Select Committee on European Union Thirty-First Report


CHAPTER 5: Implementation: Is the EU More Active, Capable and Coherent?

141.  This Chapter focuses on Section 3 of the ESS which calls on the EU to be more active, more capable and more coherent.

Implementation

142.  Dr Giegerich of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, thought that: "Looking at implementation is in fact much more important than tinkering with the text as such" (Q 90). The EU should consider whether to create sub-strategies to help with implementation, for example on crisis management (Q 94). Professor Kaldor (London School of Economics) told us that there should be "much more emphasis on implementation …" and "a greater commitment on the part of Member States" (QQ 89, 91). Implementation was not only about resources, though they were required, but how they were applied and used (Q 100).

143.  Maciej Popowski, (Director in the Development Directorate-General in Brussels) agreed that "the problem lies in the implementation … There is room for improvement" (Q 202). He thought that action plans could be the way forward: "we cannot write [the operational dimension] into the paper because it would blow up the whole intellectual construction" but, since the Security Strategy lacked an operational dimension, action plans could show how the EU could implement and mainstream security considerations into different policies (Q 210). Furthermore "We need to have a framework but also some policy instruments on how to implement what we have agreed upon at a strategic level" (Q 212).

144.  Dan Smith believed that the ESS "should be somehow reflected in the papers which the Commission draws up for its relations with and its activities and support for other countries outside the EU [the Country Strategy Papers]" as well as in the Commission's Annual Policy Strategy (Q 27).

145.  Javier Solana also told us about action plans for implementation which had been added since 2003, and cited the plan on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as an example. He also highlighted the need to develop co-operation between the civilian and the military sides of the EU's action and co-ordination in natural crises (Q 218). Richard Wright at the Commission also thought that the question which would be discussed this time was the extent to which the final strategy should have implementation plans attached to it (Q 196).

146.  Implementation of the Security Strategy is a key area on which the EU should focus its efforts. This could be achieved through the adoption of action plans or sub-strategies to take implementation forward. These action plans or sub-strategies should be linked to the overall approach to security set out in the Strategy, rather than incorporated into the existing document.

MORE ACTIVE

147.  The EU has increased its activity under the Common Foreign and Security Policy considerably since 2003. In all, the EU has sent 21 ESDP missions into the field since 2003, ranging geographically from Africa to the Middle East, from the Balkans to the Caucasus and Asia. The missions vary in size and purpose. Some have been military missions (such as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo), some civilian (such as Kosovo), and some combining military and civilian (Civ-mil) operations (such as Darfur). In some instances there has been a lead nation (France for the Congo), in some the EU is taking over operations from the UN (Kosovo), some are peacekeeping (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, FYROM), some are confidence building measures (the Rafah border crossing inspection mission in Gaza). Most recently the EU has been active in sending a peace-keeping mission to Georgia to monitor the ceasefire and Russian disengagement. These missions are consistent with the ESS's assertion in the section on "Addressing the Threats" that: "In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand" and "the first line of defence will often be abroad".

148.  Dan Smith thought that the EU had been more active and the ESDP missions represented good forward steps. "The European Security Strategy may not have caused that but it is part of that direction of the evolution of policy and approaches …" (Q 25). Nick Witney (European Council on Foreign Relations) however, thought that the ESDP fell short in all three areas—active, capable and coherent (Q 66).

MORE CAPABLE

149.  We heard from a number of witnesses that the EU's capabilities needed improvement. Specific areas were drawn to our attention, such as the shortage of civilian and military personnel—force generation—and helicopters. There were also the perennial problems of inadequate defence expenditure. These are discussed below.

150.  Dan Smith thought that there was still a long way to go on capability (Q 25). Robert Cooper echoed this thought but believed that the EU was sufficiently active. In Brussels the organisation had been improved in the five year period since 2003 and was more capable of handling the very large deployment in Kosovo than five years previously (Q 288). While he was not in favour of rewriting the Strategy document he was in favour of "trying to take some clearer steps in the direction that we want to go, particularly on the capability front" (QQ 289, 290).

