An EU policy needs to effectively tackle all the different types of bycatch (mature [over-quota] specimen, juveniles, endangered and protected species) and the two reasons for discarding (high-grading and getting rid of [general] unwanted catch).

    —  Greenpeace agrees with the Commission's proposed approach to tackle the issue on a fishery by fishery basis, and considers that a range of measures tailored to specific types of fisheries will be required, but only after the establishment of a general EU-wide framework within which certain standards are set—including rules on storage, documentation and landing. A fishery-by-fishery approach must prioritise the worst offenders, ie the fisheries with the highest bycatch and discards rates, for example beam trawls, Nephrops trawls and whitefish trawls.

    —  More selective fishing gears and practices should be promoted, including by providing appropriate incentives (tax-breaks, financial assistance, preferential licensing conditions etc), and non-selective gears prohibited or their use discouraged by introducing licensing and impact assessment requirements and/or financial disincentives.

    —  The general framework to reduce bycatch and eliminate discards should apply to all vessels, although small-scale vessels may need special consideration, as some will be too small to carry onboard observers and/or be fitted with VMS.

    —  Much of the Commission's proposal relies on industry initiative to, for example, improve the selectivity of gears, but it should be noted that the sector is not generally organised in a way suitable to collectively deal with such issues, and consideration should be given to support development of structures and processes that can facilitate, for example, the exchange of best practice, sector-based real-time-reporting on spawning aggregations and high by-catch rates etc.

Do you consider that fisheries management policies may need to adapt to climate change?

  2.7.1  Yes.

  If so, how might this be achieved?

  2.7.2  Building in resilience means adaptable measures, a precautionary approach, and moving towards an ecosystem-based management. A representative network of large-scale marine reserves is essential in allowing all marine species (including commercially important fish stocks) space to survive and thrive, as well as room to move as and when temperatures and food distribution change.

  2.7.3  While every effort is made to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, it is vital that we build up the resilience of ocean ecosystems and improve our understanding of the impacts of climate change on marine ecosystems.

  2.7.4  The experts warn that we have depleted marine biodiversity, and with that have eroded the ocean's ability to cope with and mitigate the consequences of global warming. They recommend that we reduce our exploitation levels of marine fish and other maritime activities in order to improve the resilience of our seas and oceans and ultimately safeguard their role in stabilising the climate. Simply aiming at the sustainable use of sea-life is no longer a sufficient management strategy; marine protection has become an insurance policy for an unpredictable future, which will be on average hotter, with more intense extreme events and more hostile.

  2.7.5  Marine Reserves, areas set aside from all extractive and destructive activities, offer the highest level of protection for marine life, superior to areas with a limited number of restrictions. Through protecting the diversity of marine life, Marine Reserves boost the oceans' capacity to rally its own defences against a changing climate. In addition, ocean sanctuaries act as valuable reference areas that can guide complementary management measures and recovery targets in areas beyond the reserves' boundaries, so underpinning the ecosystem approach.

  2.7.6  In 2001, the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) warned that climate change in turn will "affect the physical, biological, and biochemical characteristics of the oceans and coasts", and warned of "significant feedback on the climate system" of such changes. In light of these findings, the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) has advised that "genetically-diverse populations and species-rich ecosystems have a greater potential to adapt to climate change".

  2.7.7  Subsequently, the European Commission's own Research Centre (JRC) advised that "protected areas contribute to the good health of the ecosystem which then could become relatively more resilient to environmental changes in comparison with those affected by additional anthropogenic pressure", and called for the creation of new conservation areas in Europe's Seas, including fully protected no-take zones.

3.  CONTROL AND ENFORCEMENT

Chapter V of Regulation 2371/2002 lays down the responsibilities of the Member States and the Commission as regards the control and enforcement of the rules of the CFP. The recent Court of Auditors Report on the control, inspection and sanctions systems relating to the rules on conservation of Community fisheries resources was very sceptical of the systems currently in place. What is your view of the efficacy of the systems in place?

  3.1.1  The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement are clear in so far as the right of a state to fish is not an absolute right, but is conditional upon that state meeting its obligation to protect the marine environment and fish stocks. One of the fundamental failings of the Common Fisheries Policy is that it separates the exercising of the rights to fish (rights are allocated exclusively at EU level, largely through the TACs and quotas system) from the responsibilities of conserving the marine environment and enforcing fisheries management rules, which are almost exclusively the responsibility of the Member States.

  3.1.2  Greenpeace has documented first hand the multiple and varied ways in which illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing are conducted by the nationals of EU Member States, vessels flagged to EU Member States, vessels fishing in EU waters and/or operating and landing fish and fish products in EU ports. In addition, the products of IUU fishing enter the EU market by road and by air.

