CHAPTER 6: Conclusions and Recommendations
Chapter 1: The Security Strategy
The 2003 Strategy
196. The European Security Strategy represents
the collective thinking of Member States on the challenges and
security threats facing them at the beginning of the 21st
century, as perceived in 2003. The ESS is not a strategy in the
military sense of prescribing detailed actions and set timelines.
However, it does helpfully define a common approach to the main
security challenges and sets three important EU security objectives:
addressing the threats, building security in the EU's neighbourhood
and working with other states and organisations to achieve "effective
multilateralism" (paragraph 11).
197. The 2003 European Security Strategy is a
clearly drafted and concise document. We attach importance to
any revised Strategy not being significantly longer. In consultation
with its EU partners, we believe that the Government should seek
a limited number of changes to the 2003 European Security Strategy,
in order to introduce or strengthen references to climate change,
the links between security and development, energy security, human
security and the "responsibility to protect", and multilateral
nuclear disarmament. Other issues, including implementation and
operational lessons, could be covered in a separate document to
be appended to the revised Strategy (paragraph 18).
198. Concepts of security range from the traditional
defence against armed attack from a hostile power, to more recent
concepts, such as human security, which focuses on the individual.
Both types of concept are relevant to European security and should
be taken into account in the review. The August 2008 conflict
in Georgia has, for example, reminded Europeans of the continuing
existence of military threats while events in Afghanistan have
shown the importance of human security. But we would caution against
an approach which extends the concept of human security to almost
any form of human activity; and also against any attempt to establish
a hierarchy between state security and human security (paragraph
31).
199. We consider that developments in the past
five years on the global scene and the events in Georgia in August
2008 make a review timely, while recognising that the December
2008 date for the presentation of the review is too early for
the implications for transatlantic relations of the US election
to have been absorbed and for the future of the Lisbon Treaty
to have been resolved (paragraph 35).
200. The ESS should in future be reviewed on
a regular basis, normally every five years (paragraph 36).
Chapter 2: The Strategy's Profile and Influence
The Strategy's influence on policy-making
201. The European Security Strategy is used extensively
and influences policy-making in the EU institutions, especially
in the parts of the Council and Commission dealing with security
issues. To build on this achievement, we would encourage the Council
and Commission services to take steps to heighten awareness of
the Strategy among staff dealing primarily with other policy areas,
especially trade and development, justice and home affairs, energy
and the environment. We believe that in future the Commission
should make more use of the Strategy as a point of reference in
proposals it puts forward, including in its Annual Policy Strategy
and, where appropriate, Country Strategy Papers which the Commission
drafts as part of its development cooperation policy (paragraph
43).
202. The European Security Strategy represents
a common European analysis and Member States should therefore
use it as a point of reference although we recognise that it is
likely to continue to have a highly varying degree of influence
on policy-making in the Member States. We support the Government's
efforts to influence the outcome of the current review and encourage
them to raise awareness of the Strategy within relevant Departments,
including MOD, FCO, DFID and BERR, including through its incorporation
into staff training modules (paragraph 44).
Is there a need to increase public awareness of
the Strategy?
203. Awareness of the ESS among the general publics
in the EU is low and interest is likely to remain at that level
unless a conscious effort is made to remedy this and to connect
the Strategy to developments which affect citizens' everyday lives.
We believe that, once the review has been completed, the European
institutions and the governments of Member States should make
explaining its relevance an important part of their public diplomacy;
and that HMG should do this in the UK. We also recommend that
any future review of the Strategy should be preceded by a more
systematic consultation of civil society institutions than has
been the case on this occasion (paragraph 49).
Chapter 3: Changes in the Security Environment
Since 2003
The changing security environment since 2003
204. The coherence between the EU's internal
and external security activities needs strengthening as coordination
between the EU's external policies and home affairs policies was
identified as an area of weakness in evidence to the Committee.
We believe this should be covered in the review of the Security
Strategy (paragraph 57).
Climate change and its implications for international
security
205. The most important development since 2003
is that the EU has become more aware of the current and potential
effects of climate change. This is a crucial concern because developing
countries will be among those hit hardest by the consequences
of climate change but have the least ability to cope and adapt,
thereby potentially impacting on competition for natural resources,
conflicts and international security. We believe that the review
should recognise this (paragraph 69).
206. These security implications strengthen the
case for the UK and the EU to play a leading role in addressing
climate change, which is a fundamental challenge of our times.
Its relevance as a threat multiplier and an exacerbating factor
of human insecurity and conflict means it is one of the main issues
which should be given significant attention at the December European
Council (paragraph 70).
