Human security
27. The term "human security" was raised
in the evidence we took. The concept was strongly endorsed by
Professor Kaldor for whom it was "an easy way to make
it clear to people that what Europe does, which is sometimes called
the Petersberg[8] tasks
or contribution to crisis management, is very different from what
a classic nation state does" (Q 89). "… Serious
preventative efforts involving dialogue, co-operation, helping
to strengthen the law, all the things that are involved in a typical
human security approach" were needed for the "conflicts
waiting to happen in the Caucasus, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia,
Ossetia, Chechnya …" (Q 103). Dr Giegerich
(International Institute for Strategic Studies) agreed with the
"general assessment of the usefulness and the great promise
of human security as an underlying concept". This provided
a set of norms as well as operational implications. However, human
security was a luxury; the human being would probably lose out
against the national level if a state or government had to make
a choice, although this was not the situation at present (Q 109).
28. Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner in Brussels
told us that she had personally always taken a human-centred approach
"where the citizen is the main focus of concern—if
not for the citizens, for whom do we make these policies?"
(Q 165). Maciej Popowski, Director for Horizontal Issues
in the Development Directorate-General of the Commission, spoke
of the security risks and costs of non-achievement of the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) "because if we fail to achieve them
collectively it might produce devastating results in terms of
human security which I think will be the new focus of the revised
Security Strategy" (Q 201).
29. Nick Witney's understanding of the term "human
security" was that "to get things right in the societies
that you are possibly intervening in" it was necessary to
"look at the grass roots and ... address the problems of
the individual human beings on the ground". This was the
lesson which was being re-learnt in Afghanistan where winning
the hearts and minds of people, as well as work with the central
government, was needed for a successful outcome (Q 46). Major-General
Messervy-Whiting was not comfortable with the term "human
security" but thought that "the EU, certainly in some
of its smaller, more recent, good governance-type operations—security
sector reform and other operations, mainly military in nature—is
actually addressing those sorts of issues directly on the ground"
(QQ 46, 47).
30. An important development since 2003 has been
the adoption of the concept of the "responsibility to protect"
by the UN reform summit in 2005. We discuss this in Chapter 3,
paragraphs 93-97.
31. Concepts of security range from the traditional
defence against armed attack from a hostile power, to more recent
concepts, such as human security, which focuses on the individual.
Both types of concept are relevant to European security and should
be taken into account in the review. The August 2008 conflict
in Georgia has, for example, reminded Europeans of the continuing
existence of military threats while events in Afghanistan have
shown the importance of human security. But we would caution against
an approach which extends the concept of human security to almost
any form of human activity; and also against any attempt to establish
a hierarchy between state security and human security.
THE TIMING
32. We asked our witnesses about the timing of
the ESS review and heard differing views. Professor Bailes
thought this was not the best time for a review. Like the 2003
Strategy, any review carried out now was bound to be a creature
of its time and reflect current concerns (see Chapter 3) (Q 126).
It might be cautious because it was being undertaken before the
anticipated changes from the Lisbon Treaty, combined with the
uncertainty about what would happen to the Treaty after the Irish
"No" vote; and because the results of the United States
presidential elections would not be fully understood. December
2008 was not the right moment for the EU to "launch the big
new idea, particularly on the Euro/Atlantic partnership"
before the voice of the new United States President, or perhaps,
even the new Russian President, had been fully heard (Q 137).
33. For Professor Bailes a further problem
of timing was that the French had obtained agreement in the EU
to a larger review of the EU's future mission and scope to be
carried out by a group of "wise persons"[9]
after ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. It was not clear what
would happen to that review but some nations might want to reserve
"some of the meat" for a review taking place outside
all the traditional institutions (Q 126).
34. Professor Heisbourg, on the other hand,
had no difficulties with the timing because both US presidential
candidates had "gone out of their way to demonstrate their
multilateral bona fides" (Q 137). "It would
be quite nice to have a thoughtful EU document coming out with
… a reasonable and civilised discussion of the relationship
between the EU and the US/NATO which I think we can undertake
now. We are no longer in 2003". In addition, he thought,
one might have to wait longer for the voice of the Russian President.
He considered, though, that timing was bad in other respects because
of the Irish referendum, but he did not see why the EU should
not embark on the review. However, it should not be railroaded
through if the scheduled time [of submission to the European Council
in December 2008] proved too short. Both Professors Bailes and
Heisbourg thought that, in general, regular review processes might
usefully be built into the workings of the EU in future (QQ 129,
130). Dr Giegerich also thought that "one might have
to think about how one institutionalises a review process for
implementation" (Q 90).
35. We consider that developments in the past
five years on the global scene and the events in Georgia in August
2008 make a review timely, while recognising that the December
2008 date for the presentation of the review is too early for
the implications for transatlantic relations of the US election
to have been absorbed and for the future of the Lisbon Treaty
to have been resolved.
36. The ESS should in future be reviewed on
a regular basis, normally every five years.
1 See Appendix No 5. Back
2
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) Back
3
Council Conclusions website www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/97669.pdf.
Dr Solana was asked to examine the implementation of the 2003
European Security Strategy "with a view to proposing elements
on how to improve the implementation and, as appropriate, elements
to complement it, for adoption by the European Council in December
2008" Back
4
The Committee first looked at the European Security Strategy in
its 26 October 2004 report-European Union Committee, 31st Report
(2003-2004) EU Security Strategy (HL180)-which was published
shortly after the Strategy was adopted. Back
5
Caroline Flint MP was appointed Minister for Europe as part of
the Government reshuffle at the beginning of October 2008, replacing
Jim Murphy MP. Back
6
All EU Member States are members of NATO with the exception of
Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden. Back
7
Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the
High-level seminar on relations between the EU and NATO, Paris,
7th July 2008. Back
8
The so-called "Petersberg" crisis management tasks were
formulated by the Western European Union in 1992 and subsequently
incorporated into the EU Treaty as part of the European Security
and Defence Policy (ESDP). As stated in article 17(2) of the Treaty
on European Union, these tasks include "humanitarian and
rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in
crisis management, including peacemaking". Back
9
In order to help the Union anticipate and meet challenges more
effectively in the longer term (horizon 2020-2030), at its December
2007 meeting the European Council established an independent Reflection
Group. The Group was invited to identify the key issues and developments
which the Union is likely to face and to analyse how these might
be addressed. It will not cover institutional issues nor the EU's
next financial framework, and shall present its report to the
June 2010 European Council. Back