151.  Lieutenant-General Leakey told us that it was a constant challenge to manage the gap between the political objectives, the situation on the ground and the means put at the disposal of the mission. In conducting military operations he thought that: "We have been capable and we have also been lucky." The operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia had not been demanding but had been well done, as had the first Congo mission which had been more demanding. The EUFOR operation in Bosnia had been done very well. The next Congo operation had been lucky as it had not been seriously tested and there had been problems where countries had placed national caveats, or restrictions, on the use of their troops. In Chad there had been many problems with finding personnel for operations (force generation.) On the plus side, the arrival of mission contingents from small and new Member States had expanded capability and they had performed well on operations (QQ 305, 306).

Helicopters, policemen and other shortages

152.  We heard of concerns within the EU institutions that the EU's capacity to act effectively on missions abroad is reaching its limit, though it had much improved since the Strategy was launched in 2003. Concerns focus mainly on the ability of the EU to raise sufficient civilian and military personnel, and the shortage of helicopters.

153.  Robert Cooper had "one particular personal fetish in the area of capabilities … whenever we try and do anything there are several things we find we have not got, and one is helicopters, which everybody is now working on very hard …" (Q 263). Dr Giegerich also referred to the availability of helicopters: "… in Europe there exist about 1,700 transport helicopters. That is a large number. They might not be the right type, they might need to be upgraded, they might need changes but the key question here is how do we not just talk about getting more but how do we get more of what is already available into actual operations?" (Q 109). The importance of working with Russia was also illustrated by Robert Cooper who pointed out that the first Russian participation in an ESDP operation with the contribution of helicopters was planned for Chad (Q 293).

154.  According to Robert Cooper: "The other thing we always find is in very short supply is policemen and, indeed, more general civilian capabilities". He thought this was partly because policemen were never intended to be deployed abroad and suggested that, to remedy the situation, Member States, who had responsibility for police, might consider whether there might not be merit in having national programmes for deploying civilians abroad. It would be useful if police forces recognised that serving in a mission abroad ought to be regarded as career enhancing and to equip people for promotion, rather than the opposite, which tended to happen. The need was now a regular feature of life and "we need to organise ourselves for it better …" (QQ 263-266). Kees Klompenhouwer, Director of ESDP Civilian Operations, also thought "We want to get good people, not just people who are available" (Q 341).

155.  Major-General Messervy-Whiting believed that some countries did have deployable police and legal assets, "particularly … those with a gendarmerie type of force and overseas territories or dominions still as opposed to the British police model." He understood that "even in the British police forces there are designated forces which do have pools of officers who are available and in some cases on standby to go overseas, not least of which are in relation to our own remaining dependent territories" (Q 74). He agreed that recently retired police officers had a range of expertise which could be used overseas (Q 71). Nick Witney advocated the idea of a civilian reserve corps for the EU (Q 70).

156.  Mr Popowski echoed these concerns: Member States and the European Defence Agency were working on the Capacity Development Plan. "We are trying to redefine our strategic interests in the Security Strategy but it has to be implemented and for that we need the capabilities, both military and civilian, and that is still the weak part … when it comes to an operation there is always the same conclusion, we are lacking helicopters and policemen … Every time we were planning an operation we always faced the same difficulties. It has to be addressed, but I do not think we need to go into details of capability development in the Security Strategy" (Q 215).

157.  Dr Giegerich stressed the difficulties in recruiting judges and prosecutors for some of the missions: "if someone is a judge who is to deploy in a few months from now, he has to stop hearing cases today, and we are still a month away from actual use in these operations … That is a strain on national systems that is considerable, and it gets worse if there are then delays in these missions and these people do not get to go. There is also a professional problem for them. The incentive structure for them to go on these operations needs to be rethought" (Q 124).

158.  Nick Witney commented that a considerable amount of work had been done defining what capabilities were needed. As with NATO, the question was what constituted deployable, available and effective expeditionary forces. There was a surfeit of analysis about what should be done and the deficiencies, for example helicopters. The important thing was to arrive at "a point of critical mass of impatience for people to say let us actually seriously tackle this and see if we can do something about it". He felt that more should be done on the humanitarian side, perhaps with a common fund and pre-stocked materials. In this context he also thought the EU considers the use of ships which could reach their destinations rapidly (Q 76). One of the problems linked to the shortage of personnel was, for Nick Witney, that the EU operations tended to be "emergency room stuff". He also commented that "support might be hypothetically available, but on the day it is far too often not" (Q 66).

