Counter-terrorism
113. When the Europol Convention was signed in
1995, international terrorism did not have the prominence it has
today. Terrorist activities were not even among the forms of crime
which were Europol's initial priorities.[55]
114. There is no doubt about the importance which
the Member States, and Europol, attach today to its counter-terrorism
activities. The Analysis Work File on Islamic terrorism is the
only one to which all the Member States have agreed to contribute
information, and an annual EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report
(TE-SAT) is issued to complement the OCTA. Nevertheless one of
our concerns was to see whether Europol's working methods were
as well adapted to the fight against terrorism as against other
forms of serious crime. Mr Hughes gave us an example. (Q 92)
BOX 8
Europol's role in counter-terrorism
Europol played a key role in an operation led by Greater Manchester Police to prosecute a man for offences related to terrorism. Key evidence was developed from the documents that were seized at his address in Manchester but most of the correspondence between him and his associates in Pakistan and Afghanistan was in Arabic. Europol experts supported that investigation for GMP, translated and analysed the material and found evidence that clearly showed his complicity in supporting terrorism. That man has now been prosecuted, convicted and sentenced.
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115. In September 2005 the Council adopted a Decision[56]
which obliges Member States to provide Europol with comprehensive
information relating to investigations in terrorist cases involving
two or more Member States. But when we took evidence from Professor de
Kerchove he told us: "Europol it seems (and they have confirmed
that) does not get systematic information on terrorist cases
they have identified for the first three months of 2008 six cases,
ten per cent of what they have received, where Member States should
have sent information. After having asked the Member States to
provide information, out of the six cases they received three
answers. Out of the other three cases, in two they did not get
any information and they got one refusal, based on the fact that
it was not police information but linked to an intelligence operation.
That means that there is room for improvement for sure".
(Q 352)
116. The 2005 Council Decision was thus adopted
under the United Kingdom Presidency, two months after the 7/7
bomb attacks. It states in a recital that it is "without
prejudice to essential national security interests, and it should
not jeopardise the safety of individuals or the success of a current
investigation or specific intelligence activities in the field
of State security." This, presumably, is the basis on which
Member States believe they can decline to comply with it. But
we believe that where the Governments of the Member States have
unanimously adopted legislation requiring their security services
to pass intelligence information to Europol, that is what should
be done.
117. The Government must make sure that United
Kingdom agencies comply with the 2005 Council Decision on the
supply to Europol of information relating to terrorism investigations,
subject always to the qualification protecting essential national
security interests. We recommend that the Government should persuade
other Member States to do likewise.
118. Professor de Kerchove also pointed
out to us that Europol had suggested that the 2005 Council Decision
should be amended to delete the requirement of Article 2(3) that
at least two Member States must be involved in a terrorist act
for that Decision to apply; he explained that when you start an
investigation you do not always know if another Member State is
involved. (Q 353) He thought, and we agree, that the Council
should consider amending the 2005 Decision to remove this constraint.
However we appreciate that nothing in the Decision prevents
a Member State from providing Europol with information even if
no other Member State is involved, and we understand that the
United Kingdom already does so.
119. Currently Europol is run by the police for
the police. In at least some of the larger Member States prevention
of terrorism is dealt with, not only by the police, but primarily
by the intelligence services through other channels, usually highly
confidential bilateral channels. This is the case with the United
Kingdom: as we have explained, our national unit is SOCA, which
is not responsible for counter-terrorism. They told us that "currently
the UK's CT liaison post is provided through the posting of a
Metropolitan Police Counter Terrorism Command (SO15) officer to
the UK Liaison Bureau. He oversees the flow of a significant amount
of information to Europol from ongoing UK investigations and operations
and other sources
an increasing amount of operational data
is also provided by the recently established regional CT Units,
most significantly the Greater Manchester Police CTU."(p 26)
120. We asked Professor de Kerchove whether
in his view there should be a more direct link into Europol from
Member States' intelligence agencies. He replied that at the time
of 9/11 he had suggested creating at Europol a counter-terrorist
task force where Member States could send intelligence and security
agents. However the suggestion was not well received. "The
intelligence community is not very eager to work with Europol.
They could [do so]
'competent authorities' may provide
information to Europol. Nowhere is it said that it is only the
police as such.[57] The
security services, MI5 or the DST in France, could be considered
as competent authorities and provide information to Europol. I
think in the long run it will happen. I am optimistic on that
one, but it will take a lot of time."(Q 357)
121. For as long as communication between a Member
State and Europol could only take place through a single national
unit, there was no scope for a direct link with intelligence agencies.
But since the entry into force of the Danish Protocol in April
2007 there is a provision, which will be carried over into the
Decision, allowing Member States to authorise direct contacts
between designated competent authorities and Europol. It is thus
open to the United Kingdom to designate MI5 as an authority which
can have direct bilateral contacts with Europol. Other Member
States could of course do likewise. This would implement Professor de
Kerchove's suggestion.
122. We are however mindful of the distinction
between sending information on counter-terrorism to Europol for
law enforcement purposes, and the exchange of intelligence. We
suspect that the reasons for the intelligence community's reluctance
to work with Europol are twofold: the low level of security clearance
of many Europol officials, and the fact that intelligence is already
exchanged through SitCen, the EU Joint Situation Centre.[58]
123. We believe the Government should treat
with caution any proposal that direct exchanges of intelligence
between the security services of the United Kingdom and those
of other Member States should take place through Europol.
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