Memorandum by the Scottish Fishermen's
Federation
Formed in 1973 and comprising eight fishermen's
Associations from all round the coast of Scotland and the Northern
Isles, the Scottish Fishermen's Federation is the primary voice
of Scotland's catching industry. It does not represent the aquaculture
industry. Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the call
for evidence for the Inquiry to review the progress, since it
was reformed in 2002, of the Common Fisheries Policy.
In any discussion or inspection of the CFP,
there is a tendency for the debate to focus on the past, in particular,
on the shape of the arrangements at inception. The great UK distant
water fleets had by that time already almost met their effective
end at the hands of National limits declared by coastal states
outside the European Treaty. The CFP arrangements "relative
stability" subsequently created on historical track record
within the European limits (in the UK's case that of the "inshore"
fleets) began with a fishing industry much reduced overall from
its then recent past. This has made it superficially easy to ascribe
the reduction and all subsequent ills of the UK fishing industry
to the CFP; this is not particularly helpful at the present stage
of CFP development. Whilst the CFP has certainly not met its overall
objective of sustainable development and must not be falsely defended
as having done so, it must be clearly understood that international
arrangements to govern effectively the common participants in
an industry using common resource are vital.
It is noted that this Inquiry is into the progress
of the CFP since it was reformed in 2002 and this will
govern the comments submitted.
CONSERVATION/MANAGEMENT
1. The new methods introduced in 2002 of
ensuring conservation and sustainability of fish stocks have had
mixed success.
Recovery Plans. The Cod Recovery Plan
is perhaps the most reported on and visible example. Whilst there
is recent scientific evidence of recovery, the plan has failed
to meet its own main criterion of success—a dramatic year
on year increase in the biomass of spawning fish. This has resulted
in the automatic application of severe Total Allowable Catch (TAC)
and effort restrictions, which have not in turn delivered the
envisaged recovery. That a recovery plan was and is required is
axiomatic, however, practical experience has demonstrated that
the present arrangement contains targets which are unachievable
in the time allowed.
Other recovery plans have borne more fruit,
with the North Sea haddock stock now returned to a long term management
plan after a period of recovery and Northern hake about to achieve
a similar result.
It can therefore be concluded that the concept
of recovery plans is sound and there is evidence of success as
well as failure. The following can be postulated as required elements:
— Sound scientific evidence as
to the state of the stock and its progress over time.
— Setting of realistic criteria
of success. Experience suggests that targets stated in terms of
biomass limits may not be the best choice; movement downwards
of fishing mortality may be better where this can be realistically
assessed. If targets are too rigid, as in the case of North Sea
cod, the conditions for automatic failure of the plan are created.
Even modest recovery will be so regarded, because it does not
meet the target.
— If the stock under recovery
is caught as part of a mixed fishery, there will be difficulties
in avoiding "regulatory" discarding, where the sustainable
harvesting of one stock results in catching over quota of another
under recovery.
Management Plans. This is accepted as
a workable concept, provided again that it is realistically applied.
Similar elements will be required as for Recovery Plans: sound
scientific information; realistic criteria of success and in this
case change triggering rules; recognition of the effects of other
management plans if the stock is in a mixed fishery. Two other
concepts will impinge on the success of single stock Management
Plans:
— The ecosystem approach to fisheries
management. This is less than completely defined, but suggests
that interdependence of species should be considered. The present
approach is single species.
— Maximum Sustainable Yield. There
is an instinctively attractive if subjective logic to the theory
that light fishing pressure on large stocks will lead to the happy
result of larger catches of bigger fish for the expenditure of
a given amount of effort. The objective application of this—the
achievement of mutually large stocks of species which within an
ecosystem eat each other or depend on the same food stocks—may
constrain MSY to remain as theory. Care will be required in its
application.
2. Management Tools. It is easier
to point up the drawbacks of individual tools than to suggest
viable alternatives; however the main problem in their application
may be the overlaying of these tools one upon the other, making
it difficult to determine relative value. Regarding for instance
TACs and effort limitation, instinct suggests that one or the
other should be sufficient alone to regulate fishing pressure.
A few words on the following tools are offered:
— Total Allowable Catch.
This tool works reasonably well in single species fisheries, for
example North East Atlantic mackerel. When the TAC, divided into
individual quotas, is reached, fishing stops. However in those
fisheries where a species is a bycatch, when the quota is in one
species is reached the natural reaction is "regulatory discarding"
as described above.
— Effort Limitation. This
exists in different forms: as global effort to place a ceiling
on overall fishing effort; as constraints for specific purposes
on individual vessels, for example within the Cod Recovery Plan.