  3.1.3  Greenpeace agrees fully with the Court of Auditors Report and is alarmed at the scale of mismanagement that it has brought to light. Greenpeace would like to underscore the conclusion that an apparent lack of will amongst the Member States is to blame for weak EU fisheries management rules and an even weaker implementation of in particular those rules that are designed to provide the mechanisms for control and enforcement at national level (including the use of reporting and accounting system, statistical analyses, licensing schemes etc).

  3.1.4  Not only is there an urgent need to rectify weaknesses in the rules and application of fisheries legislation, it appears ludicrous that this level of non-compliance is being allowed to continue without serious consequences in terms of infringement procedures, fines, cuts in the allocation of public subsidies and restrictions on the way operators and Member States continue to benefit from other EU policies and services. The concept of "cross-compliance" (which in the EU's agricultural policy stipulates that farmers must comply with all legislation affecting their businesses, if they are to receive direct financial aid from the EU) should be applied to fisheries. It should also be considered a principle that should be adhered to by the Member States themselves. For instance, it simply is incomprehensible that Member States can continue to benefit from subsidies and the allocation of fishing rights, if they are so evidently in breach of the most basic EU conservation and fisheries management rules.

  3.1.5  Greenpeace believes that the Commission should encourage a mandate for EUROPOL to investigate organised transboundary crime relating to IUU fishing, including but not limited to the laundering of money earned in IUU fishing. http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/governance/consultations/contributions150107/greenpeace.pdf

  3.1.6  The issue of the link between organised crime and fishing has been highlighted by Ben Bradshaw, the then UK Fisheries Minister,

    "Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing is a huge problem. It destroys fish stocks and marine biodiversity, it depresses the market in legally caught fish, and drives legitimate fishermen out of business.

    "It's driven by sophisticated criminal gangs who don't care what or who they damage in the pursuit of easy cash. It's a crime that should concern the world, because it plunders a world resource.

    "We all have a responsibility and a duty to make sure there is adequate governance and enforcement in place to stop illegal fishing and to block illegal produce entering the food chain. New laws will target not only fishermen but processors and importers who trade in illegal fish." http://www.dfid.gov.uk/News/files/illegal-fishing-tracking-system.asp

To what extent has the Community Fisheries Control Agency already assisted in improving matters?

  3.2.1  Given the fact that the CFCA has only just started to operate, it is too early to judge its contribution. However, given its weak mandate, we have fairly low expectations as regards its effectiveness in tackling the problem of IUU fishing and improving the state of compliance with fisheries rules in the EU.

The European Commission has regularly highlighted how serious infringements of the CFP are penalised differently across the Community. This was a matter that was also raised by the Court of Auditors and sanctions were included in the recent Commission Proposal in IUU fishing. What is your view on the issue?

  3.3.1  Greenpeace agrees that the EU should adopt a common approach to sanctions and penalties, including the introduction of criminal sanctions in severe cases of non-compliance. In fact, Article 25 (4) of Basic Regulation 2371/2002 already requires the Council to come forward with a "catalogue of measures to be applied by Member States relating to serious infringements". This has not yet been developed.

  3.3.2  As well as the problems that inconsistent application and enforcement bring, this also has an effect on the perception of European Fisheries management. The pervasive view of the CFP is that it benefits other countries' fishing industries and not ours, which may well be reflected in every EU fishing industry. Lack of clarity, simplicity, and transparency do not help. Nor does the apparent lack of common sense and action on things like discards and bycatch - which industry, politicians, public, NGOs all find unacceptable and scandalous.

4.  STRUCTURAL POLICY

  Chapter III of Regulation 2371/2002 obliged Member States to put in place measures to adjust the capacity of their fleets in order to achieve a stable and enduring balance between such fishing capacity and their fishing opportunities. To what extent has this been successful?

  4.1.1  The policy has been entirely unsuccessful. The EU is still maintaining a fleet that is roughly twice as large as it should be.

  4.1.2  That said, it is clear that effort reduction measures have had greater impacts on some fishing communities than on others. Some communities feel that they have suffered unfairly to the benefit of others. This in part is the result of crises management, which requires drastic cuts in fishing effort on those stocks that suffer a severe state of depletion. A more strategic approach to cutting the EU's fleet size should discourage unsustainable means of fishing and encourage selective, sustainable and labour intensive fisheries.

  4.1.3  The overall reduction in effort has not been adequate, and is a result of political timidity against a vociferous and well-supported industry lobby.

  What are your views on the possible impact on EU fisheries structural policy of WTO-level discussions as regards subsidies in the fishing sector?

  4.2.1 We would refer you to the 2007 Greenpeace report `Trading Away Our Oceans'; http://oceans.greenpeace.org/raw/content/en/documents-reports/tradingaway.pdf

5.  GOVERNANCE

As a result of Regulation 2371/2002, regional Advisory Councils (RACs) were established to advise the Commission on matters of fisheries management in respect of certain sea areas or fishing zones.

