Examination of Witness (Questions 740-759)
Mr Sujiro Seam
8 MAY 2008
Q740 Chairman: You are trespassing!
You have not got quota for that!
Mr Seam: I am sorry. I read the whole set of
questions before coming.
Q741 Lord Cameron of Dillington:
Perhaps I could ask a further question on RACs. The Mediterranean
RAC has so far failed to get off the ground. Can you explain the
problems and how you see that developing?
Mr Seam: The problems I cannot explain. I can
only, just as you do, realise that it is slower, it is more difficult.
Maybe it is the climate, maybe it is the weather, maybe it is
the culture of the countries, I do not know, but certainly the
Mediterranean RAC is not the one which was created at first. Nevertheless,
we are right now in the process of deciding on the last elements
which would allow formal establishment of that Regional Advisory
Council. We have to decide on budget, composition, headquarters,
but we are making fairly good progress right now.
Q742 Chairman: I can understand your
concern to make sure that the RACs remain formally advisory bodies,
but the alternative is not just to go from advisory to executive
decision-making. A model that we have been presented with in the
evidence we have received would take the form of something like
the Commission or Council setting the policy parameters by saying
mortality rates were to be reduced by X per cent, then going to
the RACs and saying, "How do you think it is appropriate
in your area to achieve that policy objective? What is necessary
to achieve that policy objective?", and then, if the Commission
is satisfied that the RAC is coming up with something that is
credible, accepting that advice? Is that a model that you would
be comfortable with?
Mr Seam: That is as far as we can go in terms
of advisory function. We can even discuss with the RACs or ask
the RACs to advise us on the validity or the opportunity of the
targets you mention, so we can request advice from RACs on any
parameter of the management and conservation of the fisheries
resources or the fisheries sector, but even if in the context
of a RAC (or several RACs for that matter) a common view is achieved,
this common view will have to be factored into the Commission
proposal if the Commission so wishes, or afterwards within the
negotiation process if the concerned Member States are willing
to defend that view. This is a way for the functioning of the
system which we can accept but this remains an advisory function.
It is not for the RAC to decide on legally constraining instruments,
legally binding tools and implement them. The decision-making,
the enforcement, the control and the sanction will rest with the
public authorities in the Commission and the other institutions
here in Brussels and the Member States concerned.
Chairman: I do not think there is that degree of
conflict in the two positions that initially might appear. Having
slapped the Earl of Dundee down for mentioning the word "decentralisation",
perhaps the Earl of Arran would cover that.
Q743 Earl of Arran: There is the
criticism, as you well know, that the CFP is too centralized and
the suggestion is that some EU institutions might agree on principles
and set objectives but that they would devolve technical decisions
on implementation to Member States or even to individual regions,
so it is a question of balance. What is the French Government's
view on this and if that were to happen what do they see as the
problems thereby if that were to be suggested?
Mr Seam: I am not sure you will be satisfied
with the answer.
Q744 Earl of Arran: I have a feeling
you are right.
Mr Seam: I will read it or maybe translate it
because it is written in French anyway: "France is favourable
to subsidiarity where it is possible but we are cautious with
the coherence and the equity of the system".
Q745 Chairman: Magnificent!
Mr Seam: Having said that, I may go beyond my
formal instructions which rest in these two lines. We are very
much in favour of a regional approach or even a fisheries approach
where it is relevant, meaning that we have to take account of
the specificities of the regions or the fisheries. This is a position
which we have always advocated, most recently—and this is
an ongoing process—for the revision of the Cod Recovery
Plan where we consider that, contrary to other Member States,
the Commission has not gone far enough in the direction of a fishery-specific
approach or a regional approach. For example, we dispute the fact
that a common target in terms of fishing mortality is equally
relevant for all the areas involved. We dispute the fact that
the same pace of reduction of fishing mortality or fishing effort
is relevant for all the areas involved. Those are elements where
we consider differentiations should occur to take account of the
specificities of the stocks and the fisheries involved in the
different areas. I think this shows that we are very much in favour
of regionalisation. On the other hand, on some issues of principle
we consider that the common approach should be preserved at the
Community level, for example, for controls. Of course, we have
to take account of the specificities of the regions but we cannot
go so far as to consider that because of the hot climate in the
south the ten per cent control rate is sufficient whereas in the
north it should be 50%. It depends on the very specific issues
we address and the general statement I gave can be refined according
to the very specific elements which we are discussing. For some
issues we will defend a regional approach such as fixing targets,
fixing the relevant period of reference for assessing the situation
of the stock, or the relevant period of reference for assessing
the fishing effort because of different trends and different evolutions
in the development of the fleet, for example, but for some other
elements we are very much in favour of consistency across the
board. I cannot give you off the top of my head, beyond those
two examples that I have tried to give you to illustrate my position,
a general line on those issues which would fall into the square
"Common approach" and those issues which would fall
into the square "Take account of the specificities".
