The Strategy's influence on policy-making
37. The conclusions of the European Council of
December 2007, which mandated the review of the Strategy, stated
that "the European Security Strategy adopted in 2003 has
proved very useful. It provides the [European] Union with the
relevant framework for its external policy …"[10].
38. Our witnesses were generally in agreement
that the Strategy has been used as a point of reference in the
European Institutions. Dr Solana, High Representative for
CFSP said "the Strategy is a document that has been very
useful" (Q 218). Similarly, for Dr Giegerich "the
European Security Strategy is almost omnipresent. It is everywhere"
(Q 94). A more nuanced view was expressed by Dan Smith of
International Alert, who told us that the Strategy had provided
some "useful mapping points and reference points for the
EU institutions" (Q 1). However, Major-General Messervy-Whiting
(Birmingham University) thought that decision-makers in the Council
or the Political and Security Committee did not have the Strategy
"in their left hand whilst they voted with their right"
(Q 36).
39. Perhaps not surprisingly, within the European
institutions, awareness of the Strategy is greatest in the parts
of the Council and Commission dealing with security issues. References
are not systematically made to the Strategy in documents which
have a wider focus than just security or which cover external
relations or development issues in general. Examples include the
Country Strategy Papers (CSPs), Commission development aid planning
documents, and the Annual Policy Strategy, a strategic planning
document of the Commission.
40. Dan Smith thought it possible that the Commission
did not feel it had much ownership of the ESS document as it looked
like a Council Secretariat document. This would be felt in the
Commission's work "where there has been resistance to the
bringing in of security notions and this is also a political resistance
which has been straightforwardly expressed and argued through
in the European Parliament in the process of shaping the financial
perspectives for the current period …" (Q 28).
However, the ESS had helped to guide the work of the parts of
the Commission dealing with security and conflict prevention (Q 28).
41. Less attention has been paid to the Strategy
in the EU Member States, including the UK (Dan Smith Q 1), although
the situation varies considerably from country to country. According
to Jim Murphy MP, the then Minister for Europe, the UK Government's
approach on the other hand was that "…this is a document
that we will hope to influence to maximum effect rather than have
it influence us, because we would only sign up to that with which
we agree" (Q 391). The Government's aim was to ensure
that the revised European Security Strategy mirrored very strongly
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) four strategic priorities:
- Counter-terrorism and weapons proliferation,
and their causes;
- Prevent and resolve conflict;
- Promote a low carbon, high growth, global
economy
- Develop effective international institutions,
above all the UN and EU
Jim Murphy believed that: "If we can do that,
I think we will have achieved what we have sought to achieve".
The Government had been successful in translating its priorities
into the 2003 European Security Strategy (Q 391). For Nick
Witney of the European Council on Foreign Relations, the UK National
Security Strategy, which is considerably larger in its ambit,
was "surprisingly congruent" with the European Security
Strategy, in particular in its analysis of the threats (Q 37).
42. This attitude contrasts with the approach
taken by some of the other EU Member States, where the EU Strategy
has had a notable impact on security thinking and strategic planning.
In Germany the EU Strategy had been taken as the frame of reference
in drafting the national security strategy published this year,
and in Austria it had influenced the defence reform documents
which were published between 2004 and 2005 (Giegerich, Q 96).
43. The European Security Strategy is used
extensively and influences policy-making in the EU institutions,
especially in the parts of the Council and Commission dealing
with security issues. To build on this achievement, we would encourage
the Council and Commission services to take steps to heighten
awareness of the Strategy among staff dealing primarily with other
policy areas, especially trade and development, justice and home
affairs, energy and the environment. We believe that in future
the Commission should make more use of the Strategy as a point
of reference in proposals it puts forward, including in its Annual
Policy Strategy and, where appropriate, Country Strategy Papers
which the Commission drafts as part of its development cooperation
policy.
44. The European Security Strategy represents
a common European analysis and Member States should therefore
use it as a point of reference although we recognise that it is
likely to continue to have a highly varying degree of influence
on policy-making in the Member States. We support the Government's
efforts to influence the outcome of the current review and encourage
them to raise awareness of the Strategy within relevant Departments,
including MOD, FCO, DFID and BERR, including through its incorporation
into staff training modules.
Is there a need to increase public
awareness of the Strategy?
45. We sought the views of our witnesses about
the level of awareness of the European Security Strategy among
the general public in the EU and whether more needed to be done
to improve it. For Dr Giegerich, the British Government had
failed to explain why certain security and defence activities
were carried out in cooperation with its European partners under
the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This problem
also applied to the European Security Strategy. He described the
Government's discourse as "rather defensive" and focused
on why the ESDP did not undermine NATO, rather than aimed at explaining
why it might be useful and helpful to British security policy
(Q 97).
46. Several witnesses thought that, while the
public would like to see the EU being active in the field of security,
there was little awareness of what the EU was doing in practice.
There were few mechanisms by which the public was consulted or
informed about these issues. But whereas Professor Heisbourg
thought it not a good idea to try to generate public debate on
a strategy document, Professor Bailes was of the view that
an effort should be made to involve people indirectly by stimulating
a debate and consulting non-state actors, such as non-governmental
and civil society organisations (Q 154).
47. Jim Murphy, the then Europe Minister, accepted
that the Government should do more to "popularise" the
Strategy. This could not be done through a "well-crafted
speech" but rather by placing emphasis on how the EU was
delivering: "When the European Union is doing remarkable
work—and it is remarkable work … in Afghanistan, Kosovo,
Palestine and wherever else—we should do more to highlight
it. We rightly are fantastically proud of our own forces and our
own civilian commitment in these missions, but I think we should
be a little more open about the fact that we are only actually
able to bring democracy and stability to these countries, or minimise
conflict, because we are part of a greater organisation, this
great democratic force" (Q 391).
48. Mr Murphy recognised that one way to
improve awareness of the Strategy among security and foreign policy
practitioners, as well as the general population, was to engage
civil society and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in a dialogue
on this topic. He mentioned that the Government recently organised
eight seminars on its 'Global Europe' agenda, five or six of which
involved British NGOs from a wide range of backgrounds. However,
none of the seminars had dealt specifically with the European
Security Strategy (QQ 394, 395).
49. Awareness of the ESS among the general
publics in the EU is low and interest is likely to remain at that
level unless a conscious effort is made to remedy this and to
connect the Strategy to developments which affect citizens' everyday
lives. We believe that, once the review has been completed, the
European institutions and the governments of Member States should
make explaining its relevance an important part of their public
diplomacy; and that HMG should do this in the UK. We also recommend
that any future review of the Strategy should be preceded by a
more systematic consultation of civil society institutions than
has been the case on this occasion.
10 European Council Presidency Conclusions, December
2007. Back