159.  Kees Klompenhouwer expressed his concern that: "it is as if we are reaching a sort of capacity limit with the missions that we now have, particularly since I have a very big mission in Kosovo, EULEX, and we are doubling or significantly increasing in Afghanistan. We may have to significantly increase our presence in the Palestine Territories if the process goes well … building the capabilities of the Palestinian police is a key element of the whole two state solution." He thought that "we will have to be stronger on delivery, which means not only an effort on our side in planning these missions but also an effort on the side of the Member States who have to supply the scarce personnel …" He hoped that the next step or the next version of the ESS would help in addressing these issues (Q 308).

160.  Mr Klompenhouwer also pointed to the difficulties Member States faced in internal organisation when the call went out for personnel: "the weak part is the organisation in the Member States because a request comes in at the ministry of foreign affairs and then they have to mobilise other ministries. There is a need for a co-ordinated mechanism at the national level and nowadays in most Member States this has been established" (Q 335). Finland and Sweden had developed a national strategy.

161.  Lieutenant-General Leakey expressed concern about the fall in levels of defence expenditure across the EU. However this was presented, "it means less available capability by and large." The evidence, he thought, could be seen when the EU tried to raise personnel for operations (QQ 312-315). Different Member States fell into categories of why they could not participate in operations. Some states had the capability to participate but were unwilling to do so; some were willing to contribute but were not able to for various reasons.

162.  Kees Klompenhouwer pointed to problems arising from discrepancies in the pay of personnel on missions (QQ 349-351). The Commission contracted experts. On the other hand operational personnel were seconded by Member States and their salary was paid by the States, supplemented by an EU per diem. The result was that in Afghanistan the latter group received less pay than the former. They would also have been paid more if engaged on NATO operations. A further difficulty would be experienced in Kosovo where it would be very advantageous to transfer police personnel experienced in the terrain from the UN operation (UNMIK) to the EU mission (EULEX). "However, because of the system, those who accept the move from UNMIK employment to EU employment under EULEX will also face a decrease in their revenue because of the tight budgetary rules". This was the contrary of the image that the EU had as a big spender.

163.  Professor Kaldor commented that "We have in Europe 1.8 million people under arms and only about ten per cent are capable of being deployed into crisis zones" (Q 93). Dr Giegerich said that the EU had on paper a pool of some 12,000 civilian personnel for civilian crisis management missions. "When the EU led the mission in Kosovo the planning team put out a call for 1,375 vacancies. They got 1,200 applications from seconded personnel out of this pool of 12,000, less than one application per position, which already demonstrates that this issue of availability is a civilian and a military issue". There was clearly not enough usable capability in either civilian or military areas. Though the military tended to take the headlines, the civilian side was absolutely crucial (Q 109).

164.  Professor Heisbourg (International Institute of Strategic Studies) thought that the European goal of collectively providing 60,000 soldiers within a period of months for a duration of a year or more in demanding circumstances had disappeared. Instead the EU had moved to the battle group concept. "The 1,500 guys … small groups of soldiers, moving very quickly, acting decisively and then going home … but if we are facing a major contingency which threatens our livelihood and our security such as a major war driven by [for example] … Iran's nuclear ambition, the convergence of the numerous conflicts in the Middle East if we have a major contingency in or around the Persian Gulf, surely a few battle groups will not be an adequate response, and it is quite important for us, if we are thinking strategically and not simply about describing visions, to come back to the 60,000 figure, which is quite realistic" (Q 140).

Lessons learned

165.  Lieutenant-General Leakey thought that the operation of missions could be assisted by an overarching document on lessons learned. Separate lessons learned processes existed on both the military and civilian sides. For example, following a recent very demanding operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the military had rewritten some seven of its overarching concepts of how it carried out operations (Q 344). He added, however, that there had been difficulties in trying to get the lessons agreed frankly between Member States (Q 346).

166.  Major-General Messervy-Whiting thought that the update of the ESS would have to take account of lessons learnt from operations on the ground. He was not sure, however, to what extent there would be anything particularly useful going back into the Strategy from the EU's existing lessons learnt process. So far they tended to be fairly obvious points. "Most of the messages about the need for better co-ordination, the need for a better capacity for advanced planning, the need for Member States to act where there is an agreement to act more quickly are already tagged in the Strategy". He described a two-level lessons learnt process: "the top-level process which is signed up to by all the Member States politically, which tends to be fairly bland, because no-one wants to admit that everything has not gone correctly, and there is the practitioners' lessons learnt list". The military concept document did get amended and lessons were fed back from the practitioner's point of view (QQ 60, 65).

