DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY
168. Recital (20) of the Decision reads: "It
is also desirable to provide for enhanced control over Europol
by the European Parliament in order to ensure that Europol remains
a fully accountable and transparent organisation". Aside
from the budget, the only provision on these lines is Article
48, requiring the Presidency, the Chairman of the Management Board
and the Director to appear before the European Parliament when
so requested. The "enhanced control" seems to arise
from the fact that under the Convention it is merely permissive
for the Presidency and Director to appear before the Parliament.
169. Not surprisingly, some of our witnesses
regarded this as inadequate. Professor den Boer thought that
"democratic accountability … could still be improved
to the extent that the European Parliament were fully responsible
for the democratic control of Europol in combination (and I emphasise
'in combination') with the national parliaments."(Q 149)
Professor Juliet Lodge from the University of Leeds also
stressed the role of national Parliaments: "I think the parliaments,
the national parliaments in particular … need to become more
proactive in stating what they want before technology is adopted
… I think there is a role also for national parliaments in
being very vigilant in defining the objectives and the competences
of Europol … In addition to that, the national parliaments
might want to have some oversight over the output from joint investigation
teams …"(Q 126)
170. At the time the Decision was agreed, it
was assumed that the Treaty of Lisbon would have been in force
for a year before Europol became an agency. Had that been the
case, then as we explained in paragraph 24, Article 88 of the
TFEU would have required the European Parliament and the Council
to adopt regulations which, among other things, "shall also
lay down the procedures for scrutiny of Europol's activities by
the European Parliament, together with national Parliaments."
171. Article 85 of the TFEU has a similar but
not identical provision for Eurojust. It reads: "These regulations
shall also determine arrangements for involving the European Parliament
and national Parliaments in the evaluation of Eurojust's activities."
In the case of Eurojust the national parliaments are placed on
a more equal footing with the European Parliament, and are "involved
in the evaluation" of Eurojust's activities, as opposed to
"scrutinising" Europol's. There are differences in other
language texts. A deliberately different text normally suggests
that a different meaning is intended, but it is not clear what
that difference might be in practice.
172. What seems clear is that in the case of
Europol it was to have been for the European Parliament to take
the initiative. What remains unclear is whether, in the absence
of a formal legal base, there will be any part for the European
Parliament and national parliaments to play. Clearly there is
no way in which the Parliament and Council can adopt a Regulation
to lay down the procedures; but we see no reason why the Parliament
should not adopt its own procedures, and invite national parliaments
to play a role.
173. In our last report on Europol,[64]
looking at the proposals of the Danish Presidency which were the
basis of the Danish Protocol, we noted that in February 2002 the
Commission had published a Communication on Democratic Control
over Europol[65]
which proposed a joint committee of the European Parliament
and national parliaments meeting twice a year to scrutinise the
work of Europol. The Danish Presidency adopted this suggestion
in the first draft of the Protocol, but it was withdrawn from
subsequent drafts. We thought this a pity, and recommended that
the Government should press for the idea of a joint committee
to be reinstated.[66]
We do not repeat that recommendation today; a committee which
might have been merely cumbersome when there were only 15 Member
States would surely be almost unworkable with 27.
174. It must be for the European Parliament
to decide whether it wishes to adopt, in the spirit of the Treaty
of Lisbon, a formal procedure for the scrutiny of Europol's activities,
and whether, and if so how, to involve the national parliaments
of the Member States. We hope however that the Parliament will
give this serious consideration.
175. The change in Europol's status which will
be brought about in 2010 will not of course in any way affect
the ability of this Parliament, through its Select Committees,
to continue to hold the Government to account for their part in
the activities of Europol.
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