Memorandum by Mr Gareth Thomas MP, Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State, Department for International Development
EUROPEAN SECURITY
STRATEGY
1. Thank you for your letter of 23 May,
requesting that DFID comment on the European Security Strategy
from an international development viewpoint. You asked for our
views in particular on the extent to which the Security Strategy
should place greater emphasis on the links between climate change
and security. You also asked whether we agree with the analysis
and recommendations set out in the report by the EU High Representative
Javier Solana and Benita Ferrero-Waldner, his counterpart in the
Commission, on the impact of climate change on international security.
2. You have already received a submission
on the European Security Strategy from Jim Murphy, Minister for
Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. We agree with content
of that letter, particularly with the need to acknowledge more
fully the links between development and security (para 8). Our
thoughts on these linkages are set out in the UK National Security
Strategy and in the DFID policy papers on Security and Development
and on Conflict (all attached).
3. We therefore intend to focus this submission
on the two specific questions that you asked:
— To what extent should the European
Security Strategy place more emphasis on the links between climate
change and security?
— Does DFID agree with the analysis
and recommendations set out in the [Solana] report?
DFID's view on climate change, conflict and security
4. DFID is interested in the relationship
between climate change and conflict primarily from the perspective
of how it affects poor people in developing countries. The UK
National Security Strategy and the European Security Strategy
outline how conflict and insecurity in developing countries can
impact on UK and EU security respectively.
5. Climate change is already having, and
will continue to have, significant physical impacts in developing
countries, including changes in temperatures, changes in rainfall
(resulting in increased risk of both droughts and flooding), the
melting of glaciers and ice-caps, sea level rises, and an increase
in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events.
6. All of these physical changes that are
consequences of climate change will have significant and detrimental
effects on the human security of many millions of poor people.
Sudden-onset natural disasters will create humanitarian needs.
Changes in climate and rainfall will alter the viability of certain
livelihoods, and habitability of certain areas. The vulnerabilities
of all, but of the poor in particular, will increase.
7. Developing countries also tend to have
limited adaptive capacity in their societies and economies, which
often rely heavily on natural resources. This exacerbates their
vulnerability and the potential impact of climate change on human
security.
8. The consequences of climate change may
also increase the risk or severity of violent conflict, by influencing
or exacerbating pre-existing social and political tensions. This
is most likely to occur in fragile states or areas already at
risk of conflict. In particular, the consequences of climate change
may contribute to:
— increased political and economic
instability;
— increased migration and urbanisation;
— increased competition over access
to resources such as water and land; and
— changes in the viability of livelihoods
eg pastoralists.
9. We therefore see climate change primarily
as a factor that exacerbates conflict (a "threat multiplier"
to use the language of the Solana report) eg by aggravating existing
tensions and fragility, or by being an additional stress factor
on top of existing political and social exclusion. The risk of
climate change exacerbating conflict is greatest where governance
structures and mechanisms for handling conflict constructively
are weakest.
10. It is also important to note that some
physical changes as a result of climate change may provide opportunities
for cooperation that transcend conflict lines, for example trans-boundary
water resource management.
The Solana report "Climate change and international
security"
11. We agree with the broad thrust of the
analysis in the Solana report. We would also underline the following:
(a) The link between climate change and conflict/insecurity
is indirect. Any conflict normally has multiple causes and drivers.
It is the consequences of climate change that influence social,
political and conflict dynamics, and we would emphasise the "threat
multiplier" understanding of the relationship between climate
change and conflict—we do not believe any conflicts are
currently driven by climate change alone.
(b) Governance and conflict management structures
(at a local, national, regional and international level) are key
intervening variables. Thus the consequences of climate change
may lead to increased conflict depending on the ability of people
and institutions to adapt, manage change peacefully, and mediate
competing needs, interests and visions of the future.
(c) Whilst we agree that climate change is likely
to have an impact on migration flows, the exact dynamics of this
migration are unclear. Movement within national borders is by
far the most significant form of migration for the poorest. It
is therefore important to consider the impact of potential migration
flows on developing countries as well as on the EU.
12. We believe that the recommendations
in the Solana paper for the EU could be further strengthened.
We would emphasise the need for:
(a) The EU to push for an ambitious deal in the
UNFCCC negotiations on climate change, both on mitigating the
negative effects and on adaptation to current and future climate
change.
(b) The EU to support developing countries to
adapt to the effects of climate change.
(c) The need for the international system to
be modified to tackle the new challenge of climate change.