167.  In Nick Witney's view, the EU was very bad at learning lessons, though they might have a process. This was actually a criticism of the Member States. "Operations take place, they are finished and no-one wants to trawl over what went wrong and everybody wants to declare a success and move on to the next one. It seems to me absolutely scandalous that it is only in recent months that anybody has taken any notice at all of the shortage of support helicopters, which has been the Achilles heel of every crisis management operation in the last decade—one could replicate that: lack of communications, lack of decent surveillance capabilities. If there were a decent lessons learnt process all of these would have been highlighted in some fashion years ago, but somehow that sort of retrospective judgement never arrives at the point of visibility, of people doing things about it". There was a tendency towards corporate amnesia, in response to which "the ESDP needs to become more systematic and more professional in its approach to the operations it runs" (QQ 61, 65).

168.  We are concerned that the EU still suffers from major shortfalls of key military and civilian capabilities, made available by the Member States, although there has been an improvement since the first mission was launched in 2003. The EU's capacity to take on new crisis management operations on missions abroad will soon reach its limit if more resources are not allocated. Concerns focus mainly on the lack of civilian and military personnel and assets, with a particular gap being the shortage of helicopters. Work should continue in the European Defence Agency on the development of European capabilities, in full coordination with NATO.

169.  EU civilian crisis management capacity, comprising, for example, rule-of-law experts, judges or policemen, can make an essential contribution to preventing and resolving conflicts and strengthening democracy and respect for human rights. Member States, whose responsibility it is to provide personnel for missions, should consider developing or strengthening their national programmes for deploying civilians abroad particularly in the areas of policing and justice. These should be high quality serving or recently retired personnel, rather than be those who are simply available. For serving personnel this should considered being a career enhancing, developmental period of service.

170.  The establishment of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability in 2007 has helped to improve coherence in the planning and conduct of missions. Work on improving civilian crisis management should be continued as part of the implementation of the ESS.

171.  Member States should consider how to make the pay received by seconded personnel more equitable in comparison with the pay of UN and NATO personnel operating in the same theatre. We welcome the existence of the system of sharing common costs of EU missions with defence implications (Athena mechanism).

172.  Member States should be encouraged to address the capability shortfalls which have been identified by the EU. Member States should also be urged not to impose national caveats, or conditions, on the deployment of troops to ensure that they can fulfil their commitment to the EU and operate under agreed rules of engagement.

173.  The world-wide search for helicopters which are suitable for use during EU missions, for example for lift, should continue and contributions from non-EU countries should be welcomed, on a no-cost to the EU basis if possible. The contribution of Russian helicopters for Chad is welcome.

174.  We welcome the fact that the EU has a "lessons learned" process to take stock of the outcome of EU missions but believe that it can be improved. There would be merit in compiling an overarching document with lessons for the future based on the EU's past experience of missions. Member States should be encouraged to be as frank as possible about mistakes and failures as well as successes for improvements to be made.

MORE COHERENT

175.  A number of witnesses raised the question of coherence in the EU's actions and often linked it to discussion of the provisions of Lisbon Treaty whose fate is currently in suspense. The Lisbon Treaty would create the position of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, supported by a new European External Action Service. It also contains provisions on the strengthening of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)[21].

176.  Two issues were raised: coherence in practical co-operation and co-ordination between the various EU institutions and, importantly, the need for an overall coherent policy to guide those institutions. In general, our witnesses had seen some improvement in both, but considered that further improvement was needed in order to make the EU more effective.

177.  As far as the review itself was concerned, Dr Solana told us that "the Commission has demanded that I co-operate with the Commission and we are doing that." He had given some information to the European Parliament, a policy he would try to maintain although he did not think it would be a good idea to have big debates in the European Parliament to get the Strategy approved (Q 218).

178.  Dr Solana told us that the phrase in the Security Strategy which called on the EU to be more "active, capable and coherent" related also to the Lisbon Treaty, even if it had not at that time been conceived. He did not doubt that it would be easier to fulfil this call if the Treaty were to be ratified and implemented (Q 231). With the Treaty, co-operation among institutions would be much better. When dealing with fragile states, for example, development, security elements, economic policy and trade should all be packaged together (Q 233). In the Lisbon Treaty "structured co-operation[22] … is about capabilities … if you want to belong you have to contribute" (Q 225).

179.  Robert Cooper (Director-General, Politico-Military Affairs in the Council Secretariat) thought that: "The big challenge is coherence and that is connected to the [Lisbon] Treaty on the one hand, and it is also connected to a bit more. I ask myself sometimes if all of our activity really fits into a kind of coherent political objective or not" (Q 288). It was a "day-to-day struggle to ensure that one has a viable political strategy surrounding all of the things that you do" (Q 291). Again, the Lisbon Treaty would have been helpful in the way Europe handled its relations with other states such as China and Russia because it made much clearer who is in charge of putting forward proposals with one person clearly in charge (Q 296).

180.  Professor Heisbourg (International Institute of Strategic Studies) spoke of the importance of the EU's knowing what it was trying to do. The "headline goals" (goals to be achieved for crisis management capability) adopted as a result of the St Malo agreements between the UK and France and on the European scale at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 had disappeared, and "the biggest strategic sin one can commit is to forget what one is trying to do" (QQ 140, 141). He pointed out that, although the threat of global terrorism was well known at the time the ESS was drafted, it "hardly says anything about homeland security and defence of the Union" (Q 130).

181.  Dr Giegerich, on the other hand, did not think that the Lisbon Treaty would make the problems of coherence go away. "It is actually very ambiguous in terms of the institutional set-up, of responsibilities between individuals with overlapping competencies and very strong positions" (Q 106). Professor Bailes thought that , if one looked at interventions abroad more in terms of self-interest, and said what changes were wanted from Europe's point of view, it would be seen that those changes could only in a small part, if at all, be achieved by the use of European military force. "We should be moving towards more intervention in the world but less military intervention, considering how all the other very considerable resources of the EU—the economic/financial influence, the development aid, the technology—are going to be deployed to change situations abroad in the way that is good both for people there and for ourselves" (Q 139).

182.  Dan Smith thought that the "big division [lay] between … the Council of Ministers and the European Commission where you do not just get inter-departmental rivalry, you get something deeper and bigger than that—the gulf has been a bigger one to cross." It was impressive that in the last two years he had seen increasingly conscious efforts to cross the divide, partly with the idea of the External Action Service. As and when this was created, he did not see that it need be done "with the same sort of separated institutional structure internally that the Member States are used to" (QQ 26, 30).

183.  Mr Smith thought that there had been in the Commission's work "resistance to the bringing in of security notions and this is also a political resistance which has been straightforwardly expressed and argued through in the European Parliament in the process of shaping the financial perspectives for the current period." However, the ESS helped to guide the work of the parts of the Commission dealing with security and conflict prevention (Q 28).

184.  Professor Kaldor thought that a problem lay in involving the Commission in the planning of missions. The lack of coherence of the whole EU would be partly, but not completely, solved by the Lisbon Treaty. The implementation of the European Action Service would be very important. It should be different from the traditional diplomatic service. The EAS "should be monitoring … human rights and law and order … a forum of access of local people to the EU … much more a diplomacy between peoples or citizens" (Q 120).

185.  Major-General Messervy-Whiting of Birmingham University thought that: "Even with the Lisbon Treaty, actually getting the various bits of the Brussels machinery to … work together efficiently, singing off the same hymn sheet, is the toughest nut of all, even though the Lisbon Treaty will give them the framework with which to do that" (Q 66). The strategy touched adequately on the mix of civilian and military capabilities but the most difficult problem was to get the military and the civilian, the Commission and the Council, and the other parts of the organisation working together efficiently (Q 76).

186.  The question of coherence also encompasses the problem of when, where and why the EU should intervene in situations. Dr Giegerich raised the question of the lack of implementation in protecting human rights and "how one can allow gross violations to stand and not intervene … what is absent … is on the one hand criteria for intervention, which the European Security Strategy does not provide, the when, where and why. The 'why' it does provide but not in any specific sense" (Q 118).

187.  Professor Kaldor thought the EU needed a legal framework for missions. There were "huge problems of the competencies of international humanitarian law, human rights law, the domestic laws of individual Member States, the rules of engagement, the laws of countries where you are operating". The EU could develop with a group of lawyers a legal framework which guided the kind of activities that it was going to engage in, including criteria for "responsibility to protect" (Q 121).

188.  The intergovernmental nature of EU foreign policy makes coherence unavoidably harder to achieve and there is an unavoidable trade-off between coherence and capability: Member States acting independently would be more coherent but less capable. Dan Smith, Secretary-General of International Alert, pointed out that the EU was often held back by the Member States who had to reach a compromise between their different interests on complex and difficult issues. The higher the profile of the issue, the poorer EU coherence looked (Q 31).

189.  Our witnesses agreed that part of "coherence" consisted of working with other organisations outside the EU: "... one of the aspects of coherence … is not just a plea for an end of institutional turf warfare in Brussels, it is a plea for the Member States to work more closely together, it acknowledges the need to work effectively with partners in other multinational institutions and other centres of power …" (Nick Witney, Q 77).

190.  The establishment of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC)[23] in 2007 was considered to have assisted the coordination of operations in the field. Lieutenant-General Leakey, Director-General of the EU Military Staff in the Council Secretariat, believed that coherence had improved over the past five years: "we are getting the idea but there is a long, long way to go" (Q 306). On arriving in Brussels he had found "compartments of people doing their own thing, turf wars and egos … in Brussels in the last 16 months it has changed out of all recognition … the CPCC has been set up and we have people working collaboratively". When he had visited Chad the Commission had gone with him and joint missions were now running (Q 333).

191.  Kees Klompenhouwer, Director of Civilian ESDP Operations, thought that the organisation of civilian missions was also improving. "We are going from improvising as we go along to organising what we are doing by the establishment of the CPCC which is able to conduct operations and support operations in the field. We can still improve on planning … The key to this is civ-civ co-operation … between the civilian sides. Civ-mil is relatively unproblematic …" The methodology used was similar but "one challenge is working with the Commission, which is very jealous of its prerogatives" (Q 334). At the working level however people realised that when missions did not work due to internal differences, everyone's reputations were affected—Member States, Commission and Council. While respecting the competences of others, everyone had an interest in seeking improvements in systems for bureaucratic management, financial controls, procurement rules and framework contracts.

192.  Nick Witney told us: "When we conduct military operations run from one of seven possible alternative locations across Europe and civil operations run from an entirely different place within Brussels, you find at the very heart of direction of interventions complete separation between civil and military." The Lisbon Treaty seemed to address the problem of trying to ensure that the combined efforts of Member States marched more coherently in step in aid and trade policies and not just in the military and diplomatic sides fields (Q 66).

193.  Dan Smith felt however that there was still a long way to go on capability, in particular "in the institutions … there is still more to do. There is a lot of stovepipe thinking." Attention particularly needed to be given to detail (QQ 25-27). "However, while the EU remains ... an alliance—albeit a very close one—of sovereign states, there is always going to be a difference between what the EU is capable of doing and what a single state of that population and wealth would be capable of doing" (Q 34).

194.  For the former Europe Minister, Jim Murphy, political will and co-operation were required: "We can achieve an awful lot more by co-operating with other European nations that we could ever do by ourselves. That is the important part of the Strategy that in the past I do not think we have made enough of and, hopefully, if we can agree a comprehensive Strategy, it is a very strong case for Europe in and of itself to be a world player" (Q 375).

195.  The question of coherence will need to be addressed seriously with or without the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty if the effectiveness of the EU's actions in the security field is not to fall far short of its aspirations.


21   House of Lords EU Committee report: "The Treaty of Lisbon: an impact assessment", 10th report of session 2007-08, HL paper 62. Back

22   The Lisbon Treaty introduces a new provision allowing for a voluntary form of institutionalised cooperation between EU Member States called Permanent Structured Cooperation. Its exclusive focus is the development of the military capabilities of the Member States so as to improve the EU's ability to undertake crisis management missions.  Back

23   The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) plans and conducts civilian European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) operations. It works under the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee to provide assistance and advice to the Secretary General/High Representative (currently Dr Javier Solana), the Presidency and the relevant EU Council bodies and to direct, coordinate, advise, support, supervise and review civilian ESDP operations. The CPCC works in close cooperation with the European Commission. Source, http://consilium.europa.eu  Back


 
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