A question of trust
58. The Home Office thought it was not particularly
clear why so much information was not channelled through Europol;
it was likely to be a combination of factors, but "there
is the issue that tends to pervade all information exchange between
countries and Europol, the issue of "confidence and trust"
in handling and protecting the data". (p 3) Mr Storr
amplified this in oral evidence: "I think more needs to be
done to convince Member States of the added value that Europol
can provide, and indeed the integrity
and the security
of their information systems."(Q 55)
59. In connection with the analysis work files,
which we consider in the following chapter, the Home Office said:
"
although there is no evidence of Europol's systems
being insecure, we recognise a reluctance on the part of many
Member States to share what is very sensitive information, especially
in the early stages of an investigation and the information gathering
process, where any leak could compromise the investigation."(p 5)
Where sensitive material was compromised it was not only prosecution
cases that were jeopardised; lives which might be put at risk,
a point made both by Sir Ronnie Flanagan and by Chief Constable
Ken Jones, the President of the Association of Chief Police Officers
(ACPO). (QQ 385-386, 392) HMRC said bluntly: "
there is still a strong reluctance from HMRC to share sensitive
intelligence with other Member States through Europol channels.
The Fiscal Crime Liaison Officer Network is the preferred route."(p 205)
60. "Confidence", "security",
"integrity"these words in our view all point
to a lack of trust as being the main reason why the central Europol
system is so often bypassed. Any information going into the system
goes, potentially, to the national units of 27 Member States,
and thence to their "competent authorities", potentially
all their law enforcement authorities. While there is undoubtedly
an element of convenience in simply discussing problems and sharing
information with only a few other liaison officers, in the case
of more sensitive information this may be thought not just desirable
but essential and, we would add, entirely understandable. But
it entails the major disadvantage that, unless and until that
information is shared with Europol and with States other than
those known to be involved, it will not be apparent whether there
is a benefit to be derived from making it available for analysis
by Europol or other Member States.
61. Mr Augustin Diaz de Mera MEP, the member
of the LIBE Committee of the European Parliament[36]
who acted as rapporteur for the draft Council Decision, told us:
"Europol was created in 1995, which is almost 13 years ago,
and we have not been able to reach the kind of trust level that
we wanted
there has been a problem of not being able to
share enough information and intelligence between Member States
It is not a problem of the Member States, but rather of
their special services not being able to trust each other as much
as they should. The key is trust."(Q 273)
OUR CONCLUSIONS
62. There is a lot to be said for building
up bilateral and multilateral contacts between national liaison
officers. It is the first and most important step in the development
of trust between them.
63. However, for Member States to share information
in a limited way through liaison officers is the antithesis of
the purpose of Europol, which is the enhancement of the already
existing combined effort of the Member States' competent authorities
so that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Limited
sharing of information will not achieve a common approach to cross-border
cooperation against serious crimes.
64. The Home Office tell us that the United
Kingdom is prepared to take a lead in improving the amount of
material shared with Europol. (p 3) We look forward to hearing
in the Government's response to this report precisely what steps
they intend to take to bring this about.
65. We consider in Chapter 7 how trust might
be improved.
29 The Passenger Name Record (PNR) Framework Decision
(15th Report, Session 2007-08, HL Paper 106, paragraphs 38-40). Back
30
When we took oral evidence from the Directors of SOCA we put to
them the point that the requirement for banks, estate agents,
lawyers and others to make suspicious activity reports was too
widely drawn . We were told that there were indeed one million
records on the database, but that it was a very useful database
enabling SOCA "to identify, for example, very quickly, criminal
networks involved in the laundering of money, and the MTIC fraudsters,
the so-called carousel VAT fraudsters". We accept that since
the making of suspicious activity reports is a requirement under
the Proceeds of Crime Act there is no possibility of an immediate
change, but we caution against the possibility of SOCA being inundated
with enormous volumes of data, much of which might related to
matters other than serious crime. (QQ 78-80) Back
31
Convention, Article 4; Decision, Article 8. Back
32
Sir Stephen Lander, the Chairman of SOCA, is a former Director-General
of MI5, but this is coincidental. William Hughes, the Director-General
of SOCA, is a former Director General of the National Crime Squad,
while Rob Wainwright, the International Director of SOCA, was
formerly Director of the International Division of the National
Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS). Back
33
and a number of other States and bodies: see Chapter 6. Back
34
The figures given by Mr Wainwright in answer to Q 103 are rather
different, but this does not affect our argument. Back
35
Recommendation 19. Back
36
The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. Back