EU-CHINA: CLOSER PARTNERS, GROWING RESPONSIBILITIES
(14381/06)
Letter from the Chairman to Rt Hon Geoff
Hoon MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign amd Commonwealth Office
The above Communication was considered by the
Sub-Committee C at its meeting on 23 November, and the attached
working document on trade and investment was considered by Sub-Committee
A on 28 November. Both Sub-Committees cleared the documents from
scrutiny.
Sub-Committee C commended the Commission for
a timely and thoughtful paper. However the Sub-Committee commented
that the Commission seemed to have shown timidity in criticising
the Chinese Government. In particular the Sub-Committee believed
that the EU should not lift the arms embargo without concrete
and sustainable concessions on human rights and the rule of law,
pointing out that the communication failed to address the question
of arms transfers that are allegedly taking place through illegal
or para-legal channels: the arms embargo will only prove to be
a powerful negotiating chip if it is indeed effective and enforced.
Sub-Committee C also commented that the Communication
painted a rather rosy picture of a common interest. However, recent
analyses suggest that China's role in the world is much less about
promoting peace, development and human rights than about securing
raw materials, especially oil, for its growing economy. In particular
China has shown an ambivalent approach to the international peace
and development agenda in Africa.
In general the Sub-Committee felt that the EU's
strategy toward China should seek to tackle the negative aspects
of China's world wide impact and influence in a more direct manner.
Sub-Committee C have also requested information
on the financial implications in greater detail than the general
statement in paragraph 14 of the Explanatory Memorandum.
28 November 2006
Letter from Rt Hon Geoff Hoon MP to the
Chairman
Thank you for your letter of 28 November, about
the Commission Communication China-EU: Closer partners, growing
responsibilities.
You note that Sub-Committee C comments that
the Commission seemed to have shown "timidity" in criticising
the Chinese Government, with particular reference to the arms
embargo and to China's role in Africa.
The potential benefits of Chinese economic growth,
for East Asia, and further afield, are real. Increased trade and
investment is essential to Africa's progress towards sustainable
development and achieving the Millennium Development Goals. China,
as a global economic power with a significant and growing economic
relationship with Africa, will play a key role and there is already
evidence that this relationship is contributing to African growth
rates. China also provides large amounts of infrastructure investment
across the continent.
We understand that China's approach and priorities
in Africa do not always overlap with the EU's, and that in particular
the EU needs to work to persuade China to act in ways that directly
support peace and sustainable development, including through good
governance and sound economic management. This will take time
and require action on various levels. The Communication outlines
some key areas including encouraging China's participation in
international for a to improve aid efficiency and co-ordination.
Increasing EU-China practical co-operation on the ground is also
part of this wider process.
The Communication also calls for structured
EU-China dialogue on Africa's sustainable development. Groundwork
for such a dialogue is being prepared at working level within
the EU. We look forward to an early start as part of our broader
efforts to increase the depth and scope of our dialogue with China
both through the EU and bilaterally.
With reference to the arms embargo, although
the Communication notes the Commission's belief that "the
EU should work with China to improve the atmosphere for lift,
making progress on China's human rights situation", it is
important to note that this is a matter for Member States to decide.
And there is cunently no consensus for an arms embargo lift within
the EU, as discussion at the General Affairs and External Relations
Council on 11 December made clear. The agreed policy of Member
States remains as set out in the European Council Conclusions
of December 2004 which in this context "recalled the importance
of the criteria of the Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, in particular
criteria regarding human rights, stability and security in the
region and the national security of friendly and allied countries".
Member States decide at a national level how
to interpret the embargo. The UK interprets the embargo in line
with the statement made by FCO Ministers to Parliament on 3 June
1998, which covered lethal weapons including machine guns, large
calibre weapons, bombs, torpedoes, rockets and missiles; specially
designed components of the above and ammunition; military aircraft
and helicopters, vessels of war, armoured fighting vehicles and
other such weapons platforms; and any equipment which might be
used for internal repression.
Allegedly "para-legal" shipments is
also an issue for Member States to interpret at national level,
within the framework of the EU Consolidated Code of Conduct. The
Government believes that any item which falls outside those stipulated
in the embargo is still subject to a rigorous application process
and considered on a case by case basis. Should there be any concerns
that the goods in question are likely to be diverted to an undesirable
end-use, we will not issue a licence. We are not aware of any
illegal shipments by UK industry.
The Committee also requested further information
on the financial implications of the Commission Communication.
At this stage, the Commission has not set out associated costs.
However, we would expect that much of the cost of implementing
the strategy contained in the Communication will be administrative;
for example, those costs related to carrying out the EU-China
Strategic and Human Rights Dialogues. Such costs will be met from
within existing Commission and Member State budgets.
While the Communication does not explicitly
address financial implications, we would expect EC funds for China
to come primarily from the Development Cooperation Instrument
under the External Actions Heading of the next EC Financial Perspective
(2007-13). China would also be eligible to draw on funds from
other thematic external instruments including the Stability, Environment
and Nuclear Assistance instruments as necessary.
Some of the potential future actions outlined
in the Communication will inevitably have associated costs. While
it is not possible to quantify many of these costs, some broad
estimates are possible—for example, working together to
develop and deploy a near zero emission coal (NZEC) demonstration
plant using carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology. To construct
an NZEC power plant would cost roughly €190 million more
than a traditional power plant of equivalent output. The EU has
a climate security interest in demonstrating this technology within
the Chinese market, and might contribute towards these additional
costs.
The EU seeks, through its strategic partnership
with China, to build up an increasingly mature and realistic dialogue
across a range of international issues. The EU's strategy recognises
that, while we should seek to pursue engagement with China in
areas of common interest, there are some aspects of China's international
influence that do not fully reinforce the EU's objectives and
values. As the Communication notes, "there remain differences
in values, on which dialogue must continue". The EU therefore
seeks an effective working partnership, communicating its expectations
in an open and clear manner, while avoiding potentially counter-productive
language.
18 December 2006
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