Q746 Earl of Arran: Do you find that
general line is in line with the thinking of other Member States?
Mr Seam: Within the limits of my experience
so far it seems to me that the southern Member States put very
much emphasis on regionalisation which could be labelled otherwise
as "the Mediterranean is a different issue".
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch: We have touched on
relative stability a little bit already. We have had conflicting
opinions in the discussions that we have been having about the
importance of relative stability. For example, your colleague
from Germany who was here this morning said that this was absolutely
crucial to them in terms of future discussions and we wondered
what the French position was on this issue.
Q747 Chairman: Spain said they would
like to do away with it tomorrow.
Mr Seam: Our official position is that we consider
that relative stability is a crucial element of the Common Fisheries
Policy. I believe we should be quite comfortable with this statement—and
this is not in my instructions—because we were not badly
treated, I would say, when we decided first the allocation of
quotas between Member States, so we are fairly happy with the
way it is. Nevertheless, we consider that some elements which
are considered as relative stability by some other Member States
are not relevant for relative stability in our view. I guess you
understand what I refer to. We have a joint statement from a lot
of Member States every year in the Council to express the view
that the Hague Preferences undermine relative stability. The Hague
Preferences is a system whereby, if the UK or Ireland claim an
entitlement to the application of the Hague Preference, the allocation
between the Member States concerned is revised to leave a larger
share of the quotas to the UK and Ireland to the detriment, of
course, of the other Member States concerned because the general
TAC remains the same. This is a mechanism which allows a modification
of the allocation acquis between the Member States concerned
in an area concerned with a specific stock, which we consider
runs counter to the principle of relative stability because it
indeed modifies the allocation acquis between Member States,
but of course the UK and Ireland do not share that view. They
consider that it is an integral part of the relative stability.
Q748 Chairman: So is France a signatory
to that?
Mr Seam: Yes. We are not only a signatory but
I think we were the original drafters of that statement. I should
underline that this system does not only exist for Ireland and
the UK, even though it does not have the same name. We also have
specific preferences for mackerel for Denmark. The system operates
in a different manner. It is not upon request from Denmark that
the allocation acquis is modified between Member States.
If the TAC reaches a certain level then the mechanism automatically
kicks in and the allocation acquis is modified to the advantage
of Denmark and to the detriment, of course, of other Member States
involved.
Q749 Baroness Jones of Whitchurch:
So what you are saying is that there is no agreement on the precise
application of relative stability? In a sense it could be a meaningless
phrase that everybody signs up to but they all have a different
interpretation.
Mr Seam: The principle itself is subscribed
to by all the Member States which consider that it is a very important
element of the Common Fisheries Policy.
Q750 Lord Cameron of Dillington:
Apart from Spain.
Mr Seam: Even Spain where it suits their needs.
The problem for Spain is, of course, that they were not allocated
specific quotas in the North Sea and they would like to revise
the relative stability in the North Sea. It is not for me to tell
you but if you talk to Spain and the way they view relative stability,
for example, in the context of fisheries partnership agreements
and the way licences are allocated to Member States, for example
under those agreements, they would consider that the licences
allocated to them are an entitlement for the future, but, of course,
in the world in which we live all the Member States will just
defend relative stability where it is convenient. It is the name
of the game.
Chairman: Let us go on from relative stability at
that level to rights-based management which impacts on relative
stability.
Q751 Lord Cameron of Dillington:
Do you favour the transferable ability of quotas now individually
or between Member States or within producer organisations? How
far would you take any quota transfer as an individual right,
or is the existing system whereby you can change various quotas
in various fisheries (which seems to happen even internationally
already) sufficient although it is not necessarily fully recognised?
Mr Seam: There are several elements in your
question. Are we in favour of individual transferable quotas?
The answer is no. We do not want tradable quotas. We do not want
to have a private market for quotas. The position is very clear.