— Rights Based Management Tools.
The administration of the right to fish a quota is a very powerful
tool in shaping Europe's fishing industry in all its components.
This is delegated to Member States within the ceiling of their
National quota allocations and the administrative tools utilized
vary radically across the fishing Member States. A Commission
comparative study is under way. Depending on what is found, it
is unlikely that a centrally imposed model will contribute to
sustainable fishing in an even handed way. This will require careful
consideration.
— Technical Conservation Measures.
This wide term covers a great swath of regulation and endeavour.
In essence, the adaptation of fishing gear to achieve a conservation
aim is an area where Scotland has participated seriously. Measures
of greater effect than that required by the Commission have been
introduced, for example in mesh sizes and net twine thickness;
innovation and experiment is encouraged and trialled under the
Scottish Industry Science Partnership. TCMs provide at least some
capability to avoid regulatory discarding and should be more productive
with time. "Real Time Closures" have recently been introduced
as a voluntary measure to avoid juvenile and spawning cod and
this
3. Discards and bycatch. This has
been addressed to some extent above, but it should be noted that
conservation measures will have as their objective the avoidance
or release of fish which should not be caught. Most measures will
therefore contribute to the reduction of discarding. The subject
has gained some prominence by the use, including by Commissioner
Borg of emotive language. It is suggested that discarding is viewed
not only as a stand-alone issue but in conjunction with conservation
measures. For example, the application of very restrictive TACs,
with the best intentions, may simply contribute to discarding
rather than enhance conservation.
4. Climate change. There seems to
be no doubt that climate change will have an effect over time
on the distribution and quantity of fish in European waters. It
is important to know which influences are having what effect,
for the avoidance of inappropriate management measures. For example,
the biomasses of the Gadoid species in the North Sea during
a phenomenon of the 1960-1980s known as the Gadoid outburst
may be unattainable at any time in the foreseeable future, perhaps
due in part to climate change. For the avoidance of unrealistic
targets, knowledge of the effects of all influences is required.
CONTROL AND
ENFORCEMENT
5. The recent report of the Court of Auditors
as regards the control and enforcement of the rules of the CFP
makes disappointing reading. The introduction in late 2005 across
UK of the Registration of Buyers and Sellers (RBS) and in the
case of Scotland the widespread decommissioning schemes of the
early 2000s served the purpose of "right-sizing" the
Scottish fleet and providing an effective regulatory framework
for the elimination of the practice of landing "black"
fish. The Court of Auditor's report considers a period before
RBS and the situation in Scotland today has improved to the point
of full compliance in landings. This is auditable with the Scottish
Fishery Protection Agency.
6. The main request therefore from the Scottish
Industry is in achievement of a "flat playing Field"
across the Member States. Inequitable treatment exists not only
in the field of regulation and compliance but also in very different
treatment of past transgressions. This is one area where one size
must be seen to fit all.
STRUCTURAL POLICY
7. The capacity of the Scottish fleet is
in general terms now balanced with catching opportunity. This
is an important state to be achieved across the European industry,
for avoidance of commercial pressure on individual businesses
to circumvent rules and apply pressure in turn to their governments
to adjust regulation and compliance for them.
8. The EFF has yet to make any impact; the
administrative delay in its introduction is most unhelpful.
9. There is some apparent misalignment between
the WTO-level discussions and the EU structural policy.
GOVERNANCE
10. The RACs performance so far has been
in overall terms successful in raising stakeholder involvement,
but the process has yet to mature fully. Different RACs are at
different stages of their development and each is unique in its
circumstance. A few examples of this are: the North Sea RAC had
an assisted start given the experience of the North Sea Commission;
the Pelagic RAC has the apparently simpler task of dealing with
single-species fisheries, but the greater complication of dealing
with Coastal States outside the EU in almost every component pelagic
fishery; the NWWRAC has the greatest cultural diversity. This
will result in development proceeding at different speeds.
11. A general statement may be made with
some justification that the best level of delegation of fisheries
management is that closest to the stakeholders, recognising, to
repeat the phrase used above, that the arrangements must govern
effectively the common participants in an industry using common
resource. Overly centralised control will inevitably find itself
dealing in compromise and unable to deal with every detail, some
of which may have fundamental importance to regional fisheries.
There may be something of a temptation for governments or even
industries to resist delegation, in order to retain the luxury
of blame transfer. This should be resisted as for example, in
the acceptance by UK Ministers at the 2007 December Council of
delegated control of fisheries effort in the Cod Recovery Zone
accepts in turn the responsibility to do better than the Commission
in organising effort with the objective of reducing cod mortality.
3 March 2008
| 