(d) Investment in new technologies for both clean
energy and adaptation, in order to enable countries to pursue
low carbon and climate resilient development paths.
(e) Climate change considerations to be integrated
into the EU's international development and humanitarian activities,
including a greater emphasis on disaster risk reduction.
Should the ESS place greater emphasis on the links
between climate change and security?
13. The ESS's analysis of the dynamics around
climate change and security could be a lot more sophisticated
than it currently is, moving beyond a focus purely on competition
over natural resources. Whilst the strategy mentions global warming
in the context of global challenges, it does not follow through
the implications of this challenge in other sections. It could
examine many of the issues laid out above in DFID thinking on
this issue, and in the Solana report. It could helpfully consider
the wider human security aspects of climate change, and how climate
change affects existing conflicts and tensions.
14. However, all of these issues require
further detailed analysis. In particular, we need to understand
better how specific [projected] climatic changes may influence
particular conflict dynamics at a local or regional level. Therefore
the Solana report and other such papers should be considered as
only the start of our thinking on this subject.
15. From a development perspective a greater
emphasis on climate change in the ESS would consider it as a cross-cutting
issue that impacts on the causes and drivers of current conflicts.
It is therefore important for the ESS to examine the potential
of climate change to be an aggravating factor in regional conflicts
and state failure (both already identified as key threats in the
ESS).
16. Climate change is also likely to put
considerable pressure on multilateral (and bilateral) international
relations. Incentives for countries to take mitigation actions
vary enormously (developed v developing countries, countries who
will actually fare better under a warmer climate, etc). These
tensions will be very difficult to manage and may further undermine
the capacity of multilateral organisations to take collective
action to improve international security (not only on climate
change issues).
17. We would like to see climate change
mentioned in several sections of the strategy where it does not
currently figure. These include:
(a) Addressing the threats. Developing ambitious
mitigation strategies, sound adaptation programmes, and building
local conflict management capacity will be crucial to prevent
and address instability that may arise from the consequences of
climate change.
(b) Building security in our neighbourhood. Several
countries in the near neighbourhood, particularly in North Africa
and the Middle East, are especially vulnerable to the effects
on climate change and potential linked instability.
(c) International order: There should be an increased
focus here on the need to strengthen existing institutions to
promote development and prosperity in the face of climate change
in order to avoid future security threats. The international system
also has an important role to play, through the UNFCCC negotiations
and other institutions in tackling climate change through mitigation
and in supporting adaptation.
(d) Policy implications for Europe. In order
to properly integrate climate change considerations into the strategy
this section should include reference to the UNFCCC negotiations
and the need for an ambitious deal on both mitigation and adaptation.
It should also emphasise the need to support low carbon and climate
resilient development paths for developing countries through integration
into EU development and humanitarian policy.
Policy responses
18. DFID is particularly interested in the
recommendations once "cooperation with third countries"
in the Solana paper. DFID and the UK government are already working
in many of these areas.
19. The single most important thing that
can be done to support developing countries face the challenge
of climate change and linked security concerns, is to prevent
dangerous climate change occurring. Successful mitigation efforts,
resulting from an ambitious global deal are crucial to limiting
the severest impacts of climate change and therefore to preventing
conflict and instability. A fair deal for poor people and developing
countries will also be crucial in managing tensions in the international
governance systems.
20. DFID is developing programmes to support
adaptation measures in developing countries. Both the UK and EU
should continue to strengthen adaptation mechanisms and ensure
that these are conflict sensitive (ie that they understand and
anticipate their impact on conflict dynamics). Good adaptation
programmes that are participatory, consultative and involve a
broad range of people in planning for their own future make an
important contribution to conflict prevention and peacebuilding.
21. We agree that we should seek to better
understand the security implications of climate change. The UK
government is already undertaking various pieces of analytical
work in this regard, including work with the Met Office's Hadley
Centre, drawing upon their climate science expertise. It is also
important that the UK and EU support affected countries' ability
to develop their own analysis of the physical and social impact
of climate change, and thus to develop appropriate and sustainable
policy responses.
22. It is also important to note that continued
support to governance and conflict management mechanisms at all
levels (local, national, regional, and international) is the best
way to prevent and resolve conflict exacerbated by climate change.
Collectively, we already know a lot about what works best for
managing conflict in many relevant areas such as water management,
pastoralism, and natural resources governance. Future work needs
to draw upon existing knowledge and good practice.
1 July 2008
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