One of the underlying reasons is that we all realised the way
the allocation of fishing rights evolved in some countries where
this system applies and the main conclusion we draw from that
is that the final result is a concentration of fishing rights
within a minority, which is something we do not want to happen
in France. When it comes to exchange of quotas between Member
States we believe this is an important element to allow flexibility
in the system and this is something we are very much in favour
of, so it is totally different, of course, because we do not buy
the quota. We have to swap quotas, so the quota swapping system
is something we are very much in favour of, but beyond that, when
it comes to the allocation of quotas within one Member State,
we believe subsidiarity has to apply. If in some Member States
there is a tradition of allocating within that Member State quota
on an administrative basis, which is that the central government
or the central authority decides how things are allocated to different
areas, different fisheries, different boats maybe, it is fine.
If it is a more decentralised system because of other arrangements,
it is also fine. It is up to each of the Member States to decide
without interfering with the general functioning of the system
or within the functioning of the system of another Member State
to decide what is best suited for its specific situation.
Q752 Lord Cameron of Dillington:
But always based on annual TACs rather than long-term quota rights?
Mr Seam: So far, yes, but, talking about individual
quotas, we developed in the blue fin tuna quota management an
individual quota system with an allocation of a specific annual
quota in France to specific boats, the larger boats, but this
system of individual quota is not a transferable system. When
the quota is exhausted we close the fisheries for the specific
boat concerned. There is no possibility of exchanging quotas from
one boat to another, so we retain the competence within the central
authority to close the fisheries for those specific boats.
Q753 Lord Cameron of Dillington:
And that competence should remain with the Member State or the
producer organisation or the Community?
Mr Seam: We are flexible on the first two elements
you quoted, not the third one. We do not think it is for the Community
or for the Commission acting on behalf of the Community to decide
on the quota for individual boats. This is a competence which
rests within the Member State concerned, but afterwards, whether
the Member State wants to have that done by a director of the
central administration or the sector itself is up to that Member
State.
Q754 Lord Palmer: In its annual report
for 2006 on Member States' efforts to achieve a sustainable balance
between fishing capacity and fishing opportunities, the Commission
concluded that insufficient action had been taken by the Member
States. Your country, for example, cut its gross tonnage by just
over eight per cent over the three-year period 2003-2006. Do you
consider this to have been sufficient? How is France using the
EFF to assist in making further capacity reductions? Do you plan
to allow the EFF to be used to purchase, for example, new engines
for certain types of fishing vessels?
Mr Seam: I think to some extent, sir, I have
answered that in response to your inquiry on the so-called fuel
subsidies.
Q755 Lord Palmer: But you said there
were not fuel subsidies.
Mr Seam: Indeed. That is the reason why I called
them the "so-called fuel subsidies". To complement my
first answer and in response to the specific questions you have
here, I can say that within this Plan Barnier we envisage
huge decommissioning budgets because we are very much aware that
with the currently high costs of the operation of fishing vessels
and the limited stocks to fish we have too many boats.
Q756 Chairman: And that is a permanent
reduction of capacity, is it?
Mr Seam: And we would address that through a
reduction of capacity.
Q757 Lord Cameron of Dillington:
Have you any percentage?
Mr Seam: I do not have any percentage because
we do not decide that alone. We have to tell the sector we have
a budget available, but afterwards it will be for the sector itself
to figure out whether they want to stay in the business or whether
they would be better off quitting the business and scrapping or
decommissioning the boat. I cannot just tell you out of 30 purse
seiners for blue fin tuna we want to scrap half. This is a voluntary
scheme at the end of the day. It is up to the sector. We provide
the incentive to do so and we provide sufficient budget to cover
all the requests if they arise, but I can tell you that it is
a very significant budget we have put in place. Having said that,
this should not be a dogma. Decommissioning should not be the
only way to address fisheries management and conservation. This
is an important tool but we have to design that to make sure that
it is targeted either on the segments of the fleets which are
the least profitable or, because the costs are too high, for example,
of course, bottom trawling would qualify more than gill nets,
or because of the specific state of specific stocks. Of course,
there is a willingness right now to encourage blue fin tuna vessels
to quit the business.
Q758 Chairman: It seems to be subject
to some slight contradictory tensions within the Plan Barnier
in that at one level you are providing support to enable people
to continue in the industry and at the other level you are wanting
to decommission.
Mr Seam: We have to do both. It is also through
decommissioning that, of course, the size of the fleet will be
reduced and that the quotas allocated to those remaining in the
business will increase.
Q759 Chairman: But if you did not
provide direct support then decommissioning would be a lot more
attractive to people.
Mr Seam: It might be.
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