How do you consider EU fisheries should ideally be governed?

  5.1.1  The Court of Auditor's Report and the Sissenwine and Symes study call into question the very framework and principles on which the CFP is built. A much more substantial reform of fisheries management in the EU is urgently needed:

  5.1.2  Faced with unprecedented crises in fisheries management, the Community must switch from a focus on managing the commercialisation of fish to a policy that protects fish as a principal component of marine biodiversity. Greenpeace is of the opinion that the conservation of fish stocks should be managed on the basis of Article 175 of the EC Treaty, that is as part the EU's environment policy.

  5.1.3  Moreover, given the importance of fully protected marine reserves for the renewal and recovery of ocean resources, and considering that Member States are over eight years behind in implementing relating commitments under the Habitats and Birds Directives, the EU ought to ensure that payment of money from the EU structural and fisheries funds are made conditional upon complying fully with the aforementioned Directives (in the spirit of cross-compliance and the precautionary principle). Likewise, Member States and ultimately the fishing operators at national level should be required to verify that they are complying with fisheries and conservation rules before they are granted fishing rights.

  5.1.4  In addition to ensuring an accelerated implementation of the above Directives and strict enforcement of the CFP, the European Commission must provide for a system that can ensure the prohibition of fishing where it is in conflict with the conservation needs of a protected area. Greenpeace maintains that the currently proposed procedure, by which a Member State that has identified the need to regulate fisheries activities in order to achieve compliance with Community provisions under the Habitats and Birds Directives, must first apply for measures with the European Commission and then with the Council of Fisheries Ministers, and in addition consult fisheries bodies, such as ICES and the Regional (Fisheries) Advisory Councils (RACs), contradicts existing law and is out of line with the EU's commitment to (progressively) implement the ecosystem approach to fisheries management. It further is an obstacle to integrated decision making, as it promotes a scenario in which the Council of Fisheries Ministers may veto a management decision that has been taken on grounds of conservation needs. Even if it agrees with the measures, it will have been an overly-bureaucratic process, wasting time, effort and resources, and been to the unnecessary detriment of the area designated for protection.

  5.1.5  The current system hinders Member States in effectively discharging their duties under the Community's environmental policy. Greenpeace is of the opinion that the European Commission has failed to consider a number of more constructive mechanisms for the protection of Natura 2000 sites from fishing, including:

  (i)  Amend, if necessary, the Basic Regulation (Reg. 2371/2002) to place all measures that are aimed at the conservation of fish stocks firmly in the field of environmental policy, with Article 175 as the legal basis. In accordance with the Treaty, measures to ensure a common and stable market, availability of supplies, etc. would remain under the Common Fisheries Policy, but measures dealing with fish before they are taken out of the sea would fall under Article 175 of the EC Treaty. Greenpeace acknowledges that this would present a change of magnitude and go beyond the task of ensuring compatibility of conservation and fisheries policies in Natura 2000 sites.

  (ii)  Amend the Basic Regulation (Reg. 2371/2002) to introduce a complete or partial derogation of powers to the Member States to regulate all or certain aspects of fishing in all Special Protection Areas (SPAs) (Birds Directive), Sites of Community Interest (SCIs) and Special Areas of Conservation (SACs) (Habitats Directive), in recognition of the fact that these sites are of special conservation interest and therefore require as a matter of priority a conservation regime that provides immediate protection. The Common Fisheries Policy already includes a precedent for the derogation of powers to the Member States in the case of the "inshore derogation" (Article 9 and 17 of Regulation 2371/2002). This can act as an example for drafting relevant provisions; or

  (iii)  Regulate fisheries in Natura 2000 sites by means of Commission Regulations, in recognition of the fact that the need to restrict fisheries in certain Natura 2000 sites (on the basis of a request from a Member State) results from provisions under the Community's environmental aquis and is necessary to ensure consistency and compatibility between Community laws. It should therefore be considered as a `mundane' implementing measure that falls under the Commission's implementing powers under Article 26 of the Basic Regulation, amended if necessary.

How appropriate and feasible do you consider a regional management model to be?

  5.2.1  Greenpeace is of the opinion that the Court of Auditor's report and the Sissenwine and Symes study have shown in stark terms that a lack of political will and a breakdown of the administrative structures that are meant to ensure compliance with existing rules are at the heart of the mis-management of EU fisheries. These issues are hardly rectified by the establishment of RACs.

  5.2.2  RACs are unaccountable to the issues of broader stakeholders, being very biased towards the interest of the fishing industry. In effect they strengthen the stranglehold that the fishing industry lobby has on the marine sector, to the detriment of conservation issues. We need to move instead towards a different system, with a different set of constituents, and manage our seas at an ecosystem level.

February 2008


 
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