207. Further analysis and research is required
to identify with a greater degree of precision the exact implications
of climate change for international and human security, including
for conflict and migration dynamics. These are likely to vary
considerably in different regions of the world, and we therefore
strongly support the work currently underway by Dr Solana
and Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner on regional analysis which is
the place for further development of these issues (paragraph 71).
208. We are concerned that the EU has not yet
paid enough attention to the importance of adaptation in developing
countries. Without undermining the ambition of its mitigation
objectives, the EU should place a greater emphasis on meeting
this challenge, including by stepping up the budgetary resources
available for this end. Technology transfer to these countries
will also play an important role (paragraph 72).
Development and security
209. The increasing importance of the links between
security and development should be taken into account in the review
of the European Security Strategy. Achieving human security and
resolving conflicts in developing countries make a direct contribution
to the security of the EU and to addressing global challenges
ranging from pandemics to migration and environmental degradation
(paragraph 83).
210. An important part of this agenda is tackling
the root causes of conflict and radicalisation, including poverty,
inequality, the perception of injustice and marginalisation, poor
governance and human rights abuses. The development assistance
of the EU should be conflict-sensitive and contribute to peace-building
and conflict prevention in fragile states (paragraph 84).
211. It is in the EU's interests to help prevent
violent conflict and security threats from developing. An emphasis
on prevention can save lives and often only costs a fraction of
the cost of international intervention once a crisis has developed.
Greater attention and resources should be devoted to this objective
(paragraph 85).
Energy Security
212. Energy Security is an increasingly important
challenge for the EU, and should be fully addressed in the review
of the European Security Strategy. Concerns have been heightened
by the EU's dependence on Russian oil and gas imports which we
highlighted in our report in May 2008 on the EU and Russia. Greater
diversification of energy sources and routes, as well as solidarity
between the Member States in their external energy relationships,
should be identified as key objectives of EU security policy (paragraph
92).
The "Responsibility to Protect"
213. The "Responsibility to Protect",
as agreed at the UN summit in 2005, reflects a major shift in
the international community's thinking since the European Security
Strategy was adopted in 2003 and it should be taken into account
in the review of the European Security Strategy. We believe that
the EU should be ready to play a leading role in attempts to put
this concept into operation; and should endeavour to reduce the
suspicion felt towards it by many developing countries. The review
should also underline the fact that the concept refers to the
use of force only as a last resort and should put more emphasis
on its use as a preventive tool (paragraph 97).
Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament
214. The fundamental interest that the EU has
in the revival of negotiations on multilateral nuclear disarmament
should figure prominently in the review of the European Security
Strategy. We believe that the EU will need to discuss in depth
the multilateral nuclear disarmament agenda ahead of the 2010
NPT Review Conference. We strongly encourage the Government to
work towards a consensus on a common EU approach. We recommend
that the EU maintain an intensive dialogue with the US administration
and the new US president so as to capitalise on the recent initiatives
on both sides of the Atlantic in favour of significant progress
on this issue (paragraph 104).
Chapter 4: The Impact on the Strategic Objectives
EU Enlargement and the European Neighbourhood
Policy
215. The substantial enlargement of the EU in
2004 and 2007 came after the adoption of the 2003 Security Strategy
which placed considerable emphasis on accession as an integral
part of assuring the EU's security within the European region.
This consideration remains as valid now as it was then (paragraph
113).
216. The potential for membership of the EU acts
as a strong incentive to candidate countries to strengthen their
democracy and the market economy. The EU's enlargement process
therefore contributes to European security by building areas of
stability and good government on Europe's borders. The continued
enlargement of the EU should not be dependent upon entry into
force of the Lisbon Treaty (paragraph 114).
217. We welcome the British Government's support
for giving Ukraine an EU accession perspective (paragraph 115).
218. Chapter 2 of the ESS recognises the European
interest in countries on its borders being well-governed. We agree
with this aim, a key tool in which is the European Neighbourhood
Policy for nations who are not, or not yet, potential candidate
members. The ENP plays an important role in constructing security
and stability in the EU's wider neighbourhood and sufficient resources
should be allocated to enable it to be implemented effectively.
Key subjects for action, both political and economic, will be
the internal stability and economic well-being of the individual
countries, migration and cooperation to combat terrorism (paragraph
116).
Effective multilateralism
219. Effective multilateralism is a key pillar
of the EU's security strategy. In particular, the EU's commitment
to international law and a rules-based international system contributes
to global peace and stability, and gives it influence and credibility
as a reliable partner. The challenge now is to continue to build
stronger international institutions, including the United Nations
and the world's financial and trade systems (paragraph 120).
Working with partners: the US
220. The EU's most important bilateral relationship
is that with the USA. The inauguration of the new president in
the US presents the EU with an opportunity to intensify the transatlantic
dialogue on security strategy (paragraph 127).
221. In the area of traditional defence, the
ESS recognises that the United States has played a critical role
in European security, in particular through NATO. We welcome the
expressed willingness of the French President to work more closely
with the NATO structures. The objectives of the EU and NATO are
different but we commend efforts by both organisations to align
their strategic concepts as far as possible. Consideration should
now be given to developing areas of cooperation with NATO, particularly
as the majority of EU states belong to NATO (paragraph 128).
Working with new partners: Russia and China
222. Recent events in Georgia have underlined
the importance of Russia for European security. We believe that
the document to be adopted by the December European Council should
refer to the challenge that Russia presents both as a partner
and a source of risk and instability (paragraph 133).
223. Russia's future actions will depend partly
on the response of the EU and its partners, and the rest of the
world. The actions of the EU in sending an observer mission to
Georgia and appointing a Special Representative over the summer
of 2008 showed that the EU can act quickly when the political
will to act is there. A continuing firm stance on the principles
of sovereignty and territorial integrity will be needed, together
with dialogue and sensitivity to Russia's genuine concerns. The
review of the European Security Strategy should address these
issues (paragraph 134).
Working with other: international and regional
organisations
224. Regional institutions are also essential
in helping to maintain peace and stability, and the EU should
continue to work closely with organisations where Member States
have membership, such as NATO, the OSCE and the Council of Europe.
In addition, the EU should continue to build the relationship
with the African Union, ASEAN and others, helping to build up
the capacity of African peace and security institutions, including
the early warning, dispute resolution and peacekeeping capacities
of African regional and sub-regional organisations (paragraph
140).
Chapter 5: Implementation: Is the EU More Active,
Capable and Coherent?
Implementation
225. Implementation of the Security Strategy
is a key area on which the EU should focus its efforts. This could
be achieved through the adoption of action plans or sub-strategies
to take implementation forward. These action plans or sub-strategies
should be linked to the overall approach to security set out in
the Strategy, rather than incorporated into the existing document
(paragraph 146).
More Capable
226. We are concerned that the EU still suffers
from major shortfalls of key military and civilian capabilities,
made available by the Member States, although there has been an
improvement since the first mission was launched in 2003. The
EU's capacity to take on new crisis management operations on missions
abroad will soon reach its limit if more resources are not allocated.
Concerns focus mainly on the lack of civilian and military personnel
and assets, with a particular gap being the shortage of helicopters.
Work should continue in the European Defence Agency on the development
of European capabilities, in full coordination with NATO (paragraph
168).
227. EU civilian crisis management capacity,
comprising, for example, rule-of-law experts, judges or policemen,
can make an essential contribution to preventing and resolving
conflicts and strengthening democracy and respect for human rights.
Member States, whose responsibility it is to provide personnel
for missions, should consider developing or strengthening their
national programmes for deploying civilians abroad particularly
in the areas of policing and justice. These should be high quality
serving or recently retired personnel, rather than be those who
are simply available. For serving personnel this should considered
being a career enhancing, developmental period of service (paragraph
169).
228. The establishment of the Civilian Planning
and Conduct Capability in 2007 has helped to improve coherence
in the planning and conduct of missions. Work on improving civilian
crisis management should be continued as part of the implementation
of the ESS (paragraph 170).
229. Member States should consider how to make
the pay received by seconded personnel more equitable in comparison
with the pay of UN and NATO personnel operating in the same theatre.
We welcome the existence of the system of sharing common costs
of EU missions with defence implications (Athena mechanism) (paragraph
171).
230. Member States should be encouraged to address
the capability shortfalls which have been identified by the EU.
Member States should also be urged not to impose national caveats,
or conditions, on the deployment of troops to ensure that they
can fulfil their commitment to the EU and operate under agreed
rules of engagement (paragraph 172).
231. The world-wide search for helicopters which
are suitable for use during EU missions, for example for lift,
should continue and contributions from non-EU countries should
be welcomed, on a no-cost to the EU basis if possible. The contribution
of Russian helicopters for Chad is welcome (paragraph 173).
232. We welcome the fact that the EU has a "lessons
learned" process to take stock of the outcome of EU missions
but believe that it can be improved. There would be merit in compiling
an overarching document with lessons for the future based on the
EU's past experience of missions. Member States should be encouraged
to be as frank as possible about mistakes and failures as well
as successes for improvements to be made (paragraph 174).
More coherent
233. The question of coherence will need to be
addressed seriously with or without the entry into force of the
Lisbon Treaty if the effectiveness of the EU's actions in the
security field is not to fall far short of its aspirations (paragraph
